

**ECONOMIC AND MILITARY COOPERATION WITH NATIONS
IN THE GENERAL AREA OF THE MIDDLE EAST**

HEARINGS
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
EIGHTY-FIFTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION

ON
H. J. Res. 117

**A JOINT RESOLUTION TO AUTHORIZE THE PRESIDENT TO
UNDERTAKE ECONOMIC AND MILITARY COOPERATION
WITH NATIONS IN THE GENERAL AREA OF THE MIDDLE
EAST IN ORDER TO ASSIST IN THE STRENGTHENING
AND DEFENSE OF THEIR INDEPENDENCE**

JANUARY 7, 8, 9, 10, 15, 16, 17, AND 22, 1957

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ECONOMIC AND MILITARY COOPERATION WITH NATIONS IN THE GENERAL AREA OF THE MIDDLE EAST

MONDAY, JANUARY 7, 1957

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
Washington, D. C.

The committee met at 10:30 a. m., in room 1301, New House Office Building, Hon. Thomas S. Gordon (chairman) presiding.

Chairman GORDON. Ladies and gentlemen and colleagues, the committee is meeting this morning to hear the Secretary of State, Hon. John Foster Dulles, testify in support of House Joint Resolution 117. (H. J. Res. 117 is as follows:)

[H. J. Res. 117, 85th Cong., 1st sess.]

JOINT RESOLUTION To authorize the President to undertake economic and military cooperation with nations in the general area of the Middle East in order to assist in the strengthening and defense of their independence.

Whereas a primary purpose of the United States in its relations with all other nations is to develop and sustain a just and enduring peace for all, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations; and

Whereas the peace of the world and the security of the United States are endangered as long as international communism and the nations it controls seek, by threat of military action, use of economic pressure, internal subversion, or other means, to attempt to bring under their domination peoples now free and independent; and

Whereas such danger now exists in the general area of the Middle East: Therefore be it

Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That the President be and hereby is authorized to cooperate with and assist any nation or group of nations in the general area of the Middle East in the development of economic strength dedicated to the maintenance of national independence.

SEC. 2. The President is authorized to undertake, in the general area of the Middle East, military assistance programs with any nation or group of nations of that area desiring such assistance. Furthermore, he is authorized to employ the Armed Forces of the United States as he deems necessary to secure and protect the territorial integrity and political independence of any such nation or group of nations requesting such aid against overt armed aggression from any nation controlled by international communism: *Provided*, That such employment shall be consonant with the treaty obligations of the United States and with the Charter of the United Nations and actions and recommendations of the United Nations; and, as specified in article 51 of the United Nations Charter, measures pursuant thereto shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security.

SEC. 3. The President is hereby authorized, when he determines that such use is important to the security of the United States, to use for the purposes of this joint resolution, without regard to the provisions of any other law or regulation, not to exceed \$200,000,000 from any appropriations now available for carrying out the provisions of the Mutual Security Act of 1954, as amended. This author-

ization is in addition to other existing authorizations with respect to the use of such appropriations.

SEC. 4. The President shall within the month of January of each year report to the Congress his action hereunder.

SEC. 5. This joint resolution shall expire when the President shall determine that the peace and security of the nations in the general area of the Middle East are reasonably assured by international conditions created by action of the United Nations or otherwise.

Chairman GORDON. This is a joint resolution to authorize the President to undertake economic and military cooperation with nations in the general area of the Middle East in order to assist in strengthening the defense of their independence. This joint resolution was introduced pursuant to the message delivered by the President of the United States, Saturday, January 5, at the joint session of Congress.

This is the first meeting of the Foreign Affairs Committee in the 85th Congress. As you know, in a technical sense the committee is not fully organized and we are proceeding informally.

It is my intention to conduct our hearings under the same procedures which have been followed with such success by my distinguished predecessors. When the Secretary completes his presentation, I will call on the committee members for the interrogation under the 5-minute rule which has been the standard practice in the Foreign Affairs Committee for a decade. This has been the fairest way to allocate time for questioning and I hope the members will cooperate with me in the fullest observance of this rule.

After the first round of questioning the interrogation will continue in order that any member not finishing the questioning in the first 5-minute round may be permitted another regular turn.

Mr. Secretary, I am very happy to welcome you here today and to assure you that the committee is anxious to obtain your views on this most important legislation and that your recommendations and the recommendations of the President will receive the fullest consideration.

I understand that you have a prepared statement. You may read it or proceed extemporaneously in any way you may prefer, **Mr. Secretary.**

STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN FOSTER DULLES, SECRETARY OF STATE

Secretary DULLES. **Mr. Chairman,** I am very happy indeed to have this opportunity to appear before the committee in support of the resolution which has been introduced pursuant to the request and presentation of the President of the United States made to the joint session of the Congress last Saturday.

I am appreciative of the speed with which this committee is acting, which is, in my opinion, commensurate with the necessities of the situation.

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, since World War II the United States has had to meet a series of critical situations, to meet them with strong measures backed by national unity.

In 1947, almost exactly 10 years ago, the Congress adopted a major program for military and economic aid to Greece and Turkey then menaced by Communist aggression.

In 1948 the Congress adopted the European Recovery Program, the Marshall plan, in order to sustain freedom and independence in Europe.

In 1949 we entered into the North Atlantic Treaty alliance.

In 1950 the United States fought in Korea against Communist armed aggression.

In 1953 we made a mutual defense treaty with the Republic of Korea.

In 1954 we endorsed the Caracas Declaration calling for action in this hemisphere against international communism.

In 1954 we signed the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty.

In 1955 the Congress authorized the President to employ the Armed Forces of the United States for the protection of Taiwan and Penghu and related areas, and later that year we ratified a mutual defense treaty with the Republic of China.

The dangers, as you see, have been met in different ways, as circumstances dictated. In some cases there was economic aid alone. In some cases there was both economic and military aid. In some cases we dealt only with the military aspect of the problem. Also in some cases there was action by the Congress by legislation. In some cases there was action by treaty processes. And in some cases the Executive acted with the tacit acquiescence of the Congress.

But though the needs have been different, and the constitutional methods have been different, there have been basic underlying similarities.

In each case we proceeded from the premise that, as it was put by President Truman in his Greek-Turkey message "totalitarian regimes imposed upon free peoples, by direct or indirect aggression, undermine the foundations of international peace and hence the security of the United States."

Also, all our treaty and legislative action has been designed to promote peace by making clear our position in advance, and thus to deter aggression and to prevent dangerous miscalculations by would-be aggressors.

Also, in each case, our resolve has been impressive because of the national unity which expressed it.

Also in each case where we have so acted, we have in fact preserved freedom.

Today, we concern ourselves with the Middle East. Few, if any, of us doubt that it would be a major disaster for the nations and peoples of the Middle East, and indeed for all the world, including the United States, if that area were to fall into the grip of international communism.

It would be a political disaster for the nations of the Middle East because then those nations like the European satellites would lose the national independence which they so ardently desire and which now they are beginning to exercise in full measure.

It would be an economic disaster to them. The principal economic asset of the area is petroleum and only the free nations offer an adequate market.

It would be a disaster for the peoples of the Middle East because they are deeply religious peoples and their spiritual suffering would be grievous if they were subjected to the fate of other religious peoples who have fallen under the rule of atheistic, materialistic communism.

The disaster would spread far beyond the confines of the Middle East itself. The economies of many free world countries depend directly upon natural products of the Middle East and on transporta-

tion through the Middle East. And, indirectly, the entire free world economy is concerned. Western Europe is particularly dependent upon the Middle East. The vast sacrifices the United States has made for the economic recovery of Europe and military defense of Europe would be virtually nullified if the Middle East fell under the control of international communism.

Finally, a Communist breakthrough in the Middle East would encourage the Soviet rulers to resort everywhere, at home and abroad, to more aggressive policies. It would severely weaken the pressures within the Soviet world for more liberal policies. It would be a severe blow to the struggling peoples of Hungary and Poland who are so valiantly striving for more independence. It would undo, throughout the world, much of the benefit of the earlier actions I have recalled.

For all these reasons, the United States must do whatever it properly can to assist the nations of the Middle East to maintain their independence.

The question of what to do is extraordinarily difficult. The area is much divided among itself. There is a high degree of disunity between the Arab States and Israel, a disaccord which has been heightened by the recent Israeli military action in Egypt. There is much disunity as between Arab States themselves. There is suspicion against any outside force lest it be a device to reimpose colonialism, particularly if that force comes from those which have had colonial traditions. That suspicion has been heightened by recent events which impair what have been mutual relations between the Middle East and Europe. There is the problem of the Suez Canal.

It is not feasible to find a simple answer to the question of how the United States can help to keep the area free. It is hard to help in one direction without creating suspicion in another. No single formula will solve all the problems of the Middle East. They will have to be attacked in a variety of ways, as we have steadily sought to do and will continue to do. But the evolution of events now requires us to add a new element to reinforce our other actions in the area.

After the most thorough consideration, President Eisenhower has concluded, and has recommended to the Congress, that action be taken which will first of all make unmistakably clear that it is the policy of the United States, declared by the Congress and the President, to cooperate with the nations of the Middle East to maintain their independence.

It would in the second place authorize the President to assist any nation or group of nations in that general area in the development of economic strength dedicated to the maintenance of national independence.

It would in the third place authorize the President to undertake military assistance programs with any such nation or group of nations, if they desire such assistance.

It would in the fourth place authorize the President to employ the Armed Forces of the United States to secure and protect the territorial integrity and political independence of any such nation or group of nations requesting such aid against overt armed aggression from any nation controlled by international communism.

In order to enable the President the better to carry out economic and military assistance programs, it is proposed that from funds

already appropriated by past mutual security legislation up to \$200 million may be used in the President's discretion for the Middle East, this authority to be supplementary to his present discretionary authority under existing legislation. This does not involve the authorizing or appropriating of any additional money. We seek greater flexibility in respect of funds already appropriated so that the peace ammunition already provided by the Congress can be more freely and effectively used in what has, since last June, become an area of greater need than was then anticipated. The matter of funds for future fiscal years will be dealt with later, as outlined by the Presidential message.

The authority to use the Armed Forces of the United States is designed to apply to cases of overt armed aggression coming from some nation "controlled by international communism." That phrase is taken from the Mutual Security Act. Any employment of armed force would be consonant with the United Nations Charter and the other treaty obligations of the United States, notably the provision found in the Charter of the United Nations and in our security treaties that we shall refrain in our international relations from a threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state. Furthermore, such use of force would be subject to article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations which recognizes the inherent right of collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs, but which goes on to provide that the exercise of this right of self-defense shall in no way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council to take such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security. Coordination with the United Nations would be further assured by a provision that any United States use of force shall be consonant with the actions and recommendations of the United Nations.

The proposed legislation is in the judgment of our President necessary to meet the danger.

The danger can take any one or more of several forms. There is the possibility of open armed attack. There is the possibility of subversion, a danger which is increased if there be a sense of insecurity. There is the danger that economic conditions be such as to make communism seem an attractive choice. Any program, to be adequate, must be prepared to meet all three of these dangers and any combination of them. Also, those needs cannot be met under present conditions unless we make clear now, in relation to the Middle East, what we have already made clear in relation to so many areas; namely, that armed Communist attack would have to be met, if need be, by the Armed Forces of the United States.

Is there, in fact, doubt that the United States would, sooner or later, react with force if Communist-controlled governments used open force to conquer the Middle East? Would it not then be obvious that the United States itself was in process of being imperiled? Would not action be the overwhelming will of the Congress and of the Nation? But if that be so, the time to make clear our resolve is now. Only thus can we adequately serve the cause of freedom and of peace.

You may feel, I do feel, that there is in fact no doubt as to what the Congress would do if international communism set out on a piecemeal conquest of the world by war. But until the Congress has ac-

tually spoken, there is doubt in the Middle East and there may be doubt in the Soviet Union. If those doubts persist, then the danger persists and grows. If we elect to wait and see and then decide, the waiting period will greatly heighten vulnerability to both direct attack by overwhelming force, and to indirect aggression. And we shall not have deterred the aggression.

Only if Congress quickly dispels doubts, only if it puts the stamp of its approval upon a rounded program of economic and military assistance and reassurance for the Middle East, will it have done the maximum it can do to preserve peace and freedom.

The purpose of the proposed resolution is not war. It is peace. The purpose, as in the other cases where the President and the Congress have acted together to oppose international communism, is to stop World War III before it starts.

Chairman GORDON. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

Secretary DULLES. Could I add one other word in addition to this prepared statement?

Chairman GORDON. Yes, sir.

Secretary DULLES. You will recall that the President met with a number of the congressional leaders on New Year's Day and that the next day I met here with members of this committee and other Members of the House under the chairmanship of Speaker Rayburn, and I went on and met at the Foreign Relations Committee with the Senate leadership, with members of that committee and with members from other committees. We discussed at that time informally the kind of a recommendation that the President would finally make.

I want to say that those preliminary talks have been extremely helpful and that a number of changes have been made in the requested legislation to take account of constructive views that were put forward at those meetings with Members of the Congress.

I wish to express my appreciation for those suggestions and to point out to you that they have been to a very considerable extent taken account of in the legislation which has now been introduced by you as Joint Resolution No. 117.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman GORDON. Mr. Secretary, before I start the 5-minute questioning period, I understand that my distinguished predecessor, the Honorable James P. Richards, has been appointed a special assistant to the President with rank of ambassador. Can you confirm this good news?

Secretary DULLES. I am very happy, Mr. Chairman, to confirm it. I believe that Mr. Richards will be sworn in at a ceremony to be participated in by the President at the White House around 2 o'clock.

I am particularly happy at this. I have had, as I know all of you have had, a very high regard indeed for the ability of Mr. Richards and the familiarity which he has gained of the international scene, including the Middle East, as a Member of this House and as chairman of this committee and at times as ranking minority member of the committee.

I have been in touch with Mr. Richards for some little time about this general program. He has indicated that he would be glad to help to carry it out on the assumption that it meets with the approval of the Congress. He has started to prepare himself and will, I hope, be in a position to go out to the Middle East to head a team representa-

tive of the Department of State, Department of Defense, and ICA at an early date so as to show that we mean business in that area and intend to make our assistance quickly and substantially available to the countries of the area who want to maintain their independence.

Chairman GORDON. I am very proud and pleased and I know the members of the committee are very proud and pleased that he was appointed ambassador.

Secretary DULLES. I know the committee will have greater confidence in the program because of the knowledge that he will be a primary figure in carrying it out.

Chairman GORDON. Mr. Secretary, in this House Joint Resolution 117, would you tell me what specific countries are included in the term "in the general area of the Middle East"? That is found right in the first paragraph of the joint resolution.

Secretary DULLES. Mr. Chairman, we have, as the committee knows, arrangements with Turkey as a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and also with Pakistan as a member of the Southeast Asia Mutual Security Treaty. There is between these countries and in close proximity to and in some cases actual juxtaposition to the Soviet Union nations who do not have any explicit assurance from the United States and which are in great danger. That position fans out, you might say, through the Arab countries and into the northern areas of Africa.

I would prefer, Mr. Chairman, not to go beyond that point at this stage. I am prepared to discuss this matter more fully in executive session. But I recall, Mr. Chairman, that I testified before the Senate in 1949 with reference to the North Atlantic Treaty. We were shown there a map which had precise lines drawn around it reflecting what were thought to be the areas, or which were the areas covered by the Rio Treaty and also the areas presumably covered by the North Atlantic Treaty. I pointed out that there is always danger in drawing a line on the map because the inference is if you step across the line you are in trouble, but as long as you do not step across the line you are not in trouble.

There is no part of the world I think where any of us would want to see in effect the Soviet Union told "it is all right if you take over this country, we will not mind as long as you do not take over the other."

I think it is entirely proper and right that the committee should know pretty closely what we have in mind but I do not think that that knowledge should be imparted in a way which would seem to give an invitation to hostile forces to take over any particular countries. So, beyond the general indication which I have given, I would prefer to withhold my answer to the question until we can meet in executive session.

Chairman GORDON. We shall do so.

I have another question, Mr. Secretary. Would you care to say anything about the President's assurance to the King of Saudi Arabia on October 13, 1950, which I understand was never made public.

Secretary DULLES. I have a copy of it here.

Mr. MORANO. What date was that?

Secretary DULLES. 1950. I forget the precise date. It was a letter from the then President, President Truman, to the King of Saudi Arabia, stating in effect that any threat to the independence or terri-

torial integrity of Saudi Arabia would be a matter of grave concern to the United States. I thought I had the text of the letter here but I will make it more fully available at a later date.

Chairman GORDON. My third question is, Is there any danger that formal action by the United States in enacting this resolution will increase tensions between nations of the area—for instance, between Baghdad Pact countries and certain Arab States, or between Israel and Arab States—so that a non-Soviet-inspired conflict might be encouraged?

Secretary DULLES. I think, Mr. Chairman, we must recognize that this action may temporarily, at least, increase tension with the Soviet Union. Every one of the acts which I have outlined in the statement I have made to the committee brought forth an outburst of abuse, attack, misrepresentation, from the Soviet Union. That is already beginning with respect to this proposed action.

As far as increasing troubles within the area, I think on the contrary, it will tend to minimize rather than to accentuate those difficulties.

This particular program, as I point out, does not deal explicitly with the intra-area difficulties. These we are dealing with in other ways. They are primarily being dealt with at the moment by the United Nations. We are giving to the United Nations and its Secretary General our strong, wholehearted support. But I think this fact can be taken as a certainty. The more Soviet influence is manifested in the area, the more will the differences between the states of the area be accentuated.

The whole purpose of the Soviet Union, so far as we can judge from what it has done and from what it has said, is to make that area an area of turbulence and of turmoil by stoking the fires of difference between the member states.

Now, to the extent that this program will reduce Soviet influence in the area by making these countries feel stronger and more independent, to that extent the conditions will improve in relation to the troubles within the area.

Chairman GORDON. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. I have some more questions but I will not ask them at this time as my time is up.

The next member is Robert Chipfield.

Mr. CHIPERFIELD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

This is the date for congratulations. I want to congratulate you on your new job, Dick Richards on his new position, and the Secretary on the fine way he looks.

Secretary DULLES. Thank you. You know I got a message through Mr. Hoover from the committee or some members of it which was expressed at a time when I was not feeling as well as I am now. He brought this message to me and I can assure you it made me feel a lot better.

Mr. CHIPERFIELD. Mr. Secretary, we are always glad to have you down here and have the benefit of your constructive statements. Before you decided upon the methods suggested in this resolution, did you consider working through members of the Baghdad Pact?

Secretary DULLES. Did I consider what?

Mr. CHIPERFIELD. Did you consider working through the members of the Baghdad Pact before you decided upon this method?

Secretary DULLES. Yes, sir; we gave long and extended consideration to the desirability of adhering to the Baghdad Pact and then ask-

ing the Senate to consent to a ratification of that adherence. We decided against that for what I think are decisive reasons.

This is a situation I can discuss perhaps in somewhat more detail in executive session, but I would say that we very carefully examined it. The concept of a northern tier of countries united to resist Communist aggression is a concept I have long had, and perhaps I am in a sense the author of that concept because I expressed that view when I came back from a trip to the area in the first half of 1953, nearly 4 years ago.

But, unfortunately the developments have been such as not to make the Baghdad Pact, of which you will recall the United Kingdom is also a member, today the instrumentality through which we could primarily express our assistance to the area.

We have, as you know, associated ourselves with certain activities of the Baghdad Pact, such as economic activities. If this legislation passes, there are certain aspects of their military activities which we would no doubt want to cooperate with and assist. But we came to the conclusion, after very careful study, that it would not be advisable to recommend that the United States actually join as a full member the Baghdad Pact, assuming all of the liabilities, obligations, and responsibilities of full membership.

Mr. CHIPERFIELD. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. I will ask more questions later.

Chairman GORDON. Dr. Morgan.

Mr. MORGAN. Mr. Secretary, what reaction has this resolution had upon the Arab countries of the Middle East? Have you had anything definite on their reaction?

Secretary DULLES. The initial reaction in most of the countries to the forecast of the program was not favorable, because their information about the program was primarily derived from the Soviet Arab language radio, and they misrepresented the purpose of the program grossly. Indeed, if the program were the kind of thing which that Communist propaganda portrayed it as being they should be against it. Now that the countries of the area have read the President's message, the atmosphere toward the plan is becoming markedly changed, and I have good reason to believe that it will be quite generally welcomed in the area as it is more fully understood. I may say that the action is responsive to specific requests which we have received over the past few weeks from 4 or 5 or 6—I cannot remember the precise number—of the nations of the Middle East area. I believe in the end it will be welcomed by virtually all of them. Obviously, it is a plan which will not be operated and cannot be operated in any country unless that country wants to accept it; but I believe that it will be generally accepted.

Mr. MORGAN. Do you think this plan will be accepted by Syria and Egypt?

Secretary DULLES. Yes, sir.

Mr. MORGAN. By both countries.

Secretary DULLES. That is my guess; not immediately, but I think when they appreciate what the purpose of it is they will accept it.

I am bound to say that there are in both of those countries certain influences which may be unfriendly toward the plan, but I do not think those influences will be dominant or decisive after the plan is fully known.

Mr. MORGAN. Mr. Secretary, do you feel that this resolution tends to dissipate the good will which was built up in the Arab countries by our stand on the Suez Canal crisis?

Secretary DULLES. No, sir; I do not. The purpose of this plan is precisely the same purpose that animated us in the action we took at the time of the armed attacks first by Israel and then by the United Kingdom and France in the area. We were motivated, of course, in the first instance by our respect for the undertakings we had assumed in the Charter of the United Nations, and by our various treaties, such as the North Atlantic Treaty, which opposed the use of force against the territorial integrity of any country, and we opposed the use of force against the territorial integrity of one of the Middle East countries when that was involved.

We sought through the United Nations to help maintain the independence of one of those countries. That is precisely what we intend to do by this program; to help protect the territorial integrity of those countries and to help build up and strengthen their independence. As that is realized I think they will realize this is a reenforcement of the policies which they respected and admired when we carried them out in the early days of November, and that it is a continuity of United States policy which they will welcome.

Now, there is a phrase which is often used, which can only be used with great care, and that is "filling the vacuum." That is a phrase which, just used alone in that way, is not liked by the Arab countries and quite understandably so, because in the past the power of colonial nations was used in the area and it was very largely, you might say, the influence and the power of the United Kingdom in particular which protected the area over the last 100 years against the Czarist and then Soviet ambitions. Frankly, those countries do not now want that kind of protection. If the vacuum can only be filled by something which partakes of colonialism they do not want it, and they should not want it. What we have to make unmistakably clear here is that we have no purpose in effect to reproduce and prolong the quasi-colonial policies which were relied upon to help the area. If there is any vacuum to be filled it has to be filled by strengthening the countries of the area themselves.

We do not want to move into and dominate the area. Our pledge that if they are attacked we would act is a pledge which in essence is contained in the Charter of the United Nations, were it not in part nullified by the veto power in the United Nations. The reaffirmation of that pledge in a practical, workable form cannot, I think, in any quarter be resented so long as it is not followed up by in effect our moving into the area and taking it over. That is the last thing in the world we want to do.

If there is any so-called vacuum there it must be filled by our helping strengthen the countries themselves under the shield of precisely the kind of protection which the United Nations Charter was designed to give them. I feel quite confident that if this program is implemented—and I am sure it will be, for, as I say, I think you have a good pledge as to how it will be implemented in the person who has been asked by the President to head it up—the result is going to be increasing satisfaction with the role the United States plays in that area.

Mr. MORGAN. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

Chairman GORDON. Mr. Vorys?

Mr. VORYS. Mr. Secretary, I have for a long time admired your "guts." This operation on that part of your anatomy shook me, but your rapid recovery brings me back to where I started.

Some people want to delay action on this project so that they can take plenty of time to argue that action along this line has already been delayed. I do not feel that way. I think your timing is just about right. Doing this last session would have been awful—probably impossible. I do not think this rated a special session. I think this rates prompt action now.

I have no further questions at this time.

Secretary DULLES. Thank you.

Chairman GORDON. Mr. Carnahan.

Mr. CARNAHAN. Mr. Secretary, the pending resolution provides, among other things, for increased economic assistance in the area. Is the present difficulty in the Middle East due in part, at least, to the fact that the United States has not given enough economic assistance to those countries?

Secretary DULLES. I believe that while you cannot say the difficulty is due to that, because the difficulties are due to political causes rather than economic causes, the political situation has now become so acute that a little more economic medicine is needed to help cure the situation. No amount of economic aid, however great, would have prevented the series of events which have occurred during the last 6 months, but there are some things, you know, which are good not as a preventive but as a cure. I believe that increased economic aid is now needed as a cure.

Mr. CARNAHAN. You feel, then, that we could now accomplish with economic assistance what we have not been able to accomplish in the past.

Secretary DULLES. I believe that the combination of increased economic assistance and military protection will accomplish what we have not been able to accomplish in the past, although when you say "what we have not been able to accomplish in the past", I think it is very important to bear in mind that the present acute situation has been brought about by a series of events which were not by any means within our control. The economic situation of the area has in many respects deteriorated quite rapidly, because while we are inclined to think of the economic consequences of closing the Suez Canal and the pipeline in terms of what it does to Europe it is also important to bear in mind what it does to the area.

Some people live off of buying oil; other people live off of selling oil. The royalties which these people get and the tolls which they got for the use of the Canal had been extremely important economic assets to the area. The area has been economically weakened during the last 2 month, and will continue to be weakened during the period that the pipeline through Syria, the Iraq Petroleum Co. pipeline from Iraq to Syria, is closed. That deprives Iraq of normal revenues. Syria is deprived of the normal pay it gets for allowing the oil to go through. The shipments of oil from Saudi Arabia have had to be cut down because of lack of transportation. Its royalties have decreased. The same thing has happened, to a lesser extent, in Iran.

You have new economic problems which have arisen for the area, just as the new economic problems have arisen for Western Europe.

Mr. CARNAHAN. According to the pending resolution, the use of armed force must be consonant with treaty obligations of the United States. We do have treaty obligations with some of the countries involved. Would the authorization carried in this resolution alter our commitments to these countries?

Secretary DULLES. No, sir. We have, so far as I am aware, no treaty commitment with any country inconsistent with what we now propose.

You know, there are some people who suggest that what we are proposing now is what some other countries did a little while ago. Well, it is quite the contrary, because, as I pointed out in my statement, the United Nations Charter and I believe every single one of our security treaties contain an obligation on all the parties not to use force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any country. The purpose that we have is to reenforce that existing treaty obligation, whereas some of the action that was taken in the past has seemed to us, at least, to be a violation of some of the treaties we had, including the North Atlantic Treaty, article 1 of which contains the provision that all the parties agree not to use force against the territorial integrity of any other country.

Mr. CARNAHAN. Even if a nation in the area, in desperate need, asked for armed intervention, the action would have to be consonant with the Charter of the United Nations and with actions and recommendations of the United Nations, according to the resolution?

Secretary DULLES. That is correct.

Mr. CARNAHAN. How could any action against Communist aggression be possible in the area under these requirements?

Secretary DULLES. How could any Communist aggression—

Mr. CARNAHAN. How could any action on our part against Communist aggression be possible under these requirements?

Secretary DULLES. Because article 51 recognizes the inherent right of individual and collective self-defense, and it also goes on to say, however, that if the Security Council is able, itself, to deal with the matter that then its efforts shall have priority. We are, of course, delighted if the Security Council can maintain international peace and security in the area. If it can do it we only want to support it and would welcome its efforts. If it cannot do it then we are free to do it in cooperation with the nations of the area.

Chairman GORDON. I will give you 1 more minute, Mr. Carnahan.

Mr. CARNAHAN. The President in his special message said on Saturday that the United Nations can always be helpful but it cannot be a wholly dependable protector of freedom when the ambitions of the Soviet Union are involved. Is the pending resolution intended to permit or encourage United States military action independent of the U. N.?

Secretary DULLES. It is designed to encourage and assure action in accordance with article 51 of the Charter which was introduced to meet the possibility that the Security Council might be inhibited by a Soviet veto.

I was among those who were at the San Francisco Conference and helped to draw up that provision of the Charter. I remember the then chairman of your committee, Mr. Sol Bloom, was also there at the time and took part in that activity, as well as Senator Connally and Senator Vandenberg. We all felt there that the United Nations

would be a "death trap" if nobody could do anything except with the approval of the Security Council and if the Soviet Union had a veto in the Security Council. Therefore, in order to escape from that dilemma we provided by article 51 that there was an inherent right of individual and collective self-defense which could be exercised if the Soviet Union blocked action by the Security Council. Now, if the Security Council is able itself to protect the country, then there is nothing for us to do. If the Security Council is unable, by Soviet veto, to protect the country, then obviously it is entitled to get protection elsewhere, and that is precisely what article 51 says.

Mr. CARNAHAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman GORDON. Mrs. Bolton.

Mrs. BOLTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. May I welcome my new chairman to the committee, and welcome you also, Mr. Secretary. We are always glad to have you.

Secretary DULLES. Thank you.

Mrs. BOLTON. Particularly so at this point.

Secretary DULLES. Thank you.

Mrs. BOLTON. I have a number of questions I shall want to ask later, but I wonder if it would be possible for you to give us some definitions as to what is meant by these terms, which occur both in your testimony and in the resolution: "Internal subversion"; "Overt armed aggression"; "Direct and indirect aggression."

I think it is rather important that we know the exact meaning of those terms. I would be grateful if you would give your definition now, or later, as you prefer.

Secretary DULLES. "Internal subversion," I suppose, means the type of activity by which international communism takes over a country from within, and without there being any open act of war or of armed attack from outside.

Mrs. BOLTON. May I ask, just at that point: How is that going to be determined, and by whom?

Secretary DULLES. I think that there is generally not much doubt about whether a nation is taken over by internal subversion. Of course the classic case was Czechoslovakia. There was not any open armed attack, although Red armies were massed on the border of Czechoslovakia. The people within were so frightened that they did not resist and the minority representing the Communist Party took over.

I would say that then you had the case in Hungary, where you had a coalition between the so-called small landowners' party and a Communist group, and in the coalition they got control of the Ministry of Interior and then they began to use the power of the Ministry of Interior to put in jail all the people who opposed communism, and finally there was nobody except Communists left to man the Government, and they finally took over.

Mrs. BOLTON. Under this proposal, at what point would it be considered serious enough for us to walk in?

Secretary DULLES. Well, we would not walk in at all, Mrs. Bolton, to overthrow any government which was installed in the area, because that would involve the use of force against the territorial integrity of a country. We do not intend by this resolution to empower the Government of the United States to invade a country to overthrow its government, however it gets there.

Now you can see that is a weakness in the legislation, but it is a weakness which I think is inherent in the kind of a world we are trying to create. If you allow a country to be invaded to throw out a government which somebody else does not like or thinks is hostile, then you expose the whole world to a series of armed episodes which in my opinion will cumulate to a point where it is going to be impossible to stop World War III.

Mrs. BOLTON. Of course, the Soviet is saying that it does not need to go in by force; it will simply take over one country after another by this very method.

Secretary DULLES. Yes; they say that, but they will not be able to do it, in my opinion.

Mrs. BOLTON. That is what we want to stop; is it not?

Secretary DULLES. If, in the first place, you give a nation assurance that it is not going to be attacked by open armed force, that at once gives greater courage to the patriots in the country who want to maintain independence. The weakness in the situation in Czechoslovakia was that there was nobody who gave at that time any reassurance to Czechoslovakia that there could not be an armed invasion, so the troops stood there at the border and in effect said: "Unless you take a Communist government we are going to invade." They had no strong country to say: "Stop. If they invade we will act."

This is designed to prevent that situation; a repetition of the Czechoslovakian situation.

In the second place, it will help to build up dependable and loyal security forces within the country, which the government can depend upon. The subversion occurs very often because the independent government in power does not have loyal forces of its own. It is partly because maybe it cannot meet a payroll, which sometimes these countries cannot do. We are going to help out these countries by helping them maintain loyal forces they can depend upon to maintain law and order.

In the third place, we will help to improve their economic position, so that the masses of the people will not feel they have to turn to communism to get better economic conditions.

Under these conditions, if you meet those three dangers—the danger of open armed attack, which terrorizes the people within; the danger that their internal police force and the army may themselves be disloyal because of inability to pay them and equip them, and so forth; and the demand of the populace for better conditions, which communism will promise them—then I think it is highly unlikely there can be a takeover by subversion.

But I go on to say this: If there should be such a takeover, I am satisfied that it would be only temporary unless the Soviet Union is able to maintain that government by its own armed force, as it is doing in Hungary today. You cannot for long maintain a Communist government in a country which has to rest upon the support that it gets out of that country.

We saw an example in Guatemala. The Government was getting plenty of military supplies shipped from behind the Iron Curtain, from Poland, but the people of Guatemala in the end rose up against it.

I am satisfied that it is not possible for the Soviet Union to maintain a satellite unless that satellite is so situated that its minions

there can depend upon armed force to support it, as they are doing in Hungary.

Mrs. BOLTON. I must not go over my time, Mr. Secretary. Thank you very much.

Secretary DULLES, I am afraid you did not go over your time; I went over it.

Chairman GORDON. Mr. Zablocki.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, I am glad to see you looking so well, and give you my very best wishes for good health.

Secretary DULLES. Thank you.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. Mr. Chairman, I have several questions, some with respect to the Secretary's statement and some with respect to the resolution itself.

Mr. Secretary, in section 6 of your statement I am perplexed by some of the context, particularly when you state in the fifth paragraph:

Only if Congress quickly dispels doubts, only if it puts the stamp of its approval upon a rounded program of economic and military assistance—

Et cetera.

will it have done the maximum it can do to preserve peace and freedom.

Have we not done just that when Congress voted approval of the Mutual Security Act in the last Congress?

Secretary DULLES. The aspect of the matter which is particularly indicated there is the assurance that if there were an open armed attack we would act to resist it. That we have not yet done in this area. We have done that in one form or another, in substance, in many areas of the world. We have either legislative authority or treaty arrangements to that general effect with 42 other countries of the world, but we do not have that with this area, except with the 2 countries I mentioned: Turkey, which is protected through the North Atlantic Treaty, and Pakistan, which is protected through the South-east Asia Treaty. But in between there is a serious gap. There is also a serious potential gap by sea.

I would say to you that the countries which are thus exposed, including Turkey and Pakistan, who, while themselves protected by these treaties against direct attack, would be flanked if there were a movement down in between them, are seriously concerned at the present time and have made their concern known to the United States. That is also the case with some of the Mediterranean countries which border on the sea.

I believe, unless the action which is suggested here is taken, there will be a very serious deterioration in the position of freedom in the area.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. Mr. Secretary, you have partially answered my second question; namely, why this matter cannot wait until Congress acts upon the mutual security bill. But it does lead me to this question directed to the first sentence of section 6 of your prepared statement:

The proposed legislation is in the judgment of our President necessary to meet the danger.

My question is: In what specific country is there a danger? In October of last year, we were told there was not any danger in the

Middle East, that everything was under control. Where and to what degree has it deteriorated? In what country and to what extent is there a danger?

Secretary DULLES. I do not know who told that. I did not tell it.

I remember saying, I think it was on the 2d day of August, that the situation was one of great danger. I remember saying on the 27th day of October, in a televised address I made at Dallas, that the situation was grave; that I could not predict the outcome. And I remember that at least I suppose 20 times in between the end of July and the 1st of November I made warning statements about the situation.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. Nevertheless, to what extent has the danger increased, and in what countries?

Secretary DULLES. The danger has notably increased in countries which prior to that time placed a very considerable degree of reliance upon the United Kingdom. You will recall that the United Kingdom has protective treaty arrangements which cover Iraq and Jordan. It has under the treaty with Egypt at least a paper right to reoccupy the Suez base if there should be an attack upon the area.

Now, recent developments have created a situation such that there is a great reluctance on the part of the peoples of the area to depend upon support from the United Kingdom, which engaged in the overt attack upon Egypt, and that has very abruptly and very significantly altered the security position in the whole area.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. Mr. Chairman, if I may, I should like to ask one more question.

Mr. Secretary, in the resolution itself the second "whereas" clause refers to a threat in the Middle East of "internal subversion," and yet the resolution itself deals only with "overt armed aggression from any nation controlled by international communism." Does this mean, Mr. Secretary, that the United States will not take action against internal subversion even where such subversion is caused by international communism?

Secretary DULLES. It means we will not use armed force of the United States to invade any country and that we will only act in the area at the request of the countries concerned. Now, it is quite true that the body of the resolution does not in terms speak of the meeting of internal subversion, but as I pointed out the resolution in substance does so by doing three things: First, by reducing the fear of open armed attack, a fear which greatly heartens and encourages the subversive elements within a country and discourages the patriots within a country. That is point No. 1. The second point is it enables us to assist in the military planning, so that they will be enabled to have adequate and loyal and well-equipped and adequately paid security forces. That is the second very important thing to do to meet internal subversion. The third thing it does is to permit economic assistance to the country. That is the third point.

If you put those three things together you get as complete a protection against internal subversion as is possible, unless you want to go around the world invading countries to throw out governments which you do not like and which you think are Communist-inspired. If you give your stamp of approval to that kind of thing you will alienate the people. You will be using armed force to do what many people think is interfering in the internal affairs of another country.

And you will start a series of wars over this world which will end up, I think absolutely certainly, in a world war.

That particular way of dealing with subversion we renounce, and we in effect agreed to renounce it when we signed the Charter of the United Nations. We agreed to renounce it the second time when we signed the North Atlantic Treaty. We have agreed to renounce it in every single treaty we have signed, where we state we will not use force against the territorial integrity of any country. Therefore we are not going to use armed force to go in and overthrow governments. We are going to try to keep governments which will be dedicated to the independence of their countries, by giving them assurance against open armed attack and by giving them assurance they can have loyal security forces and by giving them a measure of economic aid. I believe that is as far as we can go or should go.

Chairman GORDON. Your time is up, Mr. Zablocki.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. Thank you.

Chairman GORDON. Mr. Smith.

Mr. SMITH. Mr. Secretary, do I understand, then, we are going to meet the problem of subversion by building up the economies of the respective countries, where they want it?

Secretary DULLES. That will be one of the methods which we will hope to use. As I say, you cannot meet it effectively, in my opinion, without a combination of the three elements to which I have alluded. We expect to employ all three.

Mr. SMITH. Is there any evidence of armed overt aggression at this time?

Secretary DULLES. Well, I would say that there is fully as much evidence to suggest overt armed aggression against that area as there is against any of the other areas where we think it is necessary to take precautions. There is a very powerful armed force. There is apparently an organization which could be used in that area and others. There is apparently a so-called volunteer force which has been organized, as was the case when the Chinese intervened in the Korean war.

I do not think that it is possible to wait until an attack occurs to be sure it is going to occur. We have taken these precautions. I do not know of any present demonstrable evidence that the Soviet Union is planning to attack the United States, but I know we would be awfully worried if we did not have something to deter that attack. The same is the case with Western Europe. There is a very great potential force in the hands of despots who are not restrained by their treaty commitments or any moral considerations. We know that they covet this area. You put those three things together, and I say that calls for action immediately.

Mr. SMITH. Mr. Secretary, for the record, what is the basic cause for present tensions in the Middle East today?

Secretary DULLES. Well, there are quite a lot of tensions and quite a lot of causes, and a great deal depends upon which situation you think about.

Now, if you think about Iran, the greatest tension in that area is the threat from Soviet Russia. They have been occupied by Soviet Russia. We had a lot of trouble getting them out. There is always a danger that they may come back in again. If they came back in they would probably go on to Iraq and all the way down through.

The northern group of countries is primarily concerned by the danger from the Soviet Union.

Other countries are concerned by the danger of subversive efforts which are being conducted within their countries and within neighboring countries.

Then you have, of course, a rather basic difference, which affects much of the area, between the Israeli and the Arabs, where the Arabs believe that the Israeli have ambitions to extend their country on far to the east and where the Israeli believe that the Arabs want to push the Israeli into the Mediterranean.

You have the aftermath of colonialism and its remnants. There is quite a strong feeling in Saudi Arabia against the United Kingdom because of its action against the Buraimi oasis and its position with respect to some of the Persian Gulf sheikdoms.

There is still a slight, but I am glad to say only a slight, prejudice against Turkey because of the reminiscences of some of the days of the Ottoman Empire.

There is a certain amount of tension in the area against Franco because of the sympathy of the Arabs with the Arabs in Algeria.

So you have a whole series of tensions there which, as I said, represent kind of cross currents and make the area a particularly complicated and difficult one to help from the standpoint of keeping it free.

MR. SMITH. Do you think we can have anything like a satisfactory peace until the difference between the Arabs and Israel is adjusted? Is that not the basic problem?

SECRETARY DULLES. You say a satisfactory peace. No; not satisfactory. But I think we can have peace at least in the sense of an absence of active hostilities.

There are a great many elements of the peace today in many parts of the world which are unjust and unsatisfactory. Take the partition of Germany. Take the partition of Korea. Take the partition of Vietnam. All around the world you find situations which are troubling, where one side or the other is not satisfied with the kind of a peace that exists. But it is a lot better to have the nations not fighting, because when you think of what modern war can turn into easily you certainly must pause, and I think everybody should accept an absence of fighting. Fighting is likely to develop, if it is continued, into major hostilities.

I believe that this last affair might have developed into a very major affair indeed, which would have endangered the peace of the whole world if the United Nations, which got a lot of help from the United States, had not been able quickly to bring about a "cease fire" in the area. So while there are many conditions in the world which are not satisfactory they are a lot more satisfactory than those conditions would be if there were active fighting going on, and I believe that it is possible to create such conditions in the Middle East.

MR. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

CHAIRMAN GORDON. Mr. Burleson.

MR. BURLESON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

MR. SECRETARY, I look forward to a more detailed discussion in executive session, but for the time being may I attempt to phrase a several-barreled question dealing with the economic aspects of the proposal.

First, what opportunity will this committee and will the Congress have to know before the fact, what economic measures are to be taken under the proposal in the entire area and, specifically, will we be advised beforehand what is to be done in each country? Is it feasible to separate that aspect of the proposal from the military one and does that mean, for instance, that financing the Aswan Dam or the Nile River development, may be possible by this action?

Secretary DULLES. There will be ample opportunity, or adequate opportunity, to discuss some of these things in executive session. It is not desirable to talk in public session about programs which may be in contemplation, because once that is done the country concerned thinks it already has a vested interest in that program and in that grant.

I would not say that this can be fully developed until there has been a resurvey made of the area under the mission which Mr. Richards will head up. As I pointed out, the economic situation in the area has very considerably changed since we were here at the last session of Congress last June when the Mutual Security Act was being considered. The events which have occurred have altered and in many respects greatly weakened many of the countries. Just what to do about it, we are not clear in all cases.

You speak about separating this. You will bear in mind that this piece of legislation does not ask for a single dollar that has not already been appropriated. In other words, we are not asking for a nickel more. What we are suggesting is that out of the moneys already appropriated there should be a greater flexibility because at the time the Mutual Security Act was adopted last June many of the specific developments that have occurred could not have been foreseen. It is like supplying ammunition to an army in a war. You think you may want to use the ammunition in one place and then events take another turn and you may have to shoot in another direction. The relative priorities have shifted and I think there should be an acceptance by Congress of shifting the already appropriated funds from areas that seem to be in less danger to the area that seems to need help the most.

I can assure you—you mentioned one thing specifically—that there is no intention on the part of the United States to finance the Aswan Dam.

Mr. BURLERSON. Mr. Secretary, you do not have the authority now to shift these funds in the manner you anticipate you may need to shift them?

Secretary DULLES. No, we do not have adequate authority in certain respects. The most conspicuous respect is the provision that 80 percent of the funds must be obligated by the end of April. These recent developments have been such that we cannot adjust our planning to this new situation in time, I believe, to get the best use out of the funds if 80 percent of them have to be obligated by the end of April.

Mr. BURLERSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman GORDON. Mr. Merrow.

Mr. MERROW. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, we are certainly glad to have you with us.

Secretary DULLES. Thank you.

Mr. MERROW. I have great admiration for your leadership and your statesmanship, and this morning you certainly have presented this program logically, clearly, and very precisely.

I remember as early as 1948 I introduced House Concurrent Resolution 190, which contained many of the principles and policies included in this proposed legislation today. I am for the proposed legislation and for the program which you have presented. I hope that it is enacted quickly, and I think you summarized the situation very well on page 5 when you said "the time to make clear our resolve is now. Only thus can we adequately serve the cause of freedom and of peace."

I have great admiration for the stand you have taken and for the leadership and statesmanship that is being shown, and I shall support your program wholeheartedly.

Secretary DULLES. Thank you. I might say I had before me at the time I was working on this a copy of your bill.

Mr. MERROW. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. That is all.

Chairman GORDON. Mr. Brooks Hays.

Mr. HAYS of Arkansas. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, I have two questions. One has to do with the emphasis on the United Nations in stabilizing the area. Perhaps you have already answered it, but do you contemplate continued use of the United Nations police force, for example, to the extent that their presence is sanctioned by appropriate action by the United Nations and world opinion?

Secretary DULLES. I believe maximum use should be made of the United Nations police force. There is some question as to the degree to which the contributors to that force are willing to have it permanent.

I was a delegate to the United Nations in 1950 and handled on the floor of the Assembly the two resolutions which have been principally invoked in this recent crisis. The so-called "Uniting for Peace" resolution provided in the case of veto in the Security Council there should be called an emergency meeting of the General Assembly within 24 hours. That resolution, for which I worked very hard and which was blocked by the Soviet Union but finally adopted, was first invoked on the 30th of October, I think, this year, and I was there personally to speak on the resolution which we introduced for cease fire in the area. That resolution also called for contributions or offers of contributions by members of the United Nations of contingents that could be called upon by the United Nations. That has never been implemented because we found very few of the nations that were willing to do it or can do it. It had to be implemented on an emergency basis. Now that it has been done, I hope very much this can be continued and some way can be found to make this, if not a permanent part a semipermanent part of the United Nations, and I hope it can be fully used in the area.

Mr. HAYS of Arkansas. Thank you. I am certainly glad to get these observations.

The second question is on the economic side. The committee has wrestled with these complex questions in the area, and I know analogies are not always helpful, but is something like the OEEC, which did prove effective in Europe, contemplated in this area?

Secretary DULLES. I am sorry I cannot say it is contemplated. I can say it would be welcomed. The differences within the area to

which I have alluded make it seem to me unlikely that at any early date, at least, you could get a drawing together of the states of the area to deal with this economic problem. If it could be done, it would be very much to be desired, and certainly we will never lose sight of that desirability. It is much better to work in this way, as it was done in the Marshall plan, to get the countries together so that they take the responsibility. I do not feel a duplication of that process is practically possible in this area.

Mr. HAYS of Arkansas. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

Chairman GORDON. Mr. Fulton.

Mr. FULTON. Mr. Secretary, we are glad to have you back, and wish you continued good health. We on the House Foreign Affairs Committee compliment our new chairman, Congressman Tom Gordon, of Illinois, and we will be glad to cooperate with him for the security of our good country during the coming sessions of the 85th Congress.

In the resolution there is used the term "Middle East." You qualify it by saying the general area of the Middle East, so that there is justly some room for leeway. Can you tell us what the Middle East consists of, because I understand under State Department usage it has extended as far as India and Indonesia in certain cases?

Chairman GORDON. Mr. Fulton, may I suggest you ask that in executive session?

Mr. FULTON. My next question is on the transfer of congressional authority. This actually is a transfer of congressional authority to the President in a particular geographic area, both for use of United States forces and economic aid.

On economic aid, this committee had cut the previous request by \$1 billion by adopting my amendment. That meant the administration foreign aid request last year was a little large because the total of the foreign aid authorized and appropriated ended up about \$900 million less than the request on the conference. Do you really need \$200 million now to be moved over from general mutual security funds, and \$200 million for fiscal 1958, and \$200 million for 1959? That is a total of \$600 million; is it not? Do you need that much?

Secretary DULLES. I do not know whether we do or not, Congressman Fulton, and of course the justification for the suggested \$200 million for 1958 and \$200 million for 1959 will have to be made at a later date after we know the situation better than we do today.

Mr. FULTON. So there is really no commitment of any new funds by this resolution?

Secretary DULLES. There is no commitment for anybody who votes for this legislation to support any particular figure for fiscal 1958 or fiscal 1959.

Mr. FULTON. I wanted to make that clear.

The other point is this: If there is a transfer of congressional power, would you have any objection to a provision, as we had in the Marshall plan, that either House of Congress, by appropriate resolution, or the Congress by concurrent resolution, could terminate this authority? Why not let either House of Congress have the same power of termination as the President under section 5 of your resolution?

Secretary DULLES. I indicated, I think in response to a question by Mr. McCormick which he put to me in our hearing last Wednesday, that I thought this question of termination could very usefully be further studied with the committee, and that we had no hard and fast

views regarding it if the Congress wished to reserve to itself a greater authority for terminating than is possessed by its power to pass a law—I realize a law theoretically could be vetoed by the President so that the will of the Congress could not prevail. That was met in the Greece-Turkey resolution by a provision for a concurrent resolution.

There is no desire by the President to continue this authority beyond the date when the majority of the Congress feel disposed to take it back. As a matter of fact, it is very difficult and almost impossible for the President to act in these fields that require appropriations and the like if the majority of Congress is not with us.

Mr. FULTON. Do you look at the power under this resolution as an added personal power to the President, or an added prerequisite to the office of President? Does the power belong to the present President, or to the Presidency?

Secretary DULLES. It belongs to the Presidency.

Mr. FULTON. How can we explain to our good British and French friends why not many months ago we were urging them to get their forces out of the area through the U. N. and now we say we will fill the needs of the area by unilateral aid in case the U. N. can't act? Is this resolution the correct approach?

Secretary DULLES. Well, I have no doubt that the point you make will be made in some quarters in Britain and in France, but I say to you that there is all the difference in the world, there is all the difference as between day and night, between using force to go in and bomb a country and going in at its request to help it from being bombed. If anyone puts those two things together, he would have to be awfully blind, in my opinion.

Mr. FULTON. You see, the point I am making is this: Is the United States not laying ourselves open to criticism of power politics on a unilateral basis when we previously have been objecting to the same right of action of other people who are our allies when they did not go through NATO or did not go through the United Nations?

Secretary DULLES. There is nothing unilateral that I know of in giving aid to a country that asks for it. And that is specified; it must be done at the request of the country. I can assure you the bombers did not come in at the request of the Egyptian Government.

Mr. FULTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman GORDON. Mrs. Kelly.

Mrs. KELLY. Mr. Secretary, since you and the President have stated that this resolution does not deal with the peaceful solution of the critical problems in this area, for example, (1) settlement of international use and operation of the Suez Canal, (2) establishment of a just peace between Israel and Arab nations including settlement of a refugee program, and so forth, and since it does not deal with indirect aggression, does not this resolution almost secure the position of the U. S. S. R. in the Middle East rather than displacing her, by almost guaranteeing the status quo, which we are all against?

Secretary DULLES. In my opinion the best way to deal with these problems is for us to undertake the program here, which is not being dealt with by the United Nations at the present time and which could not effectively be dealt with by the United Nations, and support the United Nations in its dealings with the other problems of the area. It is dealing very actively with the problem of the relations between

Israel and its Arab neighbors. As you know, the United Nations has an observation mission watching the borders as to these raids. There is a United Nations mission looking after the refugees. Mr. Hammarskjold, the Secretary General, went on two missions to the area last spring and summer to deal with that problem and to study it. He is dealing with it actively and we are supporting him.

There is the problem of the future of the Suez Canal. That is a problem before the Security Council of the United Nations and it is also being dealt with by the General Assembly, and Mr. Hammarskjold is dealing with that problem.

I believe the best way is for us to support the United Nations in the areas where it is acting and can act effectively, and for us, through this legislation, to deal with areas which the United Nations cannot cover adequately because of the veto power of the Soviet Union in the Security Council and its disregard of the General Assembly as evidenced in the case of Hungary.

Mrs. KELLY. Mr. Secretary, you emphasized international communism breakthrough in this area. Since the U. S. S. R. established herself in the Middle East during these 2 years in Egypt and Syria, and so forth, and since we are not going to deal with this indirect aggression, are we not accepting the establishment of national communism by saying that if those nations accept aid from Russia we will stand by and let them and thereby perhaps establish national communism?

Secretary DULLES. The Soviet influence, of course, is in the area. It has been there for a long time in fluctuating degrees. But we do not believe international communism has yet gained control of any Middle Eastern state, and this program that we outline is designed to take all the measures which I think are available to prevent that happening, or if it happens, to be sure it is of very brief duration.

I indicated that I do not think we should attack any country by armed force because we think it has a government controlled by communism. We are not going into the business of using armed force to accomplish that purpose. There are other ways it can be done.

Mrs. KELLY. Does this administration agree on the establishment of national communism in the area?

Secretary DULLES. If it should happen there were national communism, we would accept it as we do in Yugoslavia. But I can say this. You know the area, and the last thing that will happen in that part of the world is national communism coming in as an indigenous force. People in this area hate communism. They are deeply religious, they know communism is atheistic, and there is not a country in the area that wants communism to come there. Communism will not come in as a national phenomenon, certainly if the countries are not reduced to complete economic distress.

Mrs. KELLY. Will this resolution cause an economic aid race in the area; and bring on a situation such as the abrupt withdrawal of the Aswan Dam offer? How far will pressure force the United States to increase aid? We offer so much, Russia increases these offers, and then we have a situation where we might have to withdraw our offer?

Secretary DULLES. No. I do not anticipate that the Soviet Union is going to make any substantial offer of economic aid to the area. It has not done so so far, and I doubt if it will do so, because in the first place they have got a lot of pressure for economic aid in the satellite nations, which is a prior demand on them. The situation in those

areas is deplorable. Poland and all of them are in great distress, and if the Soviet Union is going in for economic aid, it will feel the place it needs to spend it is in the satellite countries and not in this area. The aid it has given has been in terms of military equipment. The Soviet Union has an inexhaustible supply of military equipment brought about by the modernization of their own equipment, and they have World War II stuff that will rot away or be thrown away or given away.

There is some evidence, and to some extent continuing evidence, of a desire on the part of the Soviet Union to use military supplies to get technicians and so on in the country. That has occurred in Egypt and to a lesser degree in Syria. But as far as economic aid is concerned, I doubt very much there will be developed a race between the Soviet Union and ourselves about economic aid.

Some people thought, when the Aswan Dam proposal was withdrawn as far as Great Britain and the United States were concerned, that the Soviet Union would move in and put up the money. They did not do it.

Mrs. KELLY. Are we likely to give military aid to Israel under this proposal?

Secretary DULLES. It is entirely possible to do so. It has been so far the general policy of the United States not to be an important purveyor of arms to Israel and neighboring Arab countries. That has been the policy not only of this administration but also of the preceding administration. We have sold, during the past 8 years since Israel has been an independent state, relatively small amounts of military aid to either Israel or the neighboring Arab countries and there is no present intention to alter our policy in that respect.

Mrs. KELLY. Thank you.

Chairman GORDON. Mr. Morano.

Mr. MORANO. Mr. Secretary, can you say flatly that our Government is just as vigorously opposed to colonialism as to imperialistic international communism?

Secretary DULLES. Well, we are opposed to colonialism in the sense that that word is generally used. We believe, as we have declared in the Pacific Charter, for example, and other declarations, that the non-self-governing peoples should be given independence as soon as they are able to sustain it and if they desire it. That is a very basic and fundamental policy of the United States.

I would say certainly the control of a country by international communism is a worse form of colonialism than that which we have heretofore called colonialism. It is the worst form of colonialism, and because it is, I think we are more opposed to it than the less brutal forms.

Mr. MORANO. Do you think our Government's colonial policy is strong enough to win and hold the confidence of the people in the area we are talking about?

Secretary DULLES. Yes, I do.

Mr. MORANO. This resolution contains authority which the President already has; is that not so?

Secretary DULLES. In some respects, yes.

Mr. MORANO. I want to ask specific questions about whether he has authority to do certain things. Will you cite the authority he

has as contained in this resolution and for which he seeks reaffirmation and the authority he does not have and that he now seeks?

Secretary DULLES. It would be a little difficult and perhaps controversial to go through the resolution and try to decide just where the President has authority and where he requires concurrence or authority from the Congress. Let me say this, Congressman, the important thing here is that the Nation should speak with a single voice as authoritatively as it can with respect to all vital aspects of this problem. Even if everything in this resolution could be done by the President, there still would be tremendous value in having the Congress say the same thing. The Congress speaks for the people in a somewhat different way than the President does. In all of these matters it is extremely important that the voice of America be heard in the most clear-cut, unambiguous way that it is possible.

Now there are, I believe, certain things here which the President can do already. There are other things which I do not think he can do already. There is some difference of opinion, I find, in the Congress, as to what the President can do with the Armed Forces of the United States with or without congressional approval. Different Presidents have taken different views of it, and I think it would be a mistake to get into a constitutional dispute in this respect. President Eisenhower thinks there are some things in this resolution he cannot do without congressional approval, and even if all of it could be done by the President alone, he could do it infinitely more effectively with congressional approval.

Mr. MORANO. Mr. Secretary, would you object to submitting to the committee a statement defining the things I am asking about, so that it will not consume present time, for the purpose of the record?

Secretary DULLES. As I say, I think that embarks you upon a very difficult constitutional study where I would have to get the advice of the legal people. The problem is very difficult because it is not a clearly defined problem. Some Presidents take one view about their constitutional powers and other Presidents take another view.

Mr. MORANO. I am in support of the President. What I am trying to do is make it a little easier for the passage of this resolution, perhaps not on this side of the Congress but the other side. Does this resolution give the President the authority to prevent, at the request of a country in this area, a shipment of arms from a satellite country or the Soviet Union to any other country in this area? Is my question clear to you?

Secretary DULLES. Yes, the question is perfectly clear. I am sorry to say the answer is not as clear as the question. I do not think that it does, frankly, and I do not see how you can exert that power under peaceful conditions without engaging in what in effect would be an act of aggression. There is no principle of international law which makes it unlawful for nations to send military supplies to other nations. We do a lot of that ourselves, and I would consider it a very serious act of aggression on the part of the Soviet Union if they used armed force to prevent our sending military supplies to Europe for NATO, for example, or to Taiwan.

The use of the high seas for passage which may include arms is a right I do not think we can properly interrupt by force without violating the principles of international law or our obligations under the United Nations Charter. Of course if there were a resolution of

the United Nations—and there is a resolution which covers part of this territory—then there could be and probably should be action, preferably under United Nations auspices, to prevent it.

Mr. MORANO. If you got a veto, then what would you do?

Secretary DULLES. The resolution which has been passed calling on nations to refrain from shipping arms to the area of hostility is a resolution of the General Assembly, which does not have the same force as the Security Council, but nevertheless I think would warrant action if it occurred. There has been perhaps a shipment of a small amount of arms to Syria, but it is not considered to be in the area of hostility, which has been considered in the area of Egypt.

Chairman GORDON. Your time is up. We will continue this afternoon. Mr. Secretary, I understand you have an important engagement at 12:30. We will recess until 2:30.

Secretary DULLES. I understood you had a very important engagement at 12:30.

(Thereupon, at 12:40 p. m. a recess was taken until 2:30 p. m. of the same day.)

AFTERNOON SESSION

The committee reconvened at 2:30 p. m. in room 1301, New House Office Building, the Hon. Thomas S. Gordon, chairman, presiding.

Chairman GORDON. The committee will come to order.

Mr. Secretary, as to the question I gave you this morning as to the President's letter to the King of Saudi Arabia of October 31, 1950, do you have a statement on that now?

Secretary DULLES. I did not have before me the text of the letter. I now have it. The letter is classified but I think it is proper that I should say to the committee that the letter stated that the United States was interested in the preservation of the independence and territorial integrity of Saudi Arabia and that no threat to the kingdom of Saudi Arabia could occur which would not be a matter of immediate concern to the United States.

Chairman GORDON. Mr. Carnahan.

Mr. CARNAHAN. Mr. Chairman, I ask permission that an editorial from the Washington Post of this morning be made a part of the hearings and an article by Stewart Alsop from the same edition of the Washington Post be made a part of the hearings.

Chairman GORDON. Without objection, that will be inserted in the record.

(The articles referred to are as follows:)

[Editorial, the Washington Post, January 7, 1957]

BOLSTERING THE NEAR EAST

There will be almost unanimous agreement in this country with the purposes of President Eisenhower's program for the Near East. As Mr. Eisenhower made clear to Congress on Saturday, the United States is not seeking itself to fill the vacuum caused by the change of power relationships in the Near East. It is seeking, rather, to encourage the nations of the area to fill it themselves by developing and stabilizing their independence. The prime essential in this process is to deter Russia from pushing further into the area either directly or indirectly.

This doctrine is wholly consonant with the principles of the United Nations, to which Mr. Eisenhower adverted frequently. Mr. Nehru should find nothing offensive in the objectives. There is plenty of room for debate over the administration's tactics, tardiness, and omissions. But Congress could not refuse basic approval of the request for authority to create an economic and military shield

without appearing to veto a necessary expression of American leadership—and, indeed, without repudiating past exercises of leadership.

Three components make up the Eisenhower doctrine. Economic aid to "any nation or group of nations" happily leaves the door open for a regional approach. Military aid would be extended on the same basis. Finally, American military forces would be employed if necessary and if requested by the nation concerned to protect its territorial and political independence against overt aggression from "any nation controlled by international communism." The language is significant. It means, for example, that if a Communist coup were perpetrated in Syria and Syria were to undertake an attack on any of her neighbors, American power would be available for intervention on behalf of the victim.

Much of the importance of this policy, as this newspaper noted the other day, is psychological. It seeks to bolster the independence of the area by telling the Russians, in the manner of the Monroe Doctrine of 130 years ago, that American power will be used to keep them out. By implication this is designed to cover not only the Near East but Africa as well.

Not surprisingly, Russia finds such intent proof of American "colonialist" aims. But the charge will sound a little thin, coming on top of Soviet defiance of the United Nations in Hungary. The American stand in the U. N. against the British-French invasion of Egypt should have attested to this country's motives. American purposes can of course be distorted and misunderstood; there is no guarantee that the Eisenhower doctrine will be popular even with the dispatch of the President's special mission to the area. But the United States was never in a better position to command the confidence of the people of the Near East.

Indeed, it is well for critics to remember that the present opportunity for American leadership did not exist a year ago. The administration is properly indictable for past equivocation; a more astute American policy might have forestalled some of the unhappy events in the Near East during the past year. But British involvement in the area would have made this precise type of program a year ago suspect from the beginning.

The present opportunity, in which the United States is dissociated from any real or fancied link with colonialism, is thus unique. There is no American desire to capitalize upon British misfortunes. Charges that the United States is motivated in the present policy by the wish for an oil monopoly are patently transparent and unfair; Near East oil is far more vital to Britain and Western Europe than to this country. There is now a chance, if we use it wisely, to strengthen the adherence of the Near Eastern countries to the free world in a manner that previously was impossible.

Mr. Eisenhower has gone far to conciliate legislators by promising to consult Congress if an emergency should develop while it is in session and to summon it promptly otherwise. He also has by implication recognized the importance of similar American policies in the past even though on occasion some Republican spokesmen for political reasons have sought to discredit them. If Congress is concerned with limitations, it could reasonably require periodic renewal of the authority it may grant. But the President's request in the circumstances is a moderate one, and it ought to have a bipartisan response.

It would be unfortunate, at the same time, to exaggerate the remedies that are prescribed or to fail to recognize that the new policy challenges Russia to circumvent it. The Near East is not Western Europe, and the problems accompanying the drawing of a line against Soviet penetration are far more complex. The primary threat to the independence of the Near East is not overt Soviet aggression, but indirect aggression and subversion. No doubt the men in the Kremlin, bedeviled with troubles at home and in the satellites, will be eager to step up their efforts to dominate Egypt and Syria. The Eisenhower program as outlined does not provide any check on indirect aggression or subversion—especially that undertaken with the help of the victims—except through economic and political strength. It does not of itself assure that the economic development programs will be broad enough and imaginative enough to create real stability.

The ability of the Near East to absorb large economic programs will be limited at the beginning; and any regional approach of course ought to make use of the area's own resources. But it would be very foolish for this country to talk boldly and then nurse its nickels. The Eisenhower doctrine provides the first essential of reducing the military threat; beyond this, it provides merely the framework on which a program can be built. The overwhelming need is to create a powerful magnet that not only will prevail against Communist blandishments but also will divert runaway nationalism in a concerted and cooperative effort to create the better living conditions that are the best advertisement for freedom.

[Washington Post, January 7, 1957]

MATTER OF FACT: IKE'S MIDEAST PLAN OVERSOLD

By Stewart Alsop

The scene was dramatic, when the President addressed the joint session of Congress on Saturday and the President's words were grave and eloquent. And yet, when it was over, there was a certain feeling of anticlimax.

The reason is simple. The President's proposal was oversold before he spoke. It was advertised as a new policy, a novel and remarkable doctrine and a bold, new program. In fact, what the President really seemed to be saying was about as follows:

"Look, something has to be done about the Middle East. Give me a free hand to do it—money and the authority to use force if I have to. I don't really know what it is that can be done, but I want to be able to do it when I do know."

This is neither a doctrine nor a policy nor a program. It is a request of Congress to sign in advance a very large, very blank check. To see how blank the check really is, consider the economic barrel of the President's double-barreled proposal. The economic aspect of the proposal has been described as a Middle Eastern equivalent of the Marshall plan or the Greek-Turkish aid program. It is nothing of the sort, for the simple reason that nothing of the sort is possible in the Middle East.

In fact, if precedents are sought, the closest parallel is the Administration's request for an area appropriation of \$100 million to be spent, at the Administration's discretion, in the area of Southeast Asia. The money was appropriated almost 2 years ago. And only about \$7 million has actually been spent, simply because it has proved so difficult to find useful projects on which to spend the money.

It will certainly be as difficult to find useful new ways to spend the 2-year appropriation of \$200 million the President has requested, in the angry Middle East. Consider the countries immediately involved in the Middle Eastern crisis.

Both Saudi Arabia and Iraq earn a great many dollars already, from their oil revenues. The money the President has requested can be used to bolster the defenses of Iraq as a member of the Baghdad Pact—but that is being done already.

Syria, increasingly close to becoming a Soviet puppet, has already angrily refused all dollar aid. The Egypt of Colonel Gamal Abdel Nasser is making similar angry noises—the Cairo press has been denouncing the Eisenhower proposal as imperialism and intervention. And anyway, if this country were now to hand out large sums to Nasser with no strings attached—which is certainly not the intention—the British and French, who regard Nasser as their mortal enemy, would explode with fury.

That leaves Jordan and Israel. Jordan may well go the way of Syria, or even disintegrate entirely. But in the meantime, the British hope to maintain their special position in Jordan, which they subsidize to the tune of \$35 million a year, and they would not welcome an American effort to replace them. As for Israel, it is already depending on American dollar aid, and any sharp increase in this aid will certainly not stabilize the situation in the Middle East.

The check is just as blank where it concerns the request for standby authority to use force. At first, it was intended to make this aspect of the proposal far more specific.

The intention was to make a unilateral American declaration guaranteeing both Israel and the Arab states against attack, to replace the 1950 tripartite declaration to the same effect, which was killed by the Anglo-French action in Suez. But in the end it was decided that there were too many risks for this country in making such a specific commitment alone. So the request for authority to use force was left open-ended and unspecific.

All this is not to suggest that the President's proposal is either useless or dangerous. On the contrary, the Congress ought to sign the President's blank check with alacrity. There are times when a blank check can be very useful, and this is one of them. Despite the dreary precedent of the Southeast Asia appropriation, opportunities now unpredictable may arise in the Middle East where money can be spent most effectively to serve this country's interests. Above all, it is useful for the world, and especially the Soviet Union, to know, as the President said, "Where we stand" on the Middle East.

Even so, it ought to be understood that the President's proposal is not a new policy, or a novel doctrine, or a bold new program.

It is simply a request for a blank check, and no one in the Eisenhower administration has any concrete or specific idea of how or when or to what end the check will be cashed.

Chairman GORDON. We will proceed with the members that did not have a chance to question the Secretary this morning. First is Mr. Hays of Ohio.

Mr. HAYS of Ohio. Mr. Secretary, it is possible that your answer to this question may use up my 5 minutes so I want to give some background by 3 or 4 very brief quotations and I will then ask the question.

On the 19th of August 1954, at Springfield, Ill., the President said—the long and dreary quarrels in the Suez region have been composed with the greatest possible promise for the security and prosperity of the West, including the United States of America.

On September 23, 1954, at the Hollywood Bowl, the President said:

At Suez ancient enmities and quarrels involving two of our friends have been resolved. Peace has been preserved. Progress has been assured in an area vital to Western civilization.

On October 11, 1956, at his press conference, the President answered the following question:

Mr. President, dispatches from both London and Paris reflect the rising feeling of anti-Americanism among our allies, apparently feeling that the administration's foreign policy is being inhibited by election year conditions. My question is: Do you think there is any basis for such a feeling abroad?

That was the question. Now, this is the answer:

No, I do not * * * We must be talking about the Suez Canal affair because that is the one that has been alleged to be creating this difficulty. Now, I must tell you this. I asked the Secretary of State this morning—he came in to see me—whether he had any intimation from anyone in British officialdom whom he met that they were dissatisfied with our stand in this thing or thought that we had been vacillating and not carrying forward as we stated * * * He hasn't and I assure you I haven't.

On October 21 in a television interview you said:

Big Three have developed common policy to an amazing degree in the Near East.

My question is this. You have indicated today that there is an entirely different situation in existence. What I want is some reassurance that your evaluation of the situation today is better than the Administration's evaluation prior to the election.

Secretary DULLES. You have to take, I suppose, the best evaluations you can get. The American people at least seemed to feel that they wanted President Eisenhower to be President. He is President. He seems to want me to be Secretary of State and I am Secretary of State. We both do the best we can.

Mr. HAYS of Ohio. In my district by majority of 15,000 they want him to be President and by a majority of 26,000—I disagreed violently with your Near East policy or lack of it then—they wanted me to be Congressman. I do not know where that leaves us.

Secretary DULLES. I think I know what it is. I think that there has been a high degree of nonpartisan or bipartisan cooperation between the President and the Congress and that has existed over the recent postwar years. I believe that in some respects at least this election was endorsement of that bipartisanship and the desire that it should continue.

I can assure you that as far as the executive branch of the Government is concerned we want to do everything and intend to do everything we can to make it continue.

Now, as far as the evaluation of these things is concerned, it is very difficult to judge on the basis of isolated statements. As far as our popularity is concerned in Britain and France, that fluctuates a good deal. I could produce, if there were time—I do not have them here—letters covering the period you speak of in which high officials of the British Government expressed their very great appreciation for what we were doing and our cooperation with them. I can say when I was in London at most of these conferences—I went three times to London—most of the time I was for the first time in my life, as far as England is concerned at least, a good deal of the popular hero. People gathered in the streets and even applauded when I appeared.

So that, if statements that were made by the President at that time reflected that fact, it was a fact.

Now, these things go up and down. There is nothing as fickle perhaps as your popularity with the public, particularly the public of other countries. But by and large throughout that period there was good cooperation between our governments and there was a recognition of that fact on the part of their people.

I recall that when I returned from London on August 3, I referred to the Suez situation as being a dangerous situation. I spoke repeatedly throughout the period between August 3 and the end of October and first of November. On October 27 I said about the situation "I cannot predict the outcome. The situation is grave."

I do not think that anybody can doubt or the country doubted that we recognized it to be a very grave situation throughout that period. The first time I went to London, I think it was on the 30th or 31st of July, I went on 2 hours' notice. Everybody knew that. I went over to the White House, discussed the situation with the President. We felt it was so serious that without even going home to pack a bag, I got on a plane within 2 hours to go to London. You do not do those things if the situation is one which is not full of danger.

I think everybody knew throughout that period that there were very strong forces at work which believed that the solution should best be found in terms of an armed attack. That point of view was not dominant, as a result of the meetings that we had. Indeed, it looked, toward the end or the middle of October, at the time of the meeting of the Security Council, as though very great progress indeed had been made toward a peaceful settlement of the Suez Canal controversy. The six principles had been adopted unanimously by the Security Council and Egypt had agreed to them. There had been talks going on privately with Mr. Hammarskjöld by the Foreign Ministers of Britain, France, and Egypt and they had made a very large degree of additional progress.

I think that if you would study the whole record during that period, it would show that the situation was quite accurately portrayed and that while at times good progress was made, there was never a time when it was not a dangerous situation.

I recall that on September 23 I was asked publicly, "Would you say the danger of war over the Suez Canal is now ended or reduced?" My answer was, "No, it has not been ended. I think it has been reduced."

I think the evaluation was reasonably correct. Of course, we do not, any of us, claim that we can read the future.

There occur the unpredicted and to some extent the unpredictable. I think that the evaluation you are getting here is as good as reasonably possible under all the circumstances.

It was prepared in a very careful way through our organizations, our intelligence organizations, our diplomatic corps and the like, which are wholly bipartisan and very largely the same people that were performing those or comparable functions during the prior administration. Certainly there is no effort on anybody's part to try to mislead the American people and I can assure you you are getting what we believe is an absolutely frank, clear statement of the situation and evaluation of the risks and dangers.

I do not guarantee that it will always prove to be correct but I think that it is as near a correct evaluation as is practically possible to achieve at the present time.

Mr. HAYS of Ohio. Do I have any time left, Mr. Chairman?

Chairman GORDON. Your time is up. Mrs. Church.

Mrs. CHURCH. Mr. Secretary, I think if I had 5 hours, I could not ask all the questions that I would like to ask. I am going to confine myself to the military implications, questions that perhaps should be asked of Admiral Radford, but I am asking them of you because I want your interpretation of the resolution.

If this resolution be passed, would it be mandatory upon the President to use this power to send American troops and to take formal military action if a nation asks such?

Secretary DULLES. It would not be mandatory by any means. I do not think there is now in contemplation any significant new movement of troops or equipment. We have a pretty substantial military force in the area. The principal value of the resolution is its deterrent effect.

I remember when I was in the Senate and helped carry with Senator Vandenburg a main part of the burden of the ratification of the North Atlantic Treaty. Senator Vandenburg said at that time, "It is not the force in being that is as significant as it is the assurance that if there is an attack and that if our help is wanted, it will be there."

He said, "That is"—I think he used the phrase—"the knockout deterrent."

Mrs. CHURCH. My question is whether it is not putting a great burden upon the President alone to make the decision as to which country he will give aid and to which he will deny it.

Secretary DULLES. The principal burden perhaps is upon the countries concerned because the question will be whether they request such aid or not.

Now, of course, in two of the countries of the area, Turkey and Pakistan, we already are carrying out fairly substantial military assistance programs and they have the assurances that are contained in the North Atlantic Treaty and in the Southeast Asia Treaty.

I can assure you that the kind of responsibility that is involved here is nothing that the President covets. I suspect that no man has ever been President who, more than President Eisenhower, feels that he does not want to take this kind of responsibility. As far as he is concerned I am quite sure he would much prefer to adopt the policy of waiting and seeing and then deciding with the Congress.

He adopts a different recommendation for one reason only. That is because he is satisfied—and I might almost say reluctantly satisfied—that that is necessary in order to save the area.

Mrs. CHURCH. But he is not definitely assuring nor are we assuring any nation that they will get the aid if they ask for it. In other words, there is still an element of doubt.

Secretary DULLES. There is a slight element of doubt but the element of doubt is very greatly reduced, if this action is taken. If there is no such action and an attack occurs, then there could not be any action at all until there had been action by the Congress, calling the Congress together if it was not then in session or having a debate if it was in session.

The time, I think, to have that matter considered and decided as far as the Congress is concerned is now, because I can assure you that other countries who do not know the Congress as well as some of us, do not like to have their fate depend upon what might be a congressional debate conducted after they are once attacked. They want the debate before they are attacked because they believe, as a result of that, the attack will not occur. That has been the theory upon which we have operated almost everywhere: that if we give notice, if we are set to respond to an attack, then the attack will not occur.

Mrs. CHURCH. We would hope that would be true, Mr. Secretary, but I am assuming that you also have analyzed the implications, if that does not prove to be the case and that we are ready to meet them.

Secretary DULLES. I did not catch it.

Mrs. CHURCH. I am sorry. I said that we would hope that would be the case but that I am assuming you and the President and all those who considered the resolution before it was brought to the Congress have considered the possibility that it might not be the necessary psychological deterrent and that we might find ourselves widely implicated?

Secretary DULLES. Yes.

Mrs. CHURCH. I understood this morning that we have commitments already with 42 nations and I wonder whether you would be willing to tell us how this extends our commitments. Of course, without defining the Middle East as you will in executive session—

Secretary DULLES. I cannot do it here on a country-by-country basis but it might extend our commitments in a significant way to 3 or 4 additional countries. I say "in a significant way" because only if 1 of those 3 or 4 were attacked would the others be exposed to attack. For example, Iran is one of the significant ones. There could be, of course, an air attack, but that is, I would say, unlikely where there is no opportunity also to attack by land.

Mrs. CHURCH. My last question, Mr. Secretary, at this time deals with the fears expressed in some of the newspapers that there may be the possibility of other "Koreas" arising from this resolution—little wars spread over the world. Is that a fear we can dismiss?

Secretary DULLES. Well, I think that the Korean war was at least partially due to the fact that the men in the Kremlin thought they would be unopposed. I think that if there had been a comparable resolution at that time, there would not have been the Korean war. I am not saying that in criticism because these policies evolve gradually. We started with Greece and Turkey and then we extended it—

we first started actually with this hemisphere with the Rio Pact and then Greece and Turkey and then the North Atlantic Treaty.

I think one must in all fairness recognize that these things as a practical matter cannot all be done at once.

Therefore, I do not at this point raise that in any spirit of criticism, but I do say that if there had been on the books in favor of Korea a resolution such as is now proposed, we would not have had the Korean war.

Mrs. CHURCH. If we had had such a commitment at the time of the situation in Vietnam, we would have had to go in automatically if the President so ordered?

Secretary DULLES. No; we would not and there is certainly nothing whatever of an automatic character about this. Furthermore, the situation at that time in Vietnam was not such that we would have made or could properly have made it a subject for congressional action.

I discussed at that time the situation with congressional leaders from the Senate and from the House. We all agreed that until the colonial problem had been further solved, until there were genuinely free and independent countries there, it would be inappropriate for the United States to go in to support the French position there.

Then after the grant of complete independence to Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia, then there was made the Southeast Asia Treaty which does cover those areas and that treaty was approved by the Senate by an almost unanimous vote. I think there was only one vote in the Senate against that treaty.

Mrs. CHURCH. Mr. Secretary, am I right in remembering that that treaty merely requires that each nation go back and take appropriate steps? It is not as far-reaching as the terms of this resolution; is it?

Secretary DULLES. That is a matter of interpretation but I think it is pretty much as far-reaching as this is. The difference is slight in my opinion.

I think both recognize that the national interest of the United States is identified with the security and peace of these other countries, that our own peace and security would be jeopardized if there were an attack upon these countries and that we agree to take whatever action is appropriate to meet the attack if it occurs.

I consider that for all practical purposes the resolution here proposed is the approximate equivalent as near as we can get to treaty action.

I would have felt it preferable in some ways if we could have had treaty action in this situation. But the situation is so confused among states in the area. I described, I think, this morning the very careful consideration that had been given to the possibility of joining the Baghdad Pact and the reasons why it seemed impractical to do that. We might conceivably have acted by treaty here, but that did not seem to be a very practical possibility in view of the division of the area and the uncertainties in the area and the desirability, I think, of having greater flexibility and maneuverability than is possible with a treaty.

I do not think that the implications from the standpoint of war or peace are appreciably different under this resolution from what they are, for example, under the Southeast Asia Treaty.

Mrs. CHURCH. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

Chairman GORDON. Mr. Jarman.

Mr. JARMAN. Mr. Secretary, I have one very general question that I would like to ask.

Now that the President has made this request for authorization from the Congress, my concern is what the effect would be, worldwide, if Congress should refuse to give the requested authority. That is irrespective of the arguments pro and con that may be advanced as to whether the request for the authorization should have been made.

In your opinion would it increase the political tensions in the Middle East and perhaps even invite a Soviet attack in the area if the Congress should refuse to give the President the requested authority?

Secretary DULLES. In my opinion, the consequence in the area of a refusal or even of a prolonged delay or a sharp division would be quite disastrous as far as the area is concerned. I think it would mean that the area would be in a short time dominated by international communism, and the consequences of that would be very grave, indeed, throughout the world.

As I said in my statement it would virtually nullify our whole effort in Western Europe through the Marshall plan and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

There are some cases where you set your hand to the plow and you have got to go ahead.

We started to put our hand to this plow 10 years ago. We started with the so-called Truman Doctrine applied to Greece and Turkey. We have been moving on, we have been moving forward.

Now we confront a situation which is not yet covered by substantially the same policies as had been applied in one or another area over the past 10 years. If we do not go ahead and make clear that those same policies are applicable to this area, then I think we are in effect writing this area off and if we write this area off, then it will have nullified and undone all these other steps we have taken during these 10 years.

Mr. JARMAN. Certainly the entire world is looking to us for the final position that the legislative and the executive branches take on this great issue. It certainly seems to me that the repercussions might be terrific around the world if, on a major piece of foreign policy, which this is, the Legislative should show a decided difference and division with the Executive in this policy.

I will rest my final vote, Mr. Secretary, on the hearings that we are now beginning and on what we hear also from you and others in executive session.

But I would say that my own initial reaction is certainly favorable. It seems to me that the requested authorization is dealing from strength, and dealing from strength has been the approach that I have hoped our Government would make. It is the one thing that the Soviet best understands. I certainly would like to go on record today as being initially favorable to the resolution. Thank you.

Chairman GORDON. Mr. Adair.

Mr. ADAIR. Mr. Secretary, it might be said that if this resolution is adopted, it would authorize the Executive to put us in a state of war without further congressional action. That is, a declaration of war or otherwise. Would you give us your views upon that point?

Secretary DULLES. Unfortunately, whether or not the United States is in war does not depend wholly upon the action of the President or the action of Congress. If that were the case I think we would never be in war. Actually, we have been in a number of wars recently and at no time during that period has Congress declared war. Congress has found that we were in a state of war because other people attacked our vital interests.

Now, I do not call this a declaration of war, either present, future, or deferred. I call this a declaration of peace because I do not believe that peace can be preserved unless we make clear in advance that if aggressors attack the freedom and independence of other countries, which would be but a prelude to attacks which would come always nearer and nearer to us, that we are going to do something about it and something serious about it. If we do not make that clear in advance, then I think these attacks are much more apt to occur.

You go back to the earliest great pronouncement in this field, that of President Monroe, which announced the Monroe Doctrine. What did he say? He said to the nations of Europe, in effect, that "if you attempt to seize any more territory in this hemisphere or if you seek to impose your political system of despotism into this hemisphere, that will be a danger to the peace and security of the United States which we would not sit quietly and accept but we would act against it."

That was originally done as a unilateral declaration, it has always been endorsed and accepted by the Congress. Recently, it was reaffirmed in the reaffirmation of the Caracas Declaration in reference to international communism in this hemisphere.

I do not think anybody ever thought the Monroe Doctrine was a declaration of war. It was a declaration of peace and that is what we are bringing here.

Mr. ADAIR. It is possible, Mr. Secretary, however, that if this is adopted, our Armed Forces might be engaged without further congressional action; is it not?

Secretary DULLES. That is quite true, but that is also true in respect to a good many other parts of the world.

As I say, our forces were engaged at Pearl Harbor before Congress acted. That was not because we wanted them to but because the vital interests of the United States were attacked. When interests that are deemed to be vital are attacked, then we may be in war whether we like it or not and whether Congress acts or not.

I would like nothing better, if it could be guaranteed we would not be in a war unless Congress first approved it, but unfortunately the other fellow does not always see it that way.

Mr. ADAIR. And you would not regard this then, if it is to be enacted, as a situation in which the Congress is surrendering an undue amount of authority to the Executive?

Secretary DULLES. I do not. I believe that it is an expression by the Congress, at a time when it is appropriate and likely to preserve the peace, of the fact that if areas which are vital to the free world are sought to be forcibly seized by international communism, we will do something serious about it and that Armed Forces of the United States can be used. That situation already prevails as regards a very great deal of the endangered world. To do a comparable thing here is, I think, in no sense a surrender of the congressional prerogative.

It is an exercise of the congressional prerogative at a time when it is most apt to preserve the peace.

Mr. ADAIR. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

Chairman GORDON. Mr. Byrd.

Mr. BYRD. Mr. Secretary, as one member of this committee I am glad to see this administration at last facing up to the realities of a very dangerous situation. At first blush let me say for the record that I am in favor of this resolution. There may be certain features of it, particularly the foreign aid feature, that I am not wholly in accord with. But as to the standby authorization for the use of troops in the Middle East, I am in favor of giving the President that power although I think he perhaps already has it as the Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces.

I just hope that this will not be a continuation of the current foreign policy which, in my own opinion, has been a policy of blowing hot and then blowing cold. I think that the time has long passed when we should take a firm stand and follow a firm course. I think that the time is long past when we should throw aside some of the pacifistic tendencies that we have been exemplifying and I am not too sure there are not some very strong pacifistic influences within the State Department which should long ago have been rooted out. May I hasten to add, Mr. Secretary, that I have long felt that you have stood in opposition to some of those influences.

I believe that pacifism leads to war, and I think that pacifism is interpreted as a sign of great weakness. I do find it hard to reconcile the position the administration is taking today with the position that it took not very long ago in assuring the Russians that they need have no fear of our participating in a war of liberation of the satellites.

I would like to hear you comment today, Mr. Secretary, on the two positions which seem to be incompatible, each with the other, to me. Recently we assured Russia she would not need to worry about our participating in a war of liberation of any of the satellites. Today we expect to reap some kind of psychological value from the passage of this resolution which will assure the peoples of the Middle East that they will not stand alone in the event of aggression.

Secretary DULLES. You made a number of observations and I will not comment on all of them because some of them relate to past history where we might not wholly agree, but the important thing is that we reach agreement about what we do now.

Mr. BYRD. Mr. Secretary, may I interrupt you? I am just interested in, as I said before, an explanation of, what seems to me to be, two diverse and diametric positions, each inconsistent and incompatible with the other.

Secretary DULLES. I was going on to that.

Mr. BYRD. That is what I hope you will do.

Secretary DULLES. Yes. There is, first of all, what you might call the legal aspect, and then there is the practical aspect. Now, we are bound by the Charter of the United Nations and by the North Atlantic Treaty not to use force against the territorial integrity of any country and to seek to settle all of our disputes by peaceful means, so that international peace and justice are not endangered.

I do not see, really, how we could act in relation, let us say, to Poland and Hungary without using force against the territorial integrity of another country. From a practical standpoint, the attempt

to do so would almost certainly involve a general world war, in the course of which I suppose the first people to be totally exterminated would be the people of the satellite areas whom we were ostensibly going to help. So I believe from the standpoint both of our legal and moral undertakings and from the standpoint of practical expediency the use of armed force in the satellite countries would probably not produce the results that we wanted and probably not be consistent with our Charter obligations.

At the present time, what we are seeking to do is to create a situation so that the territorial integrity of these countries in the Middle East will not be invaded by force from the Soviet Union or nations controlled by international communism. It is a distinction, you might say, between defense and offense. I think that is a distinction which practically must be kept in mind if we are not to have nations all over the world engaging in military adventures to achieve what they think is a just and deserved result by means of attacking other countries.

Now, there are at least half a dozen situations which I could name—I prefer not to name them publicly—where there are governments which are very anxious to attack in order to remedy what they consider to be great injustices. The United States does not believe they should do that, and our influence was used against it last November, because we believe that the kind of a world we are trying to build must depend upon the nonresort to war and attack in order to produce good results. I do not think you produce good results that way. I think if we start to operate on that principle that this whole effort at world order which was begun after the First World War with the projected League of Nations, as now reflected by the United Nations, will all collapse.

It is very tempting to think about the use of force to accomplish a good result and to remedy an injustice, but I believe that the more effective way to do that is to be found in other processes which are available. They are not quick processes, but I do not think that the war process is necessarily a quick process. You can start war in a hurry, but it takes a long, long time before you have overcome the consequences of a war.

International communism first got hold of Russia after World War I. International communism got hold of much of the rest of Europe after World War II. I would not want to guarantee that if we went to war to try to free the satellites and we had World War III you would not find international communism at the end controlling a lot more than when it started. I do not believe in using war as an instrument of national policy when it has to be an aggressive war.

That is not pacifism. You quite rightly say I am not a pacifist by any means whatsoever, but I do believe that our use of force should be essentially defensive in accordance with article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations and that we should not engage in offensive military operations except as we or our vital interests may first be attacked.

Mr. BYRD. Mr. Secretary, I am still not satisfied, but I will not press that at the moment. I just cannot see why our Government, through the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, had to assure Russia that she had no reason to fear our participation in any war of liberation.

Chairman GORDON. Your time is up, Mr. Byrd.

Secretary DULLES. I do not think we ever did that, as I recall.

Chairman GORDON. Mr. Prouty.

Mr. PROUTY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, I have just one question. Will the adoption of this resolution extend to the United Nations any responsibility for the development and implementation of American foreign policy? I think perhaps you answered it at least by implication this morning, but I have heard considerable concern on that score expressed by various Members of Congress and I think you should make your views very clear.

Secretary DULLES. There are certain aspects of our foreign policy in relation to this area which are reflected in the programs and policies of the United Nations. That is not a coincidence; that is because we are an influential member of the United Nations.

We introduce these resolutions and if they win sufficient support they are adopted and then that becomes a United Nations responsibility at our initiative. That is true in relation primarily, as far as this area is concerned, to three major matters.

The first is the maintenance of the armistice lines between Israel and the Arab States, lines which were negotiated under the auspices of the United Nations; and in general the development of a greater condition of tranquillity as between Israel and the Arab countries.

The second thing is the case of the Arab refugees, of which there are nearly a million—some 800,000 to 900,000—who are a great charge against the conscience of people who feel that these people ought to be kept alive and cared for under the best possible conditions and in due course assimilated where they can be useful members of society and productive members of society. That is a task which is being carried out by the United Nations.

The United States makes a very substantial contribution to the United Nations to help it carry out its tasks.

Then there is the problem of the immediate status and then the long-range status of the Suez Canal. Both aspects of that matter are being dealt with by the United Nations.

Those are certain areas where United States policy is being carried out by and through the United Nations, not because it is United States policy but because we, as a member of the United Nations, have a duty and a responsibility to propose to the United Nations activities which we think it can usefully and properly and perhaps to best advantage carry out. We have done so, and in these respects that is the view not just of our own but of the great majority, an overwhelming majority, of the world community reflected by the United Nations.

Now, there are some other aspects of United States policy which cannot be carried out by and through the United Nations. That is basically the problem of security and to some extent the problem of economic aid and military planning. It cannot do that because, as I point out, the veto power the Soviet Union has and uses in the Security Council makes it impossible for the Security Council to be what the Charter contemplates; that is, the primary means of preserving international peace and security. Therefore, we have to use the alternative authority which article 51 grants; namely, to exercise the inherent right of collective self-defense.

Most of the economic aid cannot usefully be conducted perhaps through the United Nations. We do make some contribution to the

United Nations for that purpose, but the United Nations is not in a very good position to differentiate between countries which are Communist dominated and those which are not. Perhaps we wish it could, but the fact of the matter is that the Soviet Union is a member of the United Nations, and some of the satellites are members, and we do not like to see our economic aid distributed in ways which might lead to the countries dominated by international communism getting the benefit of that aid. So there are limitations upon the degree to which we can work by and through the United Nations.

Mr. PROUTY. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Chairman GORDON. Mr. Selden.

Mr. SELDEN. Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, should this resolution be adopted and should this policy go into effect, do you feel it will be necessary for this country to station additional troops overseas?

Secretary DULLES. Do I think so?

Mr. SELDEN. Yes.

Secretary DULLES. I would rather have you put that question to Admiral Radford when he appears in executive session.

Mr. SELDEN. There are 2 or 3 points on the economic aid which possibly you can clarify for me.

Secretary DULLES. Yes.

Mr. SELDEN. You mentioned the \$200 million request. Does that mean that the \$200 million contained in the resolution is going to be added to the \$100 million appropriated in section 401 of the Mutual Security Act and to the transfer authority of \$150 million contained in that same section?

Secretary DULLES. Yes. It would mean that that would be shifted, you might say, from one pocket to another. The President's discretionary fund is being pretty rapidly depleted by another event which was not foreseen nor foreseeable at the time when the mutual security legislation was passed; and that is the Hungarian situation. The relief of Hungarian refugees and transportation to this country and so forth is principally now being taken care of out of that fund, so that fund is being rather rapidly depleted.

Furthermore, the needs of the area of the Middle East have very greatly increased, for reasons I spoke of this morning; because of the stoppage in some cases of the flow of the oil that is sold, the oil royalties, and so forth. Therefore, on the basis of using your dollar ammunition where it is most needed, we believe that some of what is now in other pockets, so to speak, should be shifted to replenish and somewhat enlarge the President's discretionary fund.

It is not proposed—and we keep repeating this—either to authorize or appropriate a single dollar more, as far as this legislation is concerned.

Mr. SELDEN. You mean, of course, during the current fiscal year.

Secretary DULLES. That is right.

Mr. SELDEN. Will there be additional requests later on for fiscal years 1958 and 1959?

Secretary DULLES. Well, there will be coming along the President's request for the Mutual Security Act for next year.

Mr. SELDEN. And any funds to augment the policy during the next year will be included in the Mutual Security Act; is that correct?

Secretary DULLES. That is correct.

Mr. SELDEN. Let me ask you one other question. If the President transfers these funds before the 30th of June—and certainly he will do so—then will this resolution have the effect of continuing after the 30th of June the funds that are not obligated by that time by the President?

Secretary DULLES. I will have to get some expert advice here.

STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN B. HOLLISTER, DIRECTOR, INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION ADMINISTRATION

Mr. HOLLISTER. Offhand I would think that while this would give the authority to the President to use that in any way without limitations, that would not, probably, carry over without the approval of the Appropriations Committee.

Mr. SELDEN. In other words, if they are not obligated by the 30th of June they will not carry over?

Mr. HOLLISTER. Unless something specific is said in the resolution.

Mr. SELDEN. Can I assume, then, that under this resolution they will not?

Mr. HOLLISTER. It gives the President authority to use them. On second thought, I suppose that the taking away of all limitations of every kind gives the President the right to use \$200 million of funds already appropriated and that would, I suppose, even give a continuing right. I think I should therefore change my first impression, but I would want to check up to be certain.

Mr. SELDEN. I would like to have a definite answer on that subject, if you can make it available for the record.

Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

Secretary DULLES. I am glad I had an expert here to answer that question for me.

Mr. HOLLISTER. Who answered it so well. [Laughter.]

Secretary DULLES. You know the provisions of these laws are so intricate that I find it extremely difficult to answer these questions. I would say that the particular section 3, I think it is, of this suggested joint resolution which the chairman has introduced, was in a constant state of being revised. I expect it went through 20 revisions, because the laws are so many and so complicated it is extremely difficult to know just what you are doing. I hope we have the best answer. If we have not, we will try to cooperate with the Congress in finding a better way to express what we want to do, which is something very simple. Money has been appropriated. That is over the dam and done. In that appropriation a certain amount was made to be expendable at the President's discretion. That amount has been very largely depleted and is being depleted because of the Hungarian situation. Furthermore, the needs in the Middle East have greatly increased in the last 6 months because of the consequences of the Suez affair, the fighting and blocking of the pipeline from Iraq to Syria, and so forth. Therefore, we are suggesting that out of the money already appropriated, having in mind on the one hand the depletion of the present fund and the increase of the need, up to \$200 million—and it may not be that much which is actually required—be transferable from other areas of lesser need into this area.

Mr. SELDEN. Thank you, sir.

Chairman GORDON. Mr. Pilcher.

Mr. PILCHER. Mr. Secretary, with our alliances over there with most of these countries, does the President not want this resolution almost as much for the psychological effect that it will have on these small countries and also on the Soviet Union as anything else?

Secretary DULLES. I would like to answer in a slightly different form of words.

The most important single aspect of this matter is that the United States, acting through whatever available voices there are—that is, the President and the Congress—should make clear that we have a very serious interest indeed in the continued independence of this area and its freedom from control by international communism. Now, this has not been an area where in the past the United States has taken a very lively interest, primarily because other countries have done so. Until recently, most of this area was a colonial area. It was first under the Ottoman Empire. This was an area about which the Ottoman Empire concerned itself. Then, after the end of the First World War, it was parceled out in mandates, principally to Britain and France, who took over mandates for this area, and they exercised the principal authority. That condition existed until after the Second World War, when there began this evolution toward independence by the nations, but the countries which had the mandates there, notably the British and the French, continued a great many of their preexisting connections—British connections in Iraq, in Egypt, in Jordan, and so forth, in the Persian Gulf area. Under those circumstances the United States took a benevolent interest in the situation but did not take an active interest.

Now the area is endangered as never before because of the consequences of the recent fighting there which have largely dissipated the influence of the British and French in the area, and the question is, what is the United States going to do?

As I said this morning, we have no desire or purpose whatsoever to move in any colonial sense. All we want to do is to say to Russia, "Stay out," and to help to build up the vitality of these countries as independent countries. I believe this is the first time, really, it has become of great importance that we should do so.

We did, of course, take a great interest in the creation of the State of Israel, and we have strongly supported the existence of the State of Israel. That came after the Second World War. But in the Arab countries, we have not taken as lively an interest as other countries have, and the question now is, will we really help support the entire area, Arab and Israel, to stay free?

Mr. PILCHER. If you can, answer this question directly. Is it your opinion and the opinion of the President of the United States and his advisers that by passing this resolution it will help prevent a shooting war instead of provoking a shooting war?

Secretary DULLES. That is my profound conviction, and also that of the President. We believe that the greatest risk of war is the risk of miscalculation; that countries with aggressive purposes might think that they can perhaps grab off a bit here and grab off a bit there without being caught at it or being seriously opposed. The thing is, if you are going to oppose them, say it in advance and say it clearly and strongly, so there is no question or doubt about it. That, I believe, is the best way that there is to preserve peace.

Mr. PILCHER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman GORDON. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

Before we start on our second round of questioning, I wish to welcome several of our new members who have been designated today to serve on the Foreign Affairs Committee: Mr. O'Hara of Illinois; Mr. Fountain, of North Carolina; Mr. Coffin, of Maine; and Mr. Fascell, of Florida. I wish you would rise and present yourselves.

We welcome you here on this committee.

We will now proceed with our second round of questions. May I start with Mr. Chipperfield, since I want to reserve some questions for executive session?

Mr. CHIPPERFIELD. Mr. Chairman, I have no questions at this time.

Chairman GORDON. Dr. Morgan.

Mr. MORGAN. Mr. Secretary, the recent acts of aggression in the Middle East have come from non-Communist sources. How will the administration cope with similar situations if they arise in the future under this resolution?

Secretary DULLES. Well, I suppose we would cope with them in much the same way; namely, by appeal to the United Nations to bring about a cease-fire, but I may say that the result of the recent experiments has not been such, in my opinion, as to make it likely that there would be any early repetition.

Mr. MORGAN. Mr. Secretary, reports in the British press indicate that Egypt, Syria, and Jordan are already under the indirect Soviet control. Do you feel that those countries would cooperate under this resolution?

Secretary DULLES. I do not share the view, if that be the view, that these governments are at the present time under the control of international communism. There is no doubt that there is a certain amount of Communist influence in the countries. I think that there is a reasonable chance these countries will cooperate in this program, although naturally that would depend upon further exploration, explaining the plan to them and getting their views. I would not want to seem to prejudge that or take for granted one or another choice that they might make.

Mr. MORGAN. That is all, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman GORDON. Mr. Vorys.

Mr. VORYS. No questions.

Chairman GORDON. Mr. Carnahan.

Mr. CARNAHAN. Mr. Secretary, it seems to me this resolution sets bounds beyond which Communist aggression will be challenged. Does not such a declaration give the international Communists a rather clearly defined area in which they can expect to proceed in imposing their political systems without any serious challenge?

Secretary DULLES. Well, we have taken national action to meet that risk in almost all areas where it has seemed to be a serious and imminent risk. This Middle East area is perhaps the most important and most significant area where we have not yet taken that action. I do not know of any other area which is in jeopardy and where the jeopardy in that area might be increased in any way by this resolution.

Mr. CARNAHAN. International communism has made its greatest gains without the use of military forces, especially in the early stages of conquest. Can it be expected that the enactment of this resolution would be moving toward a decision to challenge Communist expansion with whatever means might be required?

Secretary DULLES. Well, I would question, sir, the suggestion that international communism has made its greatest gains without any military support. I think the contrary is the case.

Mr. CARNAHAN. I said without the use of military forces in the early stages of conquest and this is especially true of Communist expansion since World War II.

Secretary DULLES. The satellite countries and the Baltic States were all taken over by military force. In 1940 it was the Soviet Armies that went into the Baltic States, and it was the presence of the Soviet forces at the end of World War II in the Eastern European countries which, I would say, enabled international communism to get control.

I pointed out that in the case of Czechoslovakia there was not military force of the Soviet Union in Czechoslovakia at the time of the coup, but I did point out those forces were massed on the border and there was a threat of invasion at the time when it took control.

I do not know of any area, with the possible exception of Albania, which is really a special case, where international communism has gained much of a foothold unless it has been helped by the potential, at least, of Soviet military power.

Mr. CARNAHAN. Does the administration feel that there is likely to be any immediate Communist overt armed aggression anywhere in the area?

Secretary DULLES. We just do not know about that. What we do know is that there is the power to take such action; that there is the temptation to take such action; and that there are no restraints, legal or moral, against the taking of such action. Under those circumstances it would, I think, be rather reckless to assume that there is no danger of the action. I do not believe that we are going to know whether or not they act until they have acted. We will not get more than a few hours notice, probably. That is the assumption on which we go so far as the United States is concerned and so far as Western Europe is concerned and so far as the Far East is concerned, and I think the only prudent theory upon which to act is that when so great a power exists in despotic hands and is tempted to be used and there are no moral or legal inhibitions against it, we have to assume that there is a risk.

Mr. CARNAHAN. Is the policy to be considered a policy of containment?

Secretary DULLES. It is a policy of containment in the sense that we do not want them to expand; that is true.

Mr. CARNAHAN. Is this resolution designed to be a policy of containment or is it intended to be a deterrent to further expansion?

Secretary DULLES. It will be a deterrent to further expansion.

Mr. CARNAHAN. But the expansion, you say, will only be made by military action.

Secretary DULLES. No; excuse me. I said by military action or the potential of military action. Czechoslovakia, as I pointed out, had no military action, but there was a threat.

Mr. CARNAHAN. So long as the Communists proceed under "potential military action," then we probably have no recourse under this resolution.

Secretary DULLES. No, but if we take this action the nations will not feel threatened. I feel absolutely confident, for example, that if Czechoslovakia had enjoyed the assurance which could come from this

resolution and which could come from the North Atlantic Treaty, the Communists would never have taken over Czechoslovakia.

Mr. CARNAHAN. That is all, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman GORDON. Mrs. Bolton.

Mrs. BOLTON. No questions at this point, thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will reserve mine.

Chairman GORDON. Mr. Zablocki.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. Mr. Chairman, I reserve my questions for the executive session, however I would like to comment as one who has been thoroughly convinced that the amounts authorized and appropriated for the Mutual Security Act were vitally necessary in every area, and justified for every area, I am anxiously awaiting explanation and justification for the transfer of the \$200 million in section 3 of the resolution. Likewise, I am sure we should discuss the possibility of amending this resolution so that it will actually mean something.

I will reserve my questions until the executive session.

Chairman GORDON. Mr. Smith.

Mr. SMITH. I make the same reservation, Mr. Chairman. Thank you.

Chairman GORDON. Things are going very smoothly, Mr. Secretary.

Mr. SMITH. There is trouble ahead, though.

Chairman GORDON. Mr. Burleson.

Mr. BURLESON. I have no questions, Mr. Chairman; thank you.

Chairman GORDON. Mr. Merrow.

Mr. MERROW. Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, on page 2 of the resolution which is before us, section 2 states:

The President is authorized to employ the Armed Forces of the United States—and so forth, provided that such employment shall be consonant with the treaty obligations of the United States and the Charter of the United Nations, and then states:

And actions and recommendations of the United Nations.

Is it possible that a situation might arise where we would deem that action would be necessary for the security of the United States which did not agree with the actions and recommendations of the United Nations and, if so, is that particular part of the resolution not a restriction on our actions?

Secretary DULLES. I do not think it is an effective restriction on our action because the United States, of course, itself possesses a veto power in the Security Council, and no action could be taken in the Security Council without our concurrence. That would be the principal source—perhaps the only source—of the recommendations and action expressed here. It is possible that there could be recommendations in the General Assembly, but whether or not we would regard them as such is a question. Those would only be adopted by a two-thirds vote and whether or not they are of such a character as we would consider them to be included in this reservation would be dependent upon the character of the action. In the main the Security Council would act either under chapter 6 or under chapter 7, where it makes recommendations and takes action. There is a whole variety of forms of resolutions to be adopted in the United Nations. Some of them are called recommendations. Some of them are called calls to action. Some of them are called invitations, and so forth.

I do not feel that there is any practical likelihood of any United Nations action which we would not want to conform to. I may say that in the Greek-Turkey resolution the Congress went a bit further than is suggested here. There the resolution provided that we would cease our action at the request either of the Security Council, as to which we waived our rights of veto, or a recommendation of the General Assembly. This is somewhat comparable to that, but does not go as far as the Congress went in that respect in the Greek-Turkey resolution.

Mr. MERROW. You have no fear, then, from your response, that this would hamper our actions?

Secretary DULLES. No, sir.

Mr. MERROW. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman GORDON. Mrs. Kelly.

Mrs. KELLY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, I would like to clear up an answer you just made to one of Mr. Carnahan's questions. I believe it was January 2 when we had the first meeting with you, and I asked you a similar question. I asked you if the Executive had received any warning of any imminent overt aggressive move by the U. S. S. R. at this time in the Middle East. I believe you answered it differently. Am I correct? I wish you would answer that again.

Secretary DULLES. I think I said—and certainly I will now say, as I said in substance before—that we do not have any concrete evidence of a planned attack upon this area. All that we know are the facts which I outlined. First, there is the power to attack. Secondly, there is the temptation to attack. And the fact that the power is lodged in the hands of despotic rulers who do not feel bound either by their obligations under the United Nations Charter or by any moral considerations is involved. Under those circumstances, it seems to me prudence requires us to take into account the possibility that there may be an attack. Under modern conditions, attacks like this occur virtually without any prior warning. The fact that we do not know about an attack being planned does not, by any means, prove that it may not be in the process of being planned.

Mrs. KELLY. That being the case, Mr. Secretary, are we not putting the cart before the horse to a degree? Why do we not assert our leadership at this time in forcing the basic settlement of the issues that are controversial in this area?

Secretary DULLES. The purpose of this resolution, as has been the purpose of the series of other acts this Nation has taken, has been to deter attack and not just to meet it. If we wait until there is an attack, then it is too late to avoid an attack. The time to stop it is before it starts. And we cannot tell when it is going to start. Therefore, we must act on the assumption that it might start any day, and for that reason we should say to anybody who may be contemplating such an attack. "Before you move, bear in mind that you may have to meet the force of the United States." That is what we have said virtually all around the world, except in this area.

Mrs. KELLY. Mr. Secretary, if the President decides or deems it necessary to move into this area with our troops, can we expect the British and French to help us, if we request it?

Secretary DULLES. I do not know whether we can count on them to help us, or not. Of course, the British are still a member of the

Baghdad Pact and have certain obligations under that Pact. Their status under the pact has been somewhat altered since the attack on Egypt. But I would assume that the British would, if they continue as members of the Pact, as I have no reason to doubt, assist according to their ability under the Baghdad Pact.

Mrs. KELLY. Did you discuss this policy with the British and French prior to the announcement?

Secretary DULLES. No; we did not discuss it with the British and the French prior to having substantially agreed upon it. I did have a meeting at which I told the British and French Ambassadors generally about the way our minds were working. That was about a week or so ago, I guess. We have had no comments from their Governments, one way or the other.

Mrs. KELLY. That was my next question. You have not at this point received any comments on it from the British and French Governments?

Secretary DULLES. No. I think they probably have been waiting to get the more full exposition of the plan as outlined by President Eisenhower and the pending legislation. Of course I could not discuss the pending legislation with them because it was still in process of formation. We were still discussing it with Members of Congress and it actually did not assume its final form as far as the Executive is concerned until just a few hours before the President spoke on Saturday.

Mrs. KELLY. That is all, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman GORDON. Mr. Fulton.

Mr. FULTON. Mr. Secretary, I would like to ask you a few other points on construction of the resolution. On line 10, page 2, it refers to—

The President is authorized to undertake, in the general area of the Middle East, military assistance programs with any nation or group of nations of that area desiring such assistance.

That is a peculiar statement because it does not say "located" in that area, but it rather infers any nations with certain interests in that area. Does that line 10 include, for example, one of the colonial powers of Britain or France?

Secretary DULLES. Mr. Chairman, I am unfortunately without a copy of the committee print.

(A copy of the resolution was handed to Secretary Dulles.)

Secretary DULLES. This is line 10?

Mr. FULTON. Yes, line 10, on page 2. I will read it again:

The President is authorized to undertake, in the general area of the Middle East, military assistance programs with any nation or group of nations of that area desiring such assistance.

That does not refer really to a physical geographical location but it seems to infer nations with certain interests in that area. The question on construction is whether that includes the colonial powers, for example, Britain and France?

Secretary DULLES. No.

Mr. FULTON. When the United States was dealing first with Korea the problem was, of course, what was left out in stating the official United States position. By our leaving out other areas such as Africa or maybe Austria or maybe Yugoslavia, are we inviting some other kind of action simply by our omission?

By the way, I am certainly opposed to that junior dictator Tito coming here to the United States on an invitation by this Administration through the State Department. I think Mrs. Kelly will join me in that, will you not, Mrs. Kelly?

Mrs. KELLY. Definitely.

Mr. FULTON. If there are to be foreign dictators coming to this country, let them be first grade dictators instead of second grade, and without invitation from the Government of the free American people.

Secretary DULLES. I have lost the question.

Mr. FULTON. Suppose we now leave out certain areas as was done in the case of Korea, does it invite action, for example, in Austria or Yugoslavia or the southern part of Africa?

Secretary DULLES. Well, it can, of course, be argued that we should take action like this with respect to all the world and do it all at once.

Mr. FULTON. Yes, but that is the point I am bringing up. Are we, area by area, as soon as something alarming turns up, then turning the area over lock, stock, and barrel to the President to do it? Is Congress by this series of resolutions adopting the policy of giving up its power in any area where there is trouble?

Secretary DULLES. When it is a situation where it seems that there is a practical risk of war unless the position of the Nation is made clear in advance, then we come to Congress and ask it to take its part—or perhaps I should say give it the opportunity to take its part—to help deter or prevent such war. We do not think there is danger in many of these areas to which you refer. Therefore we do not bring those situations to Congress because we do not believe it is desirable to have this thing done on a blanket worldwide scale covering all the nations of the world. It is too difficult to define the conditions and that would, indeed, involve a more or less blanket worldwide grant of authority to the President without our being able to prevent any concrete, specific reasons why the Congress should act at that particular time and in this particular way.

I do not think there is reason for Congress to act unless and until there is a situation of some danger that confronts the nations. I do not think there is any likelihood of Soviet armed attack against the Union of South Africa, for example. Nor is it likely against the State of Austria. There are guarantees in relation to Austria which I think are reasonably dependable at the present time. Furthermore, we know that Austria prefers to take a position of independence and does not want the kind of assistance that would be proffered by such a resolution as this. That also applies to certain other countries such as India. But where there is reason to believe there is susceptibility, and where there is reason to believe there is danger, then the President believes he has the duty to bring the situation to the attention of Congress because in that case it can make and in the past has made a very substantial contribution to the cause of peace.

Mr. FULTON. Suppose that Israel is attacked by a nation that is either supplied with arms or advised by communist-minded people, and Israel then says she is being attacked by such a country, and asks the United States for help. Then what happens under this resolution? Israel advises the United States, "All right, we are about to be attacked. Here is the situation." Here Israel's opponent may not

be under the domination of international communism but certainly well supplied and well advised.

Secretary DULLES. Under this resolution unless the country is under the control of international communism it would not apply.

Mr. FULTON. So if there were technicians or military personnel or supplies and equipment from Communist sources in neighboring countries of some size, then am I correct, that without international communism domination of that nation threatening Israel, is not sufficient for this resolution to apply?

Secretary DULLES. No.

Mr. FULTON. On page 3—

Chairman GORDON. Your time is up.

Mr. FULTON. May I have 1 more minute?

Chairman GORDON. All right.

Mr. FULTON. On page 3, line 5, it says—

not to exceed \$200 million from any appropriations now available for carrying out the provisions of the Mutual Security Act of 1954, as amended.

Is that \$200 million in addition to the transferability provisions that already exist in the mutual security law, because the language of this resolution certainly does not say it. Does that mean that amount in addition to the transferability provisions that already exist?

Secretary DULLES. It does, I suppose, as far as the language goes. Actually virtually all the economic funds, at least, are obligated or close to being obligated at the present time, so there is no practical possibility of transferring very large sums of money, and it may very well be that the President does not find it useful or necessary to transfer as much as this. I would say it probably would not be as much as this sum because of the difficulty of obligating the money in the brief period of time available between now and the end of the year.

Mr. FULTON. Is this provision in addition to the current in-built transferability provision under the Mutual Security Act?

Secretary DULLES. Yes, it would be.

Mr. FULTON. Thank you.

Chairman GORDON. Mr. Hays of Ohio.

Mr. HAYS of Ohio. Mr. Secretary, I was inclined on first blush to be against this resolution. You have weakened my resolution to some extent because I believe in the containment of communism and always have. I believe it is the only way you can operate against the Communists.

I have a question along that line I would like to get you to talk about a little bit more. You made a great deal of issue today of the fact you are not going in and violate territorial integrity, that you are only going in if the country says it is being attacked by international communism and asks our assistance.

Hungary was attacked by Russian tanks. Mr. Nagy—I do not admire him greatly but he was better than they have now—the Russians invaded and he asked for assistance. In view of some of the statements by the administration that the enslaved nations can count on us, what is the difference between his asking for assistance and our standing aside and letting his government be forcibly overthrown, and our anxiety to go in in the case of the Arab nations? Is it because of their deeply religious background that we are so interested, or because of the oil in there, or what is it?

Secretary DULLES. Of course I do not think the facts about the Hungarian situation are exactly as you have portrayed them, Congressman. In the first place, we never received any request for military assistance from Nagy that I am aware of. I was sick part of that time and I cannot be an absolute guarantor of that, but I do not believe we were ever asked for military assistance by Prime Minister Nagy. In any event, he is not there at the present time nor is there any government in Hungary at the present time that is asking for military assistance.

Mr. HAYS of Ohio. I do not quite agree with that, but for the purpose of this question suppose I agree with your statement he did not ask for assistance. Suppose the same situation exists in the Middle East then in 3 or 4 days the person who asks for aid is not there any more? Say that great champion of democracy, King Saud, asks for our help and in 3 or 4 days he is not there?

Secretary DULLES. I would expect the request would be made in a character and form so that it would not necessarily depend on the existence, the life, or the whim of any single person.

Mr. HAYS of Ohio. I had hoped it would be that way, but from what I know of the Arab countries—I do not know of any except those in the Baghdad Pact where there would be anybody to act except one person. In Egypt it would be Nasser; in Jordan it is hard to say, but there is no stable government so in that case maybe the resolution would not operate at all?

Secretary DULLES. If you think the resolution would not operate at all, I take it there would be no objection to passing it?

Mr. HAYS of Ohio. That is exactly the way I feel about it but I do not want the hucksters to foist anything else on the American people to make them think something exists that does not exist. That is my only objection to it. Otherwise I see no objection.

Secretary DULLES. I do not know what you mean by hucksters, but perhaps it is just as well I do not.

Mr. HAYS of Ohio. I could fill you in by citing instances in September and October of last year and the same in 1952.

Chairman GORDON. Mr. Morano.

Mr. MORANO. Mr. Secretary, there has been some criticism that this Administration did not act a year ago on the same type of proposal, that we did not act 6 months ago or even 3 months ago. Is it because you feel or the President feels that the opportunity for American leadership did not exist then and does now?

Secretary DULLES. That is partly the explanation. Until the events of the past 2 months, there did not seem to be occasion for a resolution of this character or for United States activity of this character, and perhaps we could not even have done so without a collision, you might say, with friends and allies who perhaps had their own ideas about how to protect this situation. Now the idea of the United States assumes a greater relevancy than before. I do not believe we could have proceeded along this line until very recently. There was some thought, as the President indicated, of calling a special session of Congress along about the middle of December or thereabouts, at about the time the retirement of the British and the French seemed assured, but in view of the imminence of the present session of Congress, it was decided to wait until that time. But until the last 2 or 3 months I do not think we could have acted usefully in that sense.

Mr. MORANO. Can you state when the usefulness of this resolution occurred in the minds of the Administration? Specifically, was it after the Suez or soon after?

Secretary DULLES. Yes; it was after the Suez.

Mr. MORANO. Now, Mr. Secretary, we have military assistance pacts in that area of one kind or another. Pakistan and Turkey, for example, are members of pacts of which we are a member. But there are some countries in the area with which we do not have pacts?

Secretary DULLES. That is true.

Mr. MORANO. Even without the passage of this resolution you have authority to enter into a military assistance pact with any nation in that area; is that true?

Secretary DULLES. We have authority under the Mutual Security Act to engage in programs of military assistance with these countries which would involve supplying them or allowing them to buy military equipment, usually, I think almost always, assisted by the presence in the country of military assistance groups. But that does not involve any political implications of what we would do.

Mr. MORANO. The country would have to sign an agreement of some kind spelling it out?

Secretary DULLES. That is right. They sign certain agreements the most significant elements of which are—

Mr. MORANO. The point I am trying to make is that without this resolution you can do that, but this resolution does not preclude that such a military agreement could be signed before a country is attacked by overt aggression?

Secretary DULLES. We do not expect by this legislation to reach any agreement with any country that would bind the United States. Is that an answer to your question?

Mr. MORANO. Not quite.

Secretary DULLES. We have, for example, at the present time certain agreements under the Mutual Security Act whereby we supply a certain amount of military equipment to these countries. We have such an agreement today with Iran, for example. That would run along and we would carry out the provisions of the resolution in section 2 pursuant to those existing arrangements of that character.

They may request us to come to their aid if the attack occurs, but we will not have bound ourselves to come to their aid if an attack occurs.

Mr. MORANO. Without any nation being attacked, would you enter into a unilateral military assistance pact with any such nation? You have the authority to do it?

Secretary DULLES. We would do so—I think perhaps my apparent lack of responsiveness to your question is because it is not clear in my mind what you mean by a mutual assistance pact.

Mr. MORANO. Let us, for the sake of argument, say that either Egypt or Israel or both of them requested our Government to enter into a military assistance agreement with them under the Mutual Security Act.

Secretary DULLES. They have already done so, have they not?

Mr. MORANO. Before they were attacked.

Secretary DULLES. We have apparently a series of agreements with a number of those countries, some of which are necessary and designed to enable them to purchase military supplies in this country.

They are called reimbursable agreements.

Then in the case of grant aids there is another form of agreement which is made, and we have those at the present time with Pakistan, Iran, Turkey, Ethiopia, Iraq, and Libya.

I still am afraid I am not answering your question. That is not because I do not want to.

Mr. MORANO. Mr. Secretary, it is getting late in the afternoon and I hate to test your endurance further.

Secretary DULLES. My endurance is all right. My mind may be slipping.

Mr. MORANO. I will ask another question. There is a great deal of question about the constitutionality, I mean about great constitutional questions in this proposal and previous proposals that have been made to us involving world problems. Have you, as a great constitutional lawyer, ever given consideration to amending the Constitution in order to meet this problem in a more permanent way than just by attacking it piecemeal every time an emergency arises?

Secretary DULLES. Well, I have thought of that, but I have a good deal of reverence and respect for the Constitution. It sometimes seems to be cumbersome, but under it our country has grown from an infant to being perhaps the greatest country in the world—and I refer to greatness not only in terms of material power but in terms of our moral influence in the world—and I have not yet seen the necessity for the kind of an amendment that you suggest.

Mr. MORANO. I do not suggest it. I am asking.

Secretary DULLES. Now, it is quite true that in most of the countries of the world it is absolutely clear that the head of government can use the armed forces without any reference to parliament. When the British and the French used their military force the 1st of November, they did so in both cases without any prior authorization from the Parliament or the Chamber of Deputies. Some people might think the Constitution should be amended to give the President that degree of power. Some people think perhaps he already has it. Personally I think the process of requiring the Executive to come and talk it all over with the Congress when these great issues of war and peace may be at stake is a sound process and I would not like to see it changed. It seems cumbersome and shortcuts sometimes seem desirable, but I do not think you should shortcut when it comes to preserving the peace. We want all the advice and counsel we can get on that, including from the Congress.

Mr. MORANO. Thank you.

Chairman GORDON. Mr. Byrd.

Mr. BYRD. Mr. Secretary, I would like briefly to clarify my statement and my position earlier. I was not taking the position that we should have gone to war with Russia or that we should have taken any action that might have resulted in war with Russia. Neither was I assuming the position that we should not have taken such action; but I cannot see the wisdom of assuring Russia that it had nothing to fear from us. It would seem to me to have been the better plan to let them guess at what we might have done.

The question I have at this time, Mr. Secretary, is this: We have an effective Strategic Air Command capable of striking an effective blow quickly. We also possess atomic bombs and atomic weapons with which to wage effective total war. Is it not envisioned under

this resolution that we must be prepared to fight a very limited war in the Middle East?

Secretary DULLES. No, I do not think so. There are two words here which are used deliberately, "as he deems necessary to secure and protect." Those are the same words used in the Formosa resolution. We did not limit ourselves to the word "protect" but we included the word "secure," which may mean that the security is obtained by striking elsewhere, lines of communication and the like, and not limited to defending any particular area.

Mr. BYRD. But must we not anticipate a situation in which we might want to confine our activity to a certain area rather than to risk going into an all-out and total war? If I might restate my thesis here, it seems to me that we must be prepared to fight a war of brush-fire proportions; is that not true?

Secretary DULLES. We must be prepared to fight brush-fire wars.

Mr. BYRD. In passing this resolution we must be prepared to put out brush fires. Suppose that the Russians move into Syria or Turkey or Pakistan, or suppose Red China decides to send volunteers to Egypt. As I understand this resolution, it would mean that we would need to be prepared to protect the territorial integrity of the nation or group of nations being attacked overtly. We certainly would not want to go to the extreme of fighting an all-out war if it could be avoided; would we?

Secretary DULLES. No; we would want to limit our activity to the minimum necessary to accomplish the objective, and if the objective could be accomplished by local action, certainly that would be all that would be undertaken. If it required action outside of the area—for example, to attack staging areas, lines of communication, and the like—then that would be done. I do not envisage the possibility that there would be, for example, an all-out attack on the Soviet Union unless it was quite apparent that what was happening was deliberately intended to be the beginning of the Third World War. In that event we might have to act differently. Those are matters which inevitably have to be left to the judgment of the Commander in Chief.

Mr. BYRD. Mr. Secretary, our country has reduced its Armed Forces to a very great extent. I am under the impression that we have reduced our manpower in the Navy by about 6 percent, that we have reduced our manpower in the Marine Corps by about 14 percent, and in the Army by 29 percent. The figures may not be exactly correct, but certainly you will agree that our manpower has been very strenuously reduced. How, then, can we expect to possess the capability with which to fight an all-out war? Do we have the capability to go into Syria, for example, and protect that country from aggression?

Secretary DULLES. I am satisfied—and Admiral Radford can correct me if I am wrong—but I am satisfied we do have the power to secure and protect—

Chairman GORDON. Mr. Secretary, may I interrupt to say I think that question should be put at executive session.

Secretary DULLES. I think it would be better put at executive session.

Mr. BYRD. Mr. Secretary, I would suggest that you certainly could say "Yes" or "No" to that question. I think you were getting ready to do so.

Secretary DULLES. I will say this: It is not "Yes" or "No," but in every country in the world that maintains a military establishment

there has been a reduction of manpower as there has been an increase in effectiveness of weapons. The Soviet Union has claimed it reduced its manpower substantially, and I think it probably has. Great Britain has reduced her manpower. So effectiveness is not measured in terms of manpower alone.

Mr. BYRD. Mr. Chairman, I ask the question in the light of testimony given before this committee by General Quesada during last November. He said at that time that he did not feel we have the capability of moving into Syria effectively and decisively.

Chairman GORDON. Mrs. Church.

Mrs. CHURCH. Mr. Secretary, at the time the Formosa resolution was introduced we had quick and almost unanimous approval. The resolution was very definite. We felt we were not signing too much of a blank check. If this is an inappropriate question I will reserve it until executive session, but I wondered if you and the Administration preferred to stick to the letter of this resolution or perhaps would accept such amendments as might achieve unanimous support of the resolution?

Secretary DULLES. Well, unanimous support is a very difficult thing to get.

Mrs. CHURCH. You had it in the House on the Formosa resolution.

Secretary DULLES. All but 3 votes in the House and all but 3 votes in the Senate. And I would hope this resolution would receive an overwhelming vote. It would certainly lose in effectiveness if it did not, but it would equally lose in effectiveness if, in order to try to get a unanimous vote, it was made more or less meaningless. I believe it is possible to have a resolution which, like this, is meaningful and still gather for it an overwhelming vote. We have already modified the proposed resolution considerably to meet what we felt were views of Members of the Congress, and while we do not have any rigid or fixed ideas, we feel the elements of the resolution are very essential.

Mrs. CHURCH. I think some Members of the House have not had sufficient education on the subject and that there is something different in this resolution than the Formosa resolution, which was in effect a statement of principle.

Secretary DULLES. The difference between the two is primarily due to the fact the area is larger. Even in the case of the Formosa resolution there was considerable doubt as to the area it covered, particularly Quemoy and Matsu, which are small but of some significance. Despite that fact, the Congress, with only three votes against it in each House, adopted it. When this resolution has been discussed, I think the Congress by some comparable vote will approve it.

Chairman GORDON. Mr. Selden.

Mr. SELDEN. I will reserve my other questions for executive session, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman GORDON. I want to introduce, for the benefit of the members who came in late, our new member from New York, Mr. Farbstein.

Ladies and gentlemen, the next meeting of the committee will be in executive session and we have asked Secretary Dulles and Admiral Radford to meet in this same room tomorrow at 10:30 a. m.

(Thereupon, at 4:40 p. m., the committee adjourned until Tuesday, January 8, 1957.)

ECONOMIC AND MILITARY COOPERATION WITH NATIONS IN THE GENERAL AREA OF THE MIDDLE EAST

TUESDAY, JANUARY 8, 1957

**HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
Washington, D. C.**

The committee met at 10:30 a. m., in room 1301, New House Office Building, Hon. Thomas S. Gordon (chairman) presiding.

Chairman GORDON. Ladies and gentlemen, we are meeting this morning in executive session. Although a transcript is being taken of the testimony, it is strictly confidential and we should be careful to regard it as such and as completely off the record.

Mr. Dulles, you may proceed.

Mr. HAYS of Ohio. Mr. Chairman, would you recognize me for a brief statement of about 1 minute prior to the time the Secretary starts?

Chairman GORDON. I should not. I should call on the members by seniority, sir.

Mr. HAYS of Ohio. In that case, because of the fact that I do not believe this meeting should be secret, when this is of such importance to the American people—

Chairman GORDON. This is an executive session, and I will carry it on as announced.

Mr. HAYS of Ohio. In that case I am not going to be here, because I do not believe in hiding this thing behind closed doors.

Chairman GORDON. You may do as you wish.

Mr. HAYS of Ohio. I am aware of that.

Chairman GORDON. Mr. Secretary, yesterday, as you will recall, you stated that you would prefer to postpone consideration of the geographic area covered by the resolution. Would you care to make a comment on that aspect of the resolution now?

STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN FOSTER DULLES, SECRETARY OF STATE

Secretary DULLES. I would, Mr. Chairman.

If the committee permits, I should like also to present somewhat more fully some of the political and economic aspects of the situation in that area.

So far as the area itself is concerned, I might allude to a statement which was made by Mr. Jernegan when he was Deputy Assistant Sec-

retary for the Near Eastern Affairs, speaking on March 6, 1955. He said this:

There is no officially or generally recognized definition of the term "Middle East" so it is necessary to be somewhat arbitrary. However, I think it is safe to say that when the American Government thinks in terms of the Middle East defense it is thinking about the area lying between and including Libya on the west and Pakistan on the east and Turkey on the north and the Arabian Peninsula to the south.

The reference to the Arabian Peninsula to the south should in my opinion include the African States which lie for the most part north of the southern end of the Arabian Peninsula; namely, Ethiopia and the Sudan.

(Discussion off the record.)

Secretary DULLES. I should like, if I might, perhaps at this point or, if you prefer, later on, to cover more fully and with somewhat more detail 1 or 2 aspects of the matter which I dealt with yesterday. Is it agreeable, Mr. Chairman, that I do so now?

Chairman GORDON. Yes.

Mr. ADAIR. Mr. Chairman, could I clarify one point?

Mr. Secretary, do you then use the terms "Middle East" and "Near East" interchangeably?

Secretary DULLES. Yes. I do not think that there is any proper distinction now to be drawn as between those words. Historically the United States has used the term "Near East" and the British have used the term "Middle East" to mean very much the same thing. The terms have never been officially defined, but the general usage in this country has been on the whole to use the term "Near East" in contradistinction to the "Far East." The British terminology has been more to use the term "Middle East." We are coming now to use the term "Middle East" more, where we formerly used the term "Near East."

Mr. ADAIR. But you think for the sake of our own terminology just two terms could be used to describe that portion of the world, particularly Asia; that is, the "Far East" and the "Near or Middle East."

Secretary DULLES. I think so, although sometimes the phrase "South Asia" is used.

Mr. ADAIR. Yes.

Secretary DULLES. This committee in prior legislation, in 1950, I think, used the phrase "the general area of China." That was then recognized as covering, I think, an area which included India. It did not, as I recall, include Afghanistan. As I say, that phrase "the general area of China" was used, recognizing it was a somewhat loose term but recognizing circumstances made it undesirable to make a precise definition by countries.

For reasons I indicated yesterday, I think it would be undesirable to have a definition by countries and that it would be preferable to let the matter stand with the definition in the act proposed and with the expression of views which I have given here.

Mr. VORYS. Mr. Chairman?

Chairman GORDON. Mr. Vorys.

Mr. VORYS. May I make a comment on that?

Another example along the same line occurred in 1940 after France had been overrun. There was a possibility that the Germans might move into Martinique and it became necessary to have a congressional

declaration of the Monroe Doctrine, opposing the transference of any area in this hemisphere to any other nonhemisphere power. The resolution came from the Senate with the words "Western Hemisphere." We asked our staff and the State Department to define the Western Hemisphere. The geographers gave us literally 57 different possible definitions. We determined that the only people who would be interested in the precise limitations of our declaration would be our enemies, the Germans, and we wound up using the words of President Monroe, "this hemisphere." We did not even say "Western."

This language of this committee was accepted and became the language in which the Monroe Doctrine was reproclaimed to the world.

It seems to me the only people who would have any gain from precision in our defining this area would be our prospective enemies, and that therefore we ought to let them guess just exactly what the boundaries are.

Secretary DULLES. Could I now develop one or two other aspects of this thing, which were touched on yesterday.

(Discussion off the record.)

Secretary DULLES. Let me speak a bit about the economic situation. We think of the effect of what has happened upon the financial and economic position of Western Europe, and we are quite well aware of that. In order to bolster up the position of the United Kingdom, it has been necessary for the United States, in one way or another, to make available large sums during recent weeks, partly through making funds available for the British to draw down through the International Monetary Fund and partly through opening a credit with the Export-Import Bank, for the purchase of oil and other American supplies in this hemisphere.

(Discussion off the record.)

Secretary DULLES. But the economic impact of what has occurred has not been limited by any means to its effect upon Western Europe or upon the United Kingdom. The impact has been very severe upon the area itself, and that area is apt to fall into economic and financial distress, unless something is done by us to meet that situation.

I know there are some who think it would be adequate, perhaps, to meet the situation just by giving a military reassurance. It is the solemn and considered judgment of the administration that it is absolutely essential to give some economic and financial reassurance to the area, also, although we believe that can adequately be done for the time being without any additional appropriation of funds.

What has happened there has been that the revenues of the area have been very largely drawn from the production of oil and royalties derived from the production of oil and revenues derived from the transportation of oil. The economy of Egypt is in a very bad condition as a result of the military attack against Egypt, the cessation of normal trade with Egypt, the cessation of normal tourist traffic with Egypt, and also the loss of income from use of the Suez Canal. In saying that, I do not mean to imply there is any present intention to extend economic aid to Egypt.

(Discussion off the record.)

Secretary DULLES. But the fact is that the economic condition in Egypt is very bad indeed, and the question of Egypt's future role will depend in part upon the ability and willingness of someone to help out

Egypt on the assumption, so far as we are concerned, at least, that Egypt's international conduct will be such as to justify such help.

Jordan has been partly living on a subsidy from the United Kingdom. The United Kingdom is not in a position to spend in the area sums comparable to what she spent in the past, and the situation in that respect is somewhat like that which existed in relation to Greece and Turkey, where the British Government just frankly said that they could not go on carrying the financial liabilities incident to what had been the policies in Greece and Turkey. That was a primary reason for the Greek-Turkey Act in 1947 which, in addition to supplying military assistance and equipment, appropriated in the first instance \$400 million. I understand that the total we have put into Greece since 1947 is about \$3 billion.

I have talked of Egypt and Jordan. Now I shall discuss Saudi Arabia. The total revenues of Saudi Arabia have been cut approximately 30 percent due to the fact that the oil has not been able to pass, as it did, out of Saudi Arabia through pipelines and through the Suez Canal, so that the shipment of oil has been cut down by about 35 percent. They still have very substantial revenues, but no government in the world can stand a sudden cut of 30 percent in total revenue without serious repercussions. In respect to the oil matters I speak of, the repercussions are somewhat delayed because the companies have been in the habit of paying somewhat in advance, so that the interruption has not yet caught up in terms of the cessation of the revenues.

In Iraq the cut in total revenues has been even greater because of the complete stoppage of the IPC pipeline which goes from Iraq through Syria. There is a very serious economic situation impending in Iraq due to its very substantial loss of revenues through oil.

The income which Syria derived for the right to ship oil through Syria has been important to the Syrian economy. Syria received a royalty on the amount of oil shipped through Syria, and since that pipeline, which you see here, has now been broken, it is not going to get the revenues from there any more.

(Discussion off the record.)

Mr. DULLES. Israel has also been affected not by the oil situation so much as by the general stoppage of trade in the area, and the expenses due to the recent military operation and mobilization of their manpower and the like.

The result is that this area faces a very grave economic and financial situation. As I say, that has been sort of a delayed "time bomb" because these royalties I speak of have generally been paid somewhat in advance and to some extent they have been able to borrow money on the assumption that the oil revenues will resume, and they are trying to tide themselves over. But, the possibilities in that respect are disappearing rapidly by the lapse of time.

(Discussion off the record.)

Mr. DULLES. Now, I say, as a result of these developments, that unless there is a program here, both of a military and economic character, it is our definite belief that this area is very likely to be lost. And if it is lost, it will be the greatest victory that the Soviet Communists could ever have gained because if they get this area they in effect will have gotten Western Europe without a war.

I have approached here openly and frankly the grave situation that confronts us and the great urgency of the situation, because events are moving very rapidly. The Soviets are stepping up their activities very rapidly in the area and the time within which we can act effectively is not of very great duration.

I hope, and I feel confident, that the committee is aware of the danger of this situation. I have been appreciative of your meeting so promptly and so steadily on the problem, but I can assure you, ladies and gentlemen, that the situation is one of very great gravity indeed.

Chairman GORDON. Mr. Chipperfield.

Mr. CHIPPERFIELD. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Secretary.

I would like to ask, have we been in consultation with any of the countries in the Middle East area as to their acceptance of this program, or have they asked for help or have they expressed a necessity for such a program?

Secretary DULLES. They have practically all of them expressed the sense of need and hope that we would meet that need. This is true as regards virtually all of the countries in the area.

Now, they have not, most of them, expressed themselves precisely in terms of this program because this program only became known in precise form when the resolution was introduced here a couple of days ago.

I will say this: I had a visit recently from the Ambassadors of Turkey, Iraq, Iran, and Pakistan, who came to see me together at the requests of their Governments, and they said unless we moved quickly in the area they thought the situation would be lost.

I told them:

I cannot tell you what we will do because that is a matter we are still thinking about and in which obviously the Congress will have to be consulted. I think I can tell you there is an excellent prospect we will do something, and I ask you to keep your courage up in the confidence that the United States will do something substantial in this area.

(Discussion off the record.)

Secretary DULLES. Of course they would like to get it, perhaps, on freer terms than suggested by this resolution. We do not want to give help except to a country that we believe is dedicated to maintaining its own independence, and by that we mean fighting against communism. We want to help them keep free from international communism. We do not want to help play one side against another, therefore we think they have to be dedicated to fighting against international communism before we give them help. Perhaps they would like it without any such assurance.

The same applies to any military assistance, but the intelligence reports I have gotten yesterday and today indicate that the reaction of these countries is more and more favorable. As I said yesterday, the first interpretations of it were given by guesswork—or I would say by benevolent malevolence—by the Russian-Arab language radio. Since it has become known, there has been a considerable shift of public opinion and we feel most of the countries of the area will want to go along with this program, and certainly enough of them will want to go along so that the results we want can be achieved.

Mr. CHIPPERFIELD. That is all.

Chairman GORDON. Mr. Morgan.

Mr. MORGAN. Mr. Secretary, Egypt, Jordan, and Syria are the real trouble spots in the Middle East, and all three have indicated their opposition to this program?

Secretary DULLES. Their opposition?

Mr. MORGAN. Yes.

Secretary DULLES. No, sir.

Mr. MORGAN. Jordan?

Secretary DULLES. No, sir. Jordan, on the other hand, has indicated—if you are talking about some of the newspaper stories you might be correct, but as far as the governments are concerned you are not correct.

Mr. MORGAN. What are our plans to bring in countries that have expressed opposition? Do we have any plans to bring them in the fold? Say Egypt, for example.

Secretary DULLES. We have programs with respect to Egypt, programs which in effect are those of the U. N.

(Discussion off the record.)

Secretary DULLES. Those policies are being worked out, I think very ably being worked out, by Mr. Hammarskjold. And I may say that the conduct of Egypt is not quite as bad as seems to be portrayed oftentimes by the press, which tend to pick up stories which are interesting and sensational but not always accurate. I talked to Mr. Hammarskjold about this situation about a week ago, and he felt there was no reason to despair at all about the future conduct of Egypt.

(Discussion off the record.)

Chairman GORDON. Mr. Vorys.

Mr. VORYS. No questions.

Chairman GORDON. Mr. Carnahan.

Mr. CARNAHAN. Mr. Secretary, in paragraph VIII of the printed version of the President's message, I want to read this sentence:

Nothing is more necessary—

and the President is talking about the employment of the Armed Forces—

Nothing is more necessary to assure this than that our policy with respect to the defense of the area be promptly and clearly determined and declared.

In my opinion we might meet this quality of promptness by passing this resolution, but it does not seem to me that the passage of the resolution will clearly determine or define our policy.

I read again, just before that sentence, a couple more sentences to attempt to point out there is nothing very clearly defined in the resolution. This is reading from the President's message:

Such authority would not be exercised—

that is, the authority to employ the Armed Forces—

except at the desire of the nation attacked. Beyond this it is my profound hope that this authority would never have to be exercised at all.

How are we to reconcile these two seemingly diverse positions?

Secretary DULLES. It is our view, which is embodied in this legislation and which has been embodied in a whole series of acts, of which the North Atlantic Treaty is perhaps the most significant, and the action taken under that treaty, that if we make clear our ability and willingness, if need be, to fight, we will not need to fight. That under-

lies the whole philosophy of this administration and I believe of the preceding administration. I recall that the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, in its report on the North Atlantic Treaty, said that the important thing was to have the deterrent, and if you had the deterrent you probably would not have to use it. I think the risk of this country having to fight is very much less because we have a powerful military establishment. I think if you have the military establishment you probably will not have to use it. If you do not have it, you probably will have to improvise it and fight.

So I do not think there is any inconsistency in the President's statement that if we do these things we will probably not have to use force.

Mr. CARNAHAN. Then you think this resolution would clearly define our policy with reference to the area?

Secretary DULLES. It will make it clear to the extent it is necessary to achieve the result. Of course the detailed planning under this resolution would have to be taken up and would be taken up by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, by the Chairman, and by the military people.

(Discussion off the record.)

Secretary DULLES. Do you want Admiral Radford to tell you about that now? Or do you want him to do it later?

Chairman GORDON. He can do that later.

Mr. CARNAHAN. Then under this resolution it is the intention of the President at some later time to clearly determine and define our policy with reference to the area?

Secretary DULLES. Our broad policy would be defined here just as it is defined under the North Atlantic Treaty. After you get the North Atlantic Treaty, you have a whole series of military planning to be done. You do not have to publish to the world all your military plans. You do need to make it clear that you are ready, willing, and able to fight if you have to. Having done that, the elaboration is up to our military advisers.

Mr. CARNAHAN. I wonder why it is necessary to say that it is necessary to promptly and clearly determine and declare our policy and to assume that the passage of this resolution is clearly determining and declaring our policy? The resolution will leave to the President the obligation to negotiate military aid programs with nations in the area desiring such programs. Would those agreements be in the form of treaties or in the form of Executive Agreements?

Secretary DULLES. To the extent they are military assistance programs, they would be done precisely as they have been done to date with a number of countries with which we have negotiated military assistance programs. We do not contemplate that apart from that there should be either any treaty or Executive Agreement that would impose on the United States the obligation to fight.

Mr. CARNAHAN. Probably no obligation to fight, but there would have to be some type of agreement under which the military assistance would be given?

Secretary DULLES. If you are thinking of military assistance in terms of peacetime assistance, that is always done pursuant to provisions of the Mutual Security Act.

Mr. CARNAHAN. Would military aid under the resolution to countries in the area be considered peacetime assistance or something else?

Secretary DULLES. We give the peacetime assistance pursuant to agreements just as we do now to a great many countries. The question

of what we do in time of war, we decide, but we do the military planning with the countries on the assumption this power will be exercised.

Mr. CARNAHAN. What I am talking about is the negotiation of these programs for military assistance.

Secretary DULLES. You are talking about peacetime assistance? There are two things, as I interpret this resolution. Section 2 has two parts. One is to undertake military assistance programs. That is peacetime assistance. Those can be done under agreements just as we are doing them today with 20 or 30 countries.

Mr. CARNAHAN. And they will be Executive Agreements?

Secretary DULLES. They will be Executive Agreements, yes, negotiated under authority of the Mutual Security Act.

The second thing is the wartime use. Those would not be subject to military agreements, but would be subject to military planning.

Mr. CARNAHAN. That is all.

Chairman GORDON. Mrs. Bolton.

Mr. VORYS. Will you yield?

Mrs. BOLTON. Yes, indeed.

Mr. VORYS. These are Executive Agreements, but I think it is important to realize they are Executive Agreements previously authorized by law and not the type we get into discussion and debate about. They have already been authorized by law; isn't that right?

Secretary DULLES. That is right. They are authorized by the Mutual Security Act, as amended.

Mr. CARNAHAN. Then this is authorizing agreements in days to come?

Mr. MORANO. Will you yield?

This is a question I asked yesterday, and I understand the Secretary is going to submit a memorandum giving the precise answer to the question; is that correct?

Secretary DULLES. Yes, if the answer I have given is not sufficiently precise. The military assistance programs referred to in the first sentence of section 2 would be programs carried out under Executive Agreements previously authorized or to be authorized under the Mutual Security Act.

Mr. MORANO. The Mutual Security Act defines those?

Secretary DULLES. Yes.

Mr. MORANO. I think, further, the Executive must report to this committee whenever such an agreement is entered into; this committee must be notified of the agreement.

Mr. CARNAHAN. Will the passage of this resolution alter or change the authorization for Executive Agreements under present legislation?

Secretary DULLES. I think it is implicit that the committee will be notified of agreements concluded. There is certainly no objection to it.

Mrs. KELLY. Will the gentlemen yield?

Mr. CARNAHAN. Yes.

Mrs. KELLY. If it is in accordance with the present mutual security bill, then this will not be a long-term authorization?

Secretary DULLES. It will be no longer term than your mutual security legislation. It may not be as long because this particular act might be terminated.

Mrs. KELLY. Is this sentence a method of getting around the long-term authorization that Congress refused to grant last year?

Secretary DULLES. No.

Chairman GORDON. Mrs. Bolton.

Mrs. BOLTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

(Discussion off the record.)

Chairman GORDON. Mr. Zablocki.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. I have a question to section 3 of the resolution. The \$200 million that is already appropriated and will be used for the purposes of this resolution is taken from what area? Since it was our opinion that every dollar requested was absolutely necessary, will you tell us from what area or what country the money is to be diverted?

Secretary DULLES. Can Mr. Hollister answer that or would you like me to?

(Discussion off the record.)

Secretary DULLES. As a general proposition let me say this: First, it is not ever possible for the Executive, or I think even for Congress, to be certain that plans which have to be formulated about 2 years in advance are going to turn out, when the time comes, to be the best expenditure of the money. Some situations get worse and some situations get somewhat better. Today this situation has gotten so much worse that, if necessary, we could rob every other area to take care of it.

We would have preferred to come in and ask for an additional authorization and appropriation, and as the bill was first drafted we did that, because it is not easy to get the money for this purpose and I doubt if we will find it useful to get as much as \$200 million. That is a ceiling and not a fixed figure at all. But we felt, in view of the complications in handling it that way, the necessity of taking it to the Appropriations Committee of both Houses, that we should try to get along without additional appropriations this year. But that was due to the necessity to get quick action here and not because we readily find the money.

Mr. Hollister, do you want to supplement that?

(Discussion off the record.)

STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN B. HOLLISTER, DIRECTOR, INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION ADMINISTRATION

Mr. HOLLISTER. In programing, while when making our presentation to the Congress we make the best guess we can at the time, as the result of planning that has been going on for months, some is out of date before the books are presented to the committee. As the world changes, we give up programs we have planned and we find places where the money can better be used. In the fall we set up firm commitments and also tentative commitments. In the list of tentative commitments are substantial sums of money which, if it turns out the needs on this area are greater somewhere else, we can use elsewhere.

I can, if the committee desires it, get up a complete list of these different sums, but that is the general approach.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. Mr. Chairman, I believe that list would be most helpful and may assure us that the sum was not diverted from some other program and some other vital area.

Mr. MORANO. Will the gentleman yield?

(Discussion off the record.)

Mr. VORYS. What I would like to know is why, under the rather broad transfer and possibly double transfer features in existing law, there is not money enough in present appropriations so that the programs that are contemplated could be carried on without section 3?

Mr. HOLLISTER. There are a number of limitations on the way in which funds can be used now, for example, that 80 percent must be obligated before the end of April.

(Discussion off the record.)

Mr. HOLLISTER. There are limitations with respect to loans which would be relieved under these circumstances because it is felt that in emergencies there should be grant authority. It is the desire to be relieved with respect to a certain amount of existing funds from these limitations that is included in this resolution.

I should point out too that this is applicable not only to the economic funds but to the military side of the picture, so even if it is not available in economic funds there may be funds under the MDAP program available in this way. We must consider the whole mutual security program.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. I thought \$200 million was in addition to the funds for the area?

(Discussion off the record.)

Mr. HOLLISTER. This \$200 million is not in addition to any fund. It is authority to the President to use in a different way funds already appropriated.

(Discussion off the record.)

Mr. ZABLOCKI. If the cutoff date is the problem, without mentioning any amount, authorization could be requested for the use of money authorized and appropriated in the last mutual security bill beyond the date limitation?

Mr. HOLLISTER. That could be asked.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. Is that the only intent of section 3?

Mr. HOLLISTER. The intent of section 3 is to give the President a free hand in using existing funds for action in the Middle East.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. Then all that need to be requested is authorization for a date beyond that set in the Mutual Security Act?

Mr. HOLLISTER. That is correct, but in addition there are a number of existing limitations from which the Executive would like to be relieved in the use of these funds.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. Mr. Chairman, could Mr. Hollister have a memorandum as soon as possible on the matter in discussion?

Mr. HOLLISTER. Yes, sir.

Mr. ADAIR. Will the gentleman yield?

Chairman GORDON. Mr. Adair.

Mr. ADAIR. Is it not true that under the provisions of this proposed amendment here the President could reach any kind of funds, any funds apportioned for any place in the world, military or anything else, for this \$200 million?

Mr. HOLLISTER. That is correct.

Mr. ADAIR. It is really just a free hand for him to take any money, European money, Asian money, any money of any kind?

Mr. HOLLISTER. That is correct.

Mr. BURLESON. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. ADAIR. Yes.

Mr. BURLESON. I am much more interested in knowing where the money is going and for what it is going, than where it is coming from.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. We were surprised there was any left to be "coming from."

Secretary DULLES. Could I add one other word to this discussion?

Chairman GORDON. Mr. Secretary.

(Discussion off the record.)

Secretary DULLES. I pointed out to you the very desperate economic and financial plight these countries face within the coming months. If there is not some expression here by the Congress of a desire to meet that as well as the military thing, I think this whole program will fail. This is, in my opinion, an absolutely essential component of this.

We have here a program which has basically three points in it. One is military assistance planning. You can say we can do that now and we can. But we spell it out again here to have a rounded program.

Economic assistance. We have a lot of power there now but we spell it out here to make it part of a rounded program.

As a last resort the use of United States forces.

Those three elements all, in my opinion, must be in some way effectively in this bill if it is going to have the effect in the area we want. If we just deal with the military thing, it will fail because the people there feel that their economic plight is becoming desperate. They feel that more quickly and more intensively than the military threat which exists at a distance.

Unless the Congress indicates its concern with economic matters as well as with the military situation, I think it will fail. I regard the economic provisions as an essential part of the resolution even though some of you may be able to figure out, Mr. Hollister can figure out, that we could squeak through without it.

Mr. VORYS. Mr. Chairman, one other question in this area if the gentleman will yield.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. I do not have any more time.

Chairman GORDON. You may proceed, Mr. Vorys.

Mr. VORYS. I spoke briefly about this to Mr. Hollister, I think he disagrees with me, but as I read section 3, the President's use of our own forces would be financed out of Mutual Security Act appropriations. Is that the purpose of the section?

Mr. HOLLISTER. I do not think so. I do not think that is the proper interpretation. They are not in the same section. It says the President is authorized to use existing funds without certain limitations, that is all, for the purposes of the preceding sections. That does not limit him, obviously, to carry out the purposes of the preceding section in any other way he may care to.

Mr. VORYS. Ordinarily, when we provide an authorization in money and refer to the provisions of the act, we mean that authorization to be exclusive.

Mr. HOLLISTER. That is generally so. This is not a new authorization really. There is existing authorization and appropriation of this money. It is merely asking to give the President a freer hand in the use of money which has already been authorized and appropriated.

Secretary DULLES. Could I add to that, Mr. Chairman, that when this bill was first drafted and indeed when I read it to the members of this committee before the President spoke, when it was in draft

form, it had in it a clause which said any use of the Armed Forces would be paid for out of funds available to the Treasury Department.

In several quarters people seemed to think in Congress that that was quite unnecessary. We checked it up with the Bureau of the Budget and they thought it was unnecessary. So in deference to what we thought was congressional sentiment we dropped that out on the theory if we have to fight a war, obviously we have to get more money appropriated.

Chairman GORDON. Mr. Smith.

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I would like to follow up, Mr. Secretary, the line of questioning that has been raised here with reference to the allocation of funds. Is it the purpose before these hearings are concluded to spell out for us the areas where the funds are going to be allocated for economic aid and military assistance?

Secretary DULLES. No, sir; that would not be practical, I am sorry to say. The purpose of the mission which the President plans to send to the area as soon as it seems reasonably assured this legislation will pass will be to feel out that situation. As I indicated to you, the economic plight which has come to this area has only come as a result of events which took place within the last 2 months. Whereas we did have a great deal in the way of economic studies for this area, I doubt very much that this present crisis can be met through programs such as that because these programs are in the main long-term programs which may run over 2 or 3 years.

You are going to face the problem here of governments that are just going to have to have some fairly quick help. We probably will have to devise perhaps emergency programs to deal with this area of quite a different character from anything we thought of when we appeared before you last May or June and the year before that. This is a situation of a different character, of a different order of emergency. It will have to be dealt with on the basis of what we find in the area; and we do not have sufficient information right here now, this week, intelligently to answer that inquiry.

Mr. SMITH. Mr. Secretary, I think that those of us who are on the committee and who have had the benefit of your exposition here this morning are sympathetic. We are, however, confronted with a practical situation when we reach the floor of the House. Those questions are going to be asked. Do you think after the mission has gone abroad and returned that we could then have the benefit of its conclusions?

Secretary DULLES. I think your committee can be quite assured, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, that as quick as our planning can develop here it will be fully laid before the committee.

Mr. SMITH. I feel quite sure, Mr. Secretary, that, if the Congress and the public generally had the benefit of your explanation this morning, it is a program that will take. But there are a number of questions, as have been quite evident, even by members of the committee.

Mr. Chairman, may I ask two more questions?

As I understand it, this resolution and the program you are suggesting here by this legislation does not attempt to deal with the Arab-Israel dispute.

Secretary DULLES. That is correct. That matter is being dealt with quite actively by the United Nations. We intend, as long as that effort holds any hope of success, to support the efforts of the United Nations in that area.

Mr. SMITH. Do you think that our aid could be made contingent upon a settlement of the differences among some of those nations?

Secretary DULLES. I doubt that very much because the problems involved in settling the Arab-Israeli dispute are extremely stubborn, extremely difficult. Even with good will on both sides, it would take a considerable period of time to convert the present armistices into peace agreements with settled boundaries and the like. I do not think the situation can be held that long.

Mr. SMITH. But the nations who have no desire to sit down and discuss this problem jointly are using it as a means to keep the tensions current. It seems to me, Mr. Secretary, that we may attempt to put out the brush fires all around the perimeter of the Arab-Israeli dispute and then, when we come to a showdown, we will still have the area just as tense as it is today. I hope I am wrong about that.

Secretary DULLES. What we are trying to create in the area is a greater sense of security, greater degree of calm, more stability of government, and elimination of the influence of the Communists. They are taking advantage of the present situation to stoke the fires of hatred between the Israeli and the Arabs. I think the first problem to be solved is to try to get the evil influence out of the area. The Soviet Union is telling the Arab States "If you will just play with us, we will see to it there is not going to be any Israel." They are doing all they possibly can to keep that hatred alive, keep alive a desire to liquidate the State of Israel.

I do not think these problems can be solved when you have a great power with considerable resources in the way of propaganda and subversion available which is constantly trying to keep these disputes alive. I think the first thing to do is try to get a sufficient stability in the area so that more sober counsels will prevail and where you have eliminated this external force which is trying to stir up trouble. I think this program will create an environment which will permit the problems to be solved; I do not think you can solve the problems as a condition precedent to this program.

Mr. SMITH. I would like to yield to the gentleman from Connecticut.

Mr. MORANO. As far as military assistance is concerned, if you follow the conditions laid out in the Mutual Security Act, it says no assistance shall be furnished to any nations under this title unless said nations shall have agreed to take such action as may be mutually agreed upon to eliminate causes of international tension.

There in that area there is a definite international tension and if you follow the Mutual Security Act with respect to military assistance, you could not enter into a military agreement with either Israel or Egypt unless they agree to aid in elimination of tension there.

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman GORDON. Mr. Burleson.

Mr. BURLESON. Mr. Secretary, perhaps it would be more considerate just to ask the purpose of the Richards mission to the Middle East which is anticipated, but to put it more bluntly, let me ask: Since we assume that Turkey, Iran, Iraq, Pakistan and others of the Baghdad Pact, and Israel, would agree pretty much with what we are doing,

is the purpose of the Richards mission to influence Syria, Jordan, and Egypt and maybe other countries in the area, to request our economic aid?

Secretary DULLES. The purpose of the mission would be, I think, to visit the capitals of most of the countries of that area to see what can be done to bring about stability and to avoid economic distress of which communism would certainly take advantage.

That would probably involve Lebanon. Lebanon is a country which particularly needs our help and support at this present time. It is one of the most western-oriented of the countries of the area. It is very greatly concerned about what is going on in its neighborhood.

I think that very much can be done and needs to be done to bolster up a government like Lebanon. Perhaps the example set there would have an influence in the rest of the area.

Mr. BURLESON. Thank you, sir.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. Would the gentleman yield?

Mr. BURLESON. Yes.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. A better man could not have been appointed for the mission.

Mr. BURLESON. I should have said that.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. Mr. Secretary, although my question may seem unusual, nevertheless, I ask it in all sincerity. Since, Mr. Secretary, this resolution is intended primarily for psychological effect, couldn't as dramatic a psychological effect be obtained if the President of the United States visited this very troublesome area?

Secretary DULLES. That would certainly be dramatic.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. President Eisenhower's announcement and visit to Korea was dramatic.

Secretary DULLES. Not as President.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. President Eisenhower announced that as soon as he would be President he would go to Korea to bring about peace. I am very serious in asking the question.

Secretary DULLES. That gets you into a discussion as to the proper role of the President in the active conduct of foreign affairs. I would doubt very much the desirability of his going. The President is under great pressure to go to almost every country in the world. He did go to Panama for the meeting with the 20 other American Presidents, which was a ceremonial affair. But I would not, myself, feel like advising him to take this trip. The President has many, many responsibilities and he cannot delegate them the way most heads of government can, heads of cabinet. There are a good many important affairs here in the United States which he has to be here to attend to in the way of domestic legislation and the like. While it is an interesting thought at first blush I would be dubious about it.

Chairman GORDON. Mr. Merrow.

Mr. MERROW. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

(Discussion off the record.)

Mr. MERROW. Is Syria particularly in danger of overt armed aggression or in greater danger from a possible takeover from the inside?

Secretary DULLES. The danger of Syria is primarily one of subversion and indirect aggression, not overt attack. At least, according to our estimate. Of course, there can be nowadays an airborne attack so that the danger is not limited necessarily to countries which have geographical boundaries with the Soviet Union. But I would say

we would estimate the greatest danger in Syria came from subversion from the inside.

Mr. MERROW. You very eloquently stressed the economic deterioration that is going on in the area. If this legislation were passed, do you anticipate that conditions would develop in such a way that our economic aid will be of help to such nations as Syria and Egypt in fighting international communism?

Secretary DULLES. We would, I think, be prepared to aid both Egypt and Syria if that aid stimulated a fight against international communism, yes, but we do not want to give such aid if it merely supports governments which are subservient to or sympathetic to international communism.

Mr. MERROW. Can you comment upon the possibility of Egypt and Syria and any other country in the area turning to the Soviet Union for economic aid and the possibility of the Soviet Union giving that aid in an effort to press its program in the area?

Secretary DULLES. There is a possibility—in fact, I think a probability—that Egypt and Syria have already turned toward the Soviet Union for aid. At least they have explored the possibility of getting aid from the Soviet Union.

I rather doubt, as I indicated, I think yesterday, that the Soviet Union in practice is willing to spend a great deal of hard money in this area because of the economic pressures which they are under to help take care of their position in the satellite areas, which you might say is a defensive move of theirs and whether they would spend their money more for defense or offense I do not know, but I would think probably the satellite situation would have a prior demand upon their resources.

But they do have an abundance of military supplies, as I indicated, left over from the Second World War and now obsolete for their purposes. The great danger comes, I think, not from the capacity or willingness of the Soviet Union to spend large sums in the area, but the fact that there will be a sort of general economic deterioration in the course of which Communists, who always know best how to take advantage of disorder, may get into control, just as they got control originally of Russia. A small, well-organized group got control of Russia during the complete breakdown of all central authority after the First World War. That kind of thing they do extremely well.

If you have a general economic breakdown through the fact that the governments are bankrupt, through the fact that they do not have any local security forces that they can maintain, equip, and pay, and if the people as a whole are in a state of despair and despondency, then the Soviet Union could take over without having to spend very much money.

Mr. MERROW. Mr. Secretary, it is clear in the case of Iran that probably if the government should ask for assistance to take care of overt armed aggression in that area, it looks like this resolution would care for it.

In the case of the other two countries we talked about that might not ask for assistance, it is not quite clear to me just how this resolution would prevent the Soviet Union through military assistance from getting into those countries. It appears as though we would

have to act in some way outside of the authority of this resolution to stop that sort of thing.

Secretary DULLES. I think that there is a very good chance that these governments eventually will ask for the help that could be available under this resolution. I do not think any of these nations wants to become a Soviet satellite. They have struggled desperately to get their independence. They were all colonies until quite recently. They do not want to lose that independent status.

(Discussion off the record.)

Secretary DULLES. If they can get assistance on terms calculated to keep their governments vigorous and strong with a dependable security force and a measure of deterrence against open armed attack, then I think they will all like the situation. It may take them time to realize it, but I think they will come to it.

Mr. MERROW. You think with the passage of this resolution, they will turn to us instead of pursuing the course further with the Soviet Union?

Secretary DULLES. Yes, sir.

Mr. MERROW. Thank you very much.

(Discussion off the record.)

Chairman GORDON. Mrs. Kelly.

Mrs. KELLY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I hope you will give me time to have two of my questions answered.

Mr. Secretary, you mentioned this morning that under the terms of the British withdrawal from Suez they maintained the right to move back into Port Said if a conflict occurred.

That being the case, why was it not legal when England moved back into Port Said, and why did we sponsor an unconditional withdrawal of the British-French?

Secretary DULLES. The terms of the treaty between the United Kingdom and Egypt in that respect are that there is a right to reoccupy the Suez base if there is an attack upon the area from outside the area. That did not occur.

Mrs. KELLY. Only from outside the area?

Secretary DULLES. That is right. It was designed to meet the situation of a Soviet attack upon the area.

Mrs. KELLY. I thought you said "if there was conflict in that area."

Secretary DULLES. No; I do not think I said that. If I did, I would correct it now.

Mrs. KELLY. I understood it that way.

Secretary DULLES. If there is an attack on the area from outside the area.

Mrs. KELLY. Do you want to comment on the resolution the United States sponsored on the U. N. calling for an unconditional withdrawal of the British and French? Why did you not make it conditional upon settlement of the Suez Canal dispute?

Secretary DULLES. It was our view that the entry had been illegal and therefore it was not proper to say that they could stay there until they had gained certain political objectives.

Mrs. KELLY. Was it not illegal and an abrogation of international treaties for Nasser to have seized the Suez Canal, To that we have not taken a positive stand.

Secretary DULLES. That is a highly debatable question. They did not, of course, seize the Suez Canal. They have had the Suez Canal for a long time.

Mrs. KELLY. I realize that situation. They seized the rights to operate or control the Suez Canal.

Secretary DULLES. They seized the assets of the Universal Suez Canal Co., a company registered in Egypt. Legal opinions differ as to whether that was lawful or unlawful.

Mrs. KELLY. Then my second question, Mr. Chairman and Mr. Secretary, is this. I deduce that you are not satisfied with the Egyptian cooperation.

(Discussion off the record.)

Mrs. KELLY. I feel Egypt should be condemned.

I want to mention Egypt's lack of cooperation, as for instance, the abrogation of the international treaty; obstruction of the Suez Canal by Egypt; Egypt has held up the clearance of the Suez Canal; and also refused the use of personnel of the British and French salvage vessels. I think she, alone, is holding up the peace in that area. To that whole statement I would like to have you comment, if you will.

I had asked Mr. Hoover in your absence, Mr. Secretary, if it was true that a leak from CIA sources had notified Mr. Nasser, we, the United States, would not act or would not fight if Egypt seized the Suez Canal.

Now in yesterday's Post—I think it is the Post, I am not sure—was an article by Chalmers Roberts, who deals with this question but not exactly in the terms of the seizure of the Suez Canal, on the leak from American Central Intelligence at Cairo which hurt Mr. Allen's mission at the time.

Would you comment on this issue?

Secretary DULLES. I am not quite clear. What is the statement, that we would not fight?

Mrs. KELLY. Pardon me?

Secretary DULLES. Did you say there was some statement to the effect we said we would not fight?

Mrs. KELLY. No. It had been reported to me that a leak from Central Intelligence hurt our relations at Suez at that time. It was brought to my attention. So I asked Mr. Hoover, I believe—I think it was Mr. Hoover—about it and he was not aware of it.

However, yesterday in the Post is an article dealing with a leak by the Central Intelligence; and I read from the Post:

An employee, who apparently hoped to soften the blow, tipped off Nasser that Allen was bringing him a protest note from Dulles. Nasser later related the incident in a speech.

Secretary DULLES. I know there is a story that a representative of the CIA in Cairo gave Nasser advance notice of a message that George Allen was bringing from me. I think that is what is alluded to here.

Mrs. KELLY. Yes.

Secretary DULLES. I think that the story of what actually took place is very much garbled. President Nasser, I believe, referred to it by implication in a rather emotional speech which he made shortly thereafter. Nasser's version of it I do not think is an accurate version and indeed the story has been denied by Ambassador Allen.

Mrs. KELLY. What is our version of it?

Secretary DULLES. What is our version of it?

Mrs. KELLY. Yes. Evidently it has been looked into. By any chance did a leak from our Central Intelligence hurt our mission and hurt the situation in the Suez at that time?

Secretary DULLES. No; this had nothing to do with the Suez. This was before the Suez business became acute.

Mrs. KELLY. I will ask the question I asked Mr. Hoover. Is there any truth in the report that has been told to me that through our Embassy in Egypt Mr. Nasser was warned ahead of time that we would not fight if he seized the Suez Canal?

Secretary DULLES. There is no truth in that.

Mrs. KELLY. No truth in that?

Secretary DULLES. No.

Mrs. KELLY. May I ask, Mr. Secretary, if the terms regarding the Suez Canal are straightened out to the degree of the six points or whatever the points are that we had hoped to achieve, would you consider then Egypt would be in good standing to that degree where we would give her economic aid and disregard the fact that she refuses to recognize the State of Israel in that area?

Secretary DULLES. It is a question of confidence and I could not say confidence would be reestablished by any one specific act. It is the totality of things which reestablish confidence.

Mrs. KELLY. Have I any time, Mr. Chairman?

Chairman GORDON. Yes; you may have time for another question.

Mrs. KELLY. The financial assistance you mentioned in reference to England, is that a beginning of the United States underwriting of the sterling?

Secretary DULLES. It is partly underwriting sterling through the International Monetary Fund. It is partly the extent, I think, of \$500 million, a credit established through the Export-Import Bank to purchase supplies, oil and other supplies, in the United States.

Mrs. KELLY. Is there any possibility that we are going to really underwrite the sterling?

Secretary DULLES. The International Monetary Fund was established in order to support currencies within certain limits. Various countries have drawn on that fund for that purpose and the United Kingdom has actually drawn down a very considerable sum for that purpose. But that is all within limits which were approved by the Congress at the time the Monetary Fund was set up.

(Discussion off the record.)

Mrs. KELLY. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

Secretary DULLES. There will, I think, be certain aspects of the British loan of 1946 that will be brought before the Congress at a later date.

Chairman GORDON. Mr. Fulton.

Mr. FULTON. Mr. Secretary, on the report made to the President on this resolution, when there are fiscal matters involved why is not the reporting time of the President set for the end of the fiscal year on financial matters? Possibly a report during the month of January to Congress on his actions, but would it not be helpful to have a fiscal year closed out as we do the mutual security program on June 30?

Secretary DULLES. I assume that date was picked so that the Congress would have the information before it as it dealt with the legislation on mutual security during the ensuing months. I assume, if

Congress prefers to get it after the fiscal year, there would be no objection.

Mr. FULTON. As well as at the end of the fiscal year. He is reporting his action generally under this resolution in January to Congress but on the fiscal matters he would report them at the end of the fiscal year.

Secretary DULLES. Yes.

Mr. FULTON. That is all. Thank you very much.

Chairman GORDON. Mr. Byrd.

Mr. BYRD. Mr. Secretary, have we any indication that Jordan would like to have the United States underwrite its Government as the British have been doing? If so, are the Jordanians willing to cooperate with us if we give them such financial aid?

Secretary DULLES. Off the record, please.

Chairman GORDON. Off the record.

(Discussion off the record.)

Secretary DULLES. Our attitude toward these governments is indicated by the sentence in the proposed resolution which specifies that these governments should be governments which are dedicated to the maintenance of national independence. We do not believe that a government which contains elements which are receptive to Soviet and Communist influences is a government dedicated to the maintenance of national independence. We think that government is dedicated to slavery.

Mr. BYRD. Mr. Secretary, what is the status of our air base in Saudi Arabia?

(Discussion off the record.)

Secretary DULLES. I think this resolution will give us a better opportunity to conclude a successful extension of the present base agreement. That agreement expired about a year ago, last June, subject to extension. There have been active discussions about extension which have not been concluded. Pending a final result, the Government of Saudi Arabia has allowed the old conditions to continue on.

(Discussion off the record.)

Secretary DULLES. The resolution would give us an opportunity to join more explicitly than we have yet done in the defense of Saudi Arabia itself. The President referred in his message, and I referred yesterday, to the fact that there is a letter from President Truman to the late King of Saudi Arabia indicating we would take a great concern in their territorial integrity and their independence, but there is some doubt in their minds as to whether that policy can be effectively carried out unless there is some congressional action of the kind suggested here. If there is that action, I think it will help us very much to strengthen our position in Saudi Arabia.

Mr. BYRD. Mr. Secretary, most of the discussions, thus far, at least, and so far as overt aggression is concerned, have dealt with Soviet Russia. I realize that the phraseology of the resolution uses the words "international communism" when it refers to overt aggression. What I should like to know, sir, is this: Just what danger is there of an act of open aggression being committed by the Red Chinese military machine in the Middle East, and, if so-called volunteers are used, will that action be considered as one of overt and open aggression?

Secretary DULLES. The phrase "governments under the control of international communism" is designed deliberately to be broad enough to cover Communist China.

On the second point, if volunteers are used in any organized way, that would be regarded as an open, overt aggression.

Mr. BYRD. As to the first point that I mentioned, what I should like to know—and again I repeat—is just what danger is there at this moment or what apparent danger is there of an act of open aggression being committed by Red China?

Secretary DULLES. I would doubt that that risk was very great, although the Chinese Communists did indicate their willingness to send volunteers to the area to help if the hostilities of last November had been prolonged. But their practical means of doing so are rather limited unless they were shipped through the Soviet Union and then perhaps flown in or brought by ship through the Bosphorus. I would think if there is to be an aggression of that character, it would probably come from the Soviet Union rather than China.

Would that be your opinion, Admiral?

Admiral RADFORD. That would be my guess.

Mr. BYRD. Mr. Secretary, I think we are all aware of the fact that you particularly, and the administration as well, would like to see this resolution passed at the very earliest moment. I am wondering if you would care to comment on what might be the very latest moment, in your opinion, that the Congress could pass this resolution and still achieve the objectives you hope to attain.

Secretary DULLES. It is very hard to be actually specific in these matters, but I would say it would be very regrettable if it were not concluded through both Houses during this month.

Mr. BYRD. By the end of the month?

Secretary DULLES. Yes, sir.

Mr. BYRD. What is the status of the situation in the Senate as of the present?

Secretary DULLES. I think they are planning to open their hearings on Monday. That is my impression. Perhaps the chairman can find that out with greater authority or equal authority. I think it is their plan to pick up as soon as this week is over and this committee has concluded its hearing.

Chairman GORDON. Mr. Secretary, I believe they want to start early next week.

Mr. BYRD. Mr. Secretary, I have this final question: I think you pretty well stated your position yesterday on it, but I would like to have you reiterate it. What would be the effect, as you see it, of a close vote on this resolution?

Secretary DULLES. That would greatly weaken the impact of the action in the area. The psychological impact—to use that term, which I do not like very much, but it is hard to get any substitute for it—of this thing is extremely important. Practically all the action we have taken of this character since the Greek-Turkey resolution has had an overwhelming support. On the Greek-Turkey resolution, as I recall, there was a substantial opposition of perhaps approximately one-third, or something of that sort. Since then practically everything has been done by a very overwhelming vote.

The fact of the national unity in these matters has been tremendously important. If there were evidence here of substantial disunity on a

matter of this importance and gravity the effect of the action would be very greatly diminished.

Mr. BYRD. In other words, it would add up to a net loss, would it not? We would have been better off not to have even asked the Congress for the passage of this resolution?

Secretary DULLES. Well, that would be a close question, whether you had better not have the resolution at all or have it adopted by a very narrow vote.

Chairman GORDON. Mr. Secretary, as I promised you that we would recess about a quarter to 1, I believe this would be the right point to recess, since it is now that time. We will carry on this afternoon at 2:30, to hear Admiral Radford. Could you appear tomorrow afternoon at 2:30, in this room, so that members can complete their questions?

Secretary DULLES. You want me back tomorrow at 2:30.

Mr. HOLLISTER. Mr. Chairman, might I ask one thing before you adjourn?

With regard to the two memoranda which Mr. Zablocki asked for, we filed with the committee on the 4th a memorandum covering the unused funds of different types which are now still available in the 1957 program. I wonder if you could review that, Mr. Zablocki? Mr. Crawford could give it to you if you do not have it. Could you review that to see if it gives you the information you want?

Mr. ZABLOCKI. Do the memoranda specifically list the unused funds by country?

Mr. HOLLISTER. Perhaps you might want it simplified. It might be a little complicated, but it gives all the information you want, by funds.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. But the memorandum does not break it down by countries?

Mr. HOLLISTER. It does break it down by countries and funds. It is a secret document filed on the 4th. If it is not adequate let me know and I will get you another one.

Chairman GORDON. The committee stands in recess until 2:30 this afternoon.

(Thereupon, at 12:53 p. m., Tuesday, January 8, 1957, a recess was taken until 2:30 p. m. of the same day.)

AFTERNOON SESSION

(The committee reconvened at 2:30 p. m., in room 1301 New House Office Building, Hon. Thomas S. Gordon (chairman), presiding.

Chairman GORDON. The committee will come to order. Our next witness is Admiral Radford.

Mr. VORYS. Mr. Chairman, I wonder if it would be possible, before we start with Admiral Radford, to find out whether we have gotten the figures requested this morning.

Chairman GORDON. I understood they would be furnished to us.

Mr. VORYS. I understood from Mr. Hollister they would be furnished by now.

Mrs. KELLY. What figures? The figures Mr. Zablocki asked for?

Mr. VORYS. That is right. Have those been furnished to the staff or to any members, so far?

Mr. CRAWFORD (the clerk). I have not had an opportunity to check. I believe what Mr. Hollister said was based on a misunderstanding of what had been requested by the staff earlier.

Mr. VORYS. I checked with Mr. Hollister and Mr. Zablocki on some figures that had been furnished the staff, and all he had to do was hand them over or send them over.

Chairman GORDON. We will have the staff look into that and get the information.

(The information referred to is as follows:)

INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION ADMINISTRATION

Balances of nonmilitary mutual security funds, as of Jan. 9, 1957

[In millions of dollars]

Accounts	Not firmly programed	Reserved for programs under active considera- tion	Total
Development assistance (sec. 201).....	97.4	50.0	147.4
Defense support, Near East and Africa.....	42.5		42.5
Palestine refugees.....	23.8		23.8
Technical cooperation.....	8.2		8.2
Defense support, Asia.....		52.0	52.0
Defense support, Latin America.....	13.5		13.5
Special presidential fund (sec. 401 (b)).....	7.7	66.5	74.2
Asian economic development fund.....	43.3	12.0	55.3
Total.....	236.4	180.5	416.9

Status of military-aid funds

[Millions of dollars]

Appropriated:

Amount appropriated, fiscal year 1957..... 2,017.5
Unobligated balance reappropriated..... 195.5

Total available for obligation, fiscal year 1957..... 2,213.0

Programs:

Approved programs, Dec. 31, 1956..... 1,762.0
Earmarked for programs under active consideration..... 415.0

Total approved or earmarked..... 2,177.0

Balance available for other programs..... 36.0

Obligations:

Fiscal year 1957 obligations and reservations, Oct. 31, 1956..... 143.0
Unobligated and unreserved, Oct. 31, 1956..... 2,070.0

Expenditures:

Unliquidated obligations, June 30, 1956..... 4,394.0
Available for obligation and reservation, fiscal year 1957..... 2,213.0

Total available for expenditure, fiscal year 1957..... 6,607.0

Fiscal year 1957 expenditures, Dec. 12, 1956 (Treasury cash estimate)..... -883.0

Unexpended, Dec. 12, 1956..... 5,724.0

Status of defense support funds for Near East and Africa, as of Dec. 31, 1956

[In millions of dollars]

Amount appropriated fiscal year 1957.....	167.5
Programs approved or in process Dec. 31.....	125.0
Fiscal year 1957 obligations Nov. 30.....	18.8
Unobligated balance of approved programs.....	106.2
Balances not firmly programed as of Dec. 31.....	42.5
Unexpended balances Nov. 30 ¹	298.8

Estimated total expenditures, fiscal year 1957 (preliminary) 167.5

¹ Public Law 853, Mutual Security Appropriation Act of 1957, for the Near East and Africa, including Greece, Turkey, and Iran. Excludes Pakistan which is funded from "Defense support, Asia."² This amount may be required for further increments to approved programs in this area.³ Including prior years' funds.

NOTE.—Totals may not add exactly due to rounding.

Status of development assistance funds (sec. 201) as of Dec. 31, 1956

[In millions of dollars]

Region	Amount appropriated fiscal year 1957	Programs approved or in process Dec. 31	Fiscal year 1957 obligations Nov. 30	Unobligated balance of appropriation	Unexpended balances Nov. 30 ¹	Estimated total expenditures fiscal year 1957 (preliminary)
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Near East ²		5.1		5.1	51.0	47.1
Africa.....		15.0		15.0	16.6	14.0
Asia.....		80.9	.8	80.1	174.7	87.3
Other.....		1.6		1.6	1.6	1.1
Subtotal.....		102.6	.8	101.8	243.9	149.5
Reserves for programs under active consideration.....				50.0	50.0	5.0
Balance available for other programs.....				97.4	97.4	10.0
Total.....	250.0	102.6	.8	249.2	391.2	164.5

¹ Including prior years' funds.² Arab States and Israel and regional programs.³ Includes 1.5 to be transferred to Administrative Expense Appropriation pursuant to Section 411 (c) of the Mutual Security Act of 1954, as amended.⁴ This balance available for possible bilateral programs in Arab States and Israel, further increments to programs presently approved and new programs.

NOTE.—Totals may not add exactly due to rounding.

Status of technical cooperation funds, as of Dec. 31, 1956

[In thousands of dollars]

Region/country	Fiscal year 1957 congressional presentation	Amount appropriated	Programs approved or in process, Dec. 31	Fiscal year 1957 obligations, Nov. 30	Unobligated balance of programs (col. 3-col. 4)	Unexpended availability, Nov. 30	Estimated unexpended, June 30, 1957
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Arab States and Israel:							
Egypt.....	3,800	-----	1,500	500	-----	2,914	1,559
Iraq.....	2,300	-----	2,300	559	1,741	3,229	1,817
Israel.....	2,000	-----	1,460	460	-----	2,643	1,818
Jordan.....	2,700	-----	1,450	450	-----	2,251	884
Lebanon.....	2,100	-----	1,518	518	-----	1,795	598
Subtotal.....	12,900	-----	4,228	2,487	1,741	12,842	6,676
Other Near East.....	13,200	-----	12,900	2,129	10,771	26,057	16,301
Unprogramed, Near East.....	-----	-----	-----	-----	8,172	8,172	8,172
Total, Near East.....	26,100	-----	25,300	4,616	20,684	47,071	31,149
Africa, total.....	8,000	-----	8,500	1,333	7,167	15,037	7,857
South Asia, total.....	24,000	-----	23,200	2,189	21,011	65,853	47,254
Other areas.....	82,400	-----	79,620	15,212	64,408	132,869	73,318
Grand total, technical cooperation.....	140,500	136,620	128,448	23,350	113,210	260,830	159,578

¹ Represents obligations for continuing expenses only.² Includes \$1,620 corporate fund unobligated balance from fiscal year 1956.*Status of special Presidential fund (sec. 401 (b)) as of Dec. 31, 1956*

[In thousands of dollars]

Appropriation.....	\$100,000
Presidential determinations made or in process:	
(a) President's Citizens' Advisers on Mutual Security....	\$200
(b) Hungarian refugee relief.....	9,000
(c) Hungarian refugee "program of asylum".....	¹ 13,000
(d) Iceland.....	3,364
(e) Canal Users Association.....	65
(f) Nuclear Energy Symposium.....	150
	<hr/> 25,779
Balance.....	74,221
Additional requirements under consideration.....	66,500
	<hr/>
Balance available for new programs.....	7,721

¹ This amount represents presently estimated costs of activities undertaken to date to transport and resettle 21,500 refugees and is subject to adjustment.

Palestine refugee program

[In thousands of dollars]

	1966 actual	1967 estimate
Status of availability:		
Balance available from prior years.....	\$62,000	\$45,300
Obligations during the year.....	16,700	21,500
Balance available for future years.....	45,300	23,800
Unliquidated obligations start of year.....	2,294	4,571
Obligations during the year.....	16,700	21,500
Total available for expenditure.....	18,994	26,071
Expenditures during the year.....	14,423	21,846
Unliquidated obligations end of year.....	4,571	4,225
Status of 1957 program:		
Programs approved to Nov. 30.....		8,750
Estimated additional programs.....		12,750
Total fiscal year 1957 program.....		21,500

Admiral Radford, do you have a prepared statement?

STATEMENT OF ADM. ARTHUR W. RADFORD, CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

Admiral RADFORD. Just a brief one, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman GORDON. You may proceed, Admiral.

Admiral RADFORD. Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, before I subject myself to the \$64 questions which I feel are coming I should like to make this brief statement.

The free world, of which we are a part, should have three main objectives in the Middle East: First, the nations of the Middle East must be kept independent of Communist domination; second, the strategic positions and transit rights in this area must be available to the free world; third, the resources, strategic positions, and transit rights must be kept from slipping behind the Iron Curtain.

I believe if you examine closely your own recent draft report on foreign policy and mutual security you will find statements which come pretty close to reaching the same three conclusions.

I further believe House Joint Resolution No. 117 is the most practical method at the present time and in the present circumstances to implement these national objectives from a military standpoint. We know from a study of history that the Russian nation has for 100 years, at least, coveted parts of the Middle East as an outlet to a warm water port. We know that Russian communism feeds on conditions of tension and economic imbalance such as exist in that area today. Finally, we know that a military vacuum has been created in the area by the withdrawal from the area, whatever the reasons, of our allies. Both nature and communism rush in to fill vacuums. It follows that from a military point of view the present situation presents a dangerous situation to the United States, a condition against which we must have an effective defense.

(Discussion off the record.)

Admiral RADFORD. That is all, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman GORDON. Admiral, I thank you for your statement. I do not have any questions at this time. I will reserve them for later.

I believe I will start with our junior members, since up to this time they have not had a chance to put questions. I will start with Mr. Farbstein, of New York.

Mr. FARBSTEIN. No questions.

Chairman GORDON. The next man is Mr. Bentley of Michigan.

Mr. BENTLEY. Mr. Chairman, this comes almost as somewhat of a shock. I appreciate the opportunity to begin the questioning of the admiral just the same.

(Discussion off the record.)

Mr. BENTLEY. One question that comes to my mind, sir, is this: Suppose, for example, a country were attacked by the Soviet Union and under the terms of this resolution requested our assistance. Would there be any circumstances arising whereby it would be difficult, let us say, to supply that country or get military equipment or troops to that country without either having to pass or overfly another country which might be neutral? Do you follow me?

Admiral RADFORD. In the first place, if this aggression came in here [indicating] that would start World War III, and the Russians, I am sure, know that.

(Discussion off the record.)

Admiral RADFORD. The importance of this resolution is to let the Russians know that we are not going to permit them to build up a satellite in this area and then operate through the satellite with the satellite forces.

(Discussion off the record.)

Mr. BENTLEY. I raised the question that I believe in the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty provisions were made for the cooperation of this Government on the question of internal subversion, such as in the countries of Thailand, Pakistan, the Philippines, et cetera.

Admiral RADFORD. For countries where we have pacts or agreements the question of subversion or the counter to an internal revolution lies largely in the development of forces which we support and which are trained to take care of that sort of thing.

(Discussion off the record.)

Mr. BENTLEY. May I ask one more question? Do you think if we could reword or redraft this resolution to cover such possibilities of subversion it would strengthen it from our own standpoint and make it more beneficial?

Admiral RADFORD. I am certainly not an expert on that, but I would be inclined to think it would be difficult to cover it without maybe giving the impression that we were getting ready to step into the internal affairs of some country. It might not have the right effect. However, I would have to see how we could reword it to cover that.

Mr. BENTLEY. The omission of subversion is definitely, of course, a weakness of the resolution. I will not say it is a weakness, but it is an omission.

Admiral RADFORD. Well, I did not feel that way. Perhaps I was looking at it from another standpoint. One of the advantages of this resolution in its operation is that by supporting the governments of some of these countries we discourage unrest and undermining of the younger element in the armed forces. In other words we will make

it more difficult, if not impossible, to subvert the armed forces. The additional assurance which this resolution provides to the governments almost automatically takes care of the unrest, in other words.

Mr. BENTLEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman GORDON. Mr. Coffin.

Mr. COFFIN. Mr. Chairman.

Admiral, this goes back to some discussion that took place yesterday afternoon. I believe Mr. Byrd was interrogating the Secretary, and I think you might be able to shed some light on the subject also.

Our estimates for our defense forces, which resulted in some reduction in each branch, were presumably made prior to the time when this resolution was conceived. Might it not work out that after the mission to the Near East concludes its work and brings back its report and request and action is taken thereon that we would find a greater demand for members of various branches of our forces, with specific reference to your answer to Mr. Bentley, for strengthening the Armed Forces, for example? I am not sure you meant the presence of military personnel in that instance, but might it not be that this would develop so that the entire area took on the appearance somewhat of an armed camp, which would place a greater demand on our forces to serve than we have hitherto thought would be made on them?

Admiral RADFORD. I do not think so, Mr. Coffin. I remember that exchange yesterday afternoon.

(Discussion off the record.)

Admiral RADFORD. I do not envisage, myself, the necessity for putting United States Armed Forces in any sizable detachments into the Middle East.

(Discussion off the record.)

Chairman GORDON. Your time is up, Mr. Coffin.

Mr. COFFIN. Thank you.

Chairman GORDON. Mr. Prouty.

Mr. PROUTY. Admiral, have the British airbases in Iraq at the present time under an agreement which I think expires this year?

Admiral RADFORD. The British turned over their airbases in Iraq to the Iraqi.

(Discussion off the record.)

Mr. PROUTY. There are no British planes whatsoever manned by the British?

Admiral RADFORD. They may come in and out.

(Discussion off the record.)

Mr. PROUTY. If the British and French had elected to stay in Egypt contrary to the wishes of the United Nations, would they have been able to take over that country?

Admiral RADFORD. To take over Egypt?

Mr. PROUTY. Yes.

Admiral RADFORD. Well, they probably would, if no one else interfered.

Mr. PROUTY. I was leading up to that. Do you think the Russians could have brought in sufficient so-called volunteers to play a decisive role?

Admiral RADFORD. No, I do not. The Russians would have had difficulty in supporting their operation down there. If they came in by sea, the British naval forces could have intercepted them. They could not very well come in either from the north or the south. To

try to support such an operation by air would have been very difficult for the Russians, if not impossible, because most of the airfields were bombed out. The only thing the Russians could have done was to use their heavy long-range bombers on the British and French forces, and that would have been difficult because the British and French would have had jet fighters in the area and the Russian bombers would have had no fighter protection.

Mr. PROUTY. Suppose that Nasser or the Egyptian Government retains its present policy, which is certainly anti-British and anti-French. Recently Egypt has said that it would not allow shipping of either of those countries to pass through the Suez Canal until the Israeli troops are withdrawn from the Sinai Peninsula. How long can we allow a situation of that nature to exist?

Admiral RADFORD. Personally, I do not think very long.

Mr. PROUTY. How does the military strength of the free world today compare with that of the Communist bloc?

Admiral RADFORD. I would say that we are definitely superior in military power to the Communist bloc.

Mr. PROUTY. In what respect? Why do you say that? I am thinking, for example, of the French NATO troops now in Algeria. The Suez is blocked, et cetera, et cetera.

Admiral RADFORD. I am not measuring it in terms of ground forces, because the Communist bloc does have a superiority in number of ground forces; but I am talking total overall strength and looking at the picture from the standpoint of the world-command situation. I would say that the Russians are not going to start world war III now, because they know they would be defeated if they did.

Mr. PROUTY. Thank you, Admiral. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman GORDON. Mr. FASCELL.

Mr. FASCELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

(Discussion off the record.)

Mr. FASCELL. Then is it reasonable or correct to assume that if an attack occurred tomorrow morning by any country in the Middle East on any other country this would be purely a local and internal action not within the scope of this resolution?

Admiral RADFORD. I am not quite sure I understand what you mean.

Mr. FASCELL. If Egypt attacked Israel tomorrow, would that be within the scope of this resolution or outside the scope of this resolution?

Admiral RADFORD. It would be outside.

Mr. FASCELL. Purely a local matter. And that would be true of an attack by any country in the Middle East, attacking any other country tomorrow?

Admiral RADFORD. Since we do not have the resolution—

Mr. FASCELL. Assuming it were passed.

Admiral RADFORD. That is right.

Mr. FASCELL. That is based on the theory that as of right now our best advice tells us we do not consider any country in the Middle East Communist controlled.

Admiral RADFORD. That is right. But I would like to point this out. We do not expect to have them automatically switch by the 1st of February. One of the effects we hope to get from this resolution is that we will prevent them from becoming Communist dominated. In other words, the people in one of these Middle East countries who

are not Communists—and we know there are a good many of them—will have an argument to use with the Communist inclined in their own country. They would be able to say to them:

“There is no point in your trying to take over one of our neighboring countries. You will not be allowed to, even if you do go Communist.”

Mr. FASCELL. But actually the purpose of the resolution is to prevent a puppet government being set up in Iran or a Communist government being set up in Syria or elsewhere?

Admiral RADFORD. No, but I am sure that would be cause for another action, taken in another way, probably.

(Discussion off the record.)

Mr. FASCELL. Is it your opinion, Admiral Radford, that it would be wise at this point to get some other government of the free world to join in this declaration?

Admiral RADFORD. No.

Mr. FASCELL. Would you tell us why not?

Admiral RADFORD. I presume you mean outside—

(Discussion off the record.)

Mr. FASCELL. And that is why we have to go it alone?

(Discussion off the record.)

Admiral RADFORD. Yes, but we hope to have the backing of the majority of the United Nations in the free world bloc to approve of this.

Mr. FASCELL. You mean moral support?

Admiral RADFORD. Moral support. We do not ask them for anything else.

Mr. FASCELL. Do I take that statement to mean that wherever Communist problems arise anywhere in the world we are prepared to undertake them by ourselves?

Admiral RADFORD. No. I thought you were confining yourself to this resolution.

Mr. FASCELL. I was originally, but I wondered what our position would be in relation to problems in other areas of the world.

That is all, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman GORDON. Mr. Adair.

(Discussion off the record.)

Mr. ADAIR. Russia has supplied Egypt almost exclusively by water, I believe?

Admiral RADFORD. That is correct.

Mr. ADAIR. Have you any notion as to how many Russian personnel are in Egypt at this time?

Admiral RADFORD. I do not have the figures.

(Discussion off the record.)

Chairman GORDON. Mr. Fountain.

Mr. FOUNTAIN. Would you say that the primary and perhaps immediate effect to be anticipated from this resolution is a diplomatic one—to encourage Syria, Iraq, Jordan, Iran, and others, to accept military and economic assistance from us and thus hope they will work with us instead of with the Communists?

Admiral RADFORD. I would put it the other way. I would say it is designed to encourage our friends. The real effect will be psychological at the moment, but it is designed also to discourage the Russians from further building up their military power in that area.

(Discussion off the record.)

Mr. FOUNTAIN. And if they were to perform an overt act against Iran we would come in?

Admiral RADFORD. We would come in if the President so decided under the terms of the resolution.

Chairman GORDON. Your time is up. Mrs. Church.

Mrs. CHURCH.

(Discussion off the record.)

Mrs. CHURCH. I would like to develop this thought. I understood you to say that if we passed this resolution, that we would proceed to take steps. You cannot do that until the overt act occurs, can you?

Admiral RADFORD. I said first we would go ahead with detailed planning.

(Discussion off the record.)

Mrs. CHURCH. Suppose the North Koreans become ambitious and you have forces moving in on South Vietnam, and so forth?

Admiral RADFORD. I think we are prepared to defend against any of that.

Mrs. CHURCH. Of any emergency?

Admiral RADFORD. Yes.

(Discussion off the record.)

Mrs. CHURCH. As I read this resolution, we are simply substituting the discretion of the President, no matter how much we might trust him, for the discretion of the Congress. As you will recall, I questioned the Secretary yesterday as to the mandatory qualities of this resolution, and he said that there is nothing mandatory, that the President is not required to do anything.

Admiral RADFORD. I think we will sit down and plan.

(Discussion off the record.)

Mrs. CHURCH. But authorized or not, the President is not required to act if the emergency arises?

Admiral RADFORD. Well—

Mrs. CHURCH. I will not press you further on that point, but I think there is a twilight zone which will mislead certain people, and I hope it does not mislead us.

Chairman GORDON. Mr. Byrd.

Mrs. KELLY. Mr. Chairman, could Mrs. Church pursue that?

Mrs. CHURCH. I will be very glad to yield to Mrs. Kelly to pursue the point.

Chairman GORDON. Mr. O'Hara.

Mr. O'HARA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am abashed, as a new member, so early in my voyage with this great committee, to break a silence becoming in the newly arrived.

(Discussion off the record.)

Mr. O'HARA. As the question relating to Israel involved policy, perhaps it would be better for me to ask it of Secretary Dulles on his return. Let me ask this:

Admiral, I was interested in the statement of Secretary Dulles that if section 3 were omitted he thought it possible and even probable that the program would fail. What would the failure of the proposed program mean?

Admiral RADFORD. You mean if this resolution were not acted upon favorably?

Mr. O'HARA. No; I refer to failure of the program if and when it is authorized. Does failure of the program, once it is authorized, mean war with Russia?

Admiral RADFORD. Are we talking about if we pass this resolution and then are not able to make it work?

Mr. O'HARA. Yes. The Secretary used the word "fail"; that if section 3 were omitted he thought there would be probability the program would fail. I wonder what would be the character and the repercussion of that failure?

Admiral RADFORD. I assume he meant we would not be able successfully to carry out the whole operation. He said it had three parts and absence of this third part would make it difficult, if not impossible, to get the results out of the other two.

Mr. O'HARA. As I understood, the Secretary said that he hoped the program authorized by the resolution would act as a deterrent, that it would contain Russia or deter Russia from expansion in the area. Then if the program should fail, as contemplated in the Secretary's statement, that would mean that it had not contained Russia and that notwithstanding she was expanding in this area? Is that right?

Admiral RADFORD. Yes.

(Discussion off the record.)

Mr. O'HARA. To what extent are we interested in protecting for our own use and advantage the oil resources of this area?

Admiral RADFORD. I think those resources are most important. That is the oil reserve for the next 100 years.

(Discussion off the record.)

Mr. O'HARA. Would the next war, being an atomic war, be a long war or a short one?

Admiral RADFORD. I do not know.

Chairman GORDON. Mr. LeCompte.

Mr. LeCOMPTÉ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

May I say I always have a feeling of very great pride when Admiral Radford, a most distinguished constituent, appears before this committee. He and I grew up in the cornfields of Iowa some 40 years ago.

Admiral RADFORD. More than that.

Mr. LeCOMPTÉ. My questions will be very simple because my thinking is along simple lines.

(Discussion off the record.)

Mr. LeCOMPTÉ. I was going to ask you, I have had the remark made to me—of course I expect to support this resolution because I am orthodox in my religion and regular in my politics and I expect to go along with it, believing as I do we should present a solid front in our foreign relations—but are we going to get ourselves in a situation where we will be involved in every small war around the globe?

Admiral RADFORD. I think we are already committed in a number of instances. In Korea we are ready to fight in 5 minutes.

Mr. LeCOMPTÉ. The statement was made to me that probably Chiang Kai-shek could not maintain himself 6 months on Formosa without our aid and support.

I was told that Chiang Kai-shek could not maintain it himself 6 months. It is conceivable, is it not, that there might be several small wars at one time?

Admiral RADFORD. I do not think so.

Mr. LeCOMPTÉ. I hope not.

Admiral RADFORD. But it is a possibility.

Mr. Lecompte. You are very encouraging and reassuring. I was afraid we would be in a position where war could break out at several points of the globe at the same time.

Admiral RADFORD. I doubt it would, but it is a possibility.

Mr. Lecompte. That is a risk you have to take?

Admiral RADFORD. That is right.

Mr. Lecompte. Well, now, we were speaking this morning when the Secretary was here about section 3 and the \$200 million already appropriated and how that would be used. But that would not be used for maintaining the Armed Forces. That would not maintain the Armed Forces for 30 days if war broke out?

Admiral RADFORD. This resolution does not say how it would be used. That would be for the President to decide, but as far as military assistance is concerned I think we are all right until the next appropriation.

Mr. Lecompte. But \$200 million would not be enough to maintain the Armed Forces for 30 days if war broke out?

Admiral RADFORD. I do not expect, and I am sure the President and the Secretary do not expect, there will be an outbreak of war right away.

(Discussion off the record.)

Mr. Lecompte. That brings me to the last question I have. I understood the Secretary to say—I think it was the other day at the Capitol—as I understood him, he said he did not foresee danger of a war within a year's time, if at all.

Admiral RADFORD. I think he feels, and I do too, that if this resolution is passed, we practically eliminate the chances of war.

Mr. Lecompte. That is the way I understood him, but that would not necessitate any great speed on this resolution, would it?

Admiral RADFORD. The whole world is watching the action of this committee and the Congress, and if it took a long time, if there were prolonged hearings and there was an indication of great division, it would lose much of its effect. That is what he meant.

Mr. Lecompte. That brings me to one more very simple question. What we call the Middle East or the Near East, that is the oil rich section of the world—not all those countries are oil rich. Jordan is very destitute, is it not?

Admiral RADFORD [indicating on map]. The largest oil reserves are in this area here, in Saudi Arabia. Iraq has these fields here, and Iran here. There are some indications of oil all through this area. The Egyptians have an oilfield down in here. There is some prospecting that has been done in this general area up in here. They may find oil in other places here. There are no fields in this area here, but I would not swear they would not find oil somewhere. They are prospecting for oil in Pakistan.

Mr. Lecompte. The Suez situation is not responsible for this resolution being introduced at this moment?

Admiral RADFORD. I would say it is one of the reasons for it. It had an impact.

Mr. Lecompte. Thank you very much.

(Discussion off the record.)

Chairman GORDON. Mr. Fulton.

Mr. FULTON. I understand last year when the recommendations were made for appropriations, the International Cooperation Administration, ICA, the current United States foreign aid agency, made one recommendation and then I understand the Joint Chiefs later made a recommendation of \$1 billion more. This committee cut the administration foreign aid request from \$4.9 billion to \$3.8 billion, in adopting my amendment in the committee for a cut of \$1 billion. This was within a very few percent of the total amount authorized and actually appropriated finally by Congress. I understand you to say there is enough military and economic assistance to last to the end of this fiscal year, June 30, 1957, even taking \$200 million out of the current program. So obviously there must have been originally some overcalculation since the authorization for this current year was reduced \$900 million from the amount that the administration requested, and now we find \$200 million we can use for another purpose.

Was that the fact, that after the ICA made its recommendation last year, the Joint Chiefs came up with a recommendation of another billion?

Admiral RADFORD. I was not expecting to contribute any military aid money to that \$200 million. I heard that discussion this morning, but I felt we could not voluntarily give up any of our money. What I meant was that the program we had for the Middle East in that bill would carry us over in our planning. It would be possible for us to defer some of our longer range procurement if we could get it next year.

Mr. FULTON. I am willing to give it to you, but you said as far as military assistance is concerned you are all right this year.

Admiral RADFORD. I was not thinking of losing anything. I have not seen any memorandum that shows where that \$200 million was coming from, but I assume it will not interfere with the military-aid planning.

Mr. FULTON. The thing I want is to be able to say that these current proposed figures have reason behind them. So if you say you actually need this \$200 million put in here under section 3 of the resolution, regardless of where it comes from, then we are willing to give it to you; but last year the figures were reduced and I was surprised there was still this \$200 million for this extra purpose.

Admiral RADFORD. So was I.

(Discussion off the record.)

Chairman GORDON. Ladies and gentlemen, I want to suspend for a moment to announce that a new member, Mr. Saund, is with us this afternoon, and to welcome him.

Mr. FULTON. Under this resolution, of course, on the use of forces we in Congress are to understand that the forces will be used only if the United Nations cannot or will not act, or we do not think the U. N. is acting sufficiently; is that not right? Does the use of United States forces come into play only upon insufficiency in United States judgment of United Nations actions or capabilities.

Admiral RADFORD. Mr. Fulton, I would like to keep out of that legal argument about it. I do not get into that. I am a straightforward military planner and I will make the plans the way they tell me to.

Mr. FULTON. I want to know when the United States forces come into play or the exact point of commitment of the United States forces.

Admiral RADFORD. As far as I know, the forces of the United States

would come into play when a country with which we had an agreement was attacked by a Communist-controlled country.

(Discussion off the record.)

Mr. FULTON. If what you say is correct, remember that Britain and France have said they acted alone because the United Nations did not act and so they did not wait. If you say "at the same time," are you not putting us in the same position as Britain and France by this resolution?

Admiral RADFORD. I feel I am getting out of my particular field in this. I am not a policymaker. In military planning my part of it is pretty straightforward.

Chairman GORDON. Your time is up, Mr. Fulton. Mr. Selden.

Mr. SELDEN. If this resolution is adopted and this new policy goes into effect, will it be necessary to station overseas additional components of our Armed Forces?

Admiral RADFORD. I would say it would have little effect upon our deployments.

Mr. SELDEN. Very little effect?

Admiral RADFORD. Yes.

Mr. SELDEN. Under your definition of the term "overt armed aggression" would border raids be included?

Admiral RADFORD. Well probably not if they were small ones.

(Discussion off the record.)

Mr. SELDEN. I have one other question I want to ask you. Secretary Dulles said this morning—and you have agreed with him—that should we eliminate section 3, it probably would have a very bad effect on the results we hope to obtain with the passage of the resolution. Do you think that it would be detrimental if we placed a time limit on it?

Admiral RADFORD. Well, I would say in my estimation it would look rather peculiar. It would be peculiar to put a time limit on when, as I understand it, Congress could in practical effect change it any time they wanted to pass another joint resolution.

Mr. SELDEN. However, if there was a time limit, Congress could later reaffirm this doctrine by extending the time limit.

Admiral RADFORD. Yes; either way. I do not know what the effect would be abroad, whether it would be terribly damaging or not. It would be hard to estimate.

Mr. SELDEN. Thank you. That is all.

Mr. FULTON. On that point, I would like to point out the differences between a joint resolution and a concurrent resolution. The revocation of a joint resolution such as this could be vetoed and it would take a two-thirds vote of Congress to pass it over the President's veto. The procedure is not that Congress could pass a revocation resolution at any time just as this Resolution 117 has been passed. That is why this is a joint resolution instead of a concurrent resolution. Thank you.

Chairman GORDON. Mr. Merrow.

(Discussion off the record.)

Mr. MERROW. Thank you.

Chairman GORDON. Mr. Byrd.

Mr. BYRD. Admiral Radford, yesterday you heard me ask the Secretary if the passage of this resolution would not envisage our having to fight a limited war in the Middle East. You also heard me mention the fact, as I understand it, that we have a very effective

Strategic Air Command and we have the atomic weapons with which to wage an all-out war.

Was I correct in thinking that the passage of this resolution would anticipate our being forced to perhaps fight a war on a localized or limited basis?

Admiral RADFORD. I do not think so, Mr. Byrd. I think that I agree with the Secretary of State that the passage of this resolution will make it less likely that we will have to fight a limited war.

(Discussion off the record.)

Mr. BYRD. Admiral, I can appreciate the fact that we do hope that the passage of this resolution would preclude the necessity of our having to fight a limited war, but should it fail in having that result and we find that we are going to have to participate in putting out a brushfire, so to speak, would we have the capability as of now to move into any one or any group of the nations of the Middle East effectively and quickly with enough manpower and materiel?

Admiral RADFORD. I think we would, Mr. Byrd.

(Discussion off the record.)

Mr. BYRD. Admiral, are you prepared to state at this time in terms of percentage what reduction in our military forces has been made since the cessation of hostilities in Korea with regard to the Navy and Marine Corps and the Army?

Admiral RADFORD. The total reduction is in the neighborhood of 600,000 men. We now have about 2.8 million and that is about the level we had for the last year. We do not intend to reduce that.

Mr. BYRD. Would it be a fair question to ask you if you have approved the reduction thus far?

Admiral RADFORD. Yes.

(Discussion off the record.)

Mr. BYRD. Admiral, does this resolution, in your opinion, give the President any power, particularly with reference to the deployment of our military forces, that he does not possess already as Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces?

Admiral RADFORD. As my aide was trying to say, that is a controversial question. I know it is. I do not think it does. But I think that it makes it much more effective, worldwide, to have the Congress go along with the President.

Mr. BYRD. Admiral, you said a moment ago that aggression in Iran by Russia could mean the beginning of world war III. Is that true regardless of whether this resolution passes?

Admiral RADFORD. I should think so.

Mr. BYRD. Are there any other places in the world, and I am not asking you to name them, are there other places in which overt aggression by the U. S. S. R. or by Red China could mean the beginning of world war III? Let me confine that question to the Middle East.

Admiral RADFORD. Yes. If they attacked in Turkey or Greece. I would say Red China by itself could not start world war III, but any overt attack in force by Russian forces, I think, would start world war III.

(Discussion off the record.)

Mr. BYRD. Thank you.

Chairman GORDON. Mr. Smith.

Mr. SMITH. Admiral, I have just two questions. In considering the possibility of hostilities, this area presents a very difficult situation, does it not, from the military standpoint?

Admiral RADFORD. Very difficult: yes, sir.

Mr. SMITH. The operations would be confined, would they not, almost entirely to air activity?

Admiral RADFORD. Maybe I should qualify my answer to your question. From a purely military standpoint, United States military standpoint, I would say they are not particularly difficult.

Mr. SMITH. If you are considering the vast areas of desert and the terrain in the area—

Admiral RADFORD. I am thinking primarily of air and naval action which I think would be our largest contribution and most immediate.

Mr. SMITH. The only other question I have, Admiral, is: What is the state of our information in that part of the world? I notice that some of the newspapers and commentators have been very critical of our intelligence.

Are you satisfied that we are getting maximum service?

Admiral RADFORD. I would say, Mr. Smith, we are getting very good information on the Middle East but I am never satisfied with it. I always hope we can improve it.

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman GORDON. Mrs. Kelly.

Mrs. KELLY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

(Discussion off the record.)

Mrs. KELLY. Did you say, Admiral, that the U. S. S. R. was directly undermining Iraq at this time, or Egypt or Syria?

Admiral RADFORD. I would say they are doing it insofar as they can.

Mrs. KELLY. Which one, U. S. S. R. or Egypt and Syria, or both?

Admiral RADFORD. I think a combination of all of them.

Mrs. KELLY. Then would you agree with Secretary Dulles that at this point neither of those countries is beginning to be Communist controlled?

Admiral RADFORD. Would I agree that neither Egypt nor Syria is now under Communist control?

Mrs. KELLY. Yes.

Admiral RADFORD. I would say that I would agree with him, as far as we know.

(Discussion off the record.)

Chairman GORDON. Your time is up, Mrs. Kelly. Mrs. Bolton.

Mrs. BOLTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

To go just for a moment into Syria and perhaps a little into Egypt, Admiral, the Syrian Army is pretty thoroughly a Russia-trained army, is it not?

Admiral RADFORD. I do not think so. In the first place, it is not particularly well trained yet and it has remnants of the French training, but the new equipment is Russian equipment.

Mrs. BOLTON. Then, in Egypt do they have any of the leftovers of the Germans who were down there training the Egyptian armies?

Admiral RADFORD. We do not know whether they are still there or not. Their time was about up. We do not know whether they kept them on or not. I think they were sort of being pushed out of the picture by the Russians.

Mrs. BOLTON. You used the phrase, if my memory is right, "when it becomes quite serious" then we do whatever the resolution permits.

Who is going to say when that moment comes what is going to happen? Is it going to be different in each country or not?

Admiral RADFORD. My own feeling is that any one of these situations will build up rather slowly and we probably will have a good deal of advance information.

Mrs. BOLTON. As you know, I spent a number of months in Africa a year and a half ago and was deeply troubled by the evidence of Communist effort in a number of areas.

If the same situation exists—and we believe it does—what is going to make possible a decision as to when it comes under this Resolution?

Admiral RADFORD. Maybe I misunderstood you. When I said "serious," I meant serious from a military operational standpoint. A lot of that will depend on the status of their equipment and training.

Mrs. BOLTON. Purely military?

Admiral RADFORD. Yes.

Mrs. BOLTON. Not political?

Admiral RADFORD. That is right. They might come out overnight with a Communist government and we would not have much warning of that.

Mrs. BOLTON. That is another thing that troubles me very much. The Communists work so well and so quietly, their people are so well-disciplined and trained, that it is quite possible that a government could change without warning. All this would suggest that we should step up not only the quantity but very definitely the quality in all our intelligence.

Admiral RADFORD. I am sure we should, too.

Mrs. BOLTON. It seems to me there is very little we could do that would be of greater service to the United States than to make it possible for all the intelligence services to be very adequate, to have exceedingly well-trained people, and to have a more productive method of procedure than we have had in the past.

Would that be acceptable to the military?

Admiral RADFORD. Yes. My own feeling is our intelligence collections in the Middle East are probably as good as we get anywhere in the world.

Mrs. BOLTON. And that could be better?

Admiral RADFORD. Yes, it could be.

Mrs. BOLTON. Thank you.

Chairman GORDON. Mr. Hays.

Mr. HAYS of Arkansas. Admiral, at this stage I suppose you are hardly able to answer the question that disturbs me some, but obviously one source of difficulty internally is the diversion of economic resources in Egypt—for example, from constructive economic processes to military expenditures.

To what extent are you taking that into account in planning long-range policies for the Arabs? This does not invite a longer statement than you might wish to make but reassurance on that point would be welcome. You would agree that there is a danger here and it enters into the discussion substantially as to whether we are wise in encouraging diversion of resources from economic stabilization to the military type.

Admiral RADFORD. Mr. Hays, we constantly try, in these military aid programs, to convince these countries they should get along with what we consider minimum military forces for just that reason. This resolution will be an assistance to us because we can tell them that we will come in and help them if they are attacked by the Communists and hold them down.

(Discussion off the record.)

Mr. HAYS of Arkansas. Then we can state with assurance that this is not a departure from that policy of keeping the two in balance and relating them to the economic situation in each country?

Admiral RADFORD. I would say we would be able to improve the situation under the terms of this resolution.

(Discussion off the record.)

Mr. HAYS of Arkansas. But earlier the U. N. was very influential, one of their best achievements, in getting Soviet troops out of the country?

Admiral RADFORD. They got the Russians out of Azerbaijan.

Mr. HAYS of Arkansas. Referring to what you said about acting simultaneously with the U. N., we would welcome their action simultaneously or prior to our action; would we not?

Admiral RADFORD. That is right.

Mr. HAYS of Arkansas. I agree with what the President said in the Formosa situation, as to world opinion being a tremendous factor. But we would not have to wait until there came into existence an enlargement of the U. N. forces proper. Once we had the mandate of the U. N. we could act in response to world opinion through the U. N.

Admiral RADFORD. That is right.

Mr. HAYS of Arkansas. That answers my question on that. These are some of the points upon which I think we seek reassurance. Personally, I would like to see the language a little more positive, a little less negative, with reference to the U. N. as presently stated. I have some reservations on resolution 117 for that reason. While you suggest you not be asked to speak on policy, you would have no objection, I am sure, if language could fit this idea that you have subscribed to a little more accurately of proceeding in line with what the free world seeks in establishing the area?

Admiral RADFORD. Mr. Hays, actually, of course, that is not my responsibility.

Mr. HAYS of Arkansas. Yes.

Admiral RADFORD. I was very interested to hear the Secretary of State testify on that part. I would be very much concerned, since I am primarily concerned with the security of the United States, in getting a resolution which tied our own hands if we had to wait for somebody else's concurrence. I think we have to reserve the right to act ourselves in the last analysis.

Mr. HAYS of Arkansas. But assuming that we are firm in that principle, you do agree, I am sure, that we must fit our actions as the President has said to the U. N. Charter requirements.

Admiral RADFORD. I feel if you buck the whole world opinion, you are not doing yourself any good. I presume we would not be doing that. But on the other hand sometimes in this day and age, particularly in modern war, things can move so fast in 2 or 3 days that you

cannot afford to wait 2 or 3 days while somebody has a debate or argument about it. That is one of the advantages of this resolution. I think you have to bear in mind that the warfare of the future, with all its airpower and its atomic weapons, can start so quickly and such damage can be done in a few hours that the old way of going into a war may be disastrous.

Mr. HAYS of Arkansas. I certainly agree. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman GORDON. Mr. Vorys.

Mr. VORYS. Admiral, on this matter of discretion and delegation, it is my understanding that even if Congress declared war on some country, the discretion as to whether or when to attack or defend or not to attack or defend and where and with what would be the sole discretion of the Commander in Chief, the President, aided by his military advisers. Am I correct in that understanding?

Admiral RADFORD. I do not think entirely. I think the other fellow would probably have something to say about it.

Mr. VORYS. Under our Constitution, even after Congress declared war, this discretion——

Admiral RADFORD. From our standpoint you are correct.

Mr. VORYS. From the standpoint of the United States, the decision on whether we will attack or defend, and with what and where, is solely in the discretion of the Commander in Chief?

Admiral RADFORD. Yes.

Mr. VORYS. And when we tried to monkey with that discretion in the War Between the States with a committee on the conduct of the war, we got into trouble.

Admiral RADFORD. Yes.

(Discussion off the record.)

Mr. VORYS. I noticed on that map there some places called neutral zones in Saudi Arabia.

Admiral RADFORD. Right here [indicating].

Mr. VORYS. Neutral as to what?

Admiral RADFORD. That was their compromise on the boundary. They could not agree on the boundary so they have these two neutral zones in here. In this one they discovered oil and they share the royalties from that neutral zone.

Mr. VORYS. That is between——

Admiral RADFORD. Iraq and Saudi Arabia. Over here the boundary line with Saudi Arabia has never been clearly defined in this area here, but it shows on the map as a line.

Mr. VORYS. That is Jordan.

Admiral RADFORD. Yes. Part of the trouble down in here between the British and Saudi Arabia is this southern boundary between Saudi Arabia and the shiekdoms around here has never been defined.

Mr. VORYS. Are those shiekdoms not British protectorates?

Admiral RADFORD. Yes. Each one is different.

Mr. VORYS. Are the British still operating in there?

Admiral RADFORD. Yes.

Mr. VORYS. They have British forces at this Buraimi Oasis.

Admiral RADFORD. One of the suggested solutions to this boundary dispute here is to have a neutral zone like these two up here.

Mr. VORYS. Does everybody stay out of the neutral zone?

Admiral RADFORD. No, I don't think so, but neither one claims full—it is like a condominium, I guess. They both have rights in it but neither has the sole rights.

(Discussion off the record.)

Mr. VORYS. You mean on the matter of our ability?

Admiral RADFORD. I read this, Mr. Vorys. General Quesada said, among other things:

It stands in bold relief that we have an effective Strategic Air Command which is capable of striking a decisive blow quickly. Most of us will agree that that Command and the ability to be decisive quickly has contributed to the fact that we have not been engaged in a total war. I mean by that condensed remark that we should also have available a military force organized and in being capable of quick and decisive military action in a limited war—

Mr. VORYS. That is right.

Admiral RADFORD (continuing):

capable of rapid movement to a local area with assured effectiveness by using devices and weapons that are under development and that could be developed if we set our minds to it and gave to it the same consideration we have given to the Strategic Air Command.

Mr. Burleson asked him:

You do not think we are now in that position?

And he said:

No, sir; I do not.

I do not agree with General Quesada, for the reason, as he admits in the second paragraph of his prepared statement, he is not up to date.

Mr. VORYS. Good. I understand you now.

Chairman GORDON. Mr. Zablocki.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Admiral Radford, you have stated repeatedly to questions that we are militarily prepared in the area to meet any aggressive force.

Admiral RADFORD. I do not think I said that. We could be.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. Well, are we?

Admiral RADFORD. Well, I meant we have some planning to do with these people in some detail, but I said we have the capability.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. I am very happy to be corrected.

(Discussion off the record.)

Mr. ZABLOCKI. Admiral, you stated in reply to a question that if this resolution were passed it would not necessarily mean that a buildup of United States manpower would be necessary. Has there been any buildup of United States military power—naval, air, and ground—since the trouble started? Let me say since the Suez Canal incident.

Admiral RADFORD. We did build up the naval forces in the Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean. We added 1 carrier and about 6 destroyers and several other supply ships to that organization. Then we moved two more big carriers over. They finally went into Lisbon. They never went into the Mediterranean Sea, but they were ready to come in. That would have made five.

(Discussion off the record.)

Mr. ZABLOCKI. There is no question that we have the preparedness to back up this resolution?

Admiral RADFORD. No, sir.

(Discussion off the record.)

Mr. ZABLOCKI. Many of us in Congress would have liked to have had it a long time ago.

Admiral RADFORD. As I say, we have felt that we would improve our position if we could sit down and plan with these countries. We could help ourselves.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. Admiral, I have just one other question. Is not a force in being in the area a greater deterrent than a long overdue restatement of a declaration of policy of containment?

Mr. FULTON. Would you repeat that?

Mr. ZABLOCKI. I asked the admiral if a force in being in the very critical area is not a greater deterrent than a restatement of a policy of containment, as we are now doing.

Admiral RADFORD. Yes. Of course, there are many different kinds of forces. One of the advantages of the naval forces is that they can move from one port to another and show the American flag and show themselves. They are identified as a force in being, and it is helpful.

We can send Air Force units in and out of a country. It gets a little bit complicated if we want to put in sizable ground forces in any country, and they stay there. Sometimes in the long run we have friction between a sizable United States force in one of those countries and the people, and it is not always the best thing to do, to put them in until you have to.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. Just one final question, Mr. Chairman.

We all know the intent of this resolution. Of course, we expect the Communists to distort the United States intent. There is reason to believe our British and French friends are not too happy about this resolution. Have the responsible people in your executive office fully considered to what extent the Soviets might distort our intent and thereby alienate our friends in Europe?

Admiral RADFORD. I am not sure I understand what you mean. Do you mean by blackmail or threats?

Mr. ZABLOCKI. No, Admiral. We fully agree with you that if the Middle East area is lost Western Europe is lost. If the Soviets could persuade the British and the French by saying, "Look here, the United States has euchred you out of the Middle East. They have asked you to take your military forces out of there in order that they may take over and dominate," could the Soviets thereby cause friction and strained relations between the United States and our European allies?

Admiral RADFORD. I think the British and the French would not believe that. In the first place, I am sure that we would not make any large moves of forces in there. I do not think they would be concerned about it. Some people might, but I think their governments would understand that this, in the long run, is going to benefit Britain and France very much.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. If my memory serves me correctly, I thought that the Secretary had testified the British have not definitely agreed with this resolution.

Admiral RADFORD. I understood that he did not ask them to agree; he told them about it.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. Would that not make matters even worse?

Admiral RADFORD. No, I do not think so. I think they were given the general line of thinking. My own feeling is that they would not disagree on it.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. Thank you.

Chairman GORDON. Mr. Chipperfield.

Mr. CHIPPERFIELD. Mr. Chairman.

Admiral, I am not sure I understood your answer to a question just a moment ago so I should like to repeat the question. I think your answer is very important.

In substance the question was: In your judgment have we sufficient military strength or capability to successfully carry out any obligations which we might undertake under this program?

Admiral RADFORD. I think we do, sir.

Mr. CHIPPERFIELD. Thank you very much.

Chairman GORDON. Mr. Carnahan.

Mr. CARNAHAN. Admiral, I think the question was asked, or certainly approached, but I did not get your response. How do we stand in comparison with the U. S. S. R. in military capability now as compared with a year ago?

Admiral RADFORD. I think we still have a definite superiority over the Soviet Union.

Mr. CARNAHAN. Do we have a greater superiority than we had a year ago, or not so great a superiority?

Admiral RADFORD. My own feeling is that we probably have a little greater superiority.

(Discussion off the record.)

Mr. CARNAHAN. We have not greatly lost out in the race, then, in the last year?

Admiral RADFORD. I do not think so, sir.

Mr. CARNAHAN. That is all, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman GORDON. Dr. Morgan.

(Discussion off the record.)

Mr. MORGAN. Admiral, I suppose you are familiar with some of the newspaper articles about our unpreparedness in regard to the type of planes necessary to transport aerial divisions any place in the world.

Admiral RADFORD. I read them all the time.

Mr. MORGAN. What is your opinion? Do you think we are prepared to transport an aerial division fully equipped to the Near East?

Admiral RADFORD. I would put it this way: We have the capability of transporting the kind of forces we would want to put into the Near East and doing it very well.

Mr. MORGAN. A distinguished Member of Congress, a member of the Appropriations Committee of the House, has been carrying on a little controversy as to our unpreparedness on the type of planes necessary to carry aerial divisions. On November 13 he issued a statement and said—

Mr. FULTON. Who is it?

Mr. MORGAN. Congressman Flood.

The plain facts are that there is not enough airlift in the country today to transport even one airborne division and its fighting gear to any of our foreign commitments.

Admiral RADFORD. To any of our what?

Mr. MORGAN. "Our foreign commitments."

Admiral RADFORD. Mr. Flood is wrong.

Mr. MORGAN. How many airborne divisions do we have?

Admiral RADFORD. Three.

(Discussion off the record.)

Mr. MORGAN. In the reorganization plan of these airborne divisions, is there any plan to increase their strength?

Admiral RADFORD. No; I do not think so. I think in the three units we have all we need. You can transport other kinds of soldiers by air; they do not have to be airborne.

(Discussion off the record.)

Chairman GORDON. Thank you very much, Admiral. I appreciate your coming and I am sure the committee is very appreciative of your appearance here today.

Admiral RADFORD. Thank you.

Chairman GORDON. You made a good witness.

Mr. BENTLEY. Mr. Chairman, may I ask one question?

Chairman GORDON. Yes.

Mr. BENTLEY. Admiral, under the terms of this resolution, to what extent is there envisioned military cooperation between or among the countries in the area itself? Let us say, for example, that Syria attacked Iraq. Would it be possible for Turkey to come to the assistance of Iraq under these terms?

Admiral RADFORD. I would say they might do it on their own. This resolution doesn't purport to tell any Middle East country what it can or cannot do.

Mr. BENTLEY. Will they be able under this resolution to increase military cooperation among these countries?

Admiral RADFORD. To encourage it.

Mr. BENTLEY. To encourage it and increase it?

Admiral RADFORD. Yes, sir.

Mr. BENTLEY. I notice the resolution says "nation or group of nations."

Admiral RADFORD. Yes, sir.

Mr. BENTLEY. Thank you.

Chairman GORDON. I want to announce at this time that we will have an open session starting at 10:30 a. m. tomorrow. Congressman Reuss, of Wisconsin, will testify; and also Mr. Clark Eichelberger, executive director, American Association for the United Nations, Inc.

Mr. FULTON. Mr. Chairman, I have one more question on the Russian forces.

As to the Russian forces, is there any change in the size of the Russian forces from 1948-50 until today, or the balance of the forces, or their deployment? Is there at any place, a posture of attack, so that an overt attack would look imminent to you at this time? Are the Soviet forces not actually just about in the same balance and location all through this 8-year period, so that they have not changed much?

Admiral RADFORD. The Russian forces have been continually improved with new equipment and new aircraft.

Mr. FULTON. But they have not changed basically?

Admiral RADFORD. No. They have said they have reduced their forces. We have not seen any real evidence of reduction in numbers.
(Discussion off the record.)

Mr. FULTON. Thank you.

Chairman GORDON. I am sorry that I missed the newest addition to our committee, Mr. Saund. Do you have any questions?

Mr. SAUND. No, sir; no questions.

Chairman GORDON. Thank you. The committee stands adjourned.
(Thereupon, at 5:07 p. m., the committee adjourned until 10:30 a.m., Wednesday, January 9, 1957.)

ECONOMIC AND MILITARY COOPERATION WITH NATIONS IN THE GENERAL AREA OF THE MIDDLE EAST

WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 9, 1957

**HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
*Washington, D. C.***

The committee met at 10:30 a. m. in room 1301, New House Office Building, the Honorable Thomas S. Gordon (chairman) presiding.

Chairman GORDON. Ladies and gentlemen, we are meeting this morning to continue hearings on House Joint Resolution 117, "to authorize the President to undertake economic and military cooperation with nations in the general area of the Middle East in order to assist in the strengthening and defense of their independence."

Our first witness this morning will be the Honorable Henry S. Reuss, a Representative in Congress from the State of Wisconsin. He will be followed by Mr. Clark M. Eichelberger, executive director of the American Association for the United Nations.

The committee will meet again this afternoon in executive session with Secretary of State Dulles at 2 o'clock.

Congressman Reuss, we are very happy to have you with us this morning and will be glad to have the benefit of your views on this pending legislation. Mr. Reuss.

STATEMENT OF HON. HENRY S. REUSS, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF WISCONSIN

Mr. REUSS. Mr. Chairman, I deeply appreciate the opportunity to appear before this committee. I have a written statement which has been distributed to the members, and I should like briefly not to read the statement but to summarize what is set forth therein so that the members that have questions on the proposition that I offer can question me.

Chairman GORDON. You may proceed.

Mr. REUSS. The central purpose of the resolution under consideration by your committee is to erect a firm deterrent by the United States to Russian or Russian-inspired aggression in the Middle East. I certainly heartily approve of that purpose and I would not weaken it one iota. But the resolution can and should serve not only the central purpose of warning those who do not wish to be our friends, but an important corollary purpose of reassuring those who do want to be our friends that this Nation operates not only from strength but with a deep respect for justice and world order.

Now, I am going to address my remarks to the important section 2 of House Joint Resolution 117, which is the section that talks about the armed response from this country to Communist-inspired aggression in the Middle East. Section 2 talks of United States armed action that will be "consonant" with the United Nations Charter and with United Nations "actions and recommendations." But in practical effect the resolution in its present form, while it is consonant with the U. N. in the sense that it does not violate the U. N. Charter, operates outside the U. N. and fails to envisage the use of U. N. machinery from which we have much to gain and nothing to lose—the Uniting-for-Peace procedure adopted by the U. N. General Assembly on November 3, 1950.

Under House Joint Resolution 117, if there is Russian or Russian-inspired armed aggression in the Middle East, the President is authorized to undertake United States armed action on a unilateral basis, by the United States alone. Now, it is true that such unilateral action is consonant with the provisions of article 51 of the U. N. Charter recognizing "the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense" against armed attack. But it is still unilateral action. Under House Joint Resolution 117, the United Nations would remain outside the picture. This is so because under article 51 the Security Council can terminate such collective self-defense only when the Security Council has put a stop to the aggression; Russia is obviously going to veto any attempt by the Security Council to stop Russia's own aggression.

Thus House Joint Resolution 117 envisages action by the United States on an independent basis, and in an area of the world, incidentally, where vital interests of countries other than the United States are at stake. By failing in the resolution to mention the U. N. General Assembly's Uniting-for-Peace procedure, though it does mention article 51, the resolution creates the impression that the President would not consider using this procedure. This is so because, as I say, while there is considerable mention of article 51 of the U. N. Charter recognizing "the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense" against armed attack, the address of the President to the joint session of Congress indicated no intention to employ what seems to me to be a most valuable U. N. resource.

The committee, I know, is thoroughly familiar with the operation and history of the Uniting-for-Peace procedure devised in 1950 as a method of getting around Russia's ability to veto antiaggression action in the Security Council. Action by the General Assembly "recommending" the use of armed forces by its members against aggression is just as effective, for all practical purposes, as action of the Security Council "directing" such action in either case, the sovereign member who is asked to act against aggression will have to consent to the United Nations action before it commits its own armed forces. The great difference is that the Uniting-for-Peace procedure requires only a two-thirds majority of the 80 members of the Assembly present and voting, whereas Security Council action can and frequently does founder on 1 vote of 1 party, the U. S. S. R.

Now, I have taken the liberty of suggesting a simple amendment to House Joint Resolution 117, not because I wish to intrude on this committee but because by suggesting specific wording I hope to make clear

what is in my mind. That simple proposed amendment is found on page 2 of my statement. It would add to section 2 the following language:

Provided further, That the President, as early as possible before or during such employment, shall unless he deems it inadvisable request the United Nations General Assembly, under the uniting-for-peace procedure adopted by the Assembly on November 3, 1950, to recommend to its members their coordinated use of armed force to stop the aggression.

Now, let me state exactly what this amendment would do. In the first place, as regards the situation right now in 1957, after this resolution is passed by the Congress or after whatever resolution is passed by the Congress becomes law, a resolution which included an affirmative reference to this U. N. machinery would, in my opinion, tell the whole world right now that our recent policy of working with and trying to strengthen the U. N. is not being junked, that we are not backtracking on it, but that it is a continuing policy. Secretary Dulles testified very ably on Monday of the excellent uses we are now making of the United Nations. We should not now give the impression that we propose to use our Armed Forces in the Middle East without concurrently using our best efforts to invoke the United Nations through its uniting-for-peace procedure.

Second, with an amendment along the lines that have been suggested, if and when the day comes when it is necessary for the President to employ United States Armed Forces in the Middle East to stop aggression, I suggest that successfully invoking the uniting-for-peace procedure would obtain for us the moral and physical backing of the United Nations, and both of those are valuable things for us to have. Free world opinion would then rally behind the United States effort, giving us their moral backing; and the burden of military action could be spread among the peace-loving nations of the world, giving us their physical backing.

Now, on the two occasions when the Uniting-for-Peace procedure was used, it had just this beneficial moral and physical effect. The Uniting-for-Peace resolution itself, passed during the Korean conflict on November 3, 1950, by a vote of 52 to 5, with 2 abstentions, gave to this country great moral and some military support for the action in Korea. More recently, last November 5, 1956, the General Assembly's vote of 57 to 0, with 19 abstentions, in favor of the United Nations Emergency Force in the Egyptian situation, further proved the utility of the uniting-for-peace procedure.

Now a word on the contention that the use of the Uniting-for-Peace procedure would retard the speed with which the United States intends to meet armed Communist aggression in the Middle East. As my amendment is drafted, it would not slow down and should not slow down our armed reaction to aggression a single moment. The proposed amendment merely asks that, concurrently with such armed action by this country, we seek moral and physical support from the United Nations General Assembly.

Judging by the overwhelming response to the Uniting-for-Peace procedure on the two occasions of its use, a two-thirds majority vote in favor of such action—ratifying the United States armed action already taken, clothing it in the mantle of the U. N., and adding military support from other members—seems to me a considerable likelihood. I tried to work out the result mathematically, and it seems to me most

likely we would get a two-thirds majority vote. But, even if the first attempt to invoke the procedure were unsuccessful because we failed to obtain a two-thirds majority, that would in no way interfere with the United States action, which would still be collective self-defense under article 51 of the U. N. Charter. Then, while continuing our unilateral action, we could continue to try to persuade a two-thirds majority of the General Assembly to utilize the uniting-for-peace procedure. Meanwhile, we would have demonstrated to the U. N. and to the world that we were not trying to proceed unilaterally, that we were doing our best to make this a coordinated action of the free peoples of the world.

I note that the Uniting-for-Peace procedure is essentially a bipartisan achievement. It was formulated under former Secretary of State Dean Acheson, and, as Secretary of State Dulles said just the other day, he himself was largely instrumental, as our then delegate to the United Nations, in securing its passage in 1950 by the General Assembly.

I am confident that the Congress does not wish to bypass the United Nations in this resolution, particularly under circumstances where we have everything to gain and nothing to lose, and I therefore am grateful for whatever consideration the committee may give to the general spirit of the amendment I propose.

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

(The following statement was submitted by Mr. Reuss:)

STATEMENT OF HON. HENRY S. REUSS, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF WISCONSIN

The central purpose of House Joint Resolution 117 is to erect a firm deterrent by the United States to Russian or Russian-inspired aggression in the Middle East. I would not weaken that purpose one iota. But the resolution can and should serve not only the central purpose of warning those who do not wish to be our friends, but an important corollary purpose of reassuring those who do want to be our friends that this Nation operates not only from strength but with a deep respect for justice and world order.

House Joint Resolution 117, in its important section 2, talks of United States armed action that will be "consonant" with the United Nations Charter and with United Nations "actions and recommendations." But in practical effect the resolution in its present form, while it is consonant with the U. N. in the sense that it does not violate the U. N. Charter, operates outside the U. N. and fails to envisage the use of U. N. machinery from which we have much to gain and nothing to lose—the uniting-for-peace procedure.

Under House Joint Resolution 117, if there is Russian or Russian-inspired armed aggression in the Middle East, the President is authorized to undertake United States armed action on a unilateral basis. True, such unilateral action is consonant with the provisions of article 51 of the U. N. Charter recognizing "the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense" against armed attack. But it is nonetheless unilateral action. Under House Joint Resolution 117, the United Nations would remain outside the picture. This is so because under article 51 the Security Council can terminate such collective self-defense only when the Security Council has put a stop to the aggression; Russia is obviously going to veto any attempt by the Security Council to stop Russia's own aggression.

Thus House Joint Resolution 117 envisages action by the United States on an independent basis, and in an area of the world where vital interests of countries other than the United States are at stake. By failing to mention the U. N. General Assembly's uniting-for-peace procedure, it creates the impression that the President would not consider using this procedure. Indeed, his address to the joint session of Congress indicated no intention to employ this U. N. resource.

The uniting-for-peace procedure was devised as a method of getting around Russia's ability to veto antiaggression action in the Security Council. Action

by the General Assembly "recommending" the use of armed forces by its members against aggression is just as effective, for all practical purposes, as action of the Security Council "directing" such action. In either case, the sovereign member will have to consent to the United Nations action before it commits its own armed forces. The great difference is that the Assembly procedure requires only a two-thirds majority of the 80 members of the Assembly present and voting, whereas Security Council action can founder on one vote—the Russian.

This failure of House Joint Resolution 117 to envisage the use of the uniting-for-peace procedure could be cured by a simple amendment adding to section 2 along the following lines:

"Provided further, That the President, as early as possible before or during such employment, shall unless he deems it inadvisable request the United Nations General Assembly, under the uniting-for-peace procedure adopted by the Assembly on November 3, 1950, to recommend to its members their coordinated use of armed force to stop the aggression."

The proposed amendment to House Joint Resolution 117 would tell the world right now that our recent policy of working with and trying to strengthen the U. N. is a continuing one. As Secretary Dulles has testified, we are using the U. N. with respect to Egypt, with respect to Hungary, with respect to the Arab refugees, with respect to the Arab-Israeli dispute. We should not now give the impression that we propose to use our Armed Forces in the Middle East without concurrently using our best efforts to invoke the United Nations through its uniting-for-peace procedure.

Secondly, if and when it became necessary for the President, pursuant to House Joint Resolution 117, to employ United States Armed Forces in the Middle East to stop aggression, successfully invoking the uniting-for-peace procedure would obtain for us the moral and physical backing of the United Nations. Free world opinion would then rally behind the United States effort. And the burden of military action could be spread among the peace-loving nations of the world.

On the two occasions when the uniting-for-peace procedure was used, it had just this effect. The uniting-for-peace resolution itself, passed during the Korean conflict on November 3, 1950, by a vote of 52 to 5, with 2 abstentions, gave to this country great moral and some military support for the action in Korea. More recently, on November 5, 1956, the General Assembly's vote of 57 to 0, with 19 abstentions, in favor of the U. N. emergency force for Egypt further proved the utility of the uniting-for-peace procedure.

Nor would use of the uniting-for-peace procedure in any way retard the speed with which the United States intends to meet armed Communist aggression in the Middle East. The proposed amendment does not envisage delaying our armed reaction to aggression one moment. It merely asks that, concurrently with such armed action by this country, we seek moral and physical support from the United Nations General Assembly.

Judging by the overwhelming response to the uniting-for-peace procedure on the two occasions of its use, a two-thirds majority vote in favor of such action—ratifying the United States armed action already taken, clothing it in the mantle of the U. N., and adding military support from other members—would seem likely. But even if an attempt to invoke the procedure failed to obtain a two-thirds majority, it would in no way interfere with the United States action, which would still be "collective self-defense" under article 51. While continuing our unilateral action, we could continue to try to persuade a two-thirds majority of the General Assembly to utilize the uniting-for-peace procedure.

The uniting-for-peace procedure is essentially a bipartisan achievement. It was formulated under former Secretary of State Dean Acheson. As Secretary of State Dulles has just testified, he was largely instrumental, as our then delegate to the United Nations, in securing its passage in 1950 by the General Assembly.

Chairman GORDON. Thank you, Congressman REUSS, for your very fine statement.

In your opinion can the United States afford to wait for action by the General Assembly of the United Nations before using our forces in case of an attack on the Middle East countries?

MR. REUSS. No, sir, and the amendment does not suggest that we wait. The amendment very clearly continues to lodge power in the President to act immediately with armed reaction and simply asks

him, as soon as may be, to go before the United Nations General Assembly and give the facts, "Yesterday an armed invasion was launched and America, consistently with House Joint Resolution 117, reacted to it. Now we ask the U. N. General Assembly to ratify this action under article 51. We had to act without consultation because the U. N., while it acts fast, cannot act within an hour. We ask the U. N. to act within its Uniting-for-Peace procedure so that the United States will not have to go it alone."

Chairman GORDON. As you mentioned, we would have to get a two thirds majority vote in the General Assembly?

Mr. REUSS. Yes, sir.

Chairman GORDON. Suppose we fail to get that two-thirds majority vote in the General Assembly. Only about 27 nations would have to vote against it. Should we refrain from taking action we feel necessary to keep the Middle East free?

Mr. REUSS. Certainly not. I think a failure of our getting the necessary two-thirds majority is simply an indication that two-thirds of the Assembly present and voting at the particular time do not think that the United Nations Assembly at this particular time should call upon its members to contribute armed forces. It in no way impinges upon the action which we already would be taking under article 51 to use our massive Armed Forces to do whatever the Congress and the President thinks should be done to protect a Middle East free country against Communist invasion.

Indeed, I do not think we can escape the judgment of the rest of the world on what we do. If one-third of the 80 Member nations at a given time disapprove of the United States action, they are going to signify their disapproval through any number of channels other than the United Nations. It may be, for example, that members of the United Nations would introduce a resolution which would have nothing to do with House Joint Resolution 117 or my amendment, which would try to condemn the United States for what it was doing in the Middle East. Secretary Dulles, I think, gave us what the United States' answer to that would be. We would pay no attention to a resolution of the United Nations General Assembly which we felt was a wrong interpretation of the spirit and letter of the United Nations Charter.

I am dredging up a ridiculous example, of course, but in answer to the chairman's question, the failure of the United Nations General Assembly at that particular time to yield a two-thirds majority would in my opinion be of no detriment to us militarily or psychologically or from a propaganda standpoint or any other way. It would show we tried to get a United Nations mantle and did not succeed. If at first you do not succeed, try and try again; and I feel sure in time they would see the light.

Chairman GORDON. Thank you very much. Mr. Chipfield.

Mr. CHIPERFIELD. Thank you, Mr. Reuss, for your very constructive statement and your helpful suggestions. I think the committee should give careful consideration to the amendment that you have offered.

I have no questions at this time. That is all, thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman GORDON. Dr. Morgan.

Mr. MORGAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Congressman Reuss, do you feel that the addition of your amendment to this resolution would enable us to get some help in case of an armed Soviet attack in the Middle East?

Mr. REUSS. Yes, I do. That help in the military sense may not be as massive as we would like, but I point out in the Korean situation where we in effect used the Security Council, because of Russia's happy absence, for the same purpose I now propose we use the General Assembly, I am personally thankful we had a Turkish battalion and Canadian forces fighting with us in Korea. There were not as many as we would have liked, but any time we can get allies to take the burden off American boys, I am for it as we all are.

In addition to getting additional fighting men and planes and guns, there is, of course, the moral question. I think we are better off resisting aggression under the mantle of the United Nations than purely by ourselves. I think one of the reasons this resolution is before this committee, the failure of French and British policy in the Middle East, is because they tried to operate, by and large, by naked power, and I think it would be a mistake for us to take over what I regard as the less attractive element of French and British policy in the Middle East. I think it is very important right now that we indicate to people all over the world that we are prepared to use the United Nations machinery which was so brilliantly evolved on a bipartisan basis 6 years ago.

Mr. MORGAN. You would not ask for any delay under your amendment? This amendment could be put into action while the armed attack was going on?

Mr. REUSS. Absolutely. I feel very keenly about that and if the wording of my rough draft can be made any clearer to show that not 1 second's delay is intended, I certainly hope that clarification will be done, although the language which talks about "during" the employment by the President of American Armed Forces clearly envisages that that employment in many possible instances would come first. If, of course, the President does not want to employ for 2 days, of course he would, under this amendment, want to first go to the U. N. General Assembly; but if he wants to employ at 3 o'clock in the morning, he could do so.

Mr. MORGAN. That is all.

Chairman GORDON. Mr. Vorys.

Mr. VORYS. Mr. Reuss, it looks to me as if your proposal involves semantics on the words "consonant" and "envisages." You claim "consonant" does not "envisage" the Uniting-for-Peace procedure. I think it does or was intended to. I agree with you on the value of this mechanism. I do not see any reason, unless we go to the dictionary and work over those two words further, I see no reason for any amendment to the resolution to invoke or to encourage the use of the machinery you refer to.

That is all.

Mr. REUSS. Could I comment?

Mr. VORYS. Yes.

Mr. REUSS. While you did not end with a question mark, I think it was a question, Mr. Vorys.

I certainly am antisemantic, and I do not want to take the committee's time with what might seem to be a verbal quibble. I do think,

however, Mr. Vorys, that there is more than that involved. The world and lawyers and everybody else will read this resolution in the light of the language it contains and also in the light of the President's address to the joint session of Congress which gave it its color and flavor. The President, in his joint address to the Congress, had the following to say in regard to the United Nations:

Our thoughts naturally turn to the United Nations as a protector of small nations. Its charter gives it primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. Our country has given the United Nations its full support in relation to the hostilities in Hungary and in Egypt. The United Nations was able to bring about a cease-fire and withdrawal of hostile forces from Egypt because it was dealing with governments and peoples who had a decent respect for the opinions of mankind as reflected in the United Nations General Assembly. But in the case of Hungary the situation was different. The Soviet Union vetoed action by the Security Council to require the withdrawal of Soviet armed forces from Hungary. And it has shown callous indifference to the recommendations, even the censure, of the General Assembly. The United Nations can always be helpful, but it cannot be a wholly dependable protector of freedom when the ambitions of the Soviet Union are involved.

That quotation from the President, Mr. Vorys, strongly indicates to me that the administration thinks that you really cannot use the United Nations, because of the Russian veto in the Security Council, and the President and Mr. Dulles went on to say the United Nations General Assembly was not any good in Hungary; Russia just sneered at it. Really, the reason Russia was able to display callous indifference to the United Nations General Assembly's resolution last October and November on Hungary was because the United Nations General Assembly's resolution did not really propose anything. It was just moral censure, and of course Russia is not deterred by moral censure. Here we are talking about force, and my suggestion is that that force which has been decided to be used by this committee and the Congress, be force exercised, if possible, through the United Nations.

So it is not just a question of semantics. The proponents of this resolution apparently are of the opinion you just have to write off the United Nations in cases of great power disputes against Russia.

I am sure that on reflection they do not really mean to intend that, and I have high hopes that Mr. Dulles, particularly, from the kindly remarks he made in answer to a question from the gentleman from Arkansas, Mr. Hays, on Monday of this week, might accept this amendment or something like it. But in the light of the legislative history, if Congress wants to urge the President to use the U. N. Uniting-for-Peace procedure, it has to somehow, in my opinion, patch up this amendment or patch up the legislative history because the history at the moment is that the administration does not recognize that the Uniting-for-Peace procedure is something that it ought to use concurrently with armed resistance.

Mr. VORYS. My interpretation of the President's message is not consonant with the interpretation you envisage. I think that the President's message and the resolution envisage an appropriate use of the Uniting-for-Peace resolution. But I do not want to detain the committee further with debate on your envisagement and my idea of what is consonant with it. Thank you.

Mr. MORGAN. Mr. Carnahan.

Mr. CARNAHAN. We appreciate your coming before the committee and the excellent statement you made.

I notice your suggestion for wording for the amendment:

Provided further, That the President, as early as possible before or during such employment, shall, unless he deems it inadvisable, request the United Nations General Assembly—

You are not directing the President that he must proceed and that he must make—

Mr. REUSS. That is correct, and I shall here reveal a little of my own internal draftsmanship. I put in, frankly, the “unless he deems it inadvisable” after turning the matter over in my mind and an earlier suggested draft by me did not have those words and did direct him when he uses armed force to concurrently use the Uniting-for-Peace procedure.

The reason I added the words “unless he deems it inadvisable” is because of a feeling I have that Congress must be very, very slow to tie the hands of the President in any way in the field of foreign policy.

As of the moment I cannot, frankly, conceive of any set of circumstances in which the President would want to use armed force and yet not at the same time invoke the Uniting-for-Peace procedure of the General Assembly.

On reflection, however, and because of the delicate ground we in Congress tread at all when we endeavor to tell the President what he can or should or may do in the field of foreign policy, I thought it well to add those words.

I do not think it weakens the sense of it much because it indicates a strong wish on the part of Congress that the President do use the Uniting-for-Peace procedure and if the President deems it inadvisable, he certainly would be required in all fairness to inform the Congress and the public why he deemed.

Let me say in conclusion that if the committee should view favorably an amendment along these general lines, it might well ask the administration how it feels about not only the general idea of the amendment, but also the necessity for including the clause that you have just remarked, Mr. Carnahan, “unless he deems it inadvisable.” If the administration feels it unnecessary to have that exculpatory clause, certainly I do not think Congress would want to insist upon it.

Mr. CARNAHAN. I am glad you included these words in the proposal and I think they should be left in.

Mr. MORANO. Would you yield?

Mr. CARNAHAN. Yes.

Mr. MORANO. Would you tell us the conditions or circumstances that impel you to use the words “deems inadvisable” that you thought might arise that the President would deem it inadvisable to take action?

Mr. REUSS. Honestly, Mr. Morano, I cannot conceive of any set of circumstances in which I think the President should deem it inadvisable.

However, today is January 1957. This resolution, when passed, will remain on the books for many months certainly. I did not want to do anything by which it could later be said that Congress had tied the hands and affirmatively directed the President to do something in the field of foreign policy in the future where the President, in his best judgment and knowing the wish of Congress in the matter, felt that he should not.

So, in answer to your question, I cannot conceive of any specific set of circumstances.

Mr. MORANO. Do you not agree that the language is conflicting with the word "shall"?

Mr. REUSS. Now I will admit that we do get into semantics. If we say "may" instead of "shall" we imply that Congress or at least the drafter of this amendment does not care much about this. I do care much about this. I think this is important. I think Congress should, if it passes a resolution, not couch it merely in terms of naked power but in terms of world order and the United Nations.

Therefore, I like the words "shall unless he deems it inadvisable."

In other words, Congress wants the President to do this unless the President, in the exercise of his good judgment and for reasons he is prepared to state before the bar of public opinion, feels it should not be done.

Mr. MORANO. If you give him that escape with the words "deemed inadvisable" why do you not say "may" and give him the escape you give with the other language?

Mr. REUSS. My reason for not using "may"—and maybe it is a bad reason—is that if a majority of the Congress believes as I do, Congress wants to inform the President and the world that it does believe in this Uniting-for-Peace procedure and affirmatively wants it used.

If you merely say "may," that merely indicates that Congress is permitting such use if the President very much wants to do it. "Shall" is stronger and in my opinion the wording should be stronger.

Mr. CARNAHAN. I would like to say that I feel your wording has been carefully and well chosen and that your recommendation deserves the careful consideration of the committee. That is all, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman GORDON. Mr. Morano.

Mr. MORANO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Congressman Reuss, I think your proposed amendment merits our careful consideration. I want to compliment you on the facility with which you have explained what you have in mind. I think it is a valuable contribution to our thinking on this subject.

In reference to the words that have just been under discussion, I think they are important and should remain in the amendment, because it would seem to me that would give us the opportunity to act when we deem it necessary for our security and would have no hampering effect upon the action by the President.

Now, do you not feel that by spelling this procedure out in this amendment or a similar amendment, that it would greatly strengthen and add to the effectiveness of the already admirable leadership we are giving in the United Nations?

Mr. REUSS. I do, sir, and that is exactly why I have introduced it. It seems to me that in view of the truly admirable leadership we have recently been giving in the United Nations, it would really seem to veer off in a different direction in which we do not want to veer for us to inadvertently give the impression that we do not think the U. N. is useful in security matters where Communist Russia is concerned. I believe that it is most useful, has been and will be again.

Mr. MORANO. And at the same time, as you explained, that does not hinder our action in any way.

Mr. REUSS. It should not and does not.

Mr. MORANO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman GORDON. Mr. Zablocki.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Congratulations, Mr. Reuss, for an excellent statement.

Several members had expressed concern that the resolution creates the impression that the President would not consider using the Uniting-for-Peace procedure. Therefore, in earlier testimony in response to questions on the point you are presenting, the Uniting-for-Peace procedure, the committee was assured that the United Nations Assembly procedure would be employed.

Nevertheless, I agree with you, Mr. Reuss, that it should be spelled out in the resolution or report. Therefore, I believe the proposal should be given the fullest consideration. I have no questions. Thank you.

Chairman GORDON. Mr. Fulton.

Mr. FULTON. As a matter of fact, on page 3, Mr. Reuss, of your statement, you said "The proposed amendment does not envisage delaying our armed reaction to aggression one moment."

On page 2 you said "in either case the sovereign member will have"—I want you to note specially the word "have"—"to consent to the United Nations action before it commits its own armed forces."

As has been pointed out already, you really put a "may" in the text when you put it in the reverse by saying "provided further, that the President, as early as possible before or during such employment, shall, unless he deems it inadvisable, request * * *." So that actually you have it both ways, required, and discretionary.

Those of us with legal training see you stating on page 2 that the sovereign member will have to consent to United Nations action before it commits its armed forces. But then you say later that U. N. action and our action are to be all contemporaneous and that one would not be stopped by the other.

Which do you mean? At what point will the President, under your resolution, have the right to commit the United States Armed Forces?

Mr. REUSS. I am glad the gentleman makes this point because, as is so often the case, I did not express myself on page 2 clearly enough and hence I misled the gentleman.

Mr. FULTON. You are doing very well on your testimony and statement.

Mr. REUSS. Let me try to restate what I mean. On page 2 in the sentence you just read "in either case, the sovereign member will have to consent to the U. N. action before it commits its own armed forces," I did not mean there is anything in the U. N. whatever which requires this country to go before the U. N. before it commits its Armed Forces in collective defense under article 51.

All I meant by the sentence that you read is that as to nations, members of the General Assembly, other than the United States, those other nations can or cannot obey the recommendation of the General Assembly.

Clearly the United States is empowered, as the resolution under consideration suggests, to go right ahead and act in collective defense without consulting the United Nations if Russia, let us say, invades Iran or any other set of circumstances.

Mr. FULTON. I am glad to have your point. Inherent in the wording of this Resolution 117 there is the differentiation between the

Security Council action and the recommendations of the General Assembly, but you really want it spelled out more in the resolution.

Mr. REUSS. Yes; because, as a practical matter, since this whole resolution is aimed at Communist Russia or a country dominated or inspired by Communist Russia, it is perfectly obvious that the Security Council is not an effective instrument for dealing with aggression in the Middle East.

Mr. FULTON. On that point let us look how effective, then, this Peace Observation Commission, under U. N. Uniting-for-Peace procedures, would be. Let us go back to the 1950 resolution of U. N. authority. The requirement there is the Commission shall consist of 14 members. The provision also is that if the U. N. General Assembly is not in session, that the procedure can be called into being on an emergency session within 24 hours by action of a majority of the General Assembly, or 7 members of the Security Council.

If you look at what happened, then, on effective action, the 14 members of the Commission in 1950 were China, Colombia, Czechoslovakia, France, India, Iraq, Israel, New Zealand, North Ireland, Pakistan, Sweden, Soviet Union, United Kingdom, Uruguay, United States. You can see what a jumble it was on trying to get a policy set by that Commission.

I would like to mention at this time the current membership of the Security Council of the United Nations to show the inherent difficulty in obtaining action by seven members. The permanent members are China, France, Great Britain, United States, and U. S. S. R. Other current members are Australia, Sweden, Cuba, Colombia, Philippines, and Iraq. So my point is to you now: When the Security Council has on it 2 members, Britain and France, who will probably be voting separately from the United States, it is hard to get the 7-out-of-12 action there.

Likewise, when you see what happens as to the technical difficulties of setting up procedures for a Commission under the U. N. uniting for peace resolution of 1950, for example, you can see how hard it would be for the President to get action in that area.

On top of the difficulties, if the President is turned down, for example, by a majority when the General Assembly is not in session, will it not hurt the United States in world public opinion?

Mr. REUSS. Surely, Mr. Fulton, that is a most pertinent question and has to be answered. In my opinion, no, sir; it will not hurt. It will help the United States in world opinion. Let us first look at the context in which we are talking. We are talking about Russia invading, call it what you will, Iran.

Mr. FULTON. Our United States action would then be under article 51 of the U. N. Charter?

Mr. REUSS. We act 2 hours later under article 51 and American armed force in the amounts and circumstances which the President deems proper go into action.

Now, the question is simply this: Should we keep on doing this all by ourselves, doing it alone, unilaterally? Or should we do our level best under the Uniting-for-Peace procedure, having gone through the empty Security Council drill and gotten a Russian veto, if we bother that much, one, calling on a majority of the United Nations General Assembly to call a special meeting on 24 hours' notice.

Certainly, in the light of the overwhelming response to the Uniting-for-Peace procedure on the two occasions in history of its use, not only was a majority obtained but a thumping, super two-thirds majority. Therefore, surely under no arithmetical sorting out can I foresee a failure to get at least a majority to get the General Assembly together.

Then, of course, the next question is: Can we get two-thirds of those present and voting? As I sort out the possible arithmetic, we probably can, very probably can. But even if we do not—I think this is an important point—we still will be able to stand before the world as the country which is taking unilateral armed action in the Middle East, it is true, but nevertheless is trying its level best to do two things, to invoke the mantle of the United Nations, and to get some allies. I think even if we fail we are better off. We have shown we are not contemptuous of the United Nations machinery. It is not bad or evil to try to do something good and fail, but I do not think we would fail.

Mr. FULTON. In conclusion, you would not put an express condition upon the use of the authority under this Resolution 117 that the United States must await either Security Council action or General Assembly action in the United Nations before proceeding?

Mr. REUSS. Clearly not; as I have said before. I think in the reality of things we have got to be able to proceed on our own.

Mr. FULTON. That is all. Thank you. Your reasoning is good on many points. I want to compliment you.

Chairman GORDON. Mr. Brooks Hays, of Arkansas.

Mr. HAYS of Arkansas. I have no questions. I do want to express appreciation for the gentleman's very fine statement.

Chairman GORDON. Mr. LeCompte.

Mr. LECOMPTE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

May I compliment our colleague for his fine statement.

I have only one question, if I can express it. I understood, as I interpreted the statement of the Secretary of State and Admiral Radford yesterday, their idea is that Resolution 117 is for psychological purposes more than anything else. They do not anticipate we will ever use our Armed Forces, that the President will ever resort to using our Armed Forces under this resolution. It is possible all of the members did not get that same idea, but I thought that was it, that we served notice to the world that we were going to defend free nations, particularly in the Middle East, but did not anticipate we would have to.

You have thought out your amendment splendidly and stated your thinking very clearly. The only thing I thought was if this resolution is for psychological purposes, does your amendment strengthen it? Would some countries think, well, the United States might resort to the use of their Armed Forces. They will think it over and see what the United Nations wants to do first.

Mr. REUSS. Indeed, Mr. LeCompte, I think that psychologically it is very necessary to recognize by the resolution which Congress is to pass that we not only are going to react promptly and with powerful effect on our own initially, if that is the timing of it, but that we have sufficient respect for the orderly processes of the United Nations so that we are going to do our level best to get them, the member nations

of the United Nations, on our side through the United Nations as speedily as possible.

If, indeed, the purpose of this resolution is largely psychological, and our military and strategic thinkers believe that it will never need to be used, then it seems to me doubly important that we make it psychologically attractive to the many people in the world who do not like the idea of great power leadership and like the notion that they have a little place in the sun which comes about through their membership in the United Nations.

I would say in conclusion, Mr. LeCompte, that any language which the committee can use to make it crystal clear that our invoking the United Nations here is not going to delay our military reaction by 1 second should be added. I tried to make it clear. It certainly should be.

Mr. Lecompte. I agree with you that since we have the United Nations we should employ the facilities and the power of the United Nations wherever we can.

I was just wondering about the thought that would occur at capitals of many nations, whether the governments in some of those countries might feel that the United States will debate the subject quite a while before employing our Armed Forces.

Mr. Reuss. We should make it clear, sir, that we are not only not going to debate it but that we are going to act; however, that we are going to try to get support for our cause in the United Nations as soon as possible.

Mr. Lecompte. Thank you. That is all the questions I have. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Gordon. Mr. Hays of Ohio.

Mr. Hays of Ohio. Mr. Reuss, thank you for bringing your views before us. I have one question.

You envisage that if the United Nations would agree to support the United States in any use of force in the Near East that would be psychologically advantageous; is that right?

Mr. Reuss. I believe it would be.

Mr. Hays of Ohio. Then, by the same token, do you not think, if they refuse to support us, it would be psychologically disadvantageous?

Mr. Reuss. No, sir; I do not. I think that if they refuse to support us their dissidence is going to be known to the world through other channels anyway. Even if we fail to get the two-thirds majority needed at a particular time, I think we will get credit for trying.

After all, in the long run, what they think of us is going to depend largely on whether we are right and righteous or not, and if our defense of an invaded country in the Middle East is righteous, as I believe it would be, I think we will come out all right in the end.

I do not think we hurt ourselves by taking our cause before the General Assembly.

I know there are 2 sides to this question, but in my opinion we are ahead by going before them, saying, "Look, we are operating under article 51, and we are going to keep right on operating under 51 until the Security Council pacifies the area, but meanwhile we want the help of the United Nations, and we want to submit our effort to the General Assembly's views." I do not think we hurt ourselves by doing

that even if we do not get a two-thirds majority. I think the intransigent one-third that votes against it hurts itself.

Mr. HAYS of Ohio. Well, I think it is a debatable question. You have your views and I have mine. It seems to me there would be the possibility that there would be more than one-third that would vote against it under certain circumstances. But there again we are just guessing. I do not know whose guess might be right. That is all.

Chairman GORDON. Mr. Morano.

Mr. MORANO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I thank you for your views, Mr. Reuss.

I want to ask a couple of questions. The first is this: Do you not believe every member who has affixed his signature to the United Nations Charter has in essence pledged to come to the defense of any member that has been attacked?

Mr. REUSS. Yes; but as a practical matter, unless this country takes the leadership in these matters of armed aggression and international security, they are quite likely to content themselves with platitudinous resolutions and things that do not really mean much.

Mr. MORANO. Would you not say your amendment, in effect, is a reaffirmation of that pledge that has already been made by member nations?

Mr. REUSS. A reaffirmation, Mr. Morano, and a determination that we are going to call out that spirit. It takes parliamentary action. It takes a resolution by somebody. That somebody in the situation envisaged should be us.

Mr. MORANO. Is it not so that if any member declines or for some reason did not furnish the aid by supplying arms and men when an attack occurred, they would be dishonoring the pledge they made when they signed the United Nations Charter? Is that not so?

Mr. REUSS. Yes; and that is a strong force in favor of getting a two-thirds majority. That is why the uniting-for-peace procedure has been successful so far.

Mr. MORANO. Let us look at the procedure that must be followed when an attack occurs. When an attack occurs, if we were to come to the defense of a member nation attacked or some nation in the Middle East that was attacked, we would then have to report it to the Security Council under article 51; would we not?

Mr. REUSS. Yes, sir.

Mr. MORANO. How long would the Security Council—how long could the Security Council delay in taking action, if any?

Mr. REUSS. The procedures in both the Security Council and the General Assembly are really quite swift.

Mr. MORANO. You have seen them when they were not so swift, have you not?

Mr. REUSS. As parliamentary bodies go, I find the Assembly, particularly, moves rather fast.

However, let me just say this. I am not prepared to say that there cannot be tentative filibusters, amendments made for delay, and other methods of slowing down this procedure.

If those occur, we are still better off for having tried to invoke the moral authority of the United Nations and let the filibusterers bear the onus of holding back our effort to accompany our armed resistance to aggression by invoking the United Nations.

Mr. MORANO. Can the Assembly act only after the veto has actually occurred in the Security Council, or before a veto has occurred?

Mr. REUSS. That is a moot question. The Uniting-for-Peace resolution talks about when the Security Council has a disagreement about action to be taken, as I recall the words. Whether that takes a formal veto or not, I do not know. But if it does, I should think that that would be a necessary first——

Mr. MORANO. Will you say that again?

Mr. REUSS. If it does require a veto——

Mr. MORANO. If what?

Mr. REUSS. If the Uniting-for-Peace procedure does require a Security Council veto before the General Assembly may entertain the procedure, I would think that we are, nevertheless, better off for doing our level best to prepare the matter for the General Assembly by tabling something which Russia will be required to veto. If Russia is delaying and filibustering, which I do not believe is possible in either body for long, then she bears the onus. It is she who is unwilling to submit the dispute to the U. N.

Mr. FULTON. Under the Uniting-for-Peace resolution passed by the United Nations in 1950, there is the requirement that any action be taken by a two-thirds majority of the General Assembly. But if the General Assembly is not in session at the time, the call for a special session or meeting can be made by decision of the majority of the General Assembly.

I will state the resolution language more specifically as I remember it. "If not in session at the time, the General Assembly may meet in emergency session within 24 hours of the request therefor. Such emergency special session may be called if requested by the Security Council on the part of seven such members or by a majority of the members of the United Nations."

Mr. MORANO. You have heard the testimony of the Secretary, or have read it very carefully. Do you not think the statement he made fully covers the point made in your suggested amendment?

Mr. REUSS. On 1 point on page 55 of the record in response to the question of Mr. Hays of Arkansas, the Secretary made what I thought was a fine statement about the Uniting-for-Peace resolution, saying how he had worked for it and how he thought it was a good thing, which to me was tremendously encouraging.

Again, however, on page 88 and a number of other places he seemed to be repeating what the President said, namely that we cannot really use the U. N. because, in the Security Council you are met by a veto and in the General Assembly look what happened in Hungary.

Mr. MORANO. That is the very point.

Mr. REUSS. My point is that no, in God's name, let us not look at what happened in Hungary. The opposite analogy would be what would have happened in Hungary if we had moved under the Uniting-for-Peace procedure and said the U. N. General Assembly herewith calls upon its members to supply armed forces to resist the foreign invasion by Russia of Hungary and the attempt to overthrow the legitimate Imre Nagy government. If we had had that situation and the U. N. had failed, you could point to the Hungary situation as an example of why the U. N. is no good.

But since such a resolution was never proposed—I am not saying such a resolution would be good or bad—you cannot really say that

the Hungarian experience shows that the U. N. General Assembly is powerless because the U. N. General Assembly was never asked to take Uniting-for-Peace procedure which involves the use of armed force. Here, in considering House Joint Resolution 117 our jumping-off place is armed force.

Mr. MORANO. You seem to be making a strong statement in support of the use of the word "may" instead of "shall."

Mr. FULTON. I agree with Mr. Morano, too.

Mr. REUSS. As I say, "may" and "shall", they come close to being the same thing. If the committee believes that "may" sufficiently indicates the hope and intent of Congress that we want the President, unless unforeseeable circumstances arise, to use the Uniting-for-Peace procedure, I will be very happy.

Mr. MORANO. I do not want to do anything, knowingly at least, to weaken the objective of the President as it is contained in this resolution. If I thought your amendment weakened that purpose and that objective, then I would feel constrained to oppose it. But I wish to again compliment you for bringing this very important matter to our attention.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman GORDON. Mr. Fascell.

Mr. FASCELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman GORDON. I am sorry. I believe Mr. Selden is next.

Mr. SELDEN. I would like to commend our colleague from Wisconsin for bringing these recommendations to us this morning.

I am certainly in favor of reporting from this committee the very best resolution possible, and I am sure that Mr. Reuss' suggestions will receive every consideration from the committee.

Chairman GORDON. Mrs. Church.

Mrs. CHURCH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Reuss, I am delighted to know that you have given so much attention to a section of the resolution which I think has raised some doubt, in the minds of some of us, as to its exact implication. Because you have given such careful attention I would like to explore your thinking in regard to other possible consequences of the resolution.

If, by any chance, we went to the U. N. as suggested and a majority of nations agreed to join us, would our military planning then be put under U. N. leadership in your mind?

Mr. REUSS. It need not be. We could ask that we be given the generalized authority to conduct the United Nations operation.

Bear in mind that at any time in an operation under the United Nations banner, when the people of this country, through its Congress and its Executive, decide that we should detach ourselves, we, of course, have that sovereign power which can be exercised any day and every day.

Mrs. CHURCH. Granting that, sir, in practical results would the terminal facilities be in the hands of the United Nations or in our own hands in any particular action?

Mr. REUSS. No doubt, Mrs. Church, you are recalling events of 1950, as I did, I can assure you, when I turned this over in my mind.

I would just say two things. One, those terminal facilities need not be, if we do not want them to be, under the control of the United Nations. We can withdraw and go it alone at any time.

Second, however, under a resolution approved by two-thirds or more of the members of the General Assembly and in which a great majority of that two-thirds joined, it might be they could have some useful things to suggest to us in the give and take of the General Assembly which might, by our free consent, modify an American opinion that had asserted itself, for example—we might as well try to bring this down to a specific case.

Let us suppose Russia invades Iran and let us suppose we then react promptly militarily, that shortly afterward we go through the Security Council, get vetoed, go then to the U. N. General Assembly under the Uniting-for-Peace procedure, and happily by a vote of somewhat more than two-thirds we get their approval of the use of member nations under some sort of coordinated U. N. arrangement to fight with us.

Let us suppose—now I am getting to your terminal-facilities point—let us suppose the resistance to aggression goes well and that invading troops are driven back toward the borders between Russia and Iran. Let us suppose there is a public opinion in this country which says we should go a little further and wipe out the Russian supply lines, invading armies, staging areas, or whatever.

At that point I, as an American, would like to know what our fighting comrades and allies in the United Nations General Assembly had to say about that.

Always, if we feel that a recommendation of the General Assembly is against our best national United States interests, we are in a position to reject that recommendation. Indeed, and paradoxically while I, as you know, am mildly critical of the resolution because I think it omits this reference to the U. N., I think it goes too far in another phrase, because it says that whatever we do will be consonant with "recommendations" of the U. N.

I am not at all sure that we really can, in honesty, say that.

Indeed, Secretary Dulles the other day in effect said we did not really mean that because, of course, if the recommendation were too unacceptable, we might not obey it.

I think now is the time for soul searching and honesty with ourselves.

Mrs. CHURCH. You have led directly into my second and final question. In your opinion, if the letter of this resolution were to be strictly enforced and a hypothetical situation arose in which a resolution of condemnation of our action were passed in the General Assembly, what do you think we would be called upon to do if the resolution was strictly enforced?

Mr. REUSS. If it were strictly enforced and an atrocious resolution of the General Assembly such as you have set up were passed, you have given me no option when you say "if the resolution were strictly enforced," we would have to abide by that atrocious resolution.

For that reason I have not commented on that wording this morning. I object to the language in the draft resolution, but that vice is not inherent in the amendment I have proposed because I do not advocate placing ourselves ever at the mercy of unjust action by the United Nations. I simply advocate that we do our level best to invoke the just action of the U. N.

Mrs. CHURCH. But unjust members of the U. N. might interpret one of our actions to be unjust when it were not; is that right?

Mr. REUSS. True and they vote against it and you would have to count votes.

Mrs. CHURCH. It is your considered judgment under such circumstances that under the resolution as now written we would have no choice but to withdraw?

Mr. REUSS. As I read the words "consonant with the recommendations of the United Nations," I have some perturbations about it and if I were a member of the committee, I would be very uneasy about that.

Mrs. CHURCH. Have you a suggested change at that point?

Mr. REUSS. I would prefer to put in language along the lines that I have suggested and strike this language about whatever we do will be done consonant with recommendations of the United Nations because it is conceivable that the United Nations may want to make recommendations that we might want to exercise our sovereign right to reject.

Mrs. CHURCH. Thank you very much.

That is all, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman GORDON. Mr. Fountain.

Mr. FOUNTAIN. Mr. Chairman, I do not have any questions but as a member who has served with Mr. Reuss on the Committee on Government Operations and who has had experience with his insight and ability I, too, want to join the other members in complimenting him for his presentation and explanation of what appears to be a very meritorious amendment.

Chairman GORDON. Mr. Fascell?

Mr. FASCELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I should like to express my commendation to my colleague for a very fine presentation. I should like to ask several questions.

Let us assume for the moment that there is a great deal of military opinion and other opinion which deems it a drag from a military standpoint to have the United Nations military command in any action involving the United States. And let us assume further that the disadvantages, as expressed by this form of opinion, far outweigh any psychological and moral value that might be gained by concerted action. How do we then reconcile the position of the people of the United States today?

Mr. REUSS. Well, I think we reconcile the position of the people of the United States by rejecting with thanks the advice of the military. This seems to me a field in which a layman, like a Congressman, is quite as capable as the military in evolving public policy.

As a practical matter the uniting-for-peace procedure taken in conjunction with article 51 does not slow us down at all. Any military man who is at all thoughtful, I should think, would prefer to fight with allies and with secure supply lines than he would prefer to fight thousands of miles from home with a world that looked upon us as the new unilateral terror of the world.

Mr. FASCELL. I might interrupt to say that is a very fine conclusion, but not always agreed to by a great many military people.

Mr. REUSS. By some.

Mr. FASCELL. Could we state it another way: That we really cannot have our cake and eat it too and we have to make a decision as to whether or not we are going to call on world opinion or disavow world opinion.

Mr. REUSS. That is the choice. That is the choice confronting Congress in this resolution. And my view of how we should come out is expressed by my amendment; that we should not disavow world opinion. We can, I think, have our cake and eat it too. That is the beauty of it.

Mr. FASCELL. By your amendment we can have our cake and eat it too?

Mr. REUSS. As close to that happy situation as I think you can come in this vale of tears.

Mr. FASCELL. I agree with you. Is it not true that we, the people of the United States, have no choice, because we are committed to the United Nations? We have made our pledge. The die is cast.

Mr. REUSS. I think so. I think it would be traveling backward for us not to.

Mr. FASCELL. The only way we could disavow would be to do a complete about face.

Mr. REUSS. I agree, Mr. Fascell.

Mr. FASCELL. So, therefore, when we consider the advantages of spelling out clearly in the manner as you seek to do, or in some other comparable manner, where we reaffirm the pledge made when we signed up with the United Nations; when we clearly interpret the words "consonant" and "envisage" so that there cannot be any question as to what we mean, because we spell them out; when we assure all other nations of the world as to what exactly our position is; and when we definitely state the position of the United Nations by reaffirming again, in announcing what our position is; these seem to be the advantages of spelling out, as you have sought to do. I am asking now if you have thought of any disadvantages.

Mr. REUSS. Yes. Of course, I have tried to do that and in my statement I have tried to meet them.

Disadvantage No. 1 which, of course, has properly been much in the minds of the members in their questioning this morning, is, Does this slow down our military reaction? Our answer is it does not by 1 second.

Mr. FASCELL. Then it is truly not a disadvantage.

Mr. REUSS. I do not think so. I think that is met.

Objection No. 2 which has been raised, among others by the gentleman from Ohio, Mr. Hays, is that if you try this drill and don't succeed, are you worse off psychologically? Is the world going to say: "Aha! The United States is now operating in defiance of the United Nations." My answer is "No," it will not because we would not be in defiance of the United Nations. We merely would have tried it and not have succeeded in invoking the additional authority of the United Nations. We still would be squarely within the four corners of article 51, the self-help provision.

Mr. FASCELL. My final question is, Since there might be some concern about the United Nations military command over the United States military objective, is there anything to prevent, whether this resolution passes or not, any country which is aggressed upon from going to the United Nations and asking exactly the same procedure, which would then commit us, the United States, to a United Nations military command?

Mr. REUSS. Of course there is nothing to prevent a nation from so doing.

Mr. FASCELL. That is all I have, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman GORDON. Mr. Coffin.

Mr. COFFIN. Mr. Chairman.

Congressman REUSS, I should like to commend you on your presentation, but I am not going to because I have found as a lawyer that in those cases where the bench joined in praise of my presentation I lost the case. I hope that your amendment to the resolution, or something which accomplishes the same end, does not meet that fate.

In a discussion with Mr. Morano earlier you indicated that perhaps if the committee saw it that way the word "may" might accomplish at least substantially what you hope to accomplish, but is it not true that now the President has the power to request the Assembly to invoke the Uniting-for-Peace procedure?

Mr. REUSS. That is correct and that is why I did not use "may" because "may" would merely tell him what he can do already.

Mr. COFFIN. Would it not be worse? If we put the word "may" in, would there not be an indication to some people that there was doubt about it being so?

Mr. REUSS. That fear is why I used "shall" instead of "may." However, I do not mean to be too absolute about this. "May" plus some good legislative history might do the job. I used "shall" knowing what I was doing.

Mr. COFFIN. Is it not something like authorizing somebody by saying he may go to church on Sunday? Well, I think I have made my point.

Mr. REUSS. He shall go to church, unless he deems it inadvisable.

Mr. MORANO. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. COFFIN. Yes.

Mr. MORANO. That is what I was about to say; he shall go to church unless he deems it inadvisable. Would it not be considered stronger, for the purposes of what you are trying to do, judging from your testimony in answer to Mr. Coffin's question, to strike the words "deems it inadvisable" and leave the word "shall," or to strike the word "shall" and put in "may"? That is the point I make.

Mr. REUSS. Certainly the first alternative would be stronger, to leave the "shall" and strike the words "if he deems it inadvisable."

In response to Congressman Carnahan's question, I said I thought it might be a little restrictive of Congress not to leave some way out for some unforeseeable circumstance.

Let me summarize my views on this part of the discussion, however, by saying that I am not one bit proud of the language which I presented in this connection, the "shall" and "deems it inadvisable" business. I have my reservations about a straight, raw "may." But I am entirely confident that if the Foreign Affairs Committee approves of the general idea of putting a United Nations invoking amendment on the resolution, it can get language which will express what seems to me to be a very general and finely bipartisan thought, that we do not want to act with naked power and that we do want to act with world order and the United Nations; and that seems to be an equally divided opinion.

Mr. COFFIN. Your feeling basically, if you were given a preference, is that the wording you have indicated is desirable; that not only does Congress realize the President has the power but that it

shall be used unless there are conditions which cause him not to use it? In other words, it shifts the burden a little bit.

Mr. REUSS. Yes, sir.

Mr. COFFIN. Thank you.

Chairman GORDON. Mr. Farbstein.

Mr. FARBSTEIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. REUSS. I want to join my colleagues in complimenting you on your presentation. I might say as a lawyer, all you can do is present a good case irrespective of whether you are successful or not; and I might say you have presented a very good case.

I just want to pursue the words "deems it inadvisable" for a moment. Now, as a practical matter, do you not think that the President in anticipating a situation which might require a move on the part of this country, would know whether or not he had a two-thirds vote in the General Assembly? Feeling that it was necessary for the protection of this country, he might desire not to delay where he finds that Russia and the satellite countries and the countries in the Middle East and the Arabian countries would make up more than one-third of the votes in the U. N., hence they could defeat any resolution. Deeming it inadvisable at the moment to go to the United Nations for its consent he moved into the Middle East. He might then, submit the question to the United Nations and so obviate delay and the danger it might encompass.

For that reason, do you not think the language "deems it inadvisable" should be in?

Mr. REUSS. Of course, as I have indicated I do not think the mere fact that a nose count by the President indicates that he would probably fail in getting a two-thirds majority of those present and voting should deter him from making them stand up and be counted as to whether or not they believe, in Mr. Morano's phrase, "in the principles of the United Nations." But the "inadvisable" clause gives the President that final opportunity and option, and I honestly do not see how we can take that away from him.

Mr. FARBSTEIN. It unties his hands. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman GORDON. Mr. Saund?

Mr. SAUND. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I do wish to congratulate you on a fine presentation, Mr. Reuss. If I understand it correctly—and you correct me if my understanding of your viewpoint and purpose in presenting this amendment is not correct—I understand that you do not wish to tie the hands of the President in any form or manner whatsoever; that the sole purpose of your amendment is to remove any doubts which the peoples of the world may have about the basic thinking of the American people and the Congress, that we do wish to use all of the facilities of the United Nations to preserve world peace and if there is any desire on the part of the enemies of freedom to exploit any lack in the wording of the original resolution, you wish to have that removed by inserting this amendment? Is that correct?

Mr. REUSS. Yes.

Mr. SAUND. Is that the sole purpose?

Mr. REUSS. Yes. I do not wish to tie the hands of the President. I do wish to help Congress to guide the President's direction, however.

Chairman GORDON. Thank you very much for your appearance today and for the points you have made, Mr. Reuss.

Mr. REUSS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman GORDON. Our next witness is Mr. Clark Eichelberger, executive director of the American Association for the United Nations, Inc. Mr. Eichelberger, we would be glad to hear from you at this time.

STATEMENT OF CLARK M. EICHELBERGER, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, AMERICAN ASSOCIATION FOR THE UNITED NATIONS, INC., NEW YORK, N. Y.

Mr. EICHELBERGER. Mr. Chairman, I enjoyed very much Mr. Reuss' presentation. It makes mine very much easier. I think he struck at the very heart of the problem before you this morning. The way in which this reference to the United Nations is interpreted and strengthened I think makes the difference between most of the world believing that we will continue to work through the United Nations or that we are seeking to use the very unilateral power which we have been condemning the British and French for using in Egypt in the last few months.

I am not saying that is it; I am saying it is the appearance.

What I should like to do, Mr. Chairman, is to call your attention to two very important facts in the world situation which I think you want to take into consideration in the final drafting of the resolution and the way in which it is presented to your colleagues in the Congress and to the world. My first fact is that possibly not at any time since the United Nations was created, with the exception of the moment when President Eisenhower delivered his atoms-for-peace speech in the General Assembly in 1953, has the United States had so overwhelmingly the leadership of the United Nations as it has at the present time. It has been my privilege to sit in the General Assembly day after day, and sometimes night after night, watching the great drama of the last few months unfold.

The United States has this leadership because when the issues were presented to the General Assembly we indicated to the rest of the nations that the law of the Charter applied to all, whether they were friends, as President Eisenhower said, or otherwise.

I know the great soul searching that Ambassador Lodge and the Department of State and the White House undertook in deciding that the law of the Charter must apply against our friends in Western Europe as well as the Soviet Union in Hungary. We took that decision and, as a result, we demonstrated that we were the one great power capable of and willing to fulfill the obligations of the Charter. We demonstrated that we were not voting with the colonial powers and consequently, day after day, whether we were dealing with the Soviet Union in Hungary or the British and the French and the Israeli in Egypt, we were having an overwhelming vote of the General Assembly.

Now the United Nations has 80 members. That is 20 more, Mr. Vorys, than when you were fighting the battle of the United States in the United Nations at Paris in 1951. It has 80 members. Only five of those are so-called great powers with permanent seats on the Security Council. Some seven belong to the Soviet bloc. If you take out about 10, there are some 70 nations in the world which are looking to the United Nations as the source of power in the world.

There are today only three nations which by any stretch of the imagination are capable of waging hydrogen and atomic warfare, but the rest of the world is trying to find a substitute for the power vacuum itself. A United Nations official said to me recently that power was like a river which was constantly seeking its bed. And today the nations have found the bed. The power has found the bed in the United Nations. The small states do not want any great power—whether Britain, France, or the Soviet Union or the United States—filling vacuums in the world. They want to fill the vacuums themselves and through the United Nations.

Consequently, I want to point out that whatever we do must be thought of in terms of this great leadership which has been very wisely carried out in the Assembly debates under Ambassador Lodge.

I should like to point out in the second place that the United Nations has indicated its capacity to function surprisingly effectively. There were those who said when the Security Council had to be bypassed for the General Assembly and the United Nations grew to some 70 members that the Assembly could not function effectively, but I call your attention to the fact that this Assembly met night and day. It is now able, with the authority vested in the Secretary General, to have a fleet of some 40 ships clearing the Suez Canal. It actually has the first real United Nations peace force, forces contributed by some 11 nations, with 23 offering forces, on the job in the Middle East. The United Nations has demonstrated it can act effectively and forcibly.

Now I want to say to you, gentlemen, that any resolution which you pass would do more harm than good if it indicated to the rest of the nations of the world that we were discarding this leadership of the 70 some small nations in the United Nations; that we were now going to use unilateral power in the Middle East, which we have condemned the British and the French for using; and that somehow or other we were going off on a bypass, paying lipservice to the United Nations but somehow or other thwarting this movement for a stronger United Nations.

The United Nations has grown up. There is great strength and power there. Granting that some of the small states do not necessarily act wisely, one-fourth of the membership of the United Nations is made up of nations that have won their political independence in the last 12 years. Every once in a while someone says: "Can you trust these Asian and African powers? They are very young." They said that about this country between 1776 and 1784. We had to find our own way to independence, and we made mistakes. We found it. The United States struck a blow against the colonial system in 1776 which is reaching its fruition in the United Nations today.

We cannot in any way give the impression that we are going to renounce the leadership that has come to us recently. Consequently, I say that if the purpose of this resolution is to give an additional indication that the United States is prepared to use force for the maintenance of peace in the Middle East, we must be clear that it is not a unilateral force. We must be clear that it is not suddenly a force to be used to bypass the United Nations and that, psychologically speaking, we are forgetting about what the United Nations has been able to accomplish in the last few months with the leadership of the United States.

Now, I have prepared—and I hope you will not feel it presumptuous—a paper. I might say that I had the advice of some distinguished international lawyers. They really prepared the paper rather than I. They were Prof. Arthur Holcombe, who has just retired from the School of Government of Harvard, and Prof. Quincy Wright, of Chicago, and others. We put down on the paper a few very brief amendments to the resolution which we thought would bring it more in with the United Nations. So I take the liberty of submitting these tentatively to you with an apology for what was a rather hasty draft in 2 or 3 days.

The President made it very clear, and so did the Secretary of State, that they wished to continue seeking a solution of the problems in the Middle East through the United Nations. Let me point out, gentlemen, that your resolution does not deal with Suez or the problems of Israel and the Arab States. It does not deal with the real problems confronting the United Nations at this time.

As Mr. LeCompte has said, the resolution is probably psychological and the President does not ever expect the force to be used. If that is the case, the purpose of the resolution is to give confidence while the United Nations, as the President says, attempts to work out these problems.

Therefore we should like to see a sentence inserted:

Whereas in pursuance of this purpose the United States will continue to take an initiative in the United Nations to preserve peace, security, and justice in the Middle East; and—

Then I would like to make another suggestion. I think everyone knows that the basic purpose of this resolution is directed against international communism getting a hold in the Middle East, but I wonder, gentlemen, if we want to spell it out in that way in a resolution. We know that is the fact, but I think we must be against aggression, period.

I was critical of the SEATO Treaty because it came out simply against Communist aggression in the Far East, and I think we are against aggression, period.

Most respectfully we suggest it might read:

Whereas the peace of the world and the security of the United States are endangered as long as any nation or party seeks by threat of military action, use of economic pressure, internal subversion, or other means to attempt to bring under its domination peoples now free and independent; and—

In other words, of course, that includes international communism but it does mean that the United States is indicating it is against any aggression in the Middle East. We have taken some pledges in the tripartite declaration. We have taken such pledges in the United Nations Charter. We are simply reaffirming a position we have previously taken.

I would like to make another suggestion on the question of economic aid. I have suggested that there might be another phrase at the close of section 1:

Provided, such cooperation and assistance shall be carried out so far as possible through the United Nations.

I know very well, of course, that you are not going to vote the United Nations \$200 million. I know a good deal of this is going to be used bilaterally. But I would like to remind you that Ambassador Lodge

remarked some time ago, as the result of his close observation as the head of the United States mission to the United Nations, that we might well do more of our technical assistance program through the United Nations, because, he said, there was danger of an auction developing where a power might play the Soviet Union and the United States off against each other; and when assistance is given through the United Nations, that danger is somewhat reduced.

I know that the President wants the authority to use the money sufficiently liberally so that he may discriminate in the Middle East. Quite obviously he would be more inclined to give technical assistance to Iraq than to Syria. But I would also submit that to get Israel and the Arab States together and a TVA of the Jordan completed—Mr. Johnston's plan—to get Israel and the Arab States together in a broad program of settlement, might better be done through the United Nations than by the United States. It might be that Israel and the Arab States would rather engage in a broad technical assistance program under the United Nations than under American aid alone. Therefore, I would like to see it recognized that to the extent practicable the President might work through or in cooperation with the Technical Assistance Division of the United Nations and the specialized agencies.

One of the most interesting developments of today is the United Nations Police Force. The United States does not contribute forces to it, quite obviously. They are to be forces from the nations not permanent members of the Security Council. But the United States most enthusiastically supported the creation of the police force.

I remember one night late in the General Assembly when the Foreign Minister of Canada, Lester Pearson, suggested that there be an international force in the Middle East, and the eagerness with which the American delegation rose to support it. I would not want any nation in the Middle East to believe that the United States, because it is willing to use military power to restrain aggression, if the President deems it wise, is in any way going to be less in support of the police force of the United Nations. I hope that the police force of the United Nations in the Middle East may grow and may be sufficiently powerful greatly to reduce the need of American action in the Middle East.

So might it be possible at the end of section 2 to say:

and to support United Nations emergency forces in any part of that area especially menaced.

Then, coming to that part which deals with the United Nations, I have great respect for the amendment that Mr. Reuss submitted. I have a somewhat different version. I yield to him because of the thought he has given it and the way you gentlemen appreciated his presentation. We have suggested at the end of the "provided" section, which deals with the United Nations:

or of the General Assembly to make recommendations for that purpose in case the Security Council fails to act.

That is probably a different wording of his essential purpose; that is, to recognize that the General Assembly may now act, now that the Security Council has vetoed; and so the whole picture is there.

As I see it, gentlemen, the United Nations has demonstrated recently the capacity to work very quickly. I remember being in the

Security Council room at 3 o'clock in the morning. The Assembly had adjourned for a few hours in order that the Security Council might listen to Henry Cabot Lodge's latest messages from Hungary. A resolution was introduced and the Soviet Union vetoed. Without getting out of their chairs, they invoked the Uniting-for-Peace resolution and the General Assembly met the next day. It was very rapid. That might not always happen. As I see it, the logical procedure is this: If an aggression occurs, we ask for an immediate meeting of the Security Council. Remember, the members of the Security Council by the Charter must always be there, so that the Security Council can meet almost instantly. If the Security Council is blocked by veto, the Uniting-for-Peace resolution may be invoked and a meeting of the General Assembly called within 24 hours. I cannot imagine the United States, with its influence in the United Nations, ever failing to get a majority of the Security Council or of the General Assembly for such an emergency meeting.

Sometimes, gentlemen, I fear that we do not have enough confidence in American leadership and our power in the United Nations, which we have seen demonstrated time and time again as they have voted with us. Remember, there is the escape clause in the Charter, article 51, if an attack occurs and we must respond instantly. We have the right under article 51, recognizing the right of individual and collective self-defense, to respond instantly, but then we have the obligation to inform the Security Council that we have acted, and if either the Security Council or the General Assembly are then able to take over resistance to aggression we unite our resistance to aggression with them. Consequently we are not stopped if an instant response to attack must occur.

But let us assume it is possible to have a meeting of the Security Council or the General Assembly and to have their support. I think this section must be made very clear, that we are not asking the Congress to give the President authority to take the unilateral action that we have criticized the British and the French for taking. Now, they are two very different things. The British and the French and the Israeli acted in Egypt without the consent of the Egyptian Government. Under this resolution, the President cannot act without the consent of the nation, so the two things are different.

But I am talking about the effect upon the world. We must indicate, if it is at all possible, that we will follow the recommendations of the United Nations to resist aggression. We only act under article 51 if we must respond instantly while the Security Council and the General Assembly are preparing to join with us in the resistance.

I would like to say, gentlemen—and I cannot put it too strongly—something very profound has occurred in the last few months. The United Nations has been growing up. It is much stronger and with a capacity to act quickly, that I could not anticipate. The United States is unquestionably the leader in the United Nations today, and the one great power that has demonstrated its capacity and willingness to live up to the obligations of the Charter. Ours is a position and an opportunity which we cannot throw away. If I thought that this resolution weakened that, then I say that our moral position in the world is more important than this power you would give the President, which he probably has anyway. But I think this resolution,

with some interpretation on his part—with certain amendments—can be of such a nature that it will seem to be strengthening our position in the United Nations rather than weakening the United Nations or bypassing it.

I was a little disturbed by a statement reported in the press the other day. I am sure it was an inaccurate description of something said before your committee, that, after all, the United Nations could not block action under this resolution because the United States has a veto in the Security Council and we would not have to follow a resolution of the General Assembly if we did not like it. We have never used a veto in the Security Council.

I would like to see it put positively. We hope that the United Nations is now strong enough to take action against aggression so that the power given the President in this resolution equips the President to act more nearly instantly in cooperation with the United Nations. It would help the United Nations to see that the United States can act effectively against aggression.

There is always the escape clause of article 51. I would plead with you to see that your presentation to Congress and our presentation to the world fully recognizes our leadership in the United Nations.

Chairman GORDON. Thank you very much, Mr. Eichelberger, for your fine presentation. On page 2 of your proposed resolution, in the second paragraph, would not your amendment in this paragraph mean that we were to interfere when there are armed raids along the border of the Middle East countries?

Mr. EICHELBERGER. Not unless we wanted to. This resolution does not say the President has to use American Armed Forces; it simply empowers him to. This does not say he has to use them against Soviet action in the Middle East; it empowers him to do it.

Remember, we did give a guaranty in the tripartite declaration to Egypt and Israel that we would go to the aid of either one of them if attacked by the other. That, of course, is quite out of date.

No; the President would not be obligated to use armed forces to protect Egypt and Israel, since it is purely permissive, but I would like to see the President able to use it against any aggression, if he wanted to.

Chairman GORDON. Thank you. Mr. Merrow.

Mr. MERROW. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Eichelberger, we are very glad to have you with us again. I want to commend you on the work you are doing in the American Association for the United Nations and for the forthright statements that you have made here this morning.

Do I understand that you feel the resolution, if it were adopted as drafted, could or would be interpreted as bypassing the United Nations, or, to use the words you used, "renouncing our leadership in the United Nations"?

Mr. EICHELBERGER. I believe it could so be interpreted. I am sure that none of you want it to give that impression. Therefore, I believe that the language can be improved upon so that the impression is positive, rather than negative.

Mr. MERROW. I am glad to hear what you had to say about our leadership in the United Nations. We appreciate those comments.

In this resolution you have suggested two changes by striking on the first page "international communism and the nations it controls"

and then on page 2, the section to which the chairman has referred, by striking "overt armed aggression from any nation controlled by international communism." The very thing we are trying to do here is to prevent international communism from taking over in this area. Do you not think that those two amendments might weaken this resolution by not referring to what we already know is the great threat here?

Mr. EICHELBERGER. Well, so far as the threat is concerned, Mr. Merrow, I doubt if the Soviet Union would attack in the Middle East by the kind of attack this resolution might meet. Again, I believe its effect to be psychological. Any effort to get into the Middle East would be more likely by infiltration by the kind of thing that is occurring in Syria. On the other hand, if Syria should become a Communist state and should attack one of the other Middle East States this resolution would apply.

But I think by the testimony of the witnesses before this committee and the testimony that will further be given, by the President's speech and by the speech of the Secretary of State, it is very clear against whom this is directed. However, I sometimes wonder whether it is wise in a resolution to single out any particular nation or group of nations. I realize the inherent eternal wickedness of international communism, yet it is possible as a result of Soviet weakness we might be able to move toward some accommodation on the question of Germany and disarmament. I would hate to have us use the language of a cold war in a resolution and probably intensify the cold war when there has been a slight shifting of position. I say that, and want the record to show, very tentatively because I would not want to appear before this committee any less aware than any of you of the inherent wickedness of communism. But I doubt the wisdom of specifying any particular ideology in a resolution.

Furthermore, I am in favor of giving the President authority, if he needs it, to act against aggression, period, in any area where he asks for the authority. I think it has been clearly stated to the world this is directed against the Soviet satellite system.

Mr. MERROW. You do not think there is any danger by armed attack from a nation or party or anyone not controlled by international communism; do you?

Mr. EICHELBERGER. Unless Egypt or Jordan or some of the Arab States should decide that they wanted to make an all-out attack on Israel. I could let my imagination go and say that aggression could occur that would not be so inspired by international communism.

Mr. MERROW. Just one thing more, Mr. Chairman. You said, as I recall it, you would accept in principle the amendment offered by our colleague as a substitute to the language on page 2, after "peace and security." You have proposed the addition of the following after those words:

or of the General Assembly to make recommendations for that purpose in case the Security Council fails to act.

Mr. EICHELBERGER. Yes. I think I had assumed that the drafters of this resolution meant some of the things that Mr. Reuss spelled out in his resolution. I had assumed that the addition that I suggested spelled out everything he had, but to make it doubly sure I would be quite content to accept his wording.

Mr. MERROW. That is all, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman GORDON. Dr. Morgan.

Mr. MORGAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Eichelberger, I want to thank you for a very forceful statement. I have just one question. Could you give us some of the background and functions of the American Association for the United Nations, Inc.?

Mr. EICHELBERGER. Surely. The American Association for the United Nations was organized as the League of Nations Association back in 1923. We went through the rather dark days of the period before the United Nations when we were quite a minority movement. Then the name of the association was changed from the League of Nations Association to the American Association for the United Nations.

You would be interested to know that we consulted President Roosevelt in December of 1944 and he said:

Go ahead and change the name of the association. Winston Churchill and I have agreed that the name of the new organization will be the United Nations, so why not change ahead of it.

So we had actually changed our name before the conference at San Francisco, by advice of the President that he and Churchill had decided on the name of the new organization.

We are an organization made up entirely of American citizens as members, and our program is to distribute the greatest amount of information about the United Nations and to develop public opinion in support of the United Nations.

Mr. MORGAN. Is it financed by private contributions?

Mr. EICHELBERGER. Entirely individuals. I think our foundation support is very small, indeed. We receive no money from the large foundation; there are one or two family foundations. Entirely by American citizens, who are members.

Mr. MORGAN. Thank you, Mr. Eichelberger. That is all, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman GORDON. Mr. Morano.

Mr. MORANO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Eichelberger, you made some reference in your statement to the fact that there are many other problems in the Middle East; the Arab-Israel conflict, the Jordan Valley development, and so on. Would you not agree with me that in order to achieve these projects these countries must be kept free and independent countries?

Mr. EICHELBERGER. I quite agree, absolutely. I agree completely.

Mr. MORANO. Then the first thing we must do is to maintain their independence and their freedom, before we can proceed to try to get these refugee problems and the Jordan Valley and the Nile River and the other projects on their way.

Mr. EICHELBERGER. I would agree with you, sir, if you would permit me to say that the faster we can get these projects under way and get a more stable economy in these countries, the less the danger that they would be open to Communist subversion. The Communists could walk in at any time with military force, but they might not. The Communists subvert people who are hungry, miserable, and wretched and who do not feel they have independence or are feeling excessively nationalistic because of ancient wrongs. I would say, therefore, the

faster we can meet the refugee problem and reduce that cancer, the faster we can get a TVA in the Jordan going, and quite a number of things we might do to promote stable economies, the more it will make it less likely the Communists will subvert these people.

Mr. MORANO. As I understand the resolution, the first objective is to deter aggression.

Mr. EICHELBERGER. That is right; but I would like to point out—

Mr. MORANO. The second objective is to stabilize the economy. Which would you put first, is the point I am trying to find out.

Mr. EICHELBERGER. You put me in sort of a dilemma, sir, because I think they have to come together. I think the resolution puts the economic first. The wording of the resolution is such that the economic comes before the military authority, so I think the White House was probably indicating how close the two come together.

I would say that we have to guarantee the independence of these nations and we have to put forward economic programs as quickly as possible. I am sure you and I are in full agreement.

Mr. MORANO. Now, the purport of your statement is that we should use the United Nations first and completely in trying to deter aggression all over the world. Is that not right?

Mr. EICHELBERGER. Yes.

Mr. MORANO. Would that be a fair statement?

Mr. EICHELBERGER. Yes.

Mr. MORANO. Would you agree with me that the United Nations is not perfect insofar as the organization of it is concerned to do just that?

Mr. EICHELBERGER. Yes, I would agree that it is far from perfect, but I think the great challenge of the picture of the United Nations is how it has been strengthening itself by practice and experience. I call attention to how much the United States of America has contributed to that evolution. You see the number of resolutions that have been introduced by the United States in the last few months, and you can go far back. The Uniting-for-Peace resolution and many things that have been undertaken have strengthened the United Nations and have come from the United States. Therefore, I want to see us continue to work through the United Nations for its improvement and its strengthening.

Mr. MORANO. Would you cite, for example, one amendment you could suggest to strengthen the United Nations Charter to deter aggression or to bring about peace?

Mr. EICHELBERGER. One thing I would like to see the United Nations have is a permanent international police force capable of being rushed by the Secretary General to any point of trouble, because I believe a United Nations force, even of a few thousand men flying the flag of the United Nations, would be like a sheriff. He wears a badge which makes him symbolic of the whole community, and I think it is not likely that anyone would attack in such a situation. Of course it does not take an amendment to establish the police force. The power is already there. I would like to see the Charter revised to reduce the veto.

I can give you many instances where the United Nations procedures could be improved.

Mr. MORANO. Do you not agree with me that other steps must be taken to assure the people of the world and to deter aggression?

Mr. EICHELBERGER. I would say our obligation under the Charter is to undertake to meet aggression through the United Nations, but that article 51 was put in the Charter in San Francisco to provide a safeguard for unilateral action in case the United Nations is incapable of fulfilling its responsibilities. So, I would say we should try to work through the United Nations, using article 51 if we have to use the right of individual or collective self-defense.

So I think we have both in our hands.

Mr. MORANO. But we may be confronted with an aggression in the world where we do not have a collective security pact. We do have with Pakistan in SEATO, and with Turkey in NATO, but we do not have a pact with some of the countries in this area.

Mr. EICHELBERGER. Quite right.

Mr. MORANO. As I understand this resolution, we are trying to plug a loophole.

Mr. EICHELBERGER. I understand that. But I am of the impression you cannot possibly have enough security pacts to protect each country in the world. You could not have had a pact to protect Korea in 1950. Atomic and hydrogen bombs may be able to leap over all our security arrangements in a worldwide situation.

But I would not want you to think I am quarreling with the purpose of this resolution to plug psychological loopholes in the Middle East. But I believe we should keep the gains we have made through the United Nations. I believe it is now announced or to be announced that the Secretary General will be able to hold conversations with Egyptians in one room and French and British in another to find a formula for the operation of the Suez Canal. All these things should go on.

Mr. MORANO. Would you agree with the statement that the President and the Secretary of State in this resolution are going as far as they possibly can go to work within the framework of the United Nations?

Mr. EICHELBERGER. I think the President said very clearly in his speech he intends to work within the framework of the United Nations, but I have suggested a few amendments which would make it clearer to the world.

Mr. MORANO. Do you think there is any doubt in the world of the President's leadership in the Suez problem? Is there any doubt in the world that we stand ready to back the United Nations Charter to the greatest extent possible?

Mr. EICHELBERGER. As a result of the leadership which the President has given the United Nations in the atoms-for-peace program and in the Suez and Hungarian problems, I do not think there is any doubt but that the President intended the United Nations to be the foundation on which actions would be taken. I would not want the impression to get abroad that the President has asked for authority for the type of unilateral action that we condemned on the part of the British and the French, and I think we should make that clear to people who cannot sit in this room.

Chairman GORDON. Your time is up. Mr. Carnahan.

Mr. CARNAHAN. I yield to my colleague, Mr. Hays of Arkansas, who has an engagement to meet.

Chairman GORDON. Mr. Hays of Arkansas.

Mr. HAYS of Arkansas. Thank you. I appreciate Mr. Carnahan's yielding to me. I have a very important engagement at 1 o'clock.

I would not want to pass up an opportunity to thank Mr. Eichelberger for his help when I was a member of the United States delegation to the United Nations General Assembly in 1955.

Mr. Eichelberger, no doubt you have seen the resolution introduced by me in March of last year, which contains this language:

the United States Government will pursue its determination to preserve the peace and foster the economic welfare of the Middle East through the instrument of the United Nations, promoting vigorously the goals of regional tranquillity, permanent settlement of the refugee problem, and significant economic and technical aid to improve the living standards and well-being of the peoples in this region, all by means of the continuation of our own foreign aid programs and the employment of the United Nations machinery for international mediation and economic contributions.

Mr. EICHELBERGER. I think that section could be lifted right out and put in this resolution because I think it would assure the world in effective language of our position.

Mr. HAYS of Arkansas. Mr. Chairman, that was House Concurrent Resolution 222 of the 84th Congress. I want that in the record for the information of my colleagues.

Mr. EICHELBERGER. I am not sure of the rules of the committee, and I would not want to appear presumptive, but I would hope that could be made a part of this resolution.

Mr. HAYS of Arkansas. Thank you.

Mr. CARNAHAN. If my colleague has not consumed all my time, I have one question I would like to ask.

Mr. Eichelberger, would the amendments you suggest, both the deletions and the additions, taken separately or together, expand the geographical area to which the resolution is directed?

Mr. EICHELBERGER. No; I do not see that they do. Mr. Carnahan, would it be out of place for me to speak of some of the very good results of your subcommittee hearings?

And I would like to suggest another subject for hearing, and that is the evolution of the powers of the General Assembly in the light of the fact the Security Council is almost inoperative. The General Assembly has had to assume powers of peacemaking not intended by the charter.

Mr. CARNAHAN. We appreciate your suggestion.

Chairman GORDON. Mr. Zablocki.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. Mr. Eichelberger, I want to compliment you for your excellent statement.

Many of the members of the committee are quite concerned that the resolution before us, House Joint Resolution 117, does not provide a formula for the basic problems of the Middle Eastern area, such as the problem of internal subversion, the Israel-Arab problem, political, economic, and other problems in that area.

Do you believe that the amendments you are proposing to the joint resolution would help resolve the basic problems in this area?

Mr. EICHELBERGER. We suggested an amendment that—

Whereas in pursuance of this purpose the United States will continue to take an initiative in the United Nations to preserve peace, security, and justice in the Middle East.

Congressman Hays of Arkansas spelled it out in more detail in his resolution of last spring. I would say that my language could even be strengthened.

Certainly there are three basic problems in the Middle East. One is Suez. It is a tragedy that the British and the French decided to attack in Suez, when the Secretary General has succeeded in getting agreement on six principles in the Security Council and hoped to get agreement in the General Assembly. Solution of the Suez may be the easiest.

The second is the internal problem between Israel and the Arab States.

The third problem is a better economy in the Middle East.

Now, this resolution you have before you does not refer to those subjects at all. The most you can say for it is that it creates a better security climate. But I would certainly hope this resolution would recognize that we will continue to attack these problems through the United Nations.

As you probably know, Ambassador Lodge has presented 2 resolutions to the General Assembly, 1 by which a committee of 5 would start work on an agreement between Israel and the Arab States, and another which would push the solution of the Suez.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. You think the resolution should include a formula to attack the basic problems of the area?

Mr. EICHELBERGER. Yes, even in stronger language than I have suggested.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. You have demonstrated how certain problems could be better handled through the United Nations. How could the internal subversion problem be better handled, through the United Nations?

Mr. EICHELBERGER. That is hard to say, but it may be that a nation that is quite confused as to whether it wants help would take it from the United Nations rather than directly from the United States or the Soviet Union. It may be easier for a nation to take it from the United Nations.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. What machinery does the United Nations have to combat internal subversion?

Mr. EICHELBERGER. The United Nations has no machinery to combat internal subversion, and the United States Government has not been able to devise any. This resolution is directed to an attack by Communist aggression, and not to dealing with subversion.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. You have stated, in reply to a question by Mr. Morano, that "the faster we can get these projects underway"—for example, the Jordan River project and other projects in the Middle East—"the faster we can go the lesser the danger of Communist subversion"; is it not a question of how fast the countries in the Middle East can receive assistance?

Mr. EICHELBERGER. Yes.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. For example, we were ready to give aid to Egypt but that country had diverted resources for military purposes and unable to undertake development projects?

Mr. EICHELBERGER. Yes.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. Is it not necessary to stabilize the political situation first?

Mr. EICHELBERGER. Yes, and sometimes it comes from a full stomach. Some of the countries in the Middle East are so impoverished, it is a dual proposition.

I would like to say the United States will have a hard time using \$200 million immediately just because, as you say, a nation can only absorb so much money. And I hope all the money we use will be used for sound economic development rather than just giving money to this country and that hoping to keep them on our side.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. Thank you.

Chairman GORDON. Mr. Selden.

Mr. SELDEN. Mr. Eichelberger, do you agree with Mr. Reuss that the passage of his amendment or one similar to it would in no way retard the speed with which the United States could act in the event of armed aggression in the Middle Eastern area?

Mr. EICHELBERGER. Yes, sir. If an act of aggression occurred, we might have to respond immediately but would immediately inform the Security Council and the General Assembly of the United Nations that we had acted and we would attempt to coordinate our resistance with theirs.

Mr. SELDEN. Do you feel action by the United States would not be retarded if we went ahead with your amendment or one similar to it?

Mr. EICHELBERGER. That is right.

Mr. SELDEN. You said you felt we would have trouble spending \$200 million in that area immediately. Do you think the authority should be for a lesser amount?

Mr. EICHELBERGER. No, indeed. I was simply saying to Mr. Zablocki that you had to have political stability with economic stability. I think the President should have authority for at least that amount.

Mr. SELDEN. Thank you.

Chairman GORDON. Mr. Fountain.

Mr. FOUNTAIN. Mr. Eichelberger, are you an attorney?

Mr. EICHELBERGER. I am not.

Mr. FOUNTAIN. You would not care to comment on the advisability of the Congress delegating to the President the authority to declare war?

Mr. EICHELBERGER. No. I would say I believe the President has authority to protect the security of the country in case of emergency.

Mr. FOUNTAIN. That is all.

Chairman GORDON. Mr. Fascell.

Mr. FASCELL. Mr. Eichelberger, I direct your attention to section 1 of your proposed resolution in which you suggest an amendment "provided such cooperation and assistance shall be carried out so far as possible through the United Nations."

And I believe you are talking about actual economic development that would contribute to the economic well-being of the country involved, with the underlying thought that would contribute to the stability of the government. Is that correct?

Mr. EICHELBERGER. Yes.

Mr. FASCELL. Let us assume that is not what we are talking about in section 1 at all. Let us assume we are talking about Iran, Iraq, Syria, and Jordan, whose economy is based almost entirely on oil, and today they do not have the oil because their pipelines are blown up. So the only way you can contribute to their stability is by putting hard cash in their treasuries. I am not so willing to admit it will take \$100 million or \$200 million or that it will take a short time or a long time, because actually until you get the flow of oil restored and money

getting into the treasuries of these countries, somebody has to pour money into the treasuries to keep those countries from falling. Is that correct?

Mr. EICHELBERGER. I may have misread the purpose of the resolution. We might assume it is both. It says:

That the President be and hereby is authorized to cooperate with and assist any nation or group of nations in the general area of the Middle East in the development of economic strength dedicated to the maintenance of national independence.

I thought that meant gradually strengthening the country so that the people could resist Communist aggression. I understand we might have to make up the deficit in the treasury of Iraq until the oil is restored.

Mr. FASCELL. You think we could divide it into two categories, one direct assistance to the treasuries and the other economic development, and you would still recommend your amendment?

Mr. EICHELBERGER. Yes. That might be strengthened. I would like some wording there that we could use United Nations machinery where possible. The refugee-resettlement program is an example.

Mr. FASCELL. We talk about overt direct aggression by the U. S. S. R.?

Mr. EICHELBERGER. Yes.

Mr. FASCELL. And we talk about reducing the possibility of a Communist-controlled country aggressing?

Mr. EICHELBERGER. Yes.

Mr. FASCELL. And we talk about maintaining the stability of the countries?

Mr. EICHELBERGER. Yes.

Mr. FASCELL. And fourth, about solving problems that contribute to that instability; and then we talk about projects that would deal with the stability of the whole area. Do you agree that is a proper priority?

Mr. EICHELBERGER. I think that is a pretty good division.

Mr. FASCELL. Let us go to the suggestion you make of not gearing ourselves to an ideology. We are not kidding anybody, that is the purpose. Do you see any harm in saying "international communism and the nations it controls or any other nations"?

Mr. EICHELBERGER. That, I think, would improve the present draft resolution. I want the United States to indicate that we are against any aggression. I would hate for us to leave a gap that would leave any doubt as to that.

Mr. FASCELL. We could accomplish both purposes, then, by including both languages?

Mr. EICHELBERGER. Yes.

Mr. FASCELL. Thank you.

Chairman GORDON. Mr. Coffin.

Mr. COFFIN. Mr. Eichelberger, it is getting late and I shall be as brief as I can.

First of all, do you feel that the change of wording you have suggested, such as knocking out "international communism," would have any effect on our relations with Britain or France?

Mr. EICHELBERGER. The way it is worded, no.

I will repeat what I said, I think for a while it looked as if the Soviet Union—not that the leopard changes its spots, but for reasons of its

own—seemed to be changing in regard to the satellite states. Now Stalinism may be coming back. I think a few doors had been opened for possible disarmament. Some accommodations were certainly thought of. Therefore, I hate to see us start using the language the “cold war” in a resolution. I sometimes wonder if it is wise in any such resolution, unless we are actually at war, to name any specific nation.

Mr. COFFIN. Do you feel that the terms “overt armed aggression” and “armed attack” are synonymous?

Mr. EICHELBERGER. I had not thought of that. Where is that?

Mr. COFFIN. Second paragraph on page 2.

Mr. EICHELBERGER. I had not thought of the difference.

Mr. COFFIN. That is in the second paragraph on page 2 where you propose to strike out “overt armed aggression” and other words and substitute “an armed attack by another nation.”

Mr. EICHELBERGER. I see no reason why the other language could not be used. My purpose was to deal with the phrase “controlled by international communism” rather than change the meaning of the resolution.

Mr. COFFIN. I thought it might be possible that “overt armed aggression” might allow greater latitude.

Mr. EICHELBERGER. It might.

Mr. COFFIN. Thank you. I also enjoyed and learned a lot from your presentation.

Chairman GORDON. Thank you very much, Mr. Eichelberger, for your appearance.

The committee will stand at recess until 2 o'clock, when we will meet in executive session to hear Secretary Dulles.

(Thereupon, at 1:15 p. m., a recess was taken until 2 p. m. the same day.)

AFTERNOON SESSION

The committee reconvened at 2 p. m., in room 1301, New House Office Building, the Honorable Thomas S. Gordon (chairman), presiding.

Chairman GORDON. The committee will come to order.

Mr. Secretary, this is a continuation of the executive session that was interrupted, and we will start off with the members who have not had a chance at questioning.

Our first member is Mr. Selden.

Mr. SELDEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, although you have discussed this before during the hearings, there are two important determinations that must be made by the United States under the terms of this resolution.

First, when is a country to be considered “under the control of international communism”; and, secondly, what will constitute “acts of overt armed aggression”? Could you define for us the terms “under the terms of international communism” and “acts of overt armed aggression?”

STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN FOSTER DULLES, SECRETARY OF STATE

Secretary DULLES. The phrase “under the control of international communism” is, as you will recall, a phrase which the Congress has already used and which appears in the present Mutual Security Act.

In other words, it is a determination which the President is often required to make under existing legislation. It is not a new test. And we would use the same criteria that are used now in applying that test. Sometimes it is not entirely easy to apply, but in the main it is pretty evident when a government in effect takes its orders from Moscow as the headquarters of the Soviet Communist Party. Generally it is reflected by a Communist being in control of the Department of the Interior and the local police force. It is reflected by the action of the country internationally in voting always with and under the direction of the Soviet Union, particularly at the United Nations.

It is reflected sometimes by the presence of the nation at the international gatherings of the International Communist Party.

There are also occasionally close decisions that have to be made. For instance, the status of Poland is presently in the twilight zone. It has been under Soviet Communist domination and now it is somewhat not under that control. It does leave a certain discretion to the President, but I do not think it is possible to deal with the problem in any other way than to leave it to Presidential determination, because he has the information, both public and confidential, which best enables that decision to be made.

Mr. SELDEN. Mr. Secretary, in that connection, we know that in the area covered by the resolution we are having so-called border raids from time to time. Would you consider border raids as "acts of overt armed aggression?"

Secretary DULLES. It would depend a little bit on where they came from. If there were border raids, for example, from the Soviet Union on Iran, I think that would be a serious affair because we know the discipline is so high in the Soviet Union that action of that kind would not occur without the active guidance of the Government itself. Therefore, it would be evidence, I think, of a serious aggressive action.

If it were another country from which border raids occurred, I do not think that would be considered as an armed attack unless there was clear evidence of Soviet participation in the matter. There is so much high feeling in the area that border raids can occur spontaneously without major action behind them. In many cases that is the case. A good deal would depend on whether there was Soviet or satellite military advisers directing the operation.

There would be an area for judgment in that matter too. But, again, it is impossible to deal with these situations without leaving a certain amount of discretion to the President.

I think there can be an absolute conviction that the President would lean over backward not to interpret the facts as justifying the use of Armed Forces unless there was real danger to the United States in the situation.

Mr. SELDEN. Let us take another hypothetical case. Let us assume one country in the area falls under the control of Soviet domination and then carries out border raids on a neighboring country. The neighboring country then calls on us for aid and we refuse it. In what position would it leave that country to whom we refused aid? Would it leave it open to further attack?

Secretary DULLES. I do not think so, because that determination would be made under a discretion which is reserved, and a reason would have to be given for the determination.

Mr. SELDEN. However, it would sanction the border raids and they could continue?

Secretary DULLES. It would sanction them only in the sense the President would not have used his discretion. None of these countries would have the right to require us to act. You cannot give that right unless you transform this to a treaty obligation. It is up clearly to the judgment of the United States, and in a dubious or questionable case I think the discretion should not be exercised, but I think the lack of exercising the discretion in those circumstances, if explained, would not result in leaving the country in a further exposed position.

Mr. SELDEN. On the economic side, has there been any determination, in the event this legislation should pass, as to where the \$200 million will be shifted from this year?

Secretary DULLES. No. Much of it is really in what you might call the Middle Eastern area now.

(Discussion off the record.)

Mr. DULLES. A good bit of the money is already earmarked or has been presented to Congress as for the area. The change is that the conditions of making it available would be altered.

(Discussion off the record.)

STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN B. HOLLISTER, DIRECTOR, INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION ADMINISTRATION

Mr. HOLLISTER. I think there has perhaps been a misapprehension in the minds of some of the committee that somehow this \$200 million is sitting somewhere in the whole program and had not been considered for programing. With respect to funds already firmly or tentatively programed for different activities under this resolution, they would be released from some of the existing restrictions.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. Will the gentleman yield at that point?

Mr. SELDEN. I would like to ask Mr. Hollister one question and then I will yield.

Mr. Hollister, were you able to ascertain just what would happen with reference to these funds—the \$200 million—in the event they have not been obligated by June 30?

Mr. HOLLISTER. There is a difference of opinion between lawyers as to whether language such as presently in the proposed joint resolution would permit the funds to be carried over or not carried over. It is not the intention of the executive branch to ask that they be carried over. The Secretary is prepared to make a statement setting out the restrictions with respect to which it is desired we be relieved from. We will not ask for the carrying over of funds under this joint resolution.

Mr. SELDEN. I think that is important and should be clarified.

Mr. HOLLISTER. We have been working on that ever since you first asked about it.

Mr. SELDEN. I yield to the gentleman from Wisconsin.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. Mr. Hollister, are we to understand that the sum you anticipate to transfer, \$200 million, is programed but thus far unused?

Mr. HOLLISTER. Mr. Zablocki, we are not talking about any transfers here. It is not a question of transferring funds.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. Where do you get the money from?

Mr. HOLLISTER. The money is already in the appropriations. However, we would like to be released from some of the limiting restrictions that now exist, such as the provision that we must obligate 80 percent by the end of April; the provision that there should be a limitation of \$30 million to any one country; the provision that under section 201 at least 80 percent must be in loans except in respect to the funds which are regional or under section 402; and things of that kind.

We would like, with respect to at least \$200 million of these funds, to be released from these limitations, but there is no transfer of any kind from some particular program. Does that make it clear?

Mr. ZABLOCKI. To a degree.

Mr. HOLLISTER. Do not forget there is always in this authority the right to consider that funds may be available under the military side of the program. It does not necessarily mean that this authority is limited to those funds which have been tentatively allocated to the economic side of the program.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. Would the same effect not be obtained if section 3 were so phrased as to exempt certain funds from the conditions and limitations?

Mr. HOLLISTER. It would be. The Secretary, I think, would like to make a statement on that subject.

This broad release of limitations now in the joint resolution is not necessary. It is not necessary to be that broad.

Secretary DULLES. If I perhaps could make this statement, it might clarify the further discussion on this point.

I may say that to me at least this Mutual Security Act and the appropriating act constitute quite a legal maze. I am afraid some of the statements I made yesterday were not quite as accurate as I would like to have them.

I spent some time since yesterday with our technical advisers on this subject and I would like, in substitution for what I said before, to read this statement.

Mr. Chairman, this committee asked me the other day to clarify the purposes which the executive branch sought in section 3 of the proposed joint resolution and I promised to give the committee a further statement on this point.

There are in the present mutual security legislation various provisions which seriously restrict our freedom of action to deal with the kind of situation which we now face in the Middle East. I have in mind in particular the provision in the 1957 appropriation act which requires that not more than 20 percent of the funds can be obligated in the last 2 months of the fiscal year; the requirement in section 201 that 80 percent of the appropriated funds must be on a loan basis and the requirements in sections 141, 142, and 303 requiring mandatory bilateral agreements. We have been examining very carefully the language of section 3 of the resolution with the aim of formalizing language which would give the President the minimum additional authority which we consider necessary under present circumstances to carry out the purposes of the joint resolution. I believe this result could be achieved with the following provisions:

1. That the \$200 million mentioned in this section is to be available only until June 30, 1957.

2. That this money is to be available under the authority granted in section 401 of the Mutual Security Act of 1954, as amended.

3. That in addition this money will not be subject to the limitation of not more than \$30 million to any country now contained in section 401 and will not be subject to the limitation in section 105 of the Mutual Security Appropriation Act, 1957.

I do not believe that it would be profitable to attempt to discuss language changes with the full committee.

I interject that I would not feel competent to do so, but I would be glad to have the committee staff meet with members of my staff in order to draft new language which meets these minimum purposes which we seek. Mr. Hollister can elaborate on our reasons for seeking these changes if you so desire.

I think perhaps he has already done so.

Mr. SELDEN. Could I ask one other question?

Chairman GORDON. Your time is up now. Did you ask questions yesterday, Mr. LeCompte?

Mr. Lecompte. No.

Chairman GORDON. Very well.

Mr. Lecompte. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, I do not know that I have many questions to submit. I had in mind asking you what probably has been submitted in 2 or 8 different ways to you.

You contemplate that this resolution does not represent necessarily the permanent foreign policy of this Government? In other words, it might be very temporary; the President might very soon declare that the situation has changed to such an extent that he would, as provided in section 5—

Secretary DULLES. We certainly hope that it will soon change in that respect.

I would, however, be lacking perhaps in candor if I said I thought it was likely to change within the next year or so. I am afraid that to work out this situation may take an appreciable amount of time. Certainly we do not think that the kind of action that is authorized here should be a permanent part of our constitutional and legislative structure.

A great deal depends in my opinion on the changes which are going on or may go on within the Soviet Union itself. There has been within the last year evidence of a large degree of ferment within the Soviet Union. I do not know what that is going to lead to. It may lead temporarily to their being more aggressive in their external policies with a view to trying to win a success somewhere to offset the troubles which they are having at home.

On the other hand, we have within the last year the first demonstrable changes to indicate that there could be a change within the Soviet Union itself toward a more liberal, more peaceful form of government. If and when that happens, then our whole attitude toward the situation would change. There would, I think, be much less likelihood of armed aggression from the Soviet Union.

I think the changes, however, that we await to eliminate this danger, this peril which exists, indeed, around so much of the world, will depend very largely upon what happens in the Soviet Union and the kind of leadership that is existent there over the next year or two.

Mr. LECOMPTE. Thank you. Let me ask you one more very short question, if I may, if my time allows.

Have you had the opportunity to see the proposed amendment the gentleman from Wisconsin brought in this morning?

Secretary DULLES. No; I have not.

Mr. LECOMPTE. You would not have any opinion on it, then?

Secretary DULLES. No.

Mr. LECOMPTE. Thank you.

Mrs. BOLTON. What is it about?

Mr. VORYS. The Uniting-for-Peace procedure in the U. N.

Mr. LECOMPTE. A proposal to submit any difficulties to the United Nations before the President, in his wisdom, takes any action.

Secretary DULLES. I would like to study this more carefully before answering.

Mr. LECOMPTE. That is all right. You have not had a chance to see it. Thank you very much.

Chairman GORDON. Mr. Hays of Arkansas.

Mr. HAYS of Arkansas. Mr. Secretary, I am very sorry I could not be here yesterday morning. I trust this is not duplicating what you have gone over.

In connection with language designed to give a more positive emphasis to the U. N., I would like to suggest consideration of language in my resolution introduced last March. I have thought of it in connection with this resolution because it is still pertinent. I will take a moment to read it. I will not expect you to express an opinion on it but I feel this is a very good way in which to get it before you. I want to state this is not a part of any Democratic collusion to alter language in House Joint Resolution 117. I had this language:

The United States Government will pursue its determination to preserve the peace and foster the economic welfare of the Middle East through the instrument of the United Nations, promoting vigorously the goals of regional tranquillity, permanent settlement of the refugee problem, and significant economic and technical aid to improve the living standards and well-being of the peoples in this region, all by means of the continuation of our own foreign aid programs and the employment of the United Nations machinery for international mediation and economic contributions.

That is in House Concurrent Resolution 222 introduced last spring, which you may have had occasion to think about.

I feel that I am speaking for some members on our side. I am sure our spirit and attitude is what you expect it to be. The value of a statement like this lies, to some extent, in unanimity and if you can find language which expresses the sentiment of the American people, which I think is in the direction you pictured, it is desirable. I think this language would appeal to a great many people. The session we had this morning was very illuminating, I thought, on this matter of making very clear that we are not giving up the commendable leadership, to use the expression used this morning, that we have exerted in the U. N. I think the world has been inspired by things that have been done recently to exert our own Nation's leadership. That was one point.

The second point is to ask the Administration to think, perhaps, about the question of evidencing our desire to enter into these security treaties to put language like this in:

The United States is prepared forthwith, in accord with article 51 of the United Nations Charter, to enter into security treaties to defend against Communist military aggression every nation in the Middle East which wishes to be so defended. The President is authorized to utilize American forces in the area to carry out this commitment if the necessity for such action becomes apparent.

I just took this time to let you know how my own thinking was directed. I would appreciate any impressions that the Department might have on those two points that I am making; the first one is to make clear that we are not just substituting a display of force and firmness militarily, though that is important, we are not simply substituting that for these broad, long-range economic services which we think are the foundation of a stable Middle East.

I am sorry I took that much time.

Secretary DULLES. I would say that on the first point—that we are not just substituting a display of force for long-range economic measures—as I understand it, that I would be quite in sympathy with the spirit of it. I would not like to comment on language until I have a chance to study it.

On the second point I do think there is some doubt as to whether it is wise to offer to make security treaties with all the states of that area. It is very difficult to do that without involving ourselves in controversies which are of a local character, and do not involve international communism. Of course, as far as the State of Israel is concerned, its boundaries are not yet fixed and it is extremely difficult to make a security treaty with a country where there is as much flexibility about the boundary situation as there is in the case of Israel.

We have given the very closest consideration to the possibility of proceeding here on a treaty basis rather than on the basis of a resolution.

We have come to the conclusion that there are very considerable difficulties in that direction. There are disputes at the present time, between Yemen and the British, a certain amount of fighting is actually going on there at the present time. The boundaries around the Persian Gulf are quite undefined, also.

In Saudi Arabia, I recall that when I was visiting the former king, Ibn Saud, in 1953, he produced for me the Presidential letter that I have already referred to and said "you said you are concerned to help us against any aggression." He said "The British are aggressing against us now in the Buraimi area and we call upon you to make good on this and help drive the British out."

That illustrates the kind of problem you get into if you give general security guaranties in an area where boundaries not only of Israel but of some of the Arab States are ill defined and where the future status of some of these countries is not as clear as it could be.

(Discussion off the record.)

Mr. DULLES. You have the status of the Gaza strip, which does not belong to Egypt but, on the other hand, was occupied by Egypt under the present armistice agreement.

There are a multiplicity of problems which have led the executive branch of the Government at least to feel that the situation is not yet ripe to proceed by security treaties in that area.

Mr. HAYS of Arkansas. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

Chairman GORDON. Mr. Morano.

Mr. MORANO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, can you tell us whether Turkey in order to protect what it believes to be its own national security was prepared to invade Syria recently?

Mr. HAYS of Arkansas. We did not hear the question.

Secretary DULLES. The question was—

Mr. MORANO. I said can you tell us whether Turkey in order to protect what it believed to be its national security was prepared to invade Syria recently?

Secretary DULLES. The answer to that is "No."

Mr. MORANO. Can you tell us whether recently in the last few days Soviet MIGS have been flown into Syria or delivered in any way to the Syrians?

Secretary DULLES. We have reason to believe that a certain amount of military equipment was delivered to Syria, probably not by air but by ship. Was it not? By ship some weeks ago.

(Discussion off the record.)

Mr. MORANO. Now, Mr. Secretary, have you read in the paper the proposed resolution the author of which is unknown, at least to me? Have you read that so-called proposed resolution of 34 words?

Secretary DULLES. Yes, I did.

Mr. MORANO. How would you feel about substituting that resolution for the one that we have before us now?

Secretary DULLES. I would not feel very satisfied with that. If I may take a moment to comment on it, I think it is useful because it illustrates the great care that has to be used in dealing with these matters. This proposal was undoubtedly made by someone who, I think, had in mind precisely the same result that the administration has in mind. But there are in the resolution some things which certainly the President and I would look upon with a good deal of concern. I would think, also, that the committee would.

This draft would purport to establish unilaterally a sort of a United States protectorate over the Middle East area irrespective of any desire or request of the countries concerned.

In our opinion any such unilateral effort to establish a protectorate which took no regard of the desires or requests of the countries of the area would be bitterly resented in the area. In certain ways it constitutes in effect a guaranty of the present territorial boundaries of the states of the Middle East. That is a very broad commitment. I have indicated already some of the reasons why, with the boundary instability in the area and with the fact that the area is to some extent in a state of flux, a guaranty of the independence and integrity of those states would be of dubious wisdom and it would be also very difficult to say honestly that all of this was vital to the interests of the United States.

(Discussion off the record.)

Mr. DULLES. It may be vital to the United States that they should not fall under Soviet Communist control but that is not what this resolution says. It is not so limited. It is very, very sweeping in that respect.

I also observe that it would call for United States armed intervention against any attacks. It is not limited to attacks from a Communist-controlled country.

If this policy had been in force last November, it would have called for the use of United States Armed Forces to fight the armed

forces of Israel, of Britain, and of France, a result which I doubt very much would be, perhaps, actually intended by the author or would be desired by the committee.

It would also apparently call for United States action to overthrow a regime if it was changed peacefully. That, I think, is not consistent with the Charter of the United Nations. The Charter of the United Nations permits use of force if an armed attack occurs but it does not permit use of armed forces to intervene in another country except in defense of an armed attack. In that respect it goes far beyond our treaty obligations as expressed in the United Nations Charter and in our North Atlantic Treaty and other security treaties where we agree not to use armed force against the territorial integrity of a country.

Indeed, in that respect the proposed resolution is somewhat inconsistent with itself. It seems to require us to use armed force to preserve the independence of a state although in the process of doing so we may violate the territorial integrity of the state. It is thus ambiguous in that respect. But certainly it pays no respect whatever to our obligation under the Charter of the United Nations.

The resolution is also, I think, defective in that it does not actually make clear that there is authority to use the Armed Forces of the United States under these conditions. It says that the United States will use her Armed Forces, but who will do it? I do not know. It is a statement of fact, but without giving any authority or direction, which is necessary in a situation which is as complicated as this situation is.

Of course, it is entirely barren on the economic aspect of the situation which I think must receive some consideration if the resolution is to accomplish its purpose of inspiring confidence in our purposes.

I described yesterday in some detail the very dangerous economic plight of the area due to the very heavy loss of revenues as a result of the interruption of the production of oil and movement of trade through the Suez Canal, and the like. I think it is quite imperative, if in fact we are to prevent that area from falling into chaos which the Soviet Communists would take advantage of, to deal somewhat with the economic aspects of the matter.

So, for these reasons, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, we would think that in some essential respects the resolution does not go far enough but in other respects it goes very much too far.

Mr. MORANO. Thank you very much. I am also opposed to that resolution. But I wondered if you had made a public statement to that effect or whether you will make a public statement, and whether what you have just said now is unclassified.

Secretary DULLES. I will ask the consent of the chairman to make a statement on this subject. Though I have been asked by the press, I have refrained from doing so before I first testified before the committee.

Chairman GORDON. Yes, Mr. Secretary, you may proceed.

Mr. VORYS. I think the chairman already has a statement prepared for release incorporating the Secretary's statement.

Secretary DULLES. That is entirely agreeable to me.

Chairman GORDON. Are you through, Mr. Morano?

Mr. MORANO. I know my 5 minutes is gone.

Secretary DULLES. I used it up. I am sorry.

Chairman GORDON. You may have another minute.

Mr. MORANO. I wanted to be sure the committee would have the benefit of your views with respect to this very widely publicized resolution that was in the paper this morning, Mr. Secretary.

I just wanted to go back to what Mr. Selden was saying about the border incidents. I think you replied to him that if one country in that area made a border raid on another country in that area, you did not feel as though that would create a situation in which we would take action under this resolution; is that correct?

Secretary DULLES. No, sir. I do not think that a border raid of itself would, in any sense, automatically call for the use of United States Armed Forces.

Mr. MORANO. Would you have any comment as to whether or not a country in that area that had been raided consistently and continually by another country that had been under international communism would have the right to retaliate and not then be deemed an aggressor or committing an overt act under this resolution? Is the question clear?

Secretary DULLES. Yes, the question is clear.

There has been a certain measure of action and reaction in the area which has in the main not been of a magnitude to call for any action of a significant character, you might say, by the United Nations. That is true as between Israel and the Arab States.

(Discussion off the record.)

Mr. DULLES. It is also true with relation to the British and Yemen forces in the area of Aden.

When there are unsettled boundaries and hostility there is inevitably a certain amount of border raids. It would be a question of judgment to determine whether or not they represented a real effort of conquest by a Soviet-controlled country. If they did, then it would be within the President's powers to invoke the authority of this resolution but not otherwise.

Mr. MORANO. One more brief question, Mr. Secretary.

Because of rumors I have heard I am just asking this question. Are you withholding any information contained in any document or communication or information you otherwise secured that would be of benefit to this committee in the consideration of this resolution?

Secretary DULLES. No, sir, I am not. I have talked very frankly and fully to this committee.

(Discussion off the record.)

Mr. MORANO. In other words, there is no information which you have not given to this committee, no information which has brought about this emergency and the reasons for you and the President asking for this resolution, no information that you have not given to the committee?

Secretary DULLES. None whatsoever.

Mr. MORANO. Thank you very much.

Chairman GORDON. Mr. O'Hara.

Mr. O'HARA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, what reasonably might be expected to be the effect of the proposed program on the position of Israel?

Secretary DULLES. I believe that this program will create an atmosphere in the area which will make it much more likely that the disputes between Israel and its Arab neighbors can be brought to a conclusion and a state of stability and order reestablished.

Now, if Soviet Communist influence becomes dominant in the area, then I think there is very little hope, indeed, for a solution of these problems of the area, because Soviet communism is trying to whip them up and manipulate them. It is at the bottom of very much of the trouble which now exists.

If their influence gains and is predominant, then I see very little prospect of there being an acceptable solution of the problem of Israel and its Arab neighbors and the problem of Palestine. I believe, if this resolution is adopted and carried out, it will create an atmosphere through the elimination of much of the Soviet influence and prevention of that influence growing, which makes much more likely a solution of the Palestine problem.

Mr. O'HARA. Mr. Secretary, I will be asked by my constituents this question and I would appreciate being in a position to answer them from your words.

As the success of this program depends on its acceptance by and the voluntary cooperation of the Arab States, is there a possibility in obtaining that acceptance and voluntary cooperation there may be a lessening of our position in upholding the sovereignty of the State of Israel?

Secretary DULLES. I can assure you, sir, that we shall not in any application of this policy or any of our discussions with the Arab countries do anything whatsoever that would detract from the statements so often made by this administration and others and by the Congress that the preservation of the State of Israel is a vital part of the United States foreign policy.

Mr. O'HARA. I wonder, Mr. Secretary, if the statement you have just made, and if agreeable to our distinguished chairman and the committee, could be made public? There is among my constituents, and I am sure among many others, a keen interest in the welfare of the State of Israel.

Secretary DULLES. I would think there is no reason why the statement should not be made public.

Mr. O'HARA. I have one other brief question. Yesterday you referred to the possibility of the failure of the program. You were then referring to section 3, the desirability of retaining that section.

What would the failure of the program mean? War?

Secretary DULLES. I think that the failure of the program would lead with a high degree of probability to a major war. If the Soviet Union, international communism, gets control of this area, it will thereby almost automatically have gotten itself into a position to control and dominate Western Europe. We have gone to war two times to prevent that result, the result of Western Europe falling under the control of a hostile despotism. I would expect that if that happened or threatened from Soviet Russia, the consequences would be the same as unhappily flowed from the fact when Western Europe was on the point of being dominated by the Kaiser or when Western Europe was on the point of being dominated by Hitlerite Germany.

Mr. O'HARA. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary.

Mr. FULTON. A parliamentary inquiry.

(Discussion off the record.)

Mrs. CHURCH. Mr. Secretary, I think there is a need for the kind of expression in this resolution which would not be misunderstood by anybody, and it is to that point I would address myself. I would

direct attention to the resolution. I do have some questions on several words or phrases. I refer particularly to page 2, in which you state, lines 17 to 19:

That such employment shall be consonant with the treaty obligations of the United States and with the Charter of the United Nations and action and recommendations of the United Nations—

If a situation arose under which we undertook unilateral action because the President deemed it necessary and then the United Nations—though it may be hard to suppose this—passed a resolution condemning such action what, under the literal application of this section, would happen?

Secretary DULLES. I do not think anything would happen.

Mrs. CHURCH. We would disregard the fact that we were limited to action “under the recommendations of the United Nations”?

Secretary DULLES. You see, there cannot be actions and recommendations of anything like a binding character except through the Security Council, and in the Security Council nothing can be adopted without our vote, nothing of substance.

(Discussion off the record.)

Mrs. CHURCH. Well, then, we really are not giving the United Nations as much control as we seem to be giving it, are we? Why do we put in this “and recommendations of”?

Secretary DULLES. Are you raising a question about the word “recommendations”?

Mrs. CHURCH. Yes.

Secretary DULLES. That is because under chapter 6, which deals with the authority of the Security Council, there is the power to make certain types of recommendations; and there is also under chapter 7 the opportunity to take action. You have your two chapters, one dealing with recommendations and the other dealing with actions. We have agreed to accept the authority of the Security Council.

You may say there is a “joker” in it in the sense that there cannot be Security Council action or recommendations under chapter 6 or chapter 7 without a vote in which the United States either votes for it—or we could abstain from voting, as we sometimes do.

I notice that in the Greek-Turkey resolution it was spelled out that we would cease our activities under that resolution if the Security Council or the General Assembly made action or recommendations, and we waived our veto power in the Security Council.

I am not suggesting here that we go nearly as far as we did go in the Greek-Turkey resolution, where we waived our so-called veto power on the requirement of the Charter that no action was valid unless it had the affirmative vote of all of the permanent members.

Mrs. CHURCH. Do you think it is necessary to keep in the term “and recommendations of”? Does it materially strengthen the resolution?

Secretary DULLES. It is in a sense wording from the United Nations Charter, in the sense that under the chapter dealing with the Security Council you have two chapters. Chapter 6 deals with the authority of the Security Council to make recommendations, and chapter 7 deals with the authority to take action. The reason why we used both the word “action” and the word “recommendations” was to cover both chapters 6 and 7. Whether you want to keep that or not,

I am not sure. If the majority of the committee felt we had better take it out, I do not think the Administration would be broken hearted.

Mrs. CHURCH. I think, Mr. Secretary, I am right in saying that there is some ambiguity: When I asked the same question of a Member of Congress who was testifying this morning, he answered he felt it meant that we would have to stop action. Am I right on that? It does contain a certain amount of ambiguity?

Secretary DULLES. Yes.

Mrs. CHURCH. I am wondering if, when you originally drew up this resolution, you made an attempt to avoid putting the direct responsibility of delegating their constitutional powers on the Congress; and, if so, why it was decided to do so. I am asking that in all sincerity, sir, because I find in my own section of the country the major criticism is coming on that point. Could you have had the Congress take the direct responsibility for action, as the new draft appears to require?

Secretary DULLES. I think, Mrs. Church, that the resolution we proposed does put the responsibility on the Congress much more so than this other draft that appeared in the newspapers. As I indicated, I think in my opening testimony, in order that our force and power may operate as a deterrent, I think that the decision needs to be made now by the Congress as to what we will do. As I said then, if we merely decide the best thing is to wait and see what we will do if an armed aggression occurs, then the resolution loses entirely its deterrent effect.

Mrs. CHURCH. Mr. Secretary, I would agree with that.

Would putting the Congress on record as being willing to oppose by armed force, be less strong than the delegation of the power to the President with his discretion to act? May I assure you that this indicates no lack of confidence in the President's decision.

Secretary DULLES. I would think it was doubtful whether it would be wise to make it mandatory, if that was what you had in mind, making it mandatory on the President to use the Armed Forces under these circumstances. I am not sure that is sound constitutional procedure, to make it obligatory on the President to act in that sense as Commander in Chief. I think it is very difficult to say to the President that under any and all circumstances he must act in this area. I can conceive of a situation where the President, for example, might judge that an attack in this area was a feint designed to pull us off balance, to gather our forces, let us say, in the Southern Mediterranean or the Eastern Mediterranean, and then, after that had happened, to strike somewhere else. I do believe that it is better to leave a certain discretion to the President and to authorize the use of the Armed Forces and not require them to be used in a certain area because, as I say, it might be that there was a feint in that area and we did not want to get our forces engaged in that area because we had reason to believe—perhaps through secret intelligence or otherwise—that the major attack was going to be launched somewhere else.

Mrs. CHURCH. Mr. Secretary, I think that the latter is an understandable point, and I am only hoping that you may be able, somehow, to give publicity to that kind of statement. Thank you very much.

Chairman GORDON. Mr. Fountain.

Mr. FOUNTAIN. Mr. Secretary, Mrs. Church touched upon a question which has been uppermost in the minds of many Members of Congress. I will read this portion of section 2 as a preface to my request for your comments:

Furthermore, he is authorized to employ the Armed Forces of the United States as he deems necessary to secure and protect the territorial integrity and political independence of any such nation or group of nations requesting such aid against overt armed aggression from any nation controlled by international communism.

As I read that language, under those circumstances that gives the President the authority to make war, does it not?

Secretary DULLES. It gives the President the authority to prosecute war, yes.

Mr. FOUNTAIN. That is the same thing, is it not?

Secretary DULLES. You know, when our Constitution was adopted there was a very long constitutional debate as to whether it should read that the Congress had the power to make war or declare war.

Mr. FOUNTAIN. To declare war.

Secretary DULLES. It was finally decided to make it read "declare war," recognizing the fact that it might be necessary to wage war or make war without having a declaration of war. I would say this is authority, you might say, to make war although not authority to declare war.

Mr. FOUNTAIN. Of course, we do not anticipate such, but this authority, if exercised by the President, could possibly lead to World War III, could it not?

Secretary DULLES. Yes. It could be World War III.

Mr. FOUNTAIN. It could be World War III. Because of the potentialities, there is a school of thought which feels that unless we are absolutely sure—and that is not always easy—as to what is going to happen the Congress should be very, very careful in delegating to the President its authority to take the country to war, to wage war, an authority which is reserved to the Congress within the Constitution, when the provision says:

"The Congress shall have the power to declare war." I wonder if you would comment upon those observations, that thinking and those objections on the part of many Members of Congress.

Secretary DULLES. I agree entirely with your statement that the Congress ought to be very careful about doing this. I say so, despite the fact that under most of the constitutions of the democracies of the world the head of the government or the head of state has the right to use the armed forces without any parliamentary approval, as was done in the recent case by the British and the French. There was no grant of authority from the Parliament to do that.

(Discussion off the record.)

Mr. DULLES. On the other hand, while Congress has a duty to be very careful about giving this authority, I think it has an equal responsibility to give the authority under conditions which are such that failure to give it would itself greatly increase the risk of war.

Now, we have situations in a good many parts of the world where Congress already, through congressional action or through treaty action, has in effect taken the position that an attack upon the political independence or the territorial integrity of another country would be so vital to the United States that we would regard ourselves as at war. I believe, and the President believes—and his belief should be, I think, very persuasive, because of his vast experience in this field—that possession of this responsibility or authority at this time will serve to make it less likely events will take a turn which would engage us in

World War III. Feeling that way and reluctant as he personally is to increase his own responsibility and authority, he nevertheless has a duty, I think, to convey that judgment of his to the Congress, which in this matter is his partner.

It is often the case—and history I think has shown—that to make clear our intentions in advance is the best way to avoid a war. I recall in the debate on the North Atlantic Treaty it was the sentiment expressed by many of the Senators that if it had been made clear to the Kaiser the United States would act if he invaded Belgium and France and if it had been made clear to Hitler that we would act if he invaded Holland, Belgium and France, those assaults would not have occurred and we would not have been engaging ourselves in a terribly costly and cruel war. That is a theory upon which we have been operating since the close of World War II, that the best way to preserve peace is to make clear our intentions in advance so that there can be no doubt about them and prevent a miscalculation by an enemy who may be tempted to try to pick up a valuable bit of real estate, if he thinks he can get away with it, to destroy the free countries one by one until we are isolated and ourselves attacked by what would then be overwhelming force.

This proposed resolution is not in its basic concepts anything that is new. It is an application to a new situation of a basic principle which has run through our policy almost consistently since the close of World War II, and is an application of what we believe, at least, to be the lessons taught by those two wars.

Mr. FOUNTAIN. Do you feel that we could make clear our intention and give the President, if he needs it, the authority to take instantaneous action, but at the same time require him to immediately, forthwith, come to the Congress and ask for ratification, approval or disapproval of any action he may have taken?

Secretary DULLES. The President said in his message, you will perhaps recall, that if the occasion came to use this authority he would keep in, as he put it, I think, hour by hour contact with the Congress if it were in session and, if it were not in session, he would promptly call it into session if the situation seemed to have major implications.

Chairman GORDON. Your time is up, Mr. Fountain.

Mr. FOUNTAIN. That is all.

Chairman GORDON. Mr. Adair.

Mr. ADAIR. Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, my question is directed toward the economic proposals in the resolution. It is my understanding that section 2 provides in the event military assistance is granted it shall be done upon request; that is, to any nation or group of nations desiring such assistance. I take it, Mr. Secretary, that would mean some expression of request from these nations.

In the preceding section, which deals with economic assistance, I do not find similar wording. As now written, would it be your feeling or perhaps the feeling of Mr. Hollister that economic assistance could be granted without any indication of desire on the part of the grantee nation?

Secretary DULLES. I think we felt, as a practical matter, you cannot very well give economic assistance to a nation, or cooperate with it economically, unless it wants it. It would be redundant in that particular case to say "desiring it," but there would certainly be no objection to incorporating those words.

Mr. ADAIR. You have anticipated my next question, Mr. Secretary, because I have spoken with representatives of countries throughout the world, particularly those in Asia, who have felt that we have sometimes had a tendency, as a country, to force economic assistance upon them when perhaps they were not ready for it, or did not want as much or the kind of economic assistance as we had given them. I must hasten to add that those are minority views.

Secretary DULLES. I will let Mr. Hollister answer that. That is his job.

Mr. HOLLISTER. So far as I know, Mr. Adair, there has been nothing of that kind recently. What may have happened some years ago, I would not be prepared to say.

There is one problem, which we must always consider: When a program is discussed with a country there are frequently things that that particular country may desire which we do not think it is wise for it to have.

Mr. ADAIR. That is true.

Mr. HOLLISTER. Sometimes there is something of a disagreement, perhaps, in the ministry of a particular country as to what they want. Some minister is very anxious for a particular program and he is somewhat "miffed" if the Minister of Foreign Affairs or the Minister of Economics or whoever has jurisdiction decides that for that particular country some other program is preferred.

It may well be that occasionally overzealous representatives of the United States may say: "We think this particular program is better for you." And therefore we get the reputation of, you might say, insisting that a certain program be followed. But it has certainly been my policy in no case to put a program into effect or try to put a program into effect that is not very strongly desired by the country, although we cannot in every case follow their wishes.

Mr. ADAIR. Would you then agree with the Secretary that if a phrase were added in section 1 to indicate this was done upon the request of a country you would have no objection?

Mr. HOLLISTER. Not the slightest.

Mr. ADAIR. Thank you, sir. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

Chairman GORDON. Mr. Fascell.

Mr. FASCELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

(Discussion off the record.)

Mr. FASCELL. Sir, do you agree with the further proposition that since no attack is imminent at this moment perhaps the primary purpose of the resolution is to prevent a satellite buildup which could then lead to an aggressive act by one of the satellites?

Secretary DULLES. A principal purpose of this resolution, or one of the principal purposes of this resolution, would be to make it clear that there would be very little to gain in the Soviet Union's trying to make one of these states into a satellite and using it as a "stooge" as they did with the so-called people's republic of Korea, which they used as a stooge. They built it up as a satellite, armed it, equipped it and then directed it into action.

By making it clear that we would react, this actually takes away a good bit of the incentive they might otherwise have to turn or try to turn one of these Middle East states into a stooge.

Mr. FASCELL. The reason I ask that is because it deals with the question of urgency, since we have also heard testimony that the

present military force of any of the satellites, in order to be effective, might take as long as a year or 2 years to build up.

Secretary DULLES. That is quite correct, but our own force does not take 1 year or 2 years to be effective.

Mr. FASCELL. No, sir; but I am just addressing myself to the urgency of the resolution.

Secretary DULLES. Yes.

Mr. FASCELL. Since the primary purpose is to discourage the satellite buildup for aggression. Sir, that leads to the question of economics. I should like to address myself to that for 1 moment. Am I correct in assuming that in your seeking to eliminate the restrictions or limitations on the Mutual Security Act on the disposition of present funds, it is for the purpose of supplanting the revenue which is being lost to the countries in the Middle East now?

Secretary DULLES. Well, it would be designed perhaps not to supplant the revenues, but to counteract the economic consequences, you might say, of the loss of the revenues.

As I pointed out yesterday—I think you were here when I discussed the economic situation.

Mr. FASCELL. Yes, sir.

Secretary DULLES. There is very considerable danger that these losses of revenue may lead to a situation close to economic chaos.

Mr. FASCELL. And we would have to give them money to protect their political stability?

Secretary DULLES. We might have to give them money to protect political stability and we would have to change in some respects, I think, the kind of planning we had been doing prior to this emergency. We might not be able to put those new plans into operation, let us say, by the 30th of April, and we might want to give somewhat more than \$30 million to some 1 country. It is those restrictions we want to get rid of.

Mr. FASCELL. Then, Mr. Secretary, we are talking in this resolution about not the economic development of the project type, but rather we are talking about direct financial assistance to the treasuries of governments.

Secretary DULLES. It might be that in part. Of course, to some extent you can kill 2 birds with 1 stone, so to speak. Sometimes budgetary aid, which is then used for certain specific purposes, contributes to the financial stability of the country. You do not necessarily have to divorce the two things.

In my opinion there is need or there will develop a need—because this is a sort of delayed “time bomb” we are working with here—for action of this type. As I said yesterday these oil royalties are often paid in advance and the full economic impact has not yet hit the area. I think there very well may be the necessity for doing more in the way of budgetary aid and less in the way of these long-term projects, particularly as the financial benefit from long-term projects only comes over a period of years and we may have to push forward quickly.

Mr. FASCELL. Then as I understand it we are talking principally about budgetary aid.

Secretary DULLES. Well, we are talking, I would say, largely so. Of course, until we have made a fresh study of this situation through the mission which the President plans to send out right away, and

which Mr. Richards will head up, I would have to say I am doing a certain amount of guessing, but I would guess you are correct on that.

Mr. FASCELL. Is it not true, sir, that we would have to continue budgetary aid as long as the oil revenues are nonexistent?

Secretary DULLES. Or until there are adjustments or alternative sources of revenue are found. Of course, we hope and have reason to expect that such a program as this will facilitate getting the Canal reopened and getting the pipelines opened again and getting these revenues reinstated. I would expect that by the end of the year the probability is that this situation will have considerably improved. I think the principal impact of it will probably be in the next 6 or 9 months.

Chairman GORDON. Your time is up, Mr. Fascell.

Mr. FASCELL. Thank you.

Chairman GORDON. Mr. Prouty.

Mr. PROUTY. Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, I should like to return to Mrs. Church's question relative to the United Nations and section 2 of the proposed resolution. Would you object to changing the phraseology so that it might resemble that contained in the Tripartite Declaration of 1950? This stated, I believe, that—

Action shall be taken both within or outside the United Nations.

Secretary DULLES. I do not see in principle any objection. I do not quite see where the words would fit in.

Mr. PROUTY. I have given no thought to that. I merely wanted your reaction.

Secretary DULLES. Of course we have in mind, as I think the President's statement made clear, that these situations should be dealt with to the maximum extent possible through the United Nations. I think he pointed out in his speech that under the Charter we have agreed that the Security Council shall have the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. It is our hope, naturally, that these things can be worked out through the United Nations, but in view of the Soviet veto power in the Security Council and its frequent exercise—most recently in the case of Hungary—we do not think that can be relied upon. We must have the alternative.

Mr. PROUTY. I think such a fear is unjustified, but there seems to be a pronounced feeling that we may be delegating our responsibility for the development of United States foreign policy to the United Nations. I think we should dispel that concern. It would be helpful to the passage of this resolution.

I have one other question. The Tripartite Declaration, I assume, is dead. And, of course, it never carried any real authority. Is it possible for the United Nations forces in the Middle East to be strengthened sufficiently to really guarantee the various nations against aggression by neighboring states? Is that feasible?

Secretary DULLES. I think it should be possible to develop what is now known as the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization, which is supposed to observe and watch the borders of Israel.

I have felt for some time—and we have suggested a long time ago—that those teams should be increased in numbers, that they should be given greater flexibility, and that means should be sought to separate

the forces on the two sides of the armistice lines in that area. Hamarskjold tried to work out something of that sort when he was out there last spring. He made some progress, but not adequate progress. There are a good many objections of a technical character which are raised. I would hope, particularly in the light of the more recent experiences and the activities back and forth—the Fedayeen activities against Israel and the retaliatory raids—that something could be done to make that situation more stable. I think that is quite possible.

Mr. PROUTY. I think it would be one answer to a major problem in the area, if such a force could be established and in sufficient strength to really assure the nations that they need not fear aggression from their immediate neighbors.

(Discussion off the record.)

Mr. PROUTY. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman GORDON. Mr. Coffin.

Mr. COFFIN. Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, you replied to some questions by Mr. Fountain that what was being sought here had precedent so far as the authority being given to the President is concerned. The questioning of several members has brought out that we are facing a resolution which, although it strives to be as clear as possible, nevertheless has a good many terms which are not too clear to all. I mention these seven:

“Control of international communism.”

“Overt armed aggression.”

“Territorial integrity.”

“Secure and protect.”

“Middle East.”

“Maintenance of national independence.”

“Consonant with treaty obligations.”

Even the term “employ armed force” is capable of many, many specific meanings. Now, the resolution asks a delegation for an exercise of discretion as to all these and other matters for an unlimited time with provision only for a report in January of each year to Congress. I should like to have your thoughts on the termination provision in the resolution and the reporting provision in the resolution, having in mind that, this being a joint resolution, Congress could not counteract its efforts with another joint resolution and be sure of its passage, unless it had the necessary two-thirds majority. In other words, what I am trying to say is: This is perhaps the most widespread, long-term authority to exercise discretion over a wider area than perhaps has been given or asked for ever—at least, I do not know of a precedent of this scope. The question is diffuse, but I am interested in the reporting and the termination provisions, in the light of what I have said.

Secretary DULLES. I think you have put the thing very well, if I may say so. We have tried in this resolution to use words which had a legislative history, which have been used in the past, such as the words “controlled by international communism” and so forth. “Political independence” and “territorial integrity” are words out of the Charter of the United Nations. We have tried insofar as it is humanly possible to use words which had a pretty much accepted meaning, but I quite recognize the fact that despite that effort on our part, there

is a good deal of discretion left here and it is a discretion which covers a considerable area.

I would think that within reason—and I am sure Congress would be reasonable—any reporting provision which Congress wanted would be quite acceptable to the President. How often do you report, Mr. Hollister, under the economic portion?

Mr. HOLLISTER. Every 6 months.

Secretary DULLES. I think that in fact if article 3 of the resolution were rewritten as suggested, it would be acceptable, and there would not be an exemption from that requirement and there would be a report every 6 months and not once a year. Is that right?

Mr. HOLLISTER. There would be, on the economic portion.

Secretary DULLES. And as for the military, the same thing applies. It is one report every 6 months, so that would automatically require this reporting every 6 months instead of a year if the change in section 3 of the resolution were adopted. I suggest it would be agreeable.

As far as the termination clause is concerned, I indicated in the prior hearing that I felt quite confident that the President would not want to exercise this discretion at any time after a majority of Congress felt he should not have it. Now, I was talking to some Member of Congress quite recently about this, and he expressed the thought that while the discretion to act could reasonably be subject to termination by a majority of Congress, that after it once had acted it probably should not be reversible by action of Congress because that would leave you hanging in a very dubious position, but some stronger provision for termination would be entirely agreeable.

Mr. COFFIN. Do I have more time? I ask not for myself, but Mr. Fountain has a question.

Chairman GORDON. You have 1 more minute.

Mr. COFFIN. I yield to Mr. Fountain.

Mr. FOUNTAIN. I think it has been fairly well explained, but for the purpose of emphasis, as I understand it, assume this resolution has passed and become law; if international communism, by the process of infiltration and subversion takes control of Syria, Iraq, and all the Middle East, there is nothing we could do about it? Is that right?

Secretary DULLES. No. There is a lot we could do about it, but we would not have the right to undertake to overthrow these countries by armed force.

Mr. FOUNTAIN. Would you express an opinion as to what we might do under those circumstances, regardless of this resolution? You may not want to.

Secretary DULLES. I think I would rather not.

Mr. FOUNTAIN. All right. That is all, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. Will the gentleman yield?

Would Soviet volunteers going to those areas be considered an act of aggression?

Secretary DULLES. We would regard Soviet volunteers as an act of overt aggression, because we know that in countries like the Soviet Union and Communist China you do not have volunteers without the knowledge and approval of the Government.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. Volunteers must be accepted by the country they enter; is that not true?

Secretary DULLES. Yes.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. What do we do about it, then?

Secretary DULLES. Perhaps I misunderstood your question. I thought you raised the question if there was attack by volunteers.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. Not necessarily an attack.

Secretary DULLES. If they just moved in?

Mr. ZABLOCKI. Yes.

Secretary DULLES. I do not think we could do anything about that so far as this resolution or the Charter or our treaty obligations are concerned. After all, we station troops of ours in many parts of the world with their consent, and we do not consider by doing so we are doing anything wrong, and I do not think we could take action against the stationing of Soviet forces in other countries. We know they are already stationed and have been for a long time in the Soviet satellites.

However, if after stationing them in the country they attack somebody else, that is another matter.

Chairman GORDON. Mr. Secretary, I have just been presented a note stating that Mr. Eden has resigned as Prime Minister of the United Kingdom. Has that any importance so far as this country is concerned?

Secretary DULLES. I would say the question of who is the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom is entirely a matter for them to decide. I think the relations between our two countries are such that any Prime Minister is looked upon as a friend of the United States, and we want to be a friend of his. The governmental shifts within another country are matters entirely within their own control, and with a country like the United Kingdom we have confidence that no shifts will occur which will alter the basic friendliness between the two countries.

Chairman GORDON. Mr. Bentley.

Mr. BENTLEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, if Egypt should qualify for economic assistance under section 1 of this resolution, to what extent would our economic assistance help alleviate the financial situation Egypt finds herself in by reason of the purchase of Soviet arms and the pledging of her cotton crops?

Secretary DULLES. Obviously, if we gave economic assistance to Egypt, that would help relieve her economic condition. Of course, it is stipulated here that this economic assistance should be given to countries to enable them to maintain their independence, and if there was any thought that the economic assistance would not be used to maintain independence from communism, we would not give aid under the act.

Mr. BENTLEY. No; but I can foresee where in a couple years that situation might change, and we would be in the position of bailing Egypt out of her financial difficulties.

Secretary DULLES. I would hope very much that the time would come in a year or two when there would be freedom from Communist influence in Egypt, and such conformity by Egypt with the good standards of nations that we would feel we could give economic aid and assistance to Egypt. I do not think the fact that they once perhaps made a reckless transaction and mortgaged much of their crops to finance arms should bar them from help at all times.

Mr. BENTLEY. I would like to ask about the types of government that could qualify for aid under this resolution.

Let us assume there were a government in the Middle East that was a type of national Communist government, such as Yugoslavia. Would they qualify for economic assistance under this program?

Secretary DULLES. Yes; I think they would, but I think that is a very unlikely contingency. I think I said earlier when I was asked a question similar to that, that given the character of the Arab peoples, their love of independence and their dedication above all to their religion, I did not think there was any likelihood of an indigenous Communist government coming in those countries.

Mr. BENTLEY. Would a nation be able to maintain neutrality and qualify under section 1?

Secretary DULLES. Yes; it would.

Mr. BENTLEY. This matter of subversion that Mr. Fountain has raised has been of concern to me. Do you think it possible to write into section 2 a provision enabling a nation to protect itself against internal subversion?

Secretary DULLES. We could, of course; and that is a purpose of this resolution, to protect against internal subversion. That is in the preamble of the resolution, and the economic and military assistance we would give would be designed primarily to assist in preventing subversion.

As I indicated, there are, I think, three elements which are particularly to be watched if you are trying to guard against internal subversion.

One is the fear that the country could be subjected to overwhelming armed attack and therefore there is no use resisting the pressure of communism because if it does not come in one way it will come in another. That was the case in Czechoslovakia.

The second thing is that the Government does not have the means to maintain a loyal and dependable security force of its own.

The third is that the economic plight of the country becomes so bad the people grab anything as an alternative.

This resolution was designed to meet these three conditions, and I believe in doing so it does all we can do consistent with our United Nations Charter and other obligations to check the danger from subversion.

I recognize the danger from subversion is possibly the greatest danger of all, but it cannot be met by direct action. I think it is contrary to our principles, it is contrary to the Charter, and, indeed, I think it is not likely to succeed.

The recent action against Nasser did not succeed in changing that regime. You do not often change a regime by attacking it from the outside by force.

I believe in covering the 3 points, we do the 3 things that are the best insurance we can provide against subversion. There are a few other things you can do of a coordinating nature which are not dealt with, and should not be dealt with, by this resolution.

Mr. BENTLEY. I was surprised yesterday when Admiral Radford, as I understood him, said he did not believe under the terms of this resolution we could aid a nation to protect itself against an internal armed uprising, even if our assistance was requested.

Secretary DULLES. I think that would depend on whether the armed uprising amounted in effect to an armed attack. I think that

problem to some extent is dealt with under the North Atlantic Treaty. I remember there was some discussion of that in the report of the Senate Foreign Affairs Committee, and it was pointed out, I think, that if the armed force was of such a character that it amounted in effect to a Soviet attack, then it would be dealt with under the treaty.

We have a provision in our security treaty with Japan, which I was responsible for very largely, which said that if the internal armed attack came from abroad or was instigated from abroad, we could act; and I think something like that would be applicable here.

Mr. BENTLEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman GORDON. Mr. Farbstein.

Mr. FARBSTEIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, yesterday you said the prime purpose of this resolution was a psychological one.

What is your reaction as to the opinion of the world if the United Nations were omitted from the resolution, as against the fluid interpretation of the resolution as it now stands?

Secretary DULLES. Well, we have taken over the past 10 years a whole series of actions in different parts of the world which were designed either to supplement United Nations action or to deal with the contingency that the United Nations might not be able to act because of the Soviet veto power in the Security Council. That occurred 10 years ago with the Greek-Turkey resolution. I know there was some objection made at that time that we should have left the whole matter with the United Nations, which was attempting to deal with it but not able to deal with it adequately. As it turned out, the United Nations was very glad to have the help provided by the Greek-Turkey resolution.

I do not think there is any feeling in most quarters that that is a derogation of our loyalty to the United Nations. I think the two things dovetail together.

Mr. FARBSTEIN. And you would prefer to leave it in?

Secretary DULLES. The reference to the United Nations?

Mr. FARBSTEIN. Yes.

Secretary DULLES. Yes; I would.

Mr. FARBSTEIN. Suppose that one country in the Middle East, because of threats and of military buildup on its border, found it necessary for its own protection to raid that other border in order to dispose of that military buildup, as a result of which that other country called for Soviet help and the Soviet Union sent volunteers and the volunteers joined with the other country in expanding the raid on the first country. What position would we take under those circumstances?

Secretary DULLES. Well, I would suppose that as long as the forces you referred to as having been contributed by the Soviet Union stayed entirely within the boundaries of the country that invited them, we would not regard that as open armed attack. If they went outside the boundaries of the country that invited them, I think it would be otherwise.

Mr. FARBSTEIN. Thank you.

Chairman GORDON. Mr. Saund.

Mr. SAUND. No questions.

Mr. FULTON. Mr. Chairman, a parliamentary inquiry.

Chairman GORDON. Do you yield for a parliamentary inquiry?

Mr. SAUND. Yes.

Mr. FULTON. It has to do with other points in the statement proposed to be released by the chairman.

Chairman GORDON. It has been released.

Mrs. CHURCH. Will the gentleman from California yield for a question?

Mr. SAUND. Yes.

Mrs. CHURCH. Mr. Secretary, I wonder if the provisions of this plan were discussed with Mr. Nehru when he was here or with any of the neutral nations in the area?

Secretary DULLES. As far as I am aware, there was no consultation with the neutral nations. Indeed, the plan was not discussed with any foreign government until it was submitted, at least in preliminary form, to the Congressional leadership.

Mrs. CHURCH. Thank you.

Chairman GORDON. Mr. Saund, you may proceed.

Mr. SAUND. I have no questions.

Chairman GORDON. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. We appreciate very much your returning this afternoon. I hope we have not kept you too long.

(Discussion off the record.)

Chairman GORDON. The committee will adjourn until 10:30 tomorrow morning. At that time we will hear Dean Acheson.

(Thereupon, at 4:40 p. m., the committee adjourned until Thursday, January 10, 1957, at 10:30 a. m.)

ECONOMIC AND MILITARY COOPERATION WITH NATIONS IN THE GENERAL AREA OF THE MIDDLE EAST

THURSDAY, JANUARY 10, 1957

**HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
Washington, D. C.**

The committee met at 10:30 a. m., in room 1301, New House Office Building, Hon. Thomas S. Gordon (chairman) presiding.

Chairman GORDON. Ladies and gentlemen, the committee will come to order. We have as our witness this morning Hon. Dean Acheson, who has testified before the committee many times in the past. We have not had the pleasure of seeing him for some time and I am happy to welcome him here this morning.

Mr. Acheson, we appreciate your taking time to give us the benefit of your views on House Joint Resolution 117. I understand you have a prepared statement, copies of which are before the members. You may read it or refer to it. Please proceed in any way you wish to make your presentation, Mr. Acheson.

If the committee does not conclude with you this morning, we will continue this afternoon with questioning.

STATEMENT BY HON. DEAN ACHESON, FORMER SECRETARY OF STATE

Mr. ACHESON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, your chairman's cordial invitation on your committee's behalf to meet with you and express my views on the President's request for authority in relation to the Middle East brings me before you. Such help as I can give must lie in analyzing the problems and various approaches to them rather than in any contribution of information. This, I assume, is or will be made available to you from official sources.

The President's message on the Middle East is not a statement of a policy but an invitation to devise one. It does not present conclusions, but suggests beginnings. Clearly these beginnings deserve encouragement. But the problem which confronts the Congress is not whether to support the President, but what it is which the Congress is asked to support; not whether the United States should have a policy toward the Middle East, but what that policy should be. The President has stated that it—

is nothing new for the President and the Congress to join to recognize that the national integrity of other free nations is directly related to our own security—and that in the past—

the President and Congress have united, without partisanship, to serve the vital interests of the United States and of the free world.

He quite properly says that the knowledge throughout the world that the President and the Congress are united on a middle eastern policy would, in itself, be important.

This leads to two suggestions: First, that a policy should be formulated before it is announced; and, second, that there may be better ways than through legislation to announce policy in this situation. One has to do with substance; the other with form or method.

Turning first to a suggestion regarding form or method, it does not seem too much to say that in the whole history of the postwar period there has been no more far-reaching or effective pronouncement of American foreign policy in a specific area than the Vandenberg resolution, Senate Resolution 239, 80th Congress, 2d session. At the same time, House Concurrent Resolution 202, declaring the same policies, was introduced by Mr. Chipfield, and another, wider in scope, had been introduced somewhat earlier by Mr. Mellow, House Concurrent Resolution 190. The Vandenberg resolution, by declaring a considered and wise policy as the sense of the Senate, immeasurably strengthened and encouraged the Executive in that more detailed series of steps which included the establishment of NATO, with its unified forces, the military assistance program, and the launching of independent and democratic governments in Germany and Japan.

Each of these steps, and many others, received separate and specific legislative consideration and approval by the Congress, sometimes by treaty, sometimes by statute. But the initial resolution neither needed nor had statutory authority. The considered and authoritative sense of the Senate was given, with all the force and with greater freedom, by simple resolution. A policy cannot be legislated; its execution can, and must, be legislated as occasion arises.

If we turn now to what the President proposes to do, as distinct from what might be said, it will, I think, be very clear that legislation is not only unnecessary but undesirable, and that Congress must play a very considerable part in formulating what it wishes to say. For the President has himself said, "This program will not solve all the problems of the Middle East." Conservatively speaking, that is the outstanding understatement of 1957.

The first section of the proposed law would authorize the President to cooperate with and assist any nation or group of nations in the general area of the Middle East in the development of economic strength dedicated to the maintenance of national independence. This is an admirable purpose and desirable activity for the executive branch, already amply authorized by law and endorsed by the platforms of both parties. We cannot reaffirm our adherence to this sentiment too often. But, surely, a simple House resolution or concurrent resolution will do this very well.

The second section authorized the President to undertake military assistance programs in the Middle East, an authority he already has. But it does more. It empowers the President to employ the Armed Forces of the United States as he deems necessary to help any middle eastern nation which asks for our help against overt armed aggression from any nation controlled by international communism, which the President, in his message, identified as the Soviet Union. Now, no one believes more firmly than I do that our own security and that of other free nations depends upon our willingness to give all practicable

help to one another when the independence of any is attacked. But, I suggest that the more one studies this proposal, the more vague, uncertain, and inadequate it appears as a statement of policy; and the more undesirable as an exercise of the legislative power of Congress.

The joint resolution appears to authorize the use of armed forces to help a middle eastern nation, when help is asked, against overt armed aggression by the Soviet Union or a nation controlled by the Soviet Union. What nations are these? If the danger is so imminent, the administration doubtless has indicated or will indicate to the committee who are thought to be the Soviet pawns. For it seems unlikely that the Soviet Union will launch an armed attack itself. Furthermore, although not to be ruled out, an overt armed aggression does not seem as probable as the support of dissident elements within the nation to be undermined.

The committee will recall that in January 1954 the Secretary of State issued a warning that our Armed Forces might be used in an analogous situation. "Let us now see," he said, "how this concept (retaliation for attack) has been applied to foreign policy, taking first the Far East. * * * I have said," he continued, "in relation to Indochina that, if there were open Red Chinese Army aggression there, that would have 'grave consequences which might not be confined to Indochina.'"

In other words, here, too, we were threatening to employ our Armed Forces if the Red Chinese Army attacked Indochina. But the threat did not correspond to the danger, because the Chinese Army never did attack, nor needed to. The Chinese supported Ho Chi Minh, and half the country was promptly lost to his Communist regime. Our threat was a grandiose gesture, implying a virile and firm attitude, but accomplishing nothing beyond temporarily anesthetizing the policymakers, and perhaps the American public.

So, as policy—that is, as a guide how to act in situations likely to occur—it is vague, inadequate, and not very useful. As legislation, it has other faults besides. Let us assume that the unlikely event occurs and that the Soviet Union, or a stooge under its control, attacks a middle eastern nation. In that event the proposed joint resolution would authorize the President to employ the Armed Forces "as he deems necessary to secure and protect the territorial integrity and political independence" of the nation attacked. In considering whether this grant of authority is a good idea, the committee may wish to inquire whether it is necessary under the circumstances, what forces would be authorized to be used, where, and under what general policy of association with other nations who might be useful allies in an undertaking not without hazard.

If we think again of the proposed joint resolution as a statement of policy, the committee will remember that the Vandenberg resolution of 1948 very powerfully and effectively advised the President—and the world—that among the objectives which the United States should pursue by constitutional means were those grouped around the individual and collective rights of self-defense specifically acknowledged in article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, including making clear that we intended to exercise the rights against armed attack affecting our security. I take it that this is what the administration wishes to stress here. A House or a concurrent resolution could simply and clearly express this policy.

Judged as legislation, does the committee know what the proposed joint resolution authorizes? Does it consider the President in need of additional emergency authority? Since the incumbency of Mr. Jefferson, Presidents have claimed and exercised the power to use the Armed Forces, as they might use other instruments of Government, to protect the vital interests of the United States. But if Mr. Eisenhower does not wish to rely on these precedents, and feels the need of specific congressional authority, exceeding a declaration of policy, has he indicated why he must have it now, when by the very nature of things the power asked for must be shadowy and vague? He, himself, says that should a situation calling for military force arise, he would—

maintain hour-by-hour contact with the Congress if it were in session. And if the Congress were not in session, and if the situation had grave implications, I would at once call the Congress into special session.

Under these conditions the President would know what powers he needed and the Congress could determine the adequacy of the power to meet the emergency.

The wisdom of such an approach becomes apparent as soon as we ask what Armed Forces the President wishes the authority to use, and where. Even before the Secretary of State testified, there was plenty of speculation on this point. The Washington correspondent of the London Observer reported some of it.

"It seems clear" he wrote on December 29:

that any Presidential declaration is unlikely to involve troops, the Air Force or even the 6th Fleet. The American intention, just now, is to issue a clear warning. It seems to imply two things.

First, that any local war will be insulated, not by the stationing of troops, but by the promise of massive reaction against any outside interference; not a physical cordon sanitaire, but a declaration of poised readiness to strike at intervention of any sort.

This correspondent must have been looking back through the files and reading the words of the Secretary of State in 1954:

* * * if our policy was to remain the traditional one of meeting aggression by direct and local opposition—then we needed to be ready to fight in the Arctic and in the Tropics; in Asia, the Near East, and in Europe; by sea, by land, and by air; with old weapons and with new weapons.

Now the Near East is another name for the area described in section 2 of the proposed joint resolution as "the general area of the Middle East"—an area where, under the Secretary's new policy of 1954 we did not need to be ready to fight. Instead a basic policy decision, said to have been made by the President and his advisers, had determined that we should fight in quite a different way and place. As the Secretary explained it—

the basic decision was to depend primarily upon a great capacity to retaliate, instantly, by means and at places of our choosing.

This may be the kind of poised readiness not involving the presence of troops in the area, which the Observer correspondent discerns in the minds of policymakers here.

The Secretary in his testimony before this committee seems to bear this out.

We would want to limit our activity to the minimum necessary to accomplish the objective, and if the objective could be accomplished by local action, certainly that would be all that would be undertaken. If it required action outside of the area, for example, to attack staging areas, lines of communication, and

the like, then that would be done. I do not envisage the possibility that there would be, for example, an all-out attack on the Soviet Union unless it was quite apparent that what was happening was deliberately intended to be the beginning of the third world war. In that event we might have to act differently. Those are matters which inevitably have to be left to the judgment of the Commanding Chief.

This sounds perilously like another approach to the brink. It is far too hazardous a course even to be hinted at. In plain language what he says is that this joint resolution grants the authority, if it should be thought (presumably by those upon whom the then President might rely) that the Soviet aggression was "intended to be the beginning of the third world war," to insure that it would be by "an all-out attack on the Soviet Union." This is reckless talk. Vague phrases which suggest that we might respond to any but the most vital danger by nuclear retaliation carry a vicious risk, whether believed or not believed, and may cause a fatal miscalculation. There can be no bluff here.

No such catastrophic threat is contained in the Vanderberg resolution, or is necessary here. Again I suggest the wisdom of avoiding a legislative grant of powers, in favor of a policy declaration.

In any event, before granting powers which include the power of instant nuclear reaction at places of our choosing, the members of the committee might wish to confer with their colleagues on the Armed Services Committee. Specifically, they might wish to read Senator Symington's report on our capacity in this very field.

Furthermore, if we turn from the nuclear implication of the phrase "employ the Armed Forces of the United States as he deems necessary," the problem of what forces are to be used and how used becomes even more puzzling. Our combat-ready ground forces amount to about one-half the figure at which General Taylor has placed the desirable army.

General Taylor has said.

We have made a great deal of progress in developing an atomic air deterrent. I think now that our program needs to be bent a little—perhaps more than a little—in order to focus attention on the danger of the small war which seems to me to be coming to the forefront all the time as the greatest danger we are facing.

Perhaps, it may seem to the committee upon reflection, a better course than legally authorizing force, which may be quite inadequate for the task, would be to report, with help of the Armed Services Committee, a declaration of policy which would include a recommendation, vigorous and plain, that the condition and extent of the Armed Forces of the United States be given immediate attention to make them fully adequate for the demands which might be made upon them.

On another military matter, also, the proposed resolution seems deficient, certainly as a declaration of policy. For it speaks as though any employment of our Armed Forces would be carried out unilaterally and alone, provided that what the President did squared with our treaty obligations, including the treaty establishing the United Nations. But forces operate from bases, and, one would hope, with both allies to join with them, and well-wishers to support their efforts as in the interest of justice and peace. For this reason the concerting of policy with like-minded nations, before action is taken, becomes of fundamental importance.

It will not do to say that the United Nations will determine policy, make decisions, and enforce them. The United Nations is not a supranational entity with a mind, a will, and power. It is a forum, and no more than the nations which meet there. Nothing more comes out of it than is put into it. If a great nation, like the United States, looks to the United Nations to form American policy, instead of fighting in the United Nations for what the American Government believes should be done, then we have committed an unprecedented abdication of responsibility and power. We deserve what we get. If we believe that we have exhausted our responsibilities when we join in the United Nations to pass resolutions which are defied, and which we have no intention of backing up, we have engaged in a most dangerous form of self-deception.

In the same field, of what Lincoln called pernicious abstractions, is the belief that in the "principles of the charter" we find the pat solutions of complicated international problems. It was one of our greatest judges who said that general principles do not decide concrete cases.

For the truly difficult decisions are those which raise the problem which of two equally valid principles shall give us our point of departure. This is so, for instance, when the principle which condemns aggressive force meets the principle which approves and justifies defensive force. In such a situation what is provocation? A sense of unimpeachable rectitude is often a danger in so treacherous a field, certainly to others. Lilburn noted it in Oliver Cromwell. "You shall scarce speak to Cromwell about anything," he wrote,

but he will lay his hand on his breast, elevate his eyes, and call God to record. He will weep, howl, and repent, even while he doth smite you under the fifth rib.

But to speak of a more contemporary matter, something surely seems askew in a course of conduct during which our Government opposes and humiliates our closest allies by joining with the very power which the present resolution asks authority to oppose with force, and whose leaders, so the President says, "do not scruple to use any means to gain their ends."

It is thinking detached in this way from concrete realities and consequences which seems to me to leave the proposed resolution so barren of any achievement as a declaration of policy. It offers little to guide and encourage the administration, and nations willing to work with this country, toward settlement of some of the problems of the Middle East. The use of force, military assistance programs, and economic aid—these break little new ground and leave untouched great areas in need of policy. Before mentioning these areas, I venture a suggestion on economic aid.

The committee might wish to consider whether a stepping up of amounts allocated for economic aid in this one area is a bold and far-sighted enough policy to meet dangers of the magnitude portrayed by the administration. For these dangers are not peculiar to the Middle East alone. They are common to the underdeveloped areas of Asia and Africa. Surely we do not propose to wait until each area slides into crisis before recognizing the nature of its need for economic development. Nothing, I suggest, would be more calculated to refresh the relations between North America and Europe, on the one hand, and the nations in need of economic development, on the other, than a great and well-conceived program involving them both.

As undeveloped countries might find their energies and capacities occupied to the full with their own progress, their preoccupation with sterile xenophobia and resentments should be far less. Last Sunday in the New York Times I urged that this was one of the three great fields in which a congressional establishment of policy and programs might well change the course of history, or at any rate fix its course in a free and open international system. Against such a background, Middle Eastern problems which seem intractable might yield to solution. I drew particular attention to the plan suggested by Messrs. Millikan and Rostow of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology in their current book *A Proposal—Key to an Effective Foreign Policy*.

Of the problems peculiar to the Middle East itself, two are outstanding, those relating to the Suez Canal and those relating to the Israeli-Arab conflict. Both are exacerbated by the Soviet Union, and each contributes to the difficulties of the other. The problems of the canal seem more susceptible of solution. But at the threshold lies an obstacle which only the Congress can remove. The present situation could hardly be better calculated to permit and encourage Colonel Nasser to be obdurate in refusing a control and management of the canal which would give reasonable safeguard to the interests of those nations whose very life depends on the freedom and efficiency of the canal. These nations are the oil-producing Middle East, oil-consuming Europe, and the trading countries of Europe and Asia whose shortest route to their markets and supplies is via Suez.

The dependence of Europe upon Middle Eastern oil is Colonel Nasser's trump card in getting the canal cleared at the expense of others without concessions on his part. So long as Europe must draw down its gold and dollar reserves for Western Hemisphere oil, Colonel Nasser can bleed Europe to death. So long as reliance on commercial channels alone continues, the supply will be inadequate for industrial and private needs, with the resultant pressure of unemployment and deprivation.

The Congress could remove this pressure by declaring the policy, and directing the administration to work out the arrangements, for this Government to supply Europe's needs and pay the excess costs of dollar oil. The clearing of the canal could then wait until a fair management and control safeguarding the users' interests against arbitrary interference could be worked out. Indeed, the Congress could well consider going further. It could state American policy to be in favor of providing means alternative to the canal for transporting oil by pipeline in an area under the administration and protection of the United Nations. This would benefit both the producing countries and the consuming ones. Such an area might serve the dual purpose of interposing a demilitarized strip between Israel and Egypt. Congress could ask the administration to work out the execution of this policy through appropriate international channels. At the present time whatever policy we have on these pressing matters, if any, is unknown at home and abroad. A firm and announced one would greatly strengthen all those who are working for a fair and just solution of the Suez problem.

There remains the incredibly difficult question of Israeli-Arab enmity. Can Congress usefully lay down any sort of American policy on this matter? No one approaches this question with more humility and diffidence than I do, for no one is more conscious of the

complexity of the problem and the meagerness of his contribution toward its solution. In this spirit I suggest a statement of policy, because it would, I believe, have been helpful in my own experience.

The Arab-Israeli situation is one wholly enveloped by fear. The fear is mutual and justified. It leads to the competition in armaments, which seems quite beyond direct control, since the Soviet Union has become a supplier and made obsolete the arms supply provisions of the tripartite declaration of May 1950. The State of Israel was established in the Middle East over a period during which Great Britain was in military and administrative control of Palestine and largely by American funds and support, private and governmental. The United States has a large measure of responsibility which it cannot properly avoid. The responsibility runs to both Arab and Jew. Whether the United States can discharge its responsibility is another matter. But it can try; and to try it must have a policy upon which the whole Government is united and which our people support. Such a policy might do something—perhaps a substantial amount—to allay the mutual fear just mentioned.

The policy cannot be complicated, though its execution may be very difficult indeed. It should be, I suggest, that having participated so prominently in the establishment of Israel in the midst of the Arab world, whether wisely or not is now irrelevant, this Government cannot properly abandon Israel to be overwhelmed by armed attack and its people dispersed. From this same prominent participation in the creation of Israel, it also follows that this Government cannot properly leave Israel free to attack her neighbors. These statements, I am quite aware, raise the whole complicated series of disputes through which Israel and her neighbors have just passed. How large an attack is an aggression which justifies a counterattack? Who is the aggressor to be opposed?

So nothing useful as policy emerges unless we go a step further. American responsibility requires getting established, underwriting, and supporting with force an international arrangement for preventing Government-supported raiding, as well as attacks, either way, by taking over responsibility for such punishment by way of retaliation or otherwise as might be necessary. I believe that if the world and the Middle Eastern nations particularly were convinced that this Nation was determined to see that the all-pervading fear was banished by action along these lines, while the announcement might be unpopular in some quarters, it would be helpful and would have a more than substantial chance for successful execution through appropriate international negotiation and organization.

The President by laying before the Congress this question of American policy in the Middle East and inviting its free discussion has given the clearest possible demonstration of the strength and vitality of our democratic system. His act should not be diminished by suggestions from any quarter that the full consideration needed for wise action be curtailed or that perfunctory approval of the administration's proposal is the proper and necessary performance of congressional duty. One of the greatest practitioners of bipartisanship in foreign policy—or, as he preferred to call it, nonpartisanship—Senator Vandenberg, had no doubts on this score. He said in a Lincoln Day speech in Detroit:

Let's be clear about that. It was not a carbon-copy process. There are outstanding Republican trademarks in every act that Congress passed. It was a meeting of minds. Thus we achieved substantial unity.

And again he wrote on January 5, 1950:

It does not involve the remotest surrender of free debate in determining our position. On the contrary, frank cooperation and free debate are indispensable to ultimate unity. In a word, it simply seeks national security ahead of partisan advantage. Every foreign policy must be totally debated (and I think the record proves it has been) and the "loyal opposition" is under special obligation to see that this occurs.

These words are true today, as they were 7 years ago. As a member of the party which now must perform the duties of the "loyal opposition," I am grateful for this opportunity to do my part in seeing that the proposed policy is "totally debated" and I venture the statement that whatever Congress does in regard to the proposal will be vastly improved by the presence of some outstanding Democratic trademarks.

Chairman GORDON. Thank you, Mr. Acheson, for your very fine statement. We will now proceed with questioning under the 5-minute rule.

Mr. Acheson, I have 1 or 2 questions which I would like to ask you. Do you believe that if we put the Soviet Union on notice, as this resolution proposes, this action will deter Soviet aggression?

Mr. ACHESON. If you would leave out of your question, Mr. Chairman, the phrase "as this resolution proposes" I would have less difficulty in answering that without repeating much I have said.

I think, as I have tried to indicate in this statement, it is wise and desirable that there should be a declaration of American policy with regard to this area. That is right. I have tried to suggest this can be better done, more freely done and more easily done, by a concurrent resolution or a House resolution than by legislation. I do not see the necessity for legislation.

I do not share the sense of panic which seems to be going about that unless there is this declaration there will be armed attack. This is always a danger, certainly. I do not say it does not exist; but it seems to me that the Russians are receiving so much by way of a free gift in the Middle East that it would be quite unwise on their part to undertake any armed attack.

I noted that the Secretary said about this that Russia was ruled by despots; there was a great temptation to attack. Surely it is ruled by despots, but I do not see where the temptation comes from. One of the smaller nations might do something, and it is therefore useful to say that our force is available for defense in this area. I do not think it is necessary to try to spell out by law how, why, when, and under what circumstances.

That was not done by the Vandenberg resolution. What Senator Vandenberg did in his resolution, and what Mr. Chipfield did in the resolution which he introduced, was to lay down some broad principles which indicated very clearly that we were prepared to join in defense through force. It left it to the administration to work out by treaty, by statute, specific proposals which were then brought back to the Congress and enacted by the Congress. And that is what I think should be done here.

Chairman GORDON. Thank you. In your article of last Sunday in the New York Times, you emphasized the serious consequences which

result from having the Suez Canal blocked. What do you believe can be done and should be done to speed up the solution of this problem?

Mr. ACHESON. Well, in the statement I indicated that the first thing which we should do is to deprive Colonel Nasser of the incentive to prevent the unblocking of the canal. Now, the longer he delays action in the canal, the more desperate becomes the position of Western Europe. Nations which had nothing to do with this recent unpleasantness in North Africa are suffering quite as much as those who did. It seems to me quite unimportant whether they did or not. All these nations are important to the Western World. All are friends and allies of ours. It is to our interest that they remain strong. It is to our interest that they should not draw down their gold and dollar balances and become financially unstable. It is to our interest that there should not be unemployment.

The best that is going to be done under the present private arrangements is likely to leave Western Europe between 20 and 25 percent short of its petroleum requirements. As I suggested in the article to which you have referred, consider that situation as applied to the United States. This would be a major disaster. It would mean the laying off of people on a very large scale. It would involve all sorts of unemployment. It would involve all sorts of privation in the country. It would involve all sorts of political weakness. It is highly undesirable.

We can cure that overnight by saying that this Government will take a vigorous part in seeing that Western Europe is supplied by Western Hemisphere oil. We can take the tankers out of mothballs and do a hundred things that the Government could do if this were wartime and at the same time say:

We will take care of the extra cost, the dollar cost, of this oil. You must still pay what you would pay for soft currency oil, but we will take the dollar cost.

That would help a great deal. It would then be clear to Mr. Nasser he has nothing more to gain. There would still be the pressure to open the canal from the oil-producing countries, which would still be losing money and which would need help from us, too. There would still be a loss to India and the other trading nations who rely very greatly on the canal. The blocking of the canal is already having the most serious effects on the Indian 5-year plan. Their costs are greatly increasing. So India and the Arab States are pressing to have the canal opened. That is all to the good. They should continue to press, but we should not have our friends bleed to death while this is going on.

Chairman GORDON. Thank you, Mr. Acheson. Mr. Chipfield.

Mr. CHIPERFIELD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman; I have no questions.

Chairman GORDON. Dr. Morgan.

Mr. MORGAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Acheson, I certainly want to congratulate you for a very excellent statement. From your statement I take it you favor a simple resolution of policy, rather than a grant of powers.

Mr. ACHESON. That is quite correct, Dr. Morgan. It can be as simple or as complex as the Congress wishes to make it, depending upon how many matters of policy the committee would wish to include.

Mr. MORGAN. Mr. Acheson, I suppose you are familiar with the so-called 34-word resolution that appeared yesterday morning in the Washington Post.

Mr. ACHESON. I have read it in the Washington Post. I would not wish my familiarity with it to be construed as authorship.

Mr. MORGAN. I was just about ready to ask you that question.

Mr. ACHESON. I thought you were going to.

Mr. MORGAN. Do you consider that so-called resolution a resolution of policy?

Mr. ACHESON. Yes; that is a resolution of policy. It is not the last word in perfection. I think the resolution would be improved by adding to it the use of economic and political means as well as military means. Other things could be put into it. But that is the line along which it seems to me wise to proceed.

And, incidentally, if I may add this, though it is not responsive to your question, I think the criticisms which have been made of that resolution by the Secretary of State are quite far from the point. It does not, as I see it, do any of the things or not do any of the things which he charges it with doing and not doing. Of course, if you approach this thing as a lawyer drafting a tax statute and say that every single omission of a word or comma from a resolution means something, you can get the most terrible fright out of it; but that is quite a silly way to think about it.

Mr. MORGAN. That is all, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman GORDON. Mr. Vorys.

Mr. VORYS. Mr. Secretary, your statement was brilliant, as your statements always are, but I confess considerable disappointment in the extent to which it is destructive rather than constructive. I never realized before your resemblance to Cromwell. In your statement you "weep and howl" and apparently "repent" what you told us 10 years ago, meanwhile "smiting" your successor "under the fifth rib." Just 10 years ago, as Acting Secretary of State, you presented the Greek-Turkey resolution to this committee. I have just been running over that Greek-Turkey resolution. It has 6 whereases, whereas the present resolution has 3. Otherwise, this is the legislative action you requested at that time:

That, notwithstanding the provisions of any other law, the President may from time to time, when he deems it in the interest of the United States, furnish assistance to Greece and Turkey upon request of their Governments and upon terms and conditions determined by him.

If that was a policy or the beginning of a policy—I think it was the beginning of a policy—it was not expressed in a concurrent resolution; it was expressed in a joint resolution which had the force of law, which was to authorize the expenditure of money, and the authority given the President which you requested was the broad authority I have just quoted.

Now do you, like Cromwell, repent of what you urged upon us 10 years ago?

Mr. ACHESON. Mr. Vorys, you and I are pretty nearly the same age because we were in college about the same time. I am afraid the advance in years has had the same effect on both of us; our memories are not as good as they once were. You do not recall the situation as it occurred.

What happened at the time of the Greek-Turkey resolution was that a very specific situation had occurred about which we came and told the Congress. That situation was that the British Government was unable any longer to carry out its support, financial and other, the furnishing of arms to these two Governments, both of which were under immediate pressure; one by armed pressure, since they were already fighting Communist forces from across the border, and the other was under threats from the Soviet Union. We came to the Congress with that specific information, with a specific bill to deal with a specific situation. You knew exactly why, when, where, how much; and everything about that was explained to you in great detail, and the Congress was wholly satisfied with it.

Now, if that act led the Congress to say that this was a good course to apply in other situations, those, too, were dealt with specifically. There was no thought on my part or President Truman's part of coming here and saying: "The Eastern Mediterranean is a tough sort of spot. Won't you let us use all our troops, give us a lot of money, and let us do whatever we want to?" That is not what we did at all.

Mr. VORYS. That is not what we are asked to do now. As you stated at the outset of your paper, you are not in possession of the facts now, as you were at that time, and of course you are not in possession of the facts that this committee has been given in the last 2 or 3 days. But I remind you that the specific situation, although it is broader in geographical area, is precisely the same as you described. There are threats of international communism involving this area and a vacuum of power caused, largely, by the withdrawal of British power.

Mr. ACHESON. Of course, I cannot debate about information which, as you say, I do not have, but what you say you have surprises me.

Mr. VORYS. Your statement shows that you are lacking a lot of information the committee has.

One other thing I wanted to comment on. On page 4 you spoke about and criticized the warning which the Secretary of State issued in January 1954, with reference to Indochina. I wonder if you recollect that your own letter of transmittal to the famous "white paper" July 30, 1949, contained a similar caveat or warning with reference to the movement of Red forces into Indochina? Do you repent of that statement now?

Mr. ACHESON. Not at all. I stand by all my statements.

Mr. VORYS. Do you feel that your statement was a reckless statement or a futile one because, due to various circumstances, the Red Chinese did help the Vietminh?

Mr. ACHESON. Mr. Vorys, I, of course, did not say that this statement of the Secretary of State was a reckless one; it was another statement about which I used that word. It clearly was futile. I do not have my statement before me, but if my statement was the same as his—and you have them both, apparently, before you—then it must have been futile, too.

Mr. VORYS. But you do not feel it was reckless. Did I understand on this "reckless talk" business you feel that it is a mistake to attempt to prevent war by miscalculation? You feel that it is better to say, "Let the dust settle," for instance, or "Korea is outside our perim-

eter"? Do you feel that is a better method of avoiding war than to attempt to warn our possible enemies of areas of our vital interest, so as to prevent any action based on miscalculation of our intentions?

Mr. ACHESON. Mr. Vorys, you draw the most extraordinary conclusions from what seems to me to be the most simple English words.

I am delighted you brought up this question of Korea, because you and I both had a good deal to do with that, and I would like to talk about it a bit.

This statement to which you have referred was made by me in a speech on the 12th of January 1950. In a moment I will read to you exactly what was said in that speech. This speech was never thought to have been an invitation to invasion of Korea. It was never referred to in that way until, curiously enough, the campaign of 1952. For 18 months, during all of which time there had been fighting going on, no one discovered that I really had invited the Russians to come in, or the North Koreans; quite an unusual oversight during the period. In the campaign of 1952 Senator Taft, notably objective in these matters, made the discovery. He passed it on to Mr. Dulles who put it, of all places, in the Republican platform. It was then picked up by the Republican candidate, General Eisenhower, and repeated by him; and it has now become sort of a doctrine which Mr. Dulles announces every time he appears everywhere, that this dreadful thing occurred and we are not going to do that any more. Well, first of all—

Mr. VORYS. I think you are a little in error about the date.

Mr. ACHESON. Let me go on and finish the answer, please, because I am having a good time and I like to have a good time. Let me just recall to you now what it is I said.

Mr. VORYS. I think you are in error about the date. I helped incorporate it in a paper which was called Background for Korea which was used by my brethren in the campaign of 1950.

Mr. ACHESON. Well, really? You were more active than I thought.

In this speech I was discussing the defense of the United States, among other things, insofar as it was affected by the situation in Asia. I pointed out that we had outlying defensive spots garrisoned by American troops, American Air Force and American Navy, and these spots, which I called a defense perimeter, were the initial points of a defense for the continental United States, and I said:

This defensive perimeter runs along the Aleutians to Japan—then goes to the Ryukyus. We hold important defense positions in the Ryukyu Islands, and those we will continue to hold. In the interest of the population of the Ryukyu Islands, we will at an appropriate time offer to hold these islands under trusteeship of the United Nations. But they are essential parts of the defensive perimeter of the Pacific, and they must and will be held.

The defensive perimeter runs from the Ryukyus to the Philippine Islands.

I will come back to what I said in that speech about Korea; but while we are on this point, I should like to refer to another matter which escaped attention, so far as I know, and that is that almost a year before I made that statement, which was a description of American military dispositions and their importance, a description which had been made many times by the Chiefs of Staff, it had been made by General MacArthur in almost exactly the same words, except that

General MacArthur began in the South and went to the North. You will see in the New York Times under date of March 2, 1949, an article, reporting an interview with General MacArthur, in the course of which this is stated:

The Pacific was looked upon as the avenue of possible enemy approach. Now the Pacific has become an Anglo-Saxon lake and our line of defense runs through the chain of islands fringing the coast of Asia.

It starts from the Philippines and continues through the Ryukyu Archipelago, which includes its main bastion, Okinawa. Then it bends back through Japan and the Aleutian Island chain to Alaska.

That is what I said. That is what General MacArthur said, and no one thought he invited the Communists into Korea.

However, I went on to talk about other situations in this same speech, and in it I said this:

So far as the military security of other areas in the Pacific is concerned, it must be clear that no person can guarantee those areas against military attack. But it must also be clear that such a guaranty is hardly sensible or necessary within the realm of practical relationship.

Should such an attack occur—one hesitates to say where such an armed attack could come from—the initial reliance must be on the people attacked to resist it and then upon the commitments of the entire civilized world under the Charter of the United Nations which so far has not proved a weak reed to lean on by any people who are determined to protect their independence against outside aggression.

Not long after that—less than a week before the attack—Mr. John Foster Dulles was in Korea and he made a speech in which he said almost the same thing. He said:

The American people give you their support, both moral and material, consistent with your own self-respect and your primary dependence on your own efforts.

We look on you as, spiritually, a part of the United Nations, which has acted with near unanimity to advance your political freedom, which seeks your unity with the North, and which, even though you are technically deprived of formal membership, nevertheless requires all nations to refrain from any threat or use of force against your territorial integrity or political independence.

Going back to my speech of January 12, 1950, I went on to say that—

We are asking the Congress to continue that help [which we have been giving to Korea] until [that country] is firmly established, and that legislation is now pending before the Congress. The idea that we should scrap all of that, that we should stop halfway through the achievement of the establishment of this country, seems to me to be the most utter defeatism and utter madness in our interests in Asia.

But it did not seem that way to my friend, John Vorys, because on the 19th of January 1950 the House of Representatives defeated that bill by a majority of 1 vote. Mr. Vorys contributed the leadership and the vote.

However, I was not discouraged by that and returned to the Congress and on March 8, 1950—

Mr. MORANO. Mr. Chairman, I think we are going far afield.

Chairman GORDON. He is answering the question.

Mr. HAYS of Ohio. It is getting a little embarrassing to Mr. Vorys, but let him go on.

Mr. FULTON. Mr. Chairman, I make a motion at this point we formally waive the 5-minute rule. I requested it before. I now move it.

Chairman GORDON. The Chair rules that we will make an exception to the rule adopted by the committee. We will then proceed under the

5-minute rule. This is an exception for an answer to Mr. Vorys' question.

Mr. FULTON. The 5 minutes is long over.

Chairman GORDON. I know, but it is a long answer.

Mr. ACHESON. The answer is finished, Mr. Chairman. I went back to the Congress and we got the money and that is the end of my answer.

Chairman GORDON. Mr. Carnahan.

Mr. CARNAHAN. Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Acheson, most of the information which has been presented to the committee this week has been in open session. Mr. Dulles stated that very little classified information has been presented. So I might just say that if your deficiency in information is limited only to the classified information which was presented to the committee during this week you are in pretty good shape.

Mr. ACHESON. Thank you, Mr. Carnahan. You reassure me.

Mr. CARNAHAN. Just a question or two. Do you consider the Resolution 117 a restatement of Executive power, or do you see any declaration of policy in it?

Mr. ACHESON. Do I consider what about it?

Mr. CARNAHAN. Do you consider the resolution merely a granting of or a restating of Executive powers, or do you see a declaration of policy in the resolution?

Mr. ACHESON. That is what I do see in it. The declaration, or the Resolution 117, repeats authority which the President already has. When it comes to the use of Armed Forces, it gives congressional authority to back up whatever Executive authority may exist. I think this is unwise, because I think it is far better in a situation of this sort to have the Congress lay down the kind of policy which it thinks the administration should follow and then have the administration come back to the Congress with specific requests which it wants the Congress to legislate upon. This is far too general for safety in my opinion.

Mr. CARNAHAN. That is all, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman GORDON. Mrs. Bolton.

Mrs. BOLTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

It is always a very stimulating and challenging moment when you come before this committee, Mr. Acheson. As Mr. Vorys has suggested, you are indeed a most brilliant witness.

I wonder if you would be good enough to enlarge somewhat upon your Arab-Israeli settlement idea.

Mr. ACHESON. Well, as I say, I do this with great diffidence, because I know how difficult the thing is. What seems to be true now is that one cannot see very far here. The extent of my vision would be that I think it would be useful now if everybody were united in this country, and everyone in the world knew we were united in this country, upon the two principles which I have suggested; we are responsible for creating a new nation, Israel, in the middle of an Arab world and we have to say, I think, that having done this we are not going to allow it to be overwhelmed with force; but neither are we going to let it terrify everybody around it and attack them. That is our obligation. Now, how you do this I have no great wisdom about, and I know how difficult it is. I think it has to be done, for instance, in a variety of ways.

I think it would have to be done by our taking a very strong lead in the United Nations, to say that attacks either way are out; and that, if there is no U. N. police force, then other members of the U. N. are charged with the responsibility of stopping it.

I think this is a ticklish and delicate thing to do because the first thing, if you were not careful about it, is you might have Soviet troops in the area in a United Nations force.

Mrs. BOLTON. Do you feel this has not been done adequately?

Mr. ACHESON. I beg your pardon?

Mrs. BOLTON. Do you feel this has not been done adequately?

Mr. ACHESON. No; I do not think it has been done at all.

Mrs. BOLTON. My recollection sometimes is not as keen, and at times I am not able to remember as well as you are, sir, but it has been my recollection that there has been a good deal said about the position of the United States with relation to Israel. We have said that her statehood is part of our whole policy. I do not know what more we can say.

Mr. ACHESON. Well, we could say what I suggested, which I think is more. The great difficulty is that a lot has been said, but not much has been done. Our tripartite declaration in May 1950, I do not put forward as the most brilliant act of statesmanship in the world. It had some good effect, because at that time the British and the French and ourselves controlled the situation with regard to physical force. We controlled all the arms that went into the area. We controlled all the forces in the area. Along came the Russians and made their arrangements with Egypt, and that changed that; so that is now obsolete. We have to do something else. How to do it, I do not know. I do not pretend to know.

Mrs. BOLTON. Having your long experience in the field, it would make it possible for you to give us some very constructive suggestions.

Mr. ACHESON. Well, I have done my best.

Mrs. BOLTON. I do not think they are—

Mr. ACHESON. You do not think my best is good enough. I agree with you; it probably is not; but it is my best.

Mrs. BOLTON. Then the suggestion I made, that you could enlarge upon it, is one where you feel you cannot enlarge upon it.

Mr. ACHESON. I think I have said everything I have in me.

Mrs. BOLTON. I see. Thank you very much.

Chairman GORDON. Mr. Zablocki.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Acheson, we are delighted to have you before our committee again. I want to compliment you for an excellent statement.

In trying to solve a problem it is always well to try to analyze what has caused the difficulty. Could we have your views as to what you attribute the present crisis in the Middle East? For example, did the British withdrawal of troops from the Suez contribute to the crisis?

Mr. ACHESON. I should think, if we were looking at the development here, it goes back quite a long way and it has several factors in it. I think one of these factors is the ambivalence of American policy in regard to Egypt. I think, at one time we seemed to be rather backing Nasser. He seemed to be the fellow we thought was full of hope and might bring about peace.

The American policy veered around and, starting with the northern tier policy, brought about the Baghdad Pact, which was thought by both Nasser and Saudi Arabia to be a grave danger to them. This led

to a counterpulling together of the Arab nations in the south as against this northern group. Then the negotiations for arms went on, a long time. Sometimes we blew hot, sometimes cold, on it. Finally, the Egyptians turned to the Communist nations and got their arms there. We immediately reentered the field with suggestions of economic help, including the Aswan Dam. When it was discovered that the Russians were not going to help in the Aswan Dam, we withdrew that offer. This was a blow to Nasser's prestige. He responded by seizing the canal.

I think our relations with our British and French allies left a good deal to be desired from a long time back but specifically from July 1956, on. We gave them the impression—perhaps they were wrong in getting it—that we were disregarding of their interests; that whenever we seemed to get them to agree on a position which they thought was the last trench to which they could withdraw, then we seemed to pull that rug out from under them and they had to fall back another bit. So the time came when they undertook a desperate gamble, which was a foolish one—but it was desperate. They did this without letting us know. This shows a state of relationship which I can hardly conceive of. There must have been grave faults, perhaps on all sides, to bring 3 close allies to the point where 2 of them do something as desperate as this—because it really was a desperate step—without letting us know. Then the whole sorry tale keeps going on. After they started we rushed in to try to stop it. They hesitated. Then they took their action in Egypt. Then we joined in bringing the greatest possible pressure, and then the Russian threats began flying around, and then they stopped. There is hardly a step which does not seem fated to bring about disaster here.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. Mr. Acheson, What effect will this resolution have on our European allies?

Mr. ACHESON. Well, I do not believe that this resolution is going to have much effect. In fact, no resolution as such is going to have much effect. But if the administration started off now on a new tack, with congressional support, I think it might perhaps begin to heal some of these wounds.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. In the past, a policy of containment was regarded not too desirable. Mr. Acheson, can this resolution be regarded as a policy of containment?

Mr. ACHESON. I should suppose so. I understood the Secretary of State to say that in answer to a question from this committee the other day.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. There is agreement that Russia will not resort to overt aggression, and that internal subversion is the key problem. Mr. Acheson, who proposals should be made in a declaration of policy to cope with the problem of internal security?

Mr. ACHESON. Well, I do not think there is any proposal to deal with that directly. I think among the suggestions which I made in my prepared statement were some which will help a great deal. Economic development in the area and in other surrounding areas will help a lot. That is one of the things that would be good. Greater political stability will be a way to deal with this sort of thing. Governments are too shaky through fear now.

If you were able in some magical way to reduce the fear of Jew for Arab and Arab for Jew, a great deal of the temptation to carry on these intrigues would disappear. If you could assure both the

Egyptians and the Saudi Arabians that the Baghdad Pact is not really, as they quite firmly believe, an attempt to reestablish the Hashemite Kingdom, that would do a lot. Economic development would do a lot. All these things together are necessary.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. Could we improve the political stability of that area if we joined the Baghdad Pact?

Mr. ACHESON. I do not know. I have always thought this northern tier business was pretty unwise. I do not believe I am a good adviser on that. If it were left to me, I would not do it, but I do not know enough about it, really.

Chairman GORDON. Ladies and gentlemen, I wish to make an announcement at this time; that we will recess at 12 o'clock and we will continue this afternoon at 2:30 to hear Mr. Acheson further.

Mr. ACHESON. Adjourn now?

Chairman GORDON. We shall recess right now.

(Thereupon, at 11:55 a. m., Thursday, January 10, 1957, a recess was taken until 2:30 p. m. of the same day.)

AFTERNOON SESSION

Chairman GORDON. The committee will come to order.

This is a continuation of the hearing of this morning, and our first questions will be offered by Mr. Smith.

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Acheson, it is always a pleasure to have you before our committee.

In view of your statement, do you suggest that the Congress take no action at all rather than to adopt this resolution?

Mr. ACHESON. I made quite a different suggestion, I think, Mr. Smith, but I was urging the Congress to consider, the committee to consider, taking some action similar to that of the Vandenberg resolution. I think if you would read that resolution over again now you would see how very helpful it was at the time, how far reaching, and how it handled matters of policy in a way that is very effective from a congressional point of view. In other words, you do not have to go into detailed questions; you lay down the broad line along which you hope Executive action will follow, and then the Executive brings back to Congress treaties, or arrangements, or proposed legislation, or whatever it needs to carry out the policy. That is what I was suggesting be done here.

Mr. SMITH. You suggest that the Soviet is exploiting the tensions that exist between Israel and the Arab countries. Do you feel that the basic cause for tension in the area is this conflict between those two groups, or are there other influences?

Mr. ACHESON. Well, there are some others which I mentioned this morning. That, I think, is probably the most fundamental one. That is the one that creates that all-enveloping fear that I spoke of this morning.

Mr. SMITH. Do you not think, then, we ought to be directing our attention to this basic difference rather than treating the periphery of the situation?

Mr. ACHESON. I wonder if we are talking about the same basic question? What I was suggesting is the more fundamental difficulty in the Middle East, the Arab-Israeli question.

Mr. SMITH. That is what I had in mind, too.

Mr. ACHESON. I see. Then we are agreed on that.

Yes, I think we should pay attention to that and in the statement I suggested how we might do it, that is, how the Congress might suggest that the Executive go to work.

Mr. SMITH. I was interested in that part of your statement which appears on page 13, and I believe Mrs. Bolton alluded to it in her questions to you. You say on page 13:

American responsibility requires getting established, underwriting, and supporting with force an international arrangement for preventing government-supported raiding, as well as attacks, either way, by taking over responsibility for such punishment by way of retaliation or otherwise as might be necessary.

I am a bit confused. How could we go about doing that very thing?

Mr. ACHESON. Well, I think that perhaps the commitment which I suggest that we should undertake here is somewhat greater than Mrs. Bolton realized when she asked me to enlarge on it. I was suggesting here a very far-reaching commitment. The method of working it out is difficult and I do not set myself up as any genius to describe how to do it. I think there are various ways in which it might be done, but first of all there must be a fundamental undertaking and underwriting of responsibility. That might be done through the establishment, through the agency of the United Nations, of a force resident in the area which would prevent, if it could—or if it could not prevent, punish—the beginnings of raids back and forth across the border which may lead, and did lead in this instance, to major retaliation by Israel against Egypt.

In many countries there are government-sponsored groups making such raids. That has been true particularly on the Syrian and Egyptian borders. Those government-sponsored groups go across borders at night and murder and blow up police stations, and so on, and then go back over the border. Three or four days later the Israelis retaliate, and then somebody retaliates against them, until it becomes unendurable, and then you have the major action of last October.

I was suggesting it is possible, if we say we will take our full share, to establish an international force in the area which will undertake to punish, prevent, and shut down this sort of raiding back and forth; and would be strong enough not to be swept aside in case there were a larger type of attack.

Now, that force obviously cannot be strong enough to fight either Israel or Egypt, but it should be strong enough to demonstrate that to attack it would be to fight the entire civilized world. Then other nations could come in to support the United Nations, we with the 6th Fleet, the Marines, or any other way, to put down this resort to force which is causing terror through the area.

I do not want to be glib about it and say it is easy; it is very difficult. But there will be no solution until the problem is tackled in some such way.

Mr. SMITH. To date the United Nations has been very ineffective in trying to reconcile the differences between Israel and its neighbors; is that not true?

Mr. ACHESON. The United Nations has been ineffective; all of us have been ineffective. We were ineffective when I was Secretary of State. I am not criticizing anybody more than I would expect to be criticized myself. This is a very hard task. Feelings run high and

fear is all-pervading. The great difficulty the United Nations has is that it has no force in the area. General Burns has done the best he can. He has some observers, but by the time they go and observe one raid there is another in another area. He did not have the force. I was suggesting we go further, and if it were known through a statement of the Congress that the United States was serious about it and recognized its responsibility and was willing to take up this burden, along with others—not that we would impose a Pax Americana in the area—it would work.

Mr. SMITH. You would work through the United Nations?

Mr. ACHESON. I think that is by far the best way, but not the only way. We can work through other groups. There is involved the right of self-defense. The difficulty is determining who is defending against whom, because the attacks go back and forth so quickly you do not know who the aggressor is. Israel was supposed to be the aggressor in the last attack. That seems to me to be an artificial approach to it. Israel was responding to a whole series of very serious provocations.

Mr. SMITH. Thank you.

Chairman GORDON. Mr. Burleson.

Mr. BURLESON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, it is good to see you again.

Mr. Secretary, I feel that this committee and the Congress have perhaps been sandbagged with this legislation. If we do not respond in some manner to the administration's proposal, or with some substitute, what would be the results? Of course I am referring to the reaction of the Soviets; they doubtless would say for propaganda purposes that we were not backing the President of the United States!

Mr. ACHESON. Yes; if there were no response of the Congress to this, it would have a damaging effect in the eyes of the world. That is always so if a President's request is not granted. It would be difficult if the Congress just went off to play golf, for instance. Therefore, Congress should respond in some way and I have suggested how I thought the Congress might respond.

Mr. BURLESON. Do you feel that no action at all would be inviting the Soviets to make physical aggression in the Middle East?

Mr. ACHESON. No; I do not think it would be inviting them to do it. As I said this morning, I think there is a tendency to exaggerate the desire of the Soviet Government to engage in military adventures all over the world. I think that so far as the Middle East is concerned, the Soviet Government is amazed at what Santa Claus brought them. Without any effort on their part, all sorts of joys fall on Moscow when they have not had much joy. They have not provoked this. They have been enthusiastic about helping it. But I do not think the real danger in the Middle East is that Russia has troops poised to go in there. They do not need to do that.

Mr. BURLESON. Would you agree that since Israel, Britain, and France have been the only recent aggressors in the Middle East and that since we used our influences to bring back the status quo ante, that we are somewhat inconsistent?

Mr. ACHESON. I do not think I would say this. I do not think the three countries you named were the only aggressors. I think there are others that could well be added to that list. I do not think there is anything inconsistent in what the Secretary now proposes. Perhaps there is.

I have heard or seen it said in the press—and I think one could make it a debating point, which I would not want to do—that the Secretary opposed the very action when taken by the British and the French that he wants to take here. That is more a debating point, because I do not think, in all honesty, the Secretary proposes to go shoot anyone, and I do not think it is quite fair to say that he is proposing that.

I do not think there is anything inconsistent in this action. I think it is belated. I wish some realization of the problem had been visible in the administration 3 months ago, 6 months ago, or a year ago—everybody seems to have known about it except the administration. There was no secret anywhere. We are terribly excited about Syria being under Communist influence. It has been known for sometime Syria was in this situation. It is nothing new. If the administration had reacted to this thing—plenty of people were calling it to their attention—it would have been very good. It was wrong for them to say in 1956 that everything was fine, that peace was breaking out all over, that our farm situation was fine and everything was wonderful, and then say now we must do something right away. This is inconsistent, surely.

Mr. BURLISON. I will not ask you to name the other aggressors in the Middle East. I know of none other in recent times than those I mentioned, except border clashes. But may I ask this: Do you think the economic aid and the military aspects of this proposal should be separated or could feasibly be separated?

Mr. ACHESON. I would suggest that perhaps the thing to do would be for the Congress now to pass a concurrent resolution which expressed our interest in the Middle East; that the security of countries in that area was directly connected with our own security; that we had a vital interest in the economic progress and political stability and the peace of that area; and that the Congress was advising the President that it would respond to any specific measures he wished to suggest to it at any time that would strengthen that area and bring about a greater degree of economic stability, and give assurance of military support against any aggression. Something of that sort I think would be highly desirable. Then have the administration come up and tell you what it is they want.

Mr. BURLISON. That is right. If money is spent in any country in the Middle East it will be known in a matter of hours in every teashop and bazaar, and yet the people and the Congress will have no knowledge of where the money is to be spent, how much, and for what.

Thank you.

Chairman GORDON. Mr. Merrow.

Mr. MERROW. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. ACHESON, I am glad to see you before the committee. I recall the last time I saw you was in my district in New Hampshire, and I hope you will come there again.

Mr. ACHESON. The last time you saw me I was accused of campaigning for you on the main street. I did not deny it at all, Mr. Merrow.

Mr. MERROW. On the first page of your statement you stated:

The President's message on the Middle East is not a statement of a policy but an invitation to devise one. It does not present conclusions—

and so on.

I find myself in rather sharp disagreement. It seems to me the President's message on the Middle East was a very clear-cut statement of policy and evidenced great leadership and great statesmanship. And I refer to what the President said. He said:

The action which I propose would have the following features:

It would, first of all, authorize the United States to cooperate with and assist any nation or group of nations in the general area of the Middle East in the development of economic strength dedicated to the maintenance of national independence.

It would, in the second place, authorize the Executive to undertake in the same region programs of military assistance and cooperation with any nation or group of nations which desires such aid.

It would, in the third place, authorize such assistance and cooperation to include the employment of the Armed Forces of the United States to secure and protect the territorial integrity and political independence of such nations, requesting such aid, against overt armed aggression from any nation controlled by international communism.

It seems to me that is rather a clear statement of policy.

I might say I appreciate your reference to the resolution which I introduced on April 27, 1948, and I would hope you would agree, in light of the unfolding of events since then, that if we had adopted some of the principles set forth at that time we might not have been in as much trouble as we were in in subsequent years.

If the President's message is not a statement of policy and conclusion, I do not understand what you would classify as a statement of policy.

Mr. ACHESON. I tried to expand on those words which you quoted as the statement went along. I think perhaps there is a platitudinous quality to the statement you read. It does not seem to me to be anything new or striking to say the President is willing to cooperate with people willing to develop their strength. That idea has been bruited about for the past decade. I am all for purity and motherhood, too, but I do not regard that as particularly striking. That was what I was suggesting. To give military aid and economic assistance, you do not have to make policy about that.

This military force part of the declaration is vague and dangerous. I do not think I can add more than I said on that.

Mr. MERROW. Do you not think it is striking if the Congress, by resolution, gives the President the power he has requested and makes it clear to the world that if such and such things happen in the world this is the policy of the administration backed by the Congress of the United States?

Mr. ACHESON. What would you say that the policy is that you are making clear? I point out, from what Mr. Dulles said to you, you do not know whom you are going to fight, where, and in what way. It does not seem to me to be clear.

Mr. MERROW. It is clear if any nation requests aid against overt armed aggression from any nation controlled by international communism the President, under this resolution, could employ the forces of the United States to prevent such overt armed aggression.

In connection with that, on the second page of your statement you said:

A policy cannot be legislated; its execution can and must be legislated, as occasion arises.

It would appear to me that if this policy is adopted, or if the Congress passes this resolution, then it is made clear to the world

where the United States is going to stand if a crisis develops, just as was the case when we passed a resolution with respect to Formosa and so forth. So, as I see it, this goes much farther than any policy has gone in the past in indicating where we are going to stand, and I cannot see in what way these statements which I have just read are platitudinous.

Mr. ACHESON. I have tried to explain it, Mr. Merrow, and have been unsuccessful, so I think I had better drop the matter.

Mr. MERROW. You still think the President's message is not a statement of policy?

Mr. ACHESON. That is what I think; yes, sir.

Mr. MERROW. It is very difficult for me to understand. I am sorry, but you have not made it clear to me, at least, why it is not a statement of policy. I think it is the most brilliant statement of policy in this area that I have heard.

That is all, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman GORDON. Mr. Hays of Arkansas.

Mr. HAYS of Arkansas. Mr. Chairman, Mrs. Kelly has to catch a plane for New York and I wonder if I might yield to her at this time.

Chairman GORDON. Mrs. Kelly.

Mrs. KELLY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Mr. Hays, for permitting me to question at this time.

I want to welcome you, Mr. Acheson, and compliment you for your very precise and forthright statements and answers.

Do you believe that failure to pass this resolution—House Joint Resolution 117—would in any way strengthen the present stronghold that the U. S. S. R. has in the Middle East?

Mr. ACHESON. No; I do not think it would strengthen it. No; I do not fear that.

Mrs. KELLY. Because if at any time any country in the Middle East is controlled by international communism or became a national Communist nation, there is not any way we can take action without overt action?

Mr. ACHESON. I presume this resolution does not close all further legislation or all further action.

Mrs. KELLY. Do you believe the Egyptian Government, by seizing the assets of the Suez Canal Company, broke an international treaty?

Mr. ACHESON. I believe they broke their word; yes.

Mrs. KELLY. Is that illegal?

Mr. ACHESON. It is very illegal, highly immoral, and undesirable, besides.

Mrs. KELLY. Should we have condemned in any form or manner the Egyptian Government for doing that?

Mr. ACHESON. I think we should have. We did when the Truman administration was in office—when they abrogated their treaty with the British; we condemned them very strongly. There is a way to bring a treaty to an end but not by unilateral abrogation.

Mrs. KELLY. Do you think we should cut off aid to any nation that sides with Egypt and agrees with them that they should maintain control of and operate the Suez Canal?

Mr. ACHESON. Ordinarily speaking, I think we ought to be careful about that. I do not believe in these very broad principles that you never give aid to somebody unless they conform with certain principles or standards, because sometimes it is desirable to give aid to

bad characters under certain circumstances. At this time, I think it would be unwise to give a great deal of aid to Colonel Nasser.

Mrs. KELLY. Do you think the resolution in the United Nations on the Middle East should remain tabled at this time?

Mr. ACHESON. I am not sure I know what resolution you mean.

Mrs. KELLY. There is a resolution in the United Nations at the present time. I do not know just what the title is, but it is designed to settle the issues in the Middle East.

Mr. ACHESON. I am afraid I am not familiar with it. I wish I were.

Mrs. KELLY. Thank you. That is all.

Chairman GORDON. Mr. Fulton.

Mr. FULTON. We on this Foreign Affairs Committee are all glad to see you here, Mr. Acheson. We welcome you and recognize you as one who has undertaken serious responsibilities for planning a bipartisan foreign policy.

I want to say your statement this morning is excellent and brings up many serious problems that we in Congress should consider fully. I should think you would likewise say if there was any blame in the development of the 1950 Korean crisis, that both the Congress and the executive department might have shared the blame. As you recall, on January 19, 1950, at the time the economic aid for Korea bill came up on the floor of the House, this Foreign Affairs Committee on the Republican side was split. Mr. Vorys made the motion to recommit the Korean aid bill and he voted against it. Mr. Chipfield joined in the motion to recommit and he voted against it. On the Republican side, Mr. Herter, Mr. Judd, Mr. Javits, Mr. Mellow, Mrs. Bolton, and I voted the other way. So we on this committee were not split along party lines. I remember that legislative history very clearly, and it would come with ill grace for any of us to try to blame the Korean aggression on another individual.

In your statement you have said in several places that an overt armed attack by the Soviet Union is unlikely at the present time. Do you have any particular information to base that on or is it just a general assumption that overt armed attack does not seem imminent?

Mr. ACHESON. I have no information that you have not got. It is the observation of what has been going on in the world since the war and particularly recently in the Middle East which would make me believe it is unlikely. I do not mean it is so small that you should not consider it, but it is unlikely.

Mr. FULTON. When the United States appeals to the United Nations for a matter to be placed before the Security Council or the General Assembly, our United States delegation is putting forth the United States position, of course. But in the United States are we not in a way submitting our official United States policy to their judgment, so should we not be willing to have the United Nations come up with a determination of the policy? In your statement, on page 8, you say:

It will not do to say that the United Nations will determine policy, make decisions, and enforce them.

To me that would cut the heart out of the United Nations if we say the United Nations cannot make decisions and enforce them. I had thought under this legislation we would first go to the United Nations, if possible. Then if the action is either inadequate or the kind of decision the United States would not want, the United States

would nevertheless have the power of self-defense under article 51. Do you agree with that?

Mr. ACHESON. I am sure we are not going to be far apart because our general views have always, I think, been very close. What I am trying to stress in this statement is the unwisdom, the folly, of a great deal of talk about the United Nations that is going on and a great deal of action there recently. There is a tendency in the world to do what the philosophers call reify the United Nations. The United Nations is a meeting place, that is all. It is a forum. The only thing that makes the policy is the people who are there. We are one of the great leaders, and therefore we have to make the policy.

Mr. FULTON. Because as a principle, legislative bodies cannot manage or direct troops. Would you say, however, the United Nations is a meeting place and legislative place alone and should not, by inference, have the United Nations armed force, which it now has. Are you saying that?

Mr. ACHESON. No, no, no, I am not saying that at all. I am saying this idea, this thing, called the United Nations is a meeting place and a medium through which we and others act. If we once get that in our heads so that we do not sit back and say, "I do not know what we should do but the United Nations will tell us," they do not tell us; we tell them.

Mr. FULTON. You were active in 1950 in the resolution for obtaining United Nations peace procedures, and I have felt the peace procedures of the United Nations are one of the most effective instruments the United Nations has. Should the members come to a decision in the United Nations, would that be more or less binding on all nations, or would you consider this was merely the right to get the views of the various member nations?

Mr. ACHESON. If we are going to be legalistic about it—which I am against—all the General Assembly can do is make a recommendation. Not even under the charter is this recommendation more than a recommendation. We do not want to turn the United Nations into some sovereign power. But, escaping from the legal issue for the moment, it will not be a good or useful recommendation unless it is a recommendation we push and believe in and argue for and that we will support.

Mr. FULTON. I see. I want to straighten out your views on the U. N. in my own mind. A few sessions ago in Congress, Mrs. Bolton, of Ohio, took the leadership and some of us worked with her in preparing and entering legislation for the regional economic development of the Mediterranean and middle eastern area. I want to ask you a specific question. Do you think it would be advisable for the President first to call together these nations, along the lines as was done in southeast Asia for the Bandung Conference, and let the area talk about the basic issues first. Would you recommend that the President now call for a conference in this area?

Mr. ACHESON. I do not know. I would have to study the situation to see if they could get together to talk about it.

Mr. FULTON. You could get these nations at least around the same table.

Mr. ACHESON. The important thing is to do something along the line you are talking about. This book I recommended in my state-

ment this morning, I hope you will read. It is an extraordinarily able document. What that points out is that the development of these undeveloped areas and the maintenance of national independence are two sides of the same whole, and if we are going to keep the growth of power in the non-Communist world equal to the growth of power in the Communist world, we must do something very big.

Mr. FULTON. You said that well on May 8, 1947, in your speech in Cleveland, Miss., which was the start of the basic idea of the Marshall plan. I think that type of program is what we should consider now.

Chairman GORDON. Mr. Hays of Arkansas.

Mr. HAYS of Arkansas. Mr. Acheson, you have been so close to the legislative processes for so many years, I know you can appreciate the fact that often we have to regard the effect of something unsaid as well as the effect of something said. This morning you said reference might well be made to the economic policies accompanying the military and political policies in this resolution.

Mr. ACHESON. Yes. I think the economic help is very important indeed and should be referred to.

Mr. HAYS of Arkansas. I have been trying to establish categories of things that have to be included. I want to be sure we get the best craftsmanship we can out of this effort.

There is the question of the United Nations. You have touched on that and I am sure you will agree we should put in some reference to it. It has a positive, not just an apologetic or negative aspect. I think we understand, after interrogation, what you think about it. Others have to do with the thing that Mrs. Kelly spoke of, the problems of the area that require political settlement. I feel we have not given enough emphasis to that. It is something the administration will struggle with, but if we could help, for example if we could just get the Arab and Israeli leaders to agree that there has to be somewhere along the line negotiation to settle border disputes and refugee problems and things of that sort.

Do you agree that is a subject to be considered?

Mr. ACHESON. I would, Mr. Hays; yes, sir.

Mr. HAYS of Arkansas. One that troubles me a good deal is the question of subversion. I can appreciate Mr. Dulles wanting to be precise about it and yet that may be the biggest problem of all and I believe this is in your statement, when you consider the Machiavelian actions of some.

I am enumerating certain categories. I wonder if you agree that these might well receive generalized treatment.

Mr. ACHESON. I quite agree. I think if you look back at the Vandenberg resolution, you will see how broadly it was treated in that. It was a really great act of the Senate.

Mr. HAYS of Arkansas. I think sooner or later the Congress will have to find a way to help the administration to cooperate fully in this matter of securing negotiation and settlement within the area by the peoples themselves.

I wonder if you heard the speech of the Canadian representative on the resolution calling on Britain and France to withdraw from the Suez? It was about 2 o'clock in the morning. I will not embarrass you by asking you if you were up that late. I was.

Mr. ACHESON. If I was I am sure I was not listening to Mr. Pearson's speech.

Mr. HAYS of Arkansas. I take it I should not pursue that except here was our neighbor, Canada, tied firmly to the British Commonwealth, forced to abstain because Canada, agreeing with our moral position, was challenging us also on the question of failing to raise the matter of settlement of area problems.

In short, do you agree with this observation that I am making that we cannot afford not to give emphasis to this question of leadership in the settlement of the things that plague the region? What I have said is for purpose of emphasis, but I wonder if you do not agree?

Mr. ACHESON. I agree entirely. I think that your reference to Mr. Pierson's action and position in this matter indicates the nature of the terrible tragedy which we forced on the world by our actions at this time without consulting anybody, without any general discussion.

Here is Canada, our closest neighbor, one of our closest friends, put in this terrific dilemma between the United States to the south of her going in a direction diametrically opposed to Britain, the central country of the British Commonwealth. Clearly there must be some opportunity to talk things over with the Canadians or someone else before we begin taking these public steps. I take it what you mean is the responsibility for leadership carries with it a responsibility that those whom you are going to lead are going to be taken into your confidence. I could not agree more with that.

Mr. HAYS of Arkansas. Thank you, sir.

Chairman GORDON. Mr. LeCompte.

Mr. LECOMPTE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, I might say that some way or other I feel flattered to be here seeing you because I was never a member of this committee when you were before the committee in years past. I do not believe I have any questions to submit but I do think you made a fine statement.

Mr. FULTON. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. LECOMPTE. I will yield to you, Mr. Fulton.

Mr. FULTON. Please look on page 13 of your statement, Mr. Secretary. You say in regard to the establishment of the State of Israel "whether wisely or not is now irrelevant." Just on below this you say "This Government," the United States Government, "cannot properly leave Israel free to attack her neighbors."

I would comment that likewise we cannot let Egypt or the Arabs attack Israel, either.

Mr. ACHESON. That is what I said just before that.

Mr. FULTON. I do not see what we, as the United States, could do. Should we intervene and put our troops in the middle between these nations? What is in your mind when you infer that we cannot leave Israel or these countries free to take action? We in the United States cannot run them.

Further in your statement you say "by taking over responsibility for such punishment by way of retaliation or otherwise as might be necessary." That would mean we might in the United States have to use economic sanctions in the Middle East or troops as a method of punishment. I very frankly do not look at it that way. I put

the problem more on a positive ground of regional economic development programs and preventing internal subversion by giving the citizens of these countries a chance to progress.

I do not think that the aim of the resolution No. 117 nor of the administration policy is to act as a schoolteacher in the Middle East by punishing and rewarding, or by putting on economic sanctions, or by putting United States or U. N. troops between warring nations or even tribes or sheikdoms where communism is not involved. I think there is a limit on this. I believe that part of your statement goes beyond a reasonable limit.

Thank you for yielding for my questions.

Mr. ACHESON. I think before you came in this afternoon, Mr. Fulton, Mr. Smith was asking me questions about this. I undertook to clarify this. I do not think what I was suggesting is what you are suggesting. It is in the transcript, I think.

Mr. FULTON. Let me ask you this. You do not mean economic sanctions, do you, as a method of retaliation?

Mr. ACHESON. No. What I said in answer to Mr. Smith's question is that in order to deal with the all-pervading fear which exists in this area based upon raids, one side to the other, retaliation back and forth, each raid increasing in size until finally you get a very large-scale military attack, this can only, I think, be dealt with by having in the first instance an international group. This might be under the auspices of the United Nations, might be some troops, as they now have, stationed in this area to prevent this sort of attack and punish those who carry it out. This is not a schoolteacher, it is a policeman.

Mr. FULTON. It is the United Nations then, not the United States.

Mr. ACHESON. That is right, we have to underwrite it. We cannot have in this area an international force large enough to fight a war with one of these nations. It is really something that is a guaranty against the small attack. By its mere presence it will make it extremely doubtful whether either nation will want to attack this police force.

We have to back that up. We have to say "if you attack our U. N. police force and start killing our fellows, we and others will be right there with the Marines or the Sixth Fleet or whatever is necessary to stop this." This is the sort of thing I have in mind.

Mr. FULTON. If you believe this policy that you state orally you should not believe on page 8 of your written statement "it will not do to say that the United Nations will determine policy, make decisions, and enforce them" because you believe otherwise.

Mr. ACHESON. I am sorry you believe that because I like that sentence very much.

Mr. FULTON. That is all. I certainly enjoyed your interesting comments. Thank you.

Chairman GORDON. Mr. Hays of Ohio.

Mr. HAYS of Ohio. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, first may I say that I appreciate your very clear and concise statement and the very forthright answers to the questions.

I have been objecting somewhat to something that my colleague from Texas, Mr. Burleson, puts perhaps more aptly than I have. That is that it seems to be all right for every Arab or anyone else in every coffeehouse in the Middle East to know who is getting the

money and how much and why but the American people and the American Congress are a little too juvenile to be trusted with this knowledge.

I also made the point that quite frequently everybody seems to know about these matters except the people who should know about them and this leads to my question.

Last night I was at dinner at which 90 percent of the people were not from Government and no other Member of Congress was there. The chief subject of conversation was an answer that Mr. Dulles gave yesterday afternoon to a question by, so it was alleged, the gentleman from Florida, Mr. Fascell, in which he said or is alleged to have said that part of this \$600 million that he wants would go in the direct payments, I think the Government term is budgetary assistance, but you and I know it means direct payments to some of the governments in the Near East perhaps to help them for losses they had suffered as a result of the Suez crisis or for other reasons.

First, I would like to ask you what you think of this general idea of giving direct budgetary assistance.

Mr. ACHESON. In a situation such as this there will be nations, as I indicated in my statement, which are in immediate trouble due to the blocking of the canal. Let us take some of the oil-producing nations, Iran, for instance, or whichever one it may be. They get a large part of their income by royalty payments from the companies which are taking oil out and selling it. These companies are not selling as much oil, not nearly as much oil, as they were before because the canal is blocked. This causes all kinds of trouble in the producing country. It causes financial weakness. Are you going to be able to pay the troops? Are you going to be able to pay the police? Questions of this sort. Can you keep the schools open?

It is important that a nation shall be stable. We should say "this will not last long but we will help you here so you will not increase the unrest and instability in this country." I would agree with that. I would not be concerned about nations which are making the whole thing very hard for us, for instance, Egypt, I would not be too concerned about what happened to the budget of Egypt. Egypt can help everyone by hastening the opening of the canal under a tolerable regime. I think you ought to use sense about whom you help.

Mr. HAYS of Ohio. Mr. Dulles said in open session yesterday, I heard this, mentioned Syria, losses suffered by blowing up the pipeline. I did not have an opportunity to question him again at that time but it occurred to me that Syrians blew up the pipeline and Syria has shown no disposition to hurry up fixing the pipeline.

It seems to me that the Congress and the American people ought to have something to say about whether their dollars are used to subsidize the Syrians for an act of self-destruction that they committed upon themselves.

Mr. ACHESON. I would agree that the commonsense of helping them is not apparent at the moment.

Mr. HAYS of Ohio. That is all.

Chairman GORDON. Mrs. Church.

Mrs. CHURCH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Acheson, unlike most of my colleagues, I cannot rewelcme you to this committee. Though I have sat on it 5 years this is the first time that I have had the opportunity to listen to you as a witness.

I know despite your occasional levity, you feel that this is a very serious moment, do you not, in United States history, or are we over-estimating the seriousness?

Mr. ACHESON. The international situation is serious?

Mr. CHURCH. Yes.

Mr. ACHESON. Yes.

Mrs. CHURCH. You think it is a serious moment as far as we, ourselves, are concerned?

Mr. ACHESON. It is, indeed.

Mrs. CHURCH. I would like to pursue two lines of thought. First, it has seemed to me, as I listened to you, sir, that you have been most critical of the procedure that we followed in regard to the Suez crisis. Am I right in assuming that you are critical of the policy?

Mr. ACHESON. Very critical; yes.

Mrs. CHURCH. Did you disagree with the moral position?

Mr. ACHESON. I find it awfully hard to understand what you mean. Would you describe what the moral position was?

Mrs. CHURCH. Well, I would attempt to use the words of the President,

You cannot have one set of rules for your friends and another set for your enemies.

Do you think that is not a moral policy?

Mr. ACHESON. Do I think—

Mrs. CHURCH. Is it not a moral policy?

Mr. ACHESON. It is a policy all right.

Mrs. CHURCH. In other words, if you deny the right of one nation to commit aggression, if such a nation is under Soviet domination, do you admit that the nation which is your friend has the right to commit aggression?

Mr. ACHESON. If you want an answer, I do. I can see no morality in the statement that you must have the same rules for your friends and your enemies. That seems to me folly. Of course, you have different rules for your friends and your enemies.

The great thing is not to be put in that kind of a position. Surely our friends ought not to be committing aggression. The point is: Were they committing aggression? Were they doing what they did because we helped to drive them to do what they did?

"Morality" is a very slippery word in international affairs. Morality in domestic affairs is a thing one can understand, because there one is living under a system which has enforcement agencies and agencies for formulating doctrine and enforcing the doctrine.

In the world at large that does not exist. You are dealing with people one-half of whom deny the very foundations of what you call morality. Therefore, are you to say "I am going to set up a series of principles here and these are going to be limitations on my action," when the other fellow has no limitations of any sort. I regard that as folly.

Mrs. CHURCH. Would you, sir, have encouraged Great Britain to invade, or would you have closed your eyes to the actual invasion, had you been Secretary of State?

Mr. ACHESON. I could not have closed my eyes to it but I should never have allowed it to happen. If you get into a position where

your best friends are not even talking with you, something is wrong with the works somewhere. That is what I am critical about.

Mrs. CHURCH. It would not occur to you that the fault might be on their side, in that situation?

Mr. ACHESON. The fault probably is on both sides, but it just should not occur. It just should not occur.

Mrs. CHURCH. Granted that the situation had occurred, what would you have done from there? Do you think that we would have been better off, if we had supported them tacitly in that action, or closed our eyes to what was going on?

Mr. ACHESON. Of course, this is a perfectly hypothetical debate in which I am—

Mrs. CHURCH. Except that you have made so much of it. As I have listened to you today, there has been a constant element of criticism; and I am asking, sir, how deep that criticism is, and whether you have a purpose in bringing it out in these hearings.

Mr. ACHESON. I have the great purpose of bringing out a highly critical attitude on conduct of affairs which estranges us from our closest friends. There is no sense in that whatever, no sense in it.

You say if the situation has gotten to a particular point, what do I do there? I say it should not have gotten to that point. If there is any purpose in my going on and supposing that I am suddenly introduced into a situation which has been allowed to develop, I will engage in that game if you like it. I do not know that it is going to enlighten you or me.

Mrs. CHURCH. It might throw some light on the situation in which we now find ourselves because there is a resolution before us against which you have raised strong criticism. I reread your words, sir, since you spoke this morning. I think that you make certain proposals. I am trying to go behind the general line of your criticism and get your plan for concrete action—beyond your plan of holding the Arab nations and Israel apart by some sort of a police force. Have you any plan as to what you would do if you brought them to the peace table while they are being held apart?

Mr. ACHESON. As a practical matter it is quite impossible to bring them to a peace table now. They do not want to talk. You cannot force them to come. This has to be worked out over a long period of time. Things have to be done indirectly at first. It seems to me that some kind of a separation of these people so that these provocative raids do not take place is a great help, tremendously great help. If it should be possible, therefore, I do not know whether it is possible but it is worth a try to see whether there could not be some area neutralized between them, that would be all to the good.

Mrs. CHURCH. Mr. Chairman, have I one minute more to digress completely from this line?

I wonder, Mr. Acheson, if you would give us your opinion as to the legality of a resolution in which the Congress would delegate its constitutional authority to declare war?

Mr. ACHESON. I suppose that the Congress has a perfectly sound constitutional position to declare a conditional state of war. It can say "we hereby declare war against country "X," "Y," "Z," if something happens." I do not see why it cannot do that. It may be unwise to do it.

Mrs. CHURCH. Under this resolution do you consider that we are making a conditional declaration of war?

Mr. ACHESON. You know I have never found much nourishment in this debate about declaring war. Wars, as Mr. Dulles pointed out quite wisely the other day, do not come from being declared. They come from people fighting. Therefore, it may be wise or it may not be wise to say that in certain events the President may take certain steps.

You do not help very much by saying this is a conditional declaration of war. Technically, it is not. Technically, if you want to bring into effect the war powers of the President, then there are various congressional acts which bring it into force. One is a declaration of war. One is an act of Congress which says "upon the President declaring a state of emergency, war powers come into effect."

I do not think it is really relevant to spend much time on worrying as to whether this is or is not a declaration of war. There was a lot of talk at the time of the fighting in Korea, is this a war or is it not a war? It never seemed to me that got anywhere. The Congress can declare war without anything happening. For instance, the Congress, at the time of our difficulties with Spain over Cuba during the Cleveland administration, was on the verge several times of declaring war against Spain. President Cleveland said "All right. You fellows go ahead and declare war but I am not going to fight one." That would present a rather curious situation. Congress has the power to declare war but there is not any war. Nobody is going to fight.

On the other hand, when the Japanese attacked us, or the Germans attacked our shipping in the First World War, we were in war whether anyone declared it or not.

Mrs. CHURCH. Might I just close by saying, Mr. Acheson, that if you come to a definite decision on the policies you would adopt to bring about a peace conference, or that you would seek these, I hope that you will give them to the public and to us. I do not feel that you have been clear or definite in that important regard.

Chairman GORDON. Mr. Byrd.

Mr. BYRD. Mr. Secretary, I am very much concerned that we do not permit our military planners and our military efforts and our fighting men to be impeded or obstructed or hamstrung in pressing forward to a total and complete victory over the enemy at any future time.

I would like to ask you this question. Is there anything in this resolution that we are studying which would subordinate our own will to the will of the United Nations in regard to military activity?

I realize that this question has perhaps been asked in other forms, but to my own untutored mind, if I might use the same expression that the gentlelady from Illinois uses, I would just like to hear you answer that question.

Can we proceed with complete freedom of judgment and action in the interest of our own national welfare and security unhampered by the United Nations because of the failure of certain other members to agree or cooperate in any effort to meet with an act of aggression?

Mr. ACHESON. Mr. Byrd, I think the answer to it is, as a practical matter, surely we can proceed in any way we want to proceed. If you want me to give you some lawyer's talk about what some of these

words mean in here, I am perfectly willing to try that, too. But I do not know that it would be of much use.

If there is any such limitation as you fear, it probably is in this proviso in section 2, and that says:

provided that such employment shall be consonant with the treaty obligations of the United States and with the charter.

Well, there are obligations in the charter which might be limitations on one's unfettered action.

"As specified in article 51." Nothing in there, I think.

Measures pursuant thereto shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council to take at any time action * * *.

No, I think the only thing you can say may exist in this resolution that limits the United States is the reference to the fact that whatever is done must be in accordance with treaty obligations including the United Nations.

I certainly do not object to that. I am just trying to answer your question.

Mr. BYRD. Mr. Secretary, have you ever been consulted by this administration about the formulation of foreign policy?

Mr. ACHESON. No, sir; I have not. I do not know whether you regard that as a recommendation of the policy or not.

Mr. BYRD. I might do just that.

Mr. ACHESON. I thought you might.

Mr. BYRD. Mr. Secretary, if the Congress should decide to pass this resolution, would you think it advisable to write into it a time limit?

Mr. ACHESON. I have not given it much thought, Mr. Byrd. At one time I thought it would be highly desirable to have in every act of Congress that it should expire in a very short time. But outside of that generalization, I do not think I have any helpful ideas.

Mr. BYRD. I assume that you would, however, see certain advantages and maybe some disadvantages to the incorporation of a time limit.

Mr. ACHESON. That is the problem of making up your mind. There are advantages and disadvantages. I do not know which—

Mr. BYRD. You have no recommendation on that point?

Mr. ACHESON. No; I would not.

Mr. BYRD. Mr. Acheson, had such a move been made a year earlier when Soviet intrusion into the region first became clear, would the Middle Eastern problem have been aggravated to its present dimensions in your opinion?

Mr. ACHESON. No; I think that vigorous action by the administration in the Middle East would have minimized the difficulty rather than increased it.

Mr. BYRD. Would not the Western alliance have been in a much healthier condition today?

Mr. ACHESON. Yes; very much so.

Mr. BYRD. Mr. Secretary, in his appearance before this committee in November 1956, Lt. Gen. Edward R. Quesada made the statement that he did not feel that assuming there should be an occupation by the Soviet forces of Syria—

Mr. ACHESON. I could not hear you.

Mr. BYRD. Lieutenant General—

Mr. ACHESON. Just when you were reading. That is the thing I missed, the last sentence.

Mr. BYRD. Would you permit me to begin again?

Mr. ACHESON. All right.

Mr. BYRD. Lt. Gen. Edward R. Quesada said that assuming there should be an occupation by the Soviet forces of Syria he did not feel that we have the capability of moving into Syria and being effective quickly and decisively. He said it would take us weeks to get into Syria.

This statement by General Quesada has been challenged and has been refuted.

I am wanting to ask you, sir, if you feel that the passage of this resolution would mean that this country would have to fight a limited war in that area?

Mr. ACHESON. I think the Secretary of State has said the contrary. He probably knows more about it than I do.

If you are talking about capacity, that is another matter. I think the capacity of the United States to engage in armed conflict with the Soviet Union is something that this committee might want to think about a good deal before it takes on some unlimited obligations.

Mr. BYRD. If I understand you correctly, sir, you say that this committee should certainly consider the possibility of our country becoming engaged in a localized or limited war if this resolution passes.

Mr. ACHESON. I most certainly do; yes.

Mr. BYRD. And in the light of General Quesada's testimony, even though it has been refuted, do you not also say that our country had certainly better be prepared to fight a limited war and had better have the capabilities?

Mr. ACHESON. I said that in the statement I read this morning. I believe it.

Chairman GORDON. Your time is up, Mr. Byrd.

Mr. BYRD. Might I ask permission of the committee to include in the record a letter I received from the Council of Jewish Federation and Welfare Fund, Inc.?

Chairman GORDON. Without objection, it will be inserted in the record.

COUNCIL OF JEWISH FEDERATIONS AND WELFARE FUNDS, INC.,
New York 19, N. Y., January 7, 1957.

HON. ROBERT C. BYRD,
House of Representatives,
Washington, D. C.

DEAR MR. BYRD: It is my privilege to transmit to you the following resolution adopted unanimously by our general assembly of community leaders representing almost 800 communities in every section of the United States (in your own State the cities of Charleston, Huntington, Wheeling, and a number of other smaller communities):

"PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST

"With the question of permanent peace in the Middle East now on the agenda of the United Nations, the nations of the world have the sacred obligation to help achieve a just and lasting peace in that crucial part of the world, which we fervently pray will be attained by mutual agreement of the parties involved.

Such a 'peace with justice'—and justice with peace—will be of momentous and enduring value to all peoples of the area—and to all mankind."

The President's declaration just being submitted to Congress has underscored strongly that peace in the Middle East is crucial to peace in the world—and to the security of the United States.

Now that Britain and France have left Suez and Israel is withdrawing its troops, it would be a tragedy of catastrophic proportions if the situation in the Middle East were permitted to return to the conditions which led to the outbreak of hostilities, and which again would bring about war. The fuse to the powder keg is still aflame—and it must be put out.

The leadership of our country in the United Nations is indispensable in order to assure that the causes of war are removed. While the United Nations force still polices the critical areas, it is imperative that the United Nations itself, with our initiative, will take action to guarantee that there will be free passage through the Suez Canal for all nations, including Israel, as required by the International Convention governing the use of the Canal and as specifically called for by the Security Council but disregarded by Egypt to date; that all ships will have access through the Red Sea and Gulf of Agaba, universally recognized as an international waterway, and that the possibility of Egypt's blockade of that waterway will not be restored; that the Gaza strip and the Sinai Desert will not longer be used to launch Fedayeen raids.

I was astonished to learn, for example, that the number killed and wounded by Fedayeen in Israel in proportion to its population would be the equivalent of more than 125,000 killed and wounded in the United States. Clearly no country can tolerate that, nor can there be any peace so long as that condition continues. The terms of the United Nations resolution of November 2 required all Fedayeen raids ended. They still continue. That United Nations resolution and the United Nations Charter, which requires all nations to maintain peaceful relations with all others, must be complied with.

The President's program for increased economic aid to all countries in the area will deal with another basic cause of instability and subversion in the Middle East. Our communities which are so fundamentally concerned with health and welfare, and which have supplied hundreds of millions of dollars for aid to refugees and destitute in the area, have long recognized the importance of such large-scale economic aid and have repeatedly urged it, so that the inhabitants of all the countries—Israel and the Arab nations alike—can conquer the truly fundamental enemies—poverty and disease.

The Middle East seething with strife and continuing to feed the causes of war is a cauldron of catastrophe. May I urge you to give the full weight of your great prestige and leadership in Congress and with the State Department to bring about the initiative and action by our country now, while we have this momentous opportunity, to help achieve clear and permanent settlements for the security of the United States and the benefit of all mankind.

I shall look forward to hearing from you regarding your views and action on this critical matter, so that I can report them to our Board of Directors and to our associated communities.

Very truly yours,

HERBERT R. ABEL, *President.*

Mr. FULTON. What kind of a letter?

Mr. BYRD. I assume you got the same letter. I think the same letter went to everybody in the committee. I will be glad to show it to you.

Chairman GORDON. Mr. Adair.

Mr. ADAIR. Mr. Acheson, earlier today you spoke with high approval of the Vandenberg resolution. I should like again to refer to that briefly.

That was a Senate resolution. Is it your feeling that any action in this whole field of international affairs in which we are now delving should be taken by one House or the other, or do you think it should be an action jointly taken?

Mr. ACHESON. It would be better in my judgment if it were a concurrent resolution. At the time that the Vandenberg resolution was adopted, as I said this morning, Mr. Chipfield introduced almost

an identical one as a concurrent resolution. Due to the speedier action of the Senate, for once, the Vandenberg resolution was adopted and the House concurrent resolution was dropped. But it would be better if it were a concurrent resolution.

Mr. ADAIR. You feel it would have a greater impact in our own country and throughout the world if it were a concurrent resolution or joint action of some sort?

Mr. ACHESON. I agree, yes, it would.

Mr. ADAIR. Then, when you were speaking of the Vandenberg resolution this morning or heretofore, you were speaking more of its content than of its actual form?

Mr. ACHESON. I was speaking of its content and of the fact that it was not legislation.

Mr. ADAIR. Now, along that same line, it would further be your feeling, then, that in any action of the nature of which we are now speaking and having reference to present world affairs, that it should be action involving the House of Representatives as well as the Senate?

Mr. ACHESON. Yes.

Mr. ADAIR. That seems to be repetitious but I am anxious to get your view clearly upon that point.

Mr. ACHESON. Yes, I agree.

Mr. ADAIR. Following that same line, then, I think I understood you in your statement and in answer to questions subsequent thereto, to say that you did think it best that some action be taken by the Congress at this time, since the matter has been presented to us.

Mr. ACHESON. I did.

Mr. ADAIR. And in your opinion, then, you feel that that action ought to be phrased or couched in the general language of the so-called Vandenberg resolution?

Mr. ACHESON. Yes, I do. I think—yes, I do.

Mr. ADAIR. Do you think it is a proper exercise of the Executive function for the President to propose at this time action of the kind that he has proposed, leaving out of account, now, the precise wording of the proposal but having in mind that he has asked the Congress for action in anticipation of something that may occur?

Mr. ACHESON. I think the President is entitled to ask Congress for whatever he thinks he needs at any time.

Mr. ADAIR. Do you think that the President, in this instance and under present circumstances, should have asked the Congress now for such?

Mr. ACHESON. I do not think that is a question on which my views are really very important.

Mr. ADAIR. But the Congress, having received the request, and whether or not you think the President should have done so, you do feel now that the Congress should act?

Mr. ACHESON. Yes, sir.

Mr. ADAIR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman GORDON. Mr. Selden.

Mr. SELDEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Acheson, I was very interested this morning in the views that you gave concerning the speech you made on January 12, 1950.

Let us assume that the boundaries of that particular area had not been defined in any way by you, by General MacArthur, or by anyone

else and, at that time, a resolution, similar to the one that is proposed now by the President, had been adopted by the Congress in connection with Korea and that general area.

In your opinion, what effect, if any, would the passage of such a resolution have had at that time on aggressors in that particular area?

Mr. ACHESON. It is almost impossible to answer that question, Mr. Selden. In the first place, such a resolution would have been overwhelmingly defeated and that would have been a most unhappy result. The whole conception that such a resolution would be passed is so different from what the facts of the matter were that it is very hard to make a statement about it.

If the country had been in a condition to say that if there were an attack on Korea, the United States would have undertaken to respond to it, and if the Russians believed that the United States meant that, I think probably they would have thought longer before the attack was launched. I think that is probably true.

Whether it would have been wise for the United States to have done that is quite another matter.

Your question is a very difficult one because it assumes a world which did not exist.

Mr. SELDEN. Of course, as you have pointed out, no request was made at that time. However, a request has been made now by the President of the United States and whether such a request was wise or unwise is irrelevant. The resolution is in the hands of Congress and some action will be taken.

Do you feel it would be a mistake if Congress now failed to pass a resolution containing the general recommendations that have been made by the President?

Mr. ACHESON. I have been into that 2 or 3 times, just recently I think with Mr. Adair.

I said the matter has been laid before the Congress, I think the Congress should act. I think the Congress should act through a concurrent resolution. I think the general nature of the concurrent resolution I have described in the statement. If matters of policy of that sort were referred to in a general way giving the advice of the Congress to the President, that if he should act through proper international or other organizations to strengthen these policies, he would have the support of the Congress for any specific moneys or other things that he wanted to ask from it.

Chairman GORDON. Mr. Bentley.

Mr. BENTLEY. Mr. Acheson, you have a copy of the President's address of last Saturday?

Mr. ACHESON. Yes, I think I have one here.

Mr. BENTLEY. In paragraph No. 8—I believe it is the same print I have here—about the middle of page 7, I think one of the most important statements in the entire message is—it is the fourth paragraph under section 8, about the middle of page 7:

In the situation now existing the greatest risk, as is often the case, is that ambitious despots may miscalculate.

It goes on. Do you see it?

Mr. ACHESON. Yes; I see the paragraph.

Mr. BENTLEY. What is your opinion of this possibility of miscalculation on the part of the Communists?

Mr. ACHESON. Always, unfortunately, in human life the chances of error exceed those of not being in error and therefore it always is very great.

I have often pointed out to friends that one of the difficulties that the Communists have is that they believe their own doctrines. That is a very great disadvantage because when they look at the world, they do not see the external phenomenon. They see it through the lenses of Marxist doctrine. Their things may be twisted. So that between the external event and the recording of it on the Communist mind there are in between the lenses of Marxist doctrine. That changes things.

Therefore, there is a possibility, always present, of miscalculation.

That is one of the reasons why I depreciated so strongly this morning the statement which the Secretary of State made here the other day about the various ways we might respond to Soviet aggression.

When you start saying:

We are not thinking now of bombing Moscow, but if it looked as though they were going to engage in world war three, it might be different—

the danger is incalculable. The Russians may regard that as a tipoff that we are going to do what they fear. Then, obviously, they would be wrong about that, but they might say "we better do it first."

They might do what Communists so often do, which is to interpret such a statement as the last death struggle of the capitalist system. Under the Marxist system, you know, the capitalist system will get so involved with internal struggles that finally it will have to attack the Communist world. They may say "Aha, see that, that is what the Americans said, we are getting close to Armageddon."

Miscalculation comes from unnecessary and, I think, foolish statements. Therefore, there is a possibility and a dangerous possibility of miscalculation. Great care ought to be taken to avoid bringing it about.

Mr. BENTLEY. Do you think, Mr. Acheson, that similar miscalculation on the part of the Chinese Communists existed a year ago last spring against Formosa?

Mr. ACHESON. Against Formosa?

Mr. BENTLEY. Yes.

Mr. ACHESON. What do you mean by miscalculation?

Mr. BENTLEY. At the time of the passage of the Formosa resolution the possibility of miscalculation existing?

Mr. ACHESON. Miscalculation about what?

Mr. BENTLEY. Miscalculation as to our reaction if they attacked Formosa, shall we say?

Mr. ACHESON. I should not think so. I do not think the Chinese Communists had the slightest intention of attacking Formosa.

Mr. BENTLEY. I take it you would have regarded the passage of the Formosa resolution as unnecessary?

Mr. ACHESON. I regard it as unnecessary, foolish, and dangerous, and said so at the time.

Mr. BENTLEY. I would like to ask, Mr. Acheson, what is your general belief with regard to the employment of the Armed Forces of the United States by the Executive to the extent that Congress should approve such action either prior to their employment or subsequently?

Mr. ACHESON. There is a very long answer to that. We prepared at the time of the MacArthur hearings in April 1951, in the State Department, a report which is filed and there is a copy of it—if there is not one up here, there is in the Senate and you can get one from the State Department—which listed the circumstances of each use by the Executive from the first one which occurred under the administration of President Jefferson down to the last one. Then we gave our views at that time as to what we thought the rights of the President were. It is all in there. It is very comprehensive. I refer you to that as being a statement of my belief which would take really all afternoon.

Mr. BENTLEY. Would you recall, sir, if in that particular publication reference was made to employment of our Armed Forces and the question of Korea?

Mr. ACHESON. It all grew out of the question of Korea, yes, we were talking about Korea and because we were talking about Korea we went back into the whole history from the Barbary pirates down.

Mr. BENTLEY. The reason I asked is it puzzled me somewhat in my mind as to whether the use of our Armed Forces in Korea was ever submitted to Congress for approval after our intervention there?

Mr. ACHESON. There was no formal approval. It was discussed with Members of the House and Senate before it was done. They were quite in accord with the necessity for doing it. It was the subject of a great deal of legislation, appropriation, and everything else after it was done. The Congress passed on it in that sense but the administration did not come up and ask the Congress to ratify it. That, they thought, was quite unnecessary. Congress was free to ratify it, or not to ratify it.

Mr. BENTLEY. Would you agree with the general principle—if I might have one more question, Mr. Chairman—that in cases where action by our Armed Forces is possible in the future the principle of getting prior approval from the Congress is desirable?

Mr. ACHESON. I do not think I agree with that; no. I think the importance of preserving the powers and prerogatives of the President of the United States is so great—and they are continually eaten away by encroachment—that I would say this was not necessary. I have not the slightest objection to the Congress at any time expressing its view about it. They can say "this is fine, we approve it thoroughly," or "we are sorry you did this," or whatever they want to do. I do not think that the President ought to get in the state of mind where he feels he cannot do something which is within his power, and often his duty to do, unless he gets somebody to share responsibility with him.

Mr. BENTLEY. Do you think such a state of mind exists at the present time?

Mr. ACHESON. One can only observe the facts.

Mr. BENTLEY. Your conclusion, sir?

Mr. ACHESON. My conclusion is what?

Mr. BENTLEY. After observing the facts do you have a conclusion?

Mr. ACHESON. I quite obviously have, but I think it is unnecessary to express it.

Mr. BENTLEY. I think in that particular case what is left unsaid is quite obvious. Thank you very much.

Chairman GORDON. Mr. Pilcher.

Mr. PILCHER. Do you think our relation with the United Kingdom over the past few months has been as close as it should have been?

Mr. ACHESON. No, sir; I do not.

Mr. PILCHER. Strictly from the defense of this country—that is what we are most all interested in, we are interested in the rest of the world but primarily everybody is looking out for number one first—with the deterioration of Britain's popularity in the Middle East, then with your experience and as former secretary, do you think that the United States and Great Britain should, by all means, stay together, as close together as possible, as far as prevention of communism not only here but all around the world is concerned?

Mr. ACHESON. Yes, sir; I do. I think one of the basic principles of American foreign policy ought to be the closest possible relations with the British Commonwealth and with our French and other allies.

Mr. PILCHER. Do you think that our policy over the past 2 months had anything to do with Sir Anthony's resignation?

Mr. ACHESON. Well, I know nothing more than what Sir Anthony says, which is that his health is very bad. His health has been very bad, and I have no reason to doubt that is the cause of his resignation.

Mr. PILCHER. Let me ask you this question: You have already said, of course, that you did not approve of Great Britain invading Egypt. At the same time, with conditions like they were, brought on by all of these different things, if you had been in Sir Anthony's position, what would you have done?

Mr. ACHESON. If I had been in Sir Anthony's place that would have meant I was Sir Anthony, and then I would have done what Sir Anthony did.

Chairman GORDON. Is that all, Mr. Pilcher?

Mr. PILCHER. That is all; thank you.

Chairman GORDON. Mr. Barratt O'Hara?

Mr. O'HARA. Mr. Secretary, this is the second time that I have been held captive to your charming wit. The first time I think was in 1949, when I was one of a group from the House, some 30 or 40, friendly to the State of Israel, who visited with you with regard to the giving of arms to the Egyptians. Our delegation went in with the feeling that perhaps your position was subject to question. We were with you 2 hours, and we left with the feeling there were valid reasons for your position and that they were not inimical to the security of Israel.

Mr. ACHESON. Thank you very much, Mr. O'Hara.

Mr. O'HARA. I would wish to comment that you have been very impressive and convincing with this distinguished committee, on which I am a raw recruit. Mr. Secretary, bearing in mind that the success of the proposed plan, if adopted and authorized, depends upon its acceptance by and the cooperation of the Arab States, there is a concern among many of my constituents that to obtain such cooperation and acceptance, concessions will be made to Egypt which will be harmful to the interests of or will lessen the position of the State of Israel. Have you any comment to make on that?

Mr. ACHESON. Well, I have been discussing that question. I was discussing it in the statement. I think there are likely to be concessions to Egypt which will injure a lot of people; the users of the Canal, both Arab users and non-Arab users.

I think, though I am not sure, that it might be these concessions which would affect the claim of the Israeli that they should use the Canal as freely as any other country. I doubt whether we would make a concession on that in this Government, but it is a possibility.

I also have an apprehension that in the eagerness to open the Canal and Colonel Nasser's reluctance to have it opened—he is continually saying: "I want to hold this, that, or the other thing up until the Israeli move out of every bit of territory which they did not occupy prior to October 28." If we should be very weak on that, I think it would be most unfortunate. I think there is nothing particularly sacred about the armistice line. I think one of the important things, as I said a little while ago, would be to separate everybody and to have a "cordon sanitaire" between Egypt and Israel. This is something that might take a little working out. I do not see that haste is useful in this period.

The Gaza strip is something that ought to be talked about a little more.

Therefore, the answer to your question is, I see the possibilities of concessions being made. I hope they will not be made.

Mr. O'HARA. Mr. Secretary, might I read a paragraph or two from a letter I have just received from Rabbi Melvyn H. Rush of Chicago, in my district. Rabbi Rush writes:

In suspending the surplus food and grant-in-aid to Israel and calling to a halt United States technical assistance to Israel, a great injustice has been done. The promised \$75 million Export-Import Bank loan by our country, which was spoken of so much by the present administration before the election, is still being held up and our country is now punishing the only democracy in the Middle East in an attempt to gain the favor of Dictator Nasser and the other Arab countries.

Have you any comment to make on Rabbi Rush's statement?

Mr. ACHESON. No, sir. I do not know anything about that situation. I would prefer not to get into it.

Mr. O'HARA. Then, Mr. Chairman, if I have time, there is one other brief question.

Chairman GORDON. One more question.

Mr. O'HARA. As I remember, during the second Cleveland administration—I think Mr. Olney was then Secretary of State—the President had called a special session of Congress at which he declared that if England, then claiming sovereignty over Nicaragua in the name of King Clarence of the Carib Indians, and also menacing Venezuela, should disregard the Monroe Doctrine and attempt to establish British sovereignty in either of those countries, it would mean war. As I recall, the Congress responded with a resolution somewhat of the nature that is now presented to it.

Do you recall, from your reading, that incident?

Mr. ACHESON. I remember the episode, and I remember the attitude which President Cleveland took. I do not recall what resolutions were passed.

Mr. O'HARA. As I recall, the resolution did prove effective on that occasion.

Mr. ACHESON. Yes.

Mr. O'HARA. There was great fear at that time that it might provoke hostilities with a country then much larger than our own.

Mr. ACHESON. Yes.

Mr. O'HARA. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary.

Chairman GORDON. Mr. Fountain?

Mr. FOUNTAIN. Mr. Secretary, fortunately most of the questions which I had jotted down to ask have been answered, and I for one, as a new member of the committee, am frank to say I am a novice in the field of foreign affairs, consequently I am most grateful for the testimony which you have given this committee today. You have at least slowed up the mental and emotional processes which have been operating in the last few days—that we should very rapidly dispose of this resolution by passing it as is.

There are quite a few who contend we should pass it simply because the President as Commander in Chief has recommended it and because he thinks it is advisable.

I should like to read one portion of his message and ask you a question. I think you may have covered it. Mr. Bentley asked you some questions with respect to miscalculations.

In his message the President said:

If power-hungry Communists should either falsely or correctly estimate that the Middle East is inadequately defended, they might be tempted to use open measures of armed attack.

Well, would it be a miscalculation for them to conclude at the present time that the Middle East is inadequately defended?

Mr. ACHESON. No. That would be a correct calculation?

Mr. FOUNTAIN. That would be a correct calculation?

Mr. ACHESON. Yes.

Mr. FOUNTAIN. So if they were interested in overt armed aggression against the Middle East at a time when it was inadequately prepared, now would be one of those opportune times?

Mr. ACHESON. Well, that has been the situation for a good many years.

Mr. FOUNTAIN. Do I understand from your previous testimony that in your opinion Russia would not attempt to take over the Middle East by overt armed aggression, but would do so (as they seem to have already indicated they want to do), by infiltration and subversion?

Mr. ACHESON. I think that is much more likely; yes, sir.

Mr. FOUNTAIN. I think it has already been indicated by the Administration that this resolution would in no way enable the President to use the Armed Forces to prevent infiltration or to prevent international communism from taking over any of those countries by infiltration or subversion, but that the resolution would have a psychological effect to deter international communism from giving assistance which they might otherwise give to those countries. What is your opinion? Do you feel that this resolution would deter them from giving both economic and military assistance and from using the process of infiltration and subversion?

Mr. ACHESON. No; I do not.

Mr. FOUNTAIN. Thank you.

Chairman GORDON. Mr. Fascell?

Mr. FASCELL. Mr. Acheson, you have been very patient and I trust you will bear with me while we peel a few more petticoats.

I likewise have a feeling which, however interpreted—and I hope correctly—is that it is unfortunate that we would excite unnecessarily 160 million people.

Let us assume for the moment that your analysis is correct; which is that there is no threat of direct or overt armed aggression by the Russians. Let us assume, also, that you are further correct that there is no immediate danger from complete capitulation by subversion in the Middle East. What is there left in your mind that requires urgent and immediate attention?

Mr. ACHESON. Well, I think two of the matters I spoke about—the Canal and the Arab-Israeli matter—require urgent and immediate attention.

Mr. FASCELL. Which are not basically touched upon in the resolution.

Mr. ACHESON. No. That is correct.

I do think that a really constructive industrial development program which took in all of the undeveloped areas would be of the greatest importance.

Mr. FASCELL. All right, sir. Now, let us assume, however, that we agree with the President in his predicate for this resolution, in which he says, "The danger now exists." Then when he refers to development of the economic strength, do you think it is likely that we are talking about long-range development projects designed to encourage the stability of a local government?

Mr. ACHESON. That is what bothered me about the proposal, and that is why I said what I did about economic aid in my statement. In an area of this sort the problem is a very long-range problem. There are only a few countries in the world today, undeveloped countries industrially, who are capable of receiving capital goods. In order to be in that position, a country has to be well on the way out of the agricultural state. If you have, say, 97 percent of the population getting an inadequate sustenance from living on the land, it does not do any good to build a steel mill. You do not have any managerial capacity. You do not have any labor which understands the problem. Everybody has to scrape around in the earth to live. Therefore, you have to have developed beyond the state of a purely agricultural state.

If you think of our own history, the United States until say 1830 was in the agricultural condition. In 1830 it emerged, and then there was a tremendous period of development until after the Civil War, say 1880, when it began to be a country which could create its own capital. But in the period between 1830 and 1880 it got a great deal of foreign capital.

Now, at the present time India is a country which is ready for development. It has the managerial skill. It has the financial institutions. It has the labor. It can receive goods.

A great many of the countries in the Middle East are not in that condition at all. They have to be helped to evolve more quickly from the purely agricultural state, than they would without help.

Mr. FASCELL. Well, sir—

Mr. ACHESON. Therefore, this will not absorb vast sums of money. And therefore I agree with you that what is needed here is a long-range view and not a short-range view.

Mr. FASCELL. Well, sir, obviously, then, we are in agreement that this language deals with some immediate emergency dealing with short-range economic assistance, and since the matter has already been discussed let us assume further that what we are talking about is a loss of revenues to the Middle East countries and that if they do not

get those revenues in their treasuries they will collapse and that if they do collapse there is a good chance the Communists will take them over and, therefore, if this reasoning is sound—and it does seem to be a reasonable assumption—it would seem logical that we have to pump money into their treasuries to keep them alive. Is this a logical reasoning in the discussion?

Mr. ACHESON. That seems logical. That seems logical.

Mr. FASCELL. Sir, do you not think it would be better if we would come out and say we are not discussing a \$200 million long-range development project, but we are talking about financing these countries until such time as their revenues are reestablished, and this may take 6 weeks or 6 months, depending upon how long it takes us to get to the basic issue of working on the differences between the various countries in that area?

Mr. ACHESON. I think that is a sensible way to go about it, provided that the Congress at the same time goes at the much broader question of the industrial development in the undeveloped areas.

Mr. FASCELL. Agreed, but I am thinking more from the standpoint of the American people, as to what the need for this resolution is, which I think is also of prime importance.

Mr. ACHESON. You are quite right.

Mr. FASCELL. Thank you.

Chairman GORDON. Mr. Coffin?

Mr. COFFIN. Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Acheson, I will not use the petticoat analogy, but at this stage of the game the packages have been unwrapped and about all we can do is look around in the wrapping paper. I would like to ask you this, if I may sum up perhaps one of your major comments with regard to the proposed resolution: Your feeling, perhaps, is that we are too long on resolution and too short on legislation, and you would like to see us a little bit shorter on resolution and longer on legislation? Is that a capsule summary?

Mr. ACHESON. Not in this situation, Mr. Coffin. I would not recommend legislation at all at this moment.

Mr. COFFIN. I understand, but eventually, if it should appear necessary to implement the program, you would.

Mr. ACHESON. Yes. What I am now saying is that the President has asked for something. There must be a congressional response to what he has asked. Therefore, let us have a resolution laying down some policy, dealing with the things where policy is now indicated, and then have the President come in and say: "In order to get ahead with what you people want to do," and with which I would hope he would agree, "I need money for this; I need money for this; authority for this; authority for that. I want an organization of this sort." Whatever it is. And he would know you would be responsive to that request.

Mr. COFFIN. In your colloquy with Mr. Merrow, when he was asking you about a statement of new policy, he had the feeling that the new policy lay in the assurance to the nations of the Middle East where we would be in the case of armed aggression. Is not one of the dangers of a rather specific resolution that people in that area might expect too much of us. That is, as I read it, it is clear that we are not pledging ourselves to assist any nation which is attacked openly by another

country dominated by international communism; we are merely saying that the President, if he deems it advisable, may use armed force.

Mr. ACHESON. That is correct; yes.

Mr. COFFIN. Would it be your thinking that a resolution which did not try to take as specific a stand in as many areas would perhaps in the long run be a sounder procedure?

Mr. ACHESON. Yes; that is my position. And I think, if you have not read it recently, if you will reread the Vandenberg resolution you will get the idea of the sort of thing which would be helpful, with a change to meet this situation and not the situation of Europe.

Mr. COFFIN. In short, your feeling would be that a resolution should state in general what our feeling is with respect to the Middle East situation; that it should include a reference not only to military aid but to economic aid; that it might also pay due attention not in an apologetic sense to the United Nations; and that, finally, the resolution might indicate a willingness on the part of Congress to entertain appropriate action on such basic problems—and you have mentioned four—as the Canal, the police force in the neutral zone, a general program of economic aid, and, domestically, due attention to conventional weapons.

Mr. ACHESON. Correct; yes.

Mr. COFFIN. You would say that is a fair, if brief, summary of some of your major recommendations.

Mr. ACHESON. Quite correct, Mr. Coffin.

Mr. COFFIN. Thank you.

Chairman GORDON. Mr. Farbstein?

Mr. FARBSTAIN. Mr. Secretary, I think it was mentioned a moment or so ago, and you agreed, that one of the greatest areas of conflict in the Middle East is the dispute between Israel and the Arab States, and yet there is nothing in this resolution which deals with it at all. Do you have an opinion with relation to the use of a statement of direct policy by this country in connection with the dispute between Israel and the Arab States?

Mr. ACHESON. Yes, sir. I mentioned that in the statement, and I have expanded it twice this afternoon here.

Mr. FARBSTAIN. You do feel that there should be a direct statement of policy in connection with that dispute.

Mr. ACHESON. That is quite correct.

Mr. FARBSTAIN. Thank you. That is all.

Chairman GORDON. Mr. Saund?

Mr. SAUND. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Acheson, I wish to divide the authority asked in the resolution in two parts. Do you agree with me that the authority which the President asks in this resolution for the use of the Armed Forces under certain conditions he possesses already as to that authority? It is nothing more than he already possesses as Commander in Chief?

Mr. ACHESON. I believe, yes, sir, if the President believes himself that an attack on some country affects the vital interests of the United States, he has the authority to protect our vital interests with the Armed Forces. I believe that.

Mr. SAUND. In other words you agree that he is not asking for any more authority than he already possesses as Commander in Chief?

Mr. ACHESON. Well, I do not know what he is asking for but I say that if this resolution means that he wants the congressional approval

to do some of the things Mr. Dulles talked about, then I think he is asking for something he has not got.

Mr. SAUND. Do you not know? Can you not tell me what this resolution means?

Mr. ACHESON. I beg your pardon?

Mr. SAUND. Am I right in assuming that he is not asking for any more than he already possesses?

Mr. ACHESON. I do not know, Mr. Saund. I do not know what he is asking for. All I was saying earlier in the day was that the interpretation put upon what he is asking for by the Secretary of State frightens me to death.

Mr. SAUND. Well, I do not quite understand you. What is he asking for? Did you tell us already in your statement?

Mr. ACHESON. It is in my statement, yes. Mr. Dulles' interpretation of what he thinks you would be authorizing here is in the quotation in my statement at the top of page 7, and my comment follows it. And therefore I think it is unwise to adopt that legislation.

Mr. SAUND. All right. I will start with this: I assume that the President is not asking for any more authority than he possesses as Commander in Chief. Then it is my assumption that the only purpose of this resolution would be to give a warning to international communism in unmistakable language as to the feelings and the thinking of the American people, that they cannot commit certain acts, and if they do so the United States Government is ready to go in and act with the use of Armed Forces. Do you believe that I am correct in assuming that?

Mr. ACHESON. You can assume anything you want to, Mr. Saund. I do not agree with the assumption.

Mr. SAUND. You do not agree?

Mr. ACHESON. But go right ahead, and let us get to the question about it.

Mr. SAUND. Could it be that because of what was said during the last election and because of the results of the election, when the people of the United States gave the President an overwhelming vote of confidence, and yet they elected a Democratic Congress—which, incidentally, in my opinion is a very healthy state of affairs today—judging from your experience and your contacts with foreign countries, that there is some misunderstanding in the thinking of the people, especially in the Communist countries, because of this situation in America with a Republican President and a Democratic Congress? There might be some misunderstanding in the minds or doubts in the minds of the people that the President might not be upheld by the Congress as much as he would like to be, and that the President needs this authority.

Mr. ACHESON. There might be. I do not think so; but in any event, if there is, it seems to me that a concurrent resolution of the type I suggested would put that to rest.

Mr. SAUND. You have already stated that now the President asks for this authority, there should be some kind of a resolution.

Mr. ACHESON. Yes.

Mr. SAUND. Now, would you be kind enough, or would you feel it almost your duty, after you have testified, to give us some kind of a draft of a resolution which you think would serve the purpose? Would you give it to me?

Mr. ACHESON. I would much rather not do that, because my idea is so good that I would not want to kill it by having it called the Acheson resolution.

I am sure you have the most able legislative counsel and they could do that for you very easily.

Mr. SAUND. No. I think in view of the fact that this committee has extended to you the courtesy of appearing and has, as I understand it, expressed very high regard for you—each member individually, about your opinion—it would be very fair for you to give us the benefit of your very good judgment.

Now, as for the other part, the authority which the President wants, so that he would be removed from the limitations of spending the money which has already been appropriated for the help of the Middle East countries, I understand that it is your belief—or, do you believe that the President does need that authority and that it will be wise for us to give aid to the countries because of their difficulties, which have arisen from the blocking of the Suez Canal?

Mr. ACHESON. I think it would be wise to give that aid. I do not know whether he has the power to do it now or not. That could easily be ascertained.

Mr. SAUND. But it would be wise to give him that authority to spend that money.

Mr. ACHESON. Surely, if that is what he wants and he would come up and ask you for it, why, give it to him.

Mr. SAUND. Thank you very much, Mr. Acheson. I still repeat, if you would give us a draft of a resolution which in your opinion would serve the purpose better than this, in view of the fact that you think something should be done by Congress, I would appreciate that.

Mr. ACHESON. Thank you, Mr. Saund.

Mr. SAUND. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman GORDON. Any further questions?

Mr. VORYS. Mr. Chairman?

Chairman GORDON. Mr. Vorys.

Mr. VORYS. Mr. Acheson, after my time for comment had expired this morning, referred to me and to legislation to help Korea on January 19, 1950. His memory may have misguided him as to the nature of that resolution. It was H. R. 5330, introduced June 7, 1949, 3 weeks before the authority to support Korea economically expired under previous legislation, and it was for economic aid alone. No military aid was provided, although the threat to Korea was a military threat. In a minority report filed, we referred to it this way:

Unless this Nation is prepared to meet force with comparable force, economic assistance cannot of itself assure the safety or the integrity of South Korea.

Later we said:

What Korea requires—what China requires—what the United States requires is a statement of policy with respect to our future conduct in the Pacific and on the land mass of the continent of Asia.

No military aid was included or proposed. This was the bill that Owen Lattimore referred to in the phrase:

The thing to do is let Korea fall but not let it appear that we pushed it.

Hence the party gift of \$150 million.

It was detained by the Democratic Rules Committee throughout that session, at my urging, because I said a public discussion of it

would hurt Korea. It was brought to the floor January 19 and was defeated by a bipartisan vote, but a vote in which obviously a majority of the Democrat-controlled Congress voted to defeat the bill. So this was a bipartisan action with reference to economic aid alone for Korea, when no military aid was requested and the Secretary of State had put Korea outside our defense perimeter 1 week before, on January 12.

Now just one more word, if I might. Mr. Acheson, you have stressed very much your preference for a concurrent rather than a joint resolution, the joint resolution being such as we have here today and such as you proposed for the Marshall plan, ECA, and Mutual Security Acts each year. Every year the Congress has included in these joint resolutions important policy statements with reference to European unity and a number of matters. The most important recent one, I think, was the Richards amendment a couple of years ago, but much of this happened while you were Secretary of State. Now I do not remember your objecting to our using these joint resolutions to make policy declarations by the Congress, in which the President joined, by the very nature of the joint resolution, because he had to sign it before it became law. Were you secretly against all of this all the time you were Secretary of State?

Mr. ACHESON. My life was an open book, Mr. Vorys.

If I may go back a little bit to your interesting exegesis on the history of the bill, the point I was trying to make this morning related to the suggestion that it was my speech which invited the Communists into Korea. I was pointing out—and I did not have a chance to finish—that this bill for the aid of Korea, to which arms funds were later added and could have been added before—

Mr. VORYS. I beg your pardon; there were none in that bill.

Mr. ACHESON. When we got through with it, there were. There were not at the time you voted against it, I quite agree. But the important thing is that when the House of Representatives defeated the bill by one vote, it was the North Korean radio which picked that up and quoted an observation made on the floor of the House by a gentleman whom I shall not further embarrass by identifying as the author, who described giving money to Korea as "pouring money down a rat hole," and the North Korean Communist radio said:

This is what the American Congress thinks of Korea.

To say that I invited them to say that America was not interested in Korea seems a little fanciful after this. That is all I was trying to say.

Mr. VORYS. You are not blaming me for what the Communist radio commentator said; are you?

Mr. ACHESON. No. No, I certainly would not blame you. You furnished them the copy unwittingly, but you have no further complicity than that.

No, I am not, I think, announcing a doctrine here today that under no circumstances should any sort of a matter of policy be dealt with in legislation. If I were, that would be quite silly, because very often it is done. That is not what I am doing. All I am saying is that when you want to announce policy, period, the best way to do that is to do it through a concurrent resolution or a Senate resolution, as was done in the Vandenberg case, and then permit the executive to go off and

bring in all the implementing steps, which then the Congress can approve. That is the attitude I was trying to take.

Mr. VORYS. I have no further questions.

Mr. BENTLEY. Mr. Chairman, may I have just one question?

Chairman GORDON. Yes, Mr. Bentley.

Mr. BENTLEY. Just one brief question, Mr. Acheson.

On page 13 of your statement you speak of the participation by this Government in the establishment of Israel in the midst of the Arab world.

Mr. ACHESON. Yes, sir.

Mr. BENTLEY. You follow that with a parenthetical remark—

whether wisely or not is now irrelevant—

I am sure that the inclusion of that parenthetical statement does not indicate in your mind any question as to the wisdom of our participation in the establishment of Israel.

Mr. ACHESON. You are sure of that?

Mr. BENTLEY. Am I? Am I correct in my assumption, or not?

Mr. ACHESON. You ought not to be.

Mr. BENTLEY. Is there doubt in your mind?

Mr. ACHESON. Not only doubt in my mind; I think there is doubt. But the point is, it is done.

Mr. BENTLEY. I understood; yes.

Mr. ACHESON. It is done. I do not want to hash over old things.

But this is not part of the present discussion. If you want to talk about it with me sometime—

Mr. BENTLEY. It is part of your statement, sir. That is why I asked.

Mr. ACHESON. I am delighted to have you ask, and to answer you.

Mr. BENTLEY. Thank you.

Mr. FULTON. Mr. Chairman?

Chairman GORDON. Mr. Fulton.

Mr. FULTON. You have made a recommendation, Mr. Acheson, on the bottom of page 11 of your statement—

for this Government to supply Europe's needs and pay the excess costs of dollar oil.

That would bring up the question of how much would that proposed program cost, to follow such a policy, and for how long would such a policy be adopted? How should our committee consider such a policy? Would it cost the United States a half billion dollars, and over what period should we program it? A 2-year period? Please just give us some relationship as to amount, if you could.

Mr. ACHESON. I should think that the cost of doing this is not very great. It is substantial.

What I would suggest in any resolution is that you would do it until it is not necessary to be done any more; in other words, until the canal is open and operating. As long as the canal is closed down, then the amount of Middle East oil is lost. It is not cut off, it is reduced. Sterling funds can be used to pay for that. And some dollar oil was always bought by Western Europe. They could continue to pay for that. But the additional oil, which is all dollar oil, has to be made up, and for that I think it would be a wise act on the part of the United States to pay for it so as not to destroy the financial solvency of these countries.

Mr. FULTON. We would have to estimate ahead what the amount of the required volume of shipments would be and what was involved in problems of transport and distribution.

Mr. ACHESON. I think the administration could tell you that very easily. They know how long they expect the canal to be closed. They know what the import shortage is. The present plans, you see, still leave it 25 percent short.

Mr. FULTON. In closing, let us refer again to the 1950 Korean program, originally for economic aid, which we all knew it was. There was, also, a difference across the party lines, because the chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee was then Mr. Kee, who sponsored the bill. Mr. Richards, of South Carolina, later the chairman of this committee, likewise spoke for the legislation, and it was backed by Mr. Charles Eaton, a former Republican chairman, and voted for by all three of these distinguished chairmen.

Mr. ACHESON. That is quite right.

Mr. FULTON. The argument was that we should not give the extra \$60 million in addition to the \$60 million authorized already for Korean economic aid, because it was either throwing money down a rathole or it was wasted money, so that within the Congress there was quite a dispute across the party lines. Some of us felt that we should encourage the Koreans, since they had been in such difficulties, and that anything we could do to stabilize their economy would work just as much as military aid, as was said under the Marshall plan, against communism and against internal subversion. So I want to emphasize again that it was a very divided time. I do not see that any blame at this point of time should be cast around among us Americans, when we were all trying to do our best for the people of the free world and our own security.

Mr. ACHESON. Quite right. I agree. Do not cast it at me, either.

Mr. FASCELL. Mr. Chairman?

Chairman GORDON. Yes.

Mr. FASCELL. I have a parliamentary inquiry.

Chairman GORDON. Mr. Fascell.

Mr. FASCELL. Is it necessary to make a motion in order to make public the testimony received in executive session from Admiral Radford and Secretary of State Dulles?

Chairman GORDON. Such a motion would not be in order.

Mr. FASCELL. That is not my inquiry. My inquiry is, sir, whether or not it is necessary to make a motion before this committee and have that motion acted upon before the testimony given in executive session to this committee would be made public.

Mr. VORYS. Mr. Chairman, may I ask a parliamentary inquiry?

Mr. FASCELL. I should like to have an answer to mine first.

Chairman GORDON. Such a motion would be ruled out of order.

Mr. FASCELL. I know, sir, but all I am asking is: Is it necessary to have a motion before the testimony can be made public, any time. I do not know whether it would be out of order now.

(Chorus of "Noes.")

Mr. FASCELL. Excuse me, sir, and then I will be glad to yield. What is the process by which the committee does make testimony in executive session, which does not affect the national security, available to the public?

Chairman GORDON. I will call on the clerk to explain the rule.

Mr. CRAWFORD (the clerk). Mr. Fascell, I might say this: The chairman has already arranged with the Secretary of State and Admiral Radford to have the portions which deal with security matters deleted, and the rest will be included eventually among the published hearings.

Mr. FASCELL. I need to expand my parliamentary inquiry, if Mr. Vorys will yield to me the time, kindly, to do that.

Is this a unilateral proposition, or is this done with the committee concurrence, or how is it done?

Mr. CRAWFORD. It is done as a matter of standard procedure, sir.

Mr. FULTON. Automatically.

Mr. CRAWFORD. It is automatic, as Mr. Fulton says.

Mr. FASCELL. In other words, an agreement has been reached between the chairman and the witnesses who have testified that the testimony will be made public at some time, with deletions made by them as to what they believe should be made in the interest of national security.

Chairman GORDON. That is right.

Mr. CRAWFORD. That is correct, sir.

Mr. FULTON. They have always had that right.

Mr. CRAWFORD. They always do.

Mr. FASCELL. And the committee has no right to discuss or pass upon whether or not their judgment was correct or incorrect?

Chairman GORDON. That is right.

Mr. VORYS. Mr. Chairman?

Chairman GORDON. Mr. Vorys.

Mr. VORYS. I will ask the chairman or others who were present at the time if it was not the case that on this Korean bill, which was defeated January 19, 1950, our present witness deleted the entire testimony of a number of witnesses, even though there were strong protests.

Mr. ACHESON. I knew it was going to be my fault.

Mr. FULTON. A parliamentary inquiry.

Chairman GORDON. Mr. Fulton.

Mr. FULTON. I am sure it is not to be inferred that the fall of North Korea occurred through the deletion of any of the record of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs.

Mr. FASCELL. Mr. Chairman, one further parliamentary inquiry.

Chairman GORDON. Mr. Fascell.

Mr. FASCELL. Is it reasonable to assume that the testimony so given will be made public prior to the time we act upon the resolution?

Chairman GORDON. Yes.

Mr. FASCELL. In other words, the Clerk said that the testimony would be published at the time that the hearings were published. There is a great deal of difference, it would seem to me, because I have served on some committees where the hearings were not published until a long time after we acted on the matter before the committee.

Chairman GORDON. I will call on the Clerk to explain this point.

Mr. CRAWFORD. Mr. Fascell, I might say this: The question of timing depends entirely on the time that is required by the members themselves to make their corrections in the transcript, and the witnesses.

Mr. FASCELL. I am talking about the testimony in executive session, now.

Mr. CRAWFORD. It all applies and runs together, sir. It is treated the same, with the double security precautions given to the executive

session. However, it depends entirely on the committee. Sometimes they vote in committee and act in the committee before the hearings themselves are printed, although the text is always available in the committee in proof form or transcript form for the use of the members.

Mr. FASCELL. I would certainly hope it would be made available as expeditiously as possible.

Mr. O'HARA. Mr. Chairman, the matter of making public the testimony of the Secretary of State was discussed in the committee yesterday. The announcement was made by the Secretary that he had no objection to his testimony being published, after of course looking it over, and apparently such publication received the consent of the committee, because nobody on the committee objected to it after it was openly discussed in the committee.

Mr. FASCELL. It was openly discussed in executive session, Mr. O'Hara.

Mr. O'HARA. By the members of the committee. Certainly the members of the committee could attend an executive session.

Mr. FASCELL. Yes, sir.

Mr. O'HARA. I did not find any of them dumb.

Mr. FASCELL. Thank you, Mr. O'Hara. I am very happy that you brought it out.

Mr. VORYS. Mr. Chairman?

Chairman GORDON. Mr. Vorys.

Mr. VORYS. Is this not the situation: That an oral statement of a member of the executive branch, just like a written statement, may be classified by the executive branch, or you do not get any communications from him, and we have a constant tussle, as I say, going back many years, where we seek to elicit as much information as we can and we argue over the classification of statements, but this committee has always taken the position that we have no right to declassify something which the executive wants to classify, even testimony before the committee?

Mr. FASCELL. Mr. Vorys, in order that my position be explicit, I am not taking issue at this time with the right of the witness to delete any evidence or testimony which he deems in his best judgment is classified for national security reasons. I am not taking issue with that at all. But since the witness did say that the testimony would be made public, I was asking the manner and the means by which to make it public as expeditiously as possible.

Chairman GORDON. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. Your statement and replies to questions have outlined factors which the committee must consider before voting on the pending resolution. We are indebted to you for a most enlightening and challenging presentation.

Mr. FULTON. We on this side want to thank you too.

Chairman GORDON. Ladies and gentlemen, I want to make an announcement.

When we conclude today's hearing the committee will then adjourn until Tuesday. The names of witnesses and place of meeting will be announced later.

(Thereupon, at 4:46 p. m., the committee adjourned until Tuesday, January 15, 1957.)

ECONOMIC AND MILITARY COOPERATION WITH NATIONS IN THE GENERAL AREA OF THE MIDDLE EAST

TUESDAY, JANUARY 15, 1957

**HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
*Washington, D. C.***

The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:45 a. m., in room 1301, New House Office Building, the Honorable Thomas S. Gordon (chairman) presiding.

Chairman GORDON. The committee will come to order.

We are meeting to continue the hearings on House Joint Resolution 117.

Our first witness this morning will be Mr. Merwin K. Hart of the National Economic Council.

Mr. Hart, you may proceed.

STATEMENT OF MERWIN K. HART, NATIONAL ECONOMIC COUNCIL

Mr. HART. Mr. Chairman and gentlemen: I represent the National Economic Council of New York, which for the past 26 years has been working for the strengthening of private enterprise and the preservation of American independence.

We of the National Economic Council agree entirely that Soviet Russia's scheme has always been and still is to conquer the whole world, including the United States. But we believe, too, that that part of American foreign policy, that has led America to intervene in the affairs of the whole world, has been one of the greatest factors in promoting this Soviet ambition.

We welcome any forehanded action by the Congress or the Executive to stop the advance of communism. The grave question here is: how effective would the administration's proposed resolution be if adopted, and to what extent would American interests be compromised and hampered by it?

The resolution is directed "against overt armed aggression from any nation controlled by international communism." It says nothing about other aggression, such as that of Israel against her Arab neighbors which has been condemned by the United Nations more often than the Arab countries for aggressions against Israel.

The resolution authorizes military and financial assistance against any communist aggression. The experience of the last 20 years suggests that such assistance might become well-nigh unlimited.

For Arab diplomats have pointed out that the only deterrent to Israel imperialist ambition is the fear of Russia. Therefore if the

United States neutralizes Russia in the Middle East, this to the Arabs would mean giving Israel the green light to attack her neighbors and extend her domain from Suez to the Euphrates.

Since our Federal debt is already more than twice that of all other nations combined, and our Federal spending, in comparison to the spending of other nations, is without doubt proportionately as great as our debt, it is highly in the interest of the people of America that the Congress take no steps like those proposed if, as we believe, any other course is open.

We note too that there is no time limit on the very great abdication of congressional power that the resolution asks, since the resolution is to expire—

when the President shall determine that the peace and security of the nations in the general area of the Middle East are reasonably assured by international conditions created by action of the United Nations or otherwise.

That is very vague indeed. If any resolution is to be passed there should be a definite time limit.

Incidentally, this is another case where vast powers are asked by the Executive on the ground of a "crisis." Secretary Dulles told this committee on January 7, in substance, that it must act fast. All that has a familiar ring. But during the years beginning 1948, it was not thought necessary to act fast to relieve the problem of the Arab refugees whose sad plight is largely responsible for any crisis that exists today.

We think, too, that our Government is placing entirely too much reliance on the United Nations. The United Nations has never done anything for the United States and we feel certain it never will. We cannot forget that such men as Alger Hiss were a large factor in organizing the United Nations. The fact is that the United States, which pays roughly one-third of all the cost, has only a single vote in the General Assembly, while Soviet Russia has three, not including her satellites. We can be outvoted in the General Assembly on any vital issue at any time. No other great nation places anywhere near the confidence in the United Nations that the United States does.

The language of this resolution is so interlaced with references to the United Nations that by adopting it the Congress might be tying this nation into commitments that we would discover only when it is too late—after we have become irrevocably a very minor segment of a world government.

The American Government insisted on viewing the Korean war as a United Nations war. Yet 90 percent of the "U. N. troops" were Americans—and practically all the financial cost was borne by America. And after we had thrown away 30,000 American lives, other nations—members of the United Nations—wouldn't let us win it. And so North Korea, along with China, was lost to communism.

This is probably the greatest disaster the United Nations has brought to the United States and to the world—so far.

But if this resolution were adopted, the chief cause of dissension in the Middle East would still remain, utterly unaffected by anything authorized by this resolution. For many of the Arab nations would continue as before to be a breeding ground for communism.

This, of course, is because of the bitterness among the roughly 40 million Arabs in that area of the Middle East over the injustice of the driving out of Palestine in 1948 of more than 700,000 Palestinian

Arabs, most of whom are still living in squalor on a pittance of some 9 cents per day tossed to them through the United Nations.

I might say that we in the National Economic Council, when the partition of Palestine took place in 1947, predicted that the very things that have been happening and are now happening would happen and that it would lead to war.

The Arabs—and I have talked with many of them in various countries of the Middle East—resent the physical and mental harm done their fellow Arabs of Palestine, and even more the affront to all Arab peoples. They also fear the ambitions of the Israelis, some of whose champions have boasted that they are going to set up a world power. And they know the Israelis have refused to follow such provisions of the United Nations as the Israelis did not like.

I might say that one of those who predicted this world-power business is Kenneth de Courcy, whose excellent Intelligence Digest and Weekly Review has referred to this subject many times, recently; and in an issue not over 5 or 6 weeks ago of the Weekly Review he predicted that Israel would be a world power in 10 years.

If it is, it will be at the expense of the United States and of Britain and certain other European countries.

And, while the Arabs know that Zionism is a world movement, they remember that the partition of Palestine was effected in 1947 by the United Nations in New York, under the prodding of the then President Truman. So they naturally hold America particularly responsible for their plight.

Over a period of a century or more, largely because of such American philanthropic activities as the American University at Beirut, Americans built up a tremendous amount of goodwill not only among the 40 million Arabs but among the roughly 300 million Moslems. All this goodwill has been, to say the least, greatly undermined by the United States backing of the synthetic State of Israel—a venture in which the vast majority of the American people have not the slightest interest, and to which such co-religionists of the Zionists as the American Council for Judaism are bitterly opposed.

It is of interest that such distinguished Jews as the late Jacob H. Schiff and the late Henry Morgenthau, father of the former Secretary of the Treasury, were most emphatic in their opposition to a political State of Israel.

American Zionists have two allegiances, that to the United States and that to Israel. In fact, their allegiance to Israel seems clearly greater than to the United States; for they are willing to wreak grave injury to the United States by building up the State of Israel. And, by founding this state and building it up, they have converted the Arabs into enemies.

The Arabs, most of whom are Moslems with a passionate belief in God, would never have listened to the blandishments of communism had it not been for these activities of American Zionists, which have opened the door to communism in the Middle East.

If it had not been for this activity, America and the western world would not now be so threatened by communism in the Middle East. But this American-made threat is what has led to the President's resolution, now before this committee.

There is reason to believe there is a powerful bloc in the State Department that is constantly working for Zionist objectives. Mr. Don

Lohbeck, whose biography of Gen. Patrick J. Hurley was published January 8 of this year, speaks several times of this bloc and of its power. This bloc has long carried on pro-Israel propaganda not only throughout the country, but right here in Congress. And many Zionists, both in and out of the State Department, have not hesitated to use threat and intimidation to advance their objectives.

I would like to say, Mr. Chairman, that we in our organization have not hesitated to say what we thought was true on any subject with which we treated. We published several Economic Council letters in 1947 and 1948 on the subject of Zionism and warned of the danger to America. We have not hesitated to criticize Zionists or any other group of Americans if we thought they were endangering American sovereignty. Because of that, our organization has been attacked directly and indirectly, and in the most sly and dishonorable way by aggressive Zionists, feeling they were somehow doing their cause a service.

They have canvassed many of our supporters urging them to desist from supporting us. Many of them told them to "go to." A few of our supporters have desisted.

In a certain number of instances our people resented it and threatened exposure, whereupon the Zionists cringed and went away.

We believe an enormous amount of that kind of propaganda has been used.

Russia, both under the Czars and the Soviets, has long had its eyes on the Middle East. It has wanted a warm-water port. It has long sought to cut the British line of communications to the Orient. And it has wanted to participate in the development of Africa.

Yet so long as America, with its own heavy stake in the Middle East, maintained the good will of the Arabs, the Arabs greatly preferred American good will to that of the Soviets. And this Arab good will was a strong factor in keeping back Soviet infiltration and aggression in the Middle East. But, as I have said, the new American policy of building up Israel has undermined American relations with the Arabs and opened the door to Soviet aggression.

Yet I do not believe this undermining is irreparable. From conversations with many Arabs both in the Middle East and in America, I believe there is one measure we can take that will be far more effective than this pending resolution, necessary as some resolutions may be.

It is vital that the Congress place the interests of America first, unhindered by the promptings of any propaganda group in this country that is trying to serve another country.

Let the Congress cut off all aid, both governmental and private to Israel. Israel would then cease to be a factor. The Arabs, in my opinion, would cease to be interested in communism. War, which could become a third world war, in which we Americans would lose even if we won, would cease to be a serious threat. What Americans want to send their sons to fight for Israel? The lives of perhaps millions of Americans might be sacrificed in such a war. And, incidentally, the great property interests of Americans, which promise such benefits to all the people of the Middle East, might be destroyed.

If this Congress permits continued vast aid to Israel, public and private (and it already has amounted to nearly a billion and a half), then America will be guaranteeing herself a war.

And even rich America, overextended as she is, is in no condition to fight a third world war.

Chairman GORDON. Thank you very much for your statement, Mr. Hart. I have 1 or 2 questions I would like to present to you at this time.

Do you believe that the Soviet Union would like to get control of the Middle East?

Mr. HART. There is no question of it.

Chairman GORDON. Do you believe that the United States would be injured if the Soviet got control of the Middle East?

Mr. HART. Without question.

I might add, Mr. Chairman, that that is the very reason that we, 10 years ago, urged against the partition of Palestine.

We will hold the Arab good will, I am satisfied from talking with many Arabs on the ground, if we will simply try to win them back, and they can be won back.

Chairman GORDON. Mr. Vorys—

Mr. VORYS. Following the questions by our chairman, do you feel that Congress should do nothing with reference to the Soviet threat in the Middle East? As you point out, Russian ambitions in this area originated under the Czars and have continued ever since.

Mr. HART. No, I would not say that Congress should do nothing, but I certainly would say that it should pass a resolution much less comprehensive than this resolution before the committee.

Mr. VORYS. What would you have in mind?

Mr. HART. Well, sir, I do not have the outline of a resolution in mind, but I think that a firm resolution saying that the United States would fight to protect the Middle East would, if coupled with a reversal of the policy of the United States toward the State of Israel, be effective.

On the other hand, no matter what resolution is passed by the Congress, I doubt very much that it would do more than delay the eventual attack by Soviet Russia on the Middle East.

The Arabs are our only hope because they are the people who occupy that country. If we had been half as solicitous for the welfare of the Arabs as we have for the welfare of Israel, this problem would never have arisen.

Mr. VORYS. We have been given to understand that Pakistan, Iran, Iraq, and Turkey, all of which have long borders with the Soviets, are concerned for their own security.

Do you think that, whatever else we do, we should take some steps to reassure them and to let the Soviets know that attacks on those countries would mean that our Armed Forces might become involved?

Mr. HART. Of course, the only 1 of those 3 countries that I know fairly well is Iraq. I have never been in the other two, but I have some contacts in them and I am sure we want to reassure them. However, it is going to be very hard for their own governments to meet the anti-American propaganda that we are helping to stir up among the Arabs of those countries.

When, sir, in all history, did one great nation start out to construct a little nation, which from the very start was a festering sore, right in the heart of a people that had been friendly to the nations that did such a thing? I don't recall any such thing in history.

Mr. VORYS. Cutting off private aid to Israel would mean that we would prohibit, for instance, the sale of Israeli bonds in the United

States. So far as I know, we do not make a practice of prohibiting the sale of foreign securities in this country.

Would you recommend we stop the sale of Israeli bonds?

Mr. HART. Yes, sir, I would. It is my impression or my recollection—I can't describe his exact words, but I think I read that when Britain and France invaded Egypt, even the President himself said something about the possibility of freezing all Israel assets in the United States. It might have been just a passing thought, but apparently he thought of such a thing as being possible.

I think we have got to resort to something like that in the interests of America—not in the interests of the Arabs. We have had good relations with the Arabs, and it is important to us to continue them and I think we will. I think we can. But just in the interests of America and to avoid a third world war, which would be the greatest tragedy that could possibly come to this country.

Mr. VORYS. I have no further questions.

Chairman GORDON. Dr. Morgan—

Mr. MORGAN. Mr. Chairman, thank you.

Mr. Hart, what are some of the functions and the background of the National Economic Council?

Mr. HART. The National Economic Council was started in 1930, Congressman, as the New York State Economic Council, following a 3-year legislative investigation into the effects of high taxation. We thought taxation was high in those days but "We hadn't seen nothin' yet." It was formed for that purpose. Its sphere of operations were limited to the State of New York.

By 1936 we began to see evidence that the main force opposing what we were trying to do—namely, bring about economy and to reduce the regimentation of private enterprise—was communism.

Mr. FULTON. Would you repeat that, please? I am sorry but I didn't hear it.

Mr. HART. I say, the forces opposing what we were trying to do were nothing in the world but Communists, and we promptly said so.

Immediately we began to be attacked by groups all over the country, by groups that were Communist inspired, if not actually Communist, and within a year or two we had members in every State of the Union.

In 1943 we changed our name to the National Economic Council, to conform with the facts. We have been active down here ever since then.

Mr. MORGAN. From your statement I gather you feel Israel is the main cause for unrest in the Middle East?

Mr. HART. I think it is, without any question.

Mr. MORGAN. You feel that stopping all aid, all private and Government aid to Israel, would stop the advance of international communism in the Middle East?

Mr. HART. Well, I will put it this way: If we don't stop the aid to Israel, I think nothing can stop the Soviets. I think there is grave danger that nothing can stop the Soviets from winning over the Arab peoples.

I don't think it is too late, even now, if we stop this fantastic scheme of trying to build up another state 5,000 miles from our own shores. I think there would be time to win back the Arab good will.

Mr. MORGAN. Do you really believe that Zionism is a world movement?

Mr. HART. There is no question about it. I assumed that was taken for granted. You find Zionists in every country.

Churchill boasted on a number of occasions that he was a Zionist. And the Zionists are not limited by any means to the coreligionists of the Zionists.

We have many Zionists in this country who are Christians, and perhaps others of no faith whatever. But there is no doubt in my mind but that it is a world movement and political Zionism is aiming for world power.

Mr. MORGAN. Has your organization always opposed all foreign aid or have they approved of the mutual security program?

Mr. HART. We have not strongly approved foreign aid. We have been discriminatory. We believed in the foreign aid given Greece and Turkey. We believe in the foreign aid given to Spain. We think the foreign aid sent to Britain built up the Socialist government of Britain and kept the Socialists in power there.

We think the foreign aid sent to France, from what we can make out, went into the strongboxes of a great many already well-to-do French people.

Mr. MORGAN. Do you approve of foreign aid sent to Yugoslavia?

Mr. HART. I think that has been a great mistake.

Mr. MORGAN. That is all, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman GORDON. Mrs. Bolton—

Mrs. BOLTON. I am sorry, I missed so much, Mr. Chairman. I have no questions.

Chairman GORDON. Mr. Carnahan—

Mr. CARNAHAN. Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Hart, you say:

We believe, too, that that part of American foreign policy that has led America to intervene in the affairs of the whole world has been one of the greatest factors in promoting this Soviet ambition.

That is, the Soviet ambition to conquer the whole world.

Do you think the international Communists would have had that ambition if there had been no American foreign policy?

Mr. HART. I don't think they would have satisfied their ambition. I think if Roosevelt had not sent Harry Hopkins to Moscow to beg Stalin to accept what became 11 billions of dollars of foreign aid, I think probably Russia would have collapsed, would have been knocked out by Hitler, or he might have knocked Hitler out; but both countries would have been exhausted.

That money came out of the taxpayers. All of us. All of you gentlemen. All the rest of us.

Mr. CARNAHAN. Then do I understand you correctly, you believe that American foreign policy, perhaps over the last quarter of a century, is responsible for the international Communist's desire for conquering the whole world?

Mr. HART. I think I would put it stronger than that, sir. I would say that American foreign policy with its giveaway program, as it is called, is what has made communism as strong as it is today, and it would have very possibly fallen by the wayside if we had been more restrained.

Mr. CARNAHAN. Then you feel that American foreign policy has sustained the Communist's desire to conquer the world?

Mr. HART. Decidedly.

Mr. CARNAHAN. You also in your statement say, "We welcome any forehanded action by the Congress." What do you mean by "forehanded"?

Mr. HART. Perhaps "forwardlooking" might have been a little better, although I think that word means about the same.

Some expression by the Congress that we will use force, if driven to it, would perhaps be useful, but only, I think, if we change our policy with respect to the chief cause of the trouble in the Middle East, namely, the fact that we have driven away the friendship of the Arabs.

Mr. CARNAHAN. Do you feel that the resolution we are considering would be beneficial to both Israel and the Arab nations?

Mr. HART. I think it would be chiefly beneficial to Israel.

Mr. CARNAHAN. And would have no benefit to any of the Arab countries?

Mr. HART. Well, to the extent that we spent a great deal of money in this Arab country and that Arab country, it might temporarily buy time. But the rancor in the minds of the Arabs would remain.

Mr. CARNAHAN. Would you recommend a program of assistance to the Arab countries of the Middle East?

Mr. HART. If after thorough investigation some assistance program could be formulated—in the form of loans, not grants—that might be worth considering.

Mr. CARNAHAN. You suggest also that this resolution should have a time limit. What time limit do you suggest?

Mr. HART. I have no time limit in mind, Congressman, but I would say a very modest time limit. Very modest, indeed.

Mr. CARNAHAN. That might mean what—1 year, 2 years, 3 years, 5 years?

Mr. HART. I would say not over a year. To watch it and see what happens. I think the resolution as a whole is entirely too comprehensive. It is an abdication of power by the Congress. It is an abdication by this committee of its power over foreign affairs. That is what it seems to be to me.

Mr. CARNAHAN. Do you believe the Congress can abdicate its constitutional powers through the adoption of a resolution?

Mr. HART. Yes; I think that is true. I don't know whether you have seen this book "Inside the State Department" by Bryton Barron, who was an official there for 26 years and then was dropped out because he opposed the deletion of any material in the Yalta papers before they were put out, and he makes clear the power exerted by the State Department, not only over the Executive but over even the Congress.

Take the matter of the instructions of the Congress to publish the Yalta papers and the papers of other conferences. He gives in great detail how the State Department substantially threw those instructions in the wastebasket. And even when they put out one volume of the Yalta papers, which is the only volume I think has been put out over a good many years, they deleted some of the most essential things. They didn't think the American people or even the Congress could be trusted to see those statements. That was about it.

Mr. CARNAHAN. That is all, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman GORDON. Mr. Merrow.

Mr. MERROW. No questions, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman GORDON. Mr. Zablocki.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have a few brief questions.

Mr. Hart, you are unequivocally opposed to the resolution?

Mr. HART. In its present form, yes, sir.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. Do you have particular concern about the economic or financial portion of the resolution? The economic assistance provisions to the Middle East area?

Mr. HART. Do you mean am I interested in that?

Mr. ZABLOCKI. Are you disturbed about the economic aid portion of the resolution?

Mr. HART. My chief concern about it is, if unaccompanied by any cutting off of the aid to Israel, it would practically guarantee us a war.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. Would you be in favor of the resolution if the aid would be used to promote economic and political stability of the Arab States?

Mr. HART. No, sir, because I don't think you can buy them.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. How would you suggest that we promote economic stability and a political stability in that area?

Mr. HART. As I mentioned a moment before I think, I think a resolution showing—

Mr. ZABLOCKI. Just by cutting off aid to Israel?

Mr. HART. Under certain circumstances we would use force there, and then by judicious loans—and loans, not grants—to those countries that we believe could use them. Provided we could afford to make the loans and I don't know how much longer this country is going to be able to make loans.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. I have one other short question: Is it not true that the State of Israel is the only democratic nation in the very center of that area?

Mr. HART. I wouldn't say that, sir. I have never been in Israel. I have been all around it—in Lebanon, in Syria, in Jordan, in Iraq, and in Egypt—but I have never been in Israel. I couldn't get a visa to get in since I was going to the Arab countries. And it seemed best not to go.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. I have been in the Arab States and Israel.

Mr. HART. I wouldn't say—from what I have heard of Israel and what I have read of Rabbi Elmer Berger's book, and that book written by Alfred Lilienthal, who have both been in Israel as well as all the Arab countries—I wouldn't say that Israel is a democratic country. The American Council for Judaism, which opposed the setting up of Israel, has 20,000 courageous members, who hold America as their only political allegiance.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. Nothing surpasses personal observation. No further questions, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman GORDON. Mr. Fulton.

Mr. FULTON. What area do you think the Middle East comprises when you speak of the Middle East? Aren't you speaking of the Middle East, actually, as being the Near East? Is your definition of the Middle East the same as this resolution? Does the term go as far as India and Pakistan, so that the Middle East might be said to cut off at Singapore?

Mr. HART. I wouldn't say that the common understanding of Middle East would go even as far as Pakistan. I think it means

those Arab countries in the Levant: Egypt, Lebanon—Israel, of course, is in the Middle East—Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Turkey, and possibly Iran; but Iran and Turkey, of course, are not Arab countries.

Mr. FULTON. The State Department has no official definition of the Middle East and this term is not official terminology. It is a new term for the United States, borrowed from former British usage. As a matter of fact the Middle East has been used lately in the sense of going clear to Singapore.

Mr. HART. I didn't get you, sir.

Mr. FULTON. The term has been used to cover nations clear to Singapore.

If this resolution is to extend out of the eastern Mediterranean area, would you say Israel wouldn't be the key to that type of Middle East area, if it does run clear to Singapore?

Mr. HART. Well, I wouldn't think that the Middle East would go as far as Singapore, but it is just a question of what definition you want to use.

Mr. FULTON. So the bigger the area of the Middle East, the less factor Israel is to you, is it not?

Mr. HART. Well, I don't know, but I think the ambitions of those who are promoting world Zionism are practically boundless.

Mr. FULTON. Now you said that Israel would be a world power within 10 years.

Mr. HART. I said that Kenneth de Courcy said that.

Mr. FULTON. Well, what do you say?

Mr. HART. Well, he has information far greater than I. It would not surprise me if it did.

Mr. FULTON. Here is Israel with 1,750,000 people, for example. There is Egypt with 22 million, Jordan with 1.5 million, there is Lebanon with 1.4 million, and Syria would have about 3.5 million people. That would be about 28,400,000 people, total.

The Arab world actually contains many more countries than that, so it amounts to about 40 million people as against 1,750,000 in Israel.

Why do you think that Israel is such a great threat to the Arab world or can be a world power so soon, when there is that tremendous adverse population already against them? Or why would you think that Israel would be such a great threat in the world of economics and power and would hurt the United States if it became a world power, when the United States with 169 million people has a \$416 billion rate of national income, gross national product, during the current fiscal year? Or, for example, the State of Israel is just as big as my own county back in Pennsylvania, and we in our area pay \$1,250 million worth of Federal taxes every year, and that is larger than the gross national income of Israel.

Now let us put it into context. Aren't we getting this so-called threat of Israel you mention, just a little bit out of size?

Mr. HART. I don't think so, sir. In the first place, the dollars you are talking about are, of course, depreciated dollars. Forty-eight cents or whatever the dollar is worth, today.

Mr. FULTON. No, they are not 48 cents, sir, they are 52 and a fraction cents. They are Eisenhower dollars.

Mr. HART. The last I heard it was getting down below 50 cents. You asked why I am afraid, Congressman.

Mr. FULTON. It appears to me you are exaggerating it, at certain points, you see.

Mr. HART. I am afraid for this reason. That those who are pushing the scheme of world Zionism are a very bold, imaginative people who do not hesitate to intimidate or try to intimidate anybody that they want to influence. I am reliably informed that much of the money they have collected from private citizens to send over there has been literally forced out of them.

Mr. FULTON. But look at this. You believe in the Bible, certainly, in the Old Testament. You know it was sometime between 1440 B. C. to 1308 B. C. that the Exodus occurred, when God had Moses lead the children of Israel out of Egypt and for 40 years through the wilderness toward this same Promised Land. They buried Moses in the Valley of Moab, and he never got there. But it was God who did it, it wasn't the United States, and likewise, it was clear back about the reign of King Merneptah, the son of Rameses II, that God decided that the tribes of Israel should go back to the Promised Land. There is evidence the Jewish have been in the Israel area, from archaeological records, ever since the year 1267 B. C. There have been people of the Judaistic religion in Palestine and in Israel, in more or less numbers ever since. The fact that these people have been decimated or fled from persecution in the area, should not be a reason against existence of the survivors.

When Moses was the founder of Judaism which has descended to Mohammedanism, and to the Jewish religion and Christianity and these two great religions are both parts of the same branch, why then do you pick a fight between them? Why don't you try to settle the fight the way some of us do and say give aid to both of them and don't discriminate. Why not say, let's help them all up the economic scale, and say that they are all fine people so we in the United States can get along with every people in the Middle East? Why don't you take that position?

Mr. HART. Well, I believe, sir, in the Bible, I am sure, as much as you do. As much as all of us do. I respect the Jews for their great history in the past but the fact remains that they have not been in Palestine, or had not been down to 30 or 40 years ago, except in trifling numbers, for 1,300 years.

Mr. FULTON. But for much longer than that they have been there. It was 1267 B. C., that archaeologists date the first known record of the Jews in the Israel area. It was God who directed them to go. Now why are you opposed to God's direction? You say we both believe in the Bible and now you don't want to go by it.

Mr. HART. No. I think to press their cause there will bring about war. It is just what Soviet Russia wants, sir. Just exactly. We are playing right into Soviet Russia's hands, just as we have so often in the last 30 or 40 years.

Mr. FULTON. Are you looking at the immediate prospect, that the existence of Israel or even her people might cause war that will involve the United States? Therefore you say, that although these Israeli people have lived in the area now called Israel for a period of 3,100 to 3,200 years in varying numbers, that they should not any longer even be permitted to exist there, as the Arab States exist in their respective areas? Certainly you don't mean that the people of Israel should be removed, or destroyed, as the extremist Arab politicians say?

Mr. HART. No, sir, but Congressman, the Jews and the Arabs in varying numbers, but substantial numbers of both, have lived in Palestine amicably and in a most friendly way for 1,300 years. Nothing happened adversely, they got along perfectly and men of both sides say so. It wasn't until the world Zionist movement under Herzl, starting in the latter part of the 19th century, conceived this scheme of building up a world power that would have its seat of power at Jerusalem, and then they began bringing in these Jewish people from various parts of the world, principally central Europe, and they forced through the Balfour resolution, which was misinterpreted. You know the whole history.

In other words, it has all been changed, not by the Arabs, who did live peaceably with the Jews in Palestine, but by outside Zionist influences.

Mr. FULTON. Let me finish with this point: When we in the United States maintain a policy of being able to move against a possible enemy in one-half the time and in one-half the distance, and we maintain foreign bases and have friendly countries where our troops can be stationed, why does your organization, then, oppose foreign aid of every kind and variety, not only to the people whom you don't like, for example, but also even to the people whom you befriend, the Arabs? Why do you oppose it every place?

Mr. HART. Well, we don't oppose foreign aid in every place. As I said, we have been glad to see it done in certain places where it has been used with great discretion.

Mr. FULTON. But you would give it then to the Arabs and not to the Israelis; is that the case?

Mr. HART. What is that?

Mr. FULTON. You would give foreign aid, economic or military, to the Arabs and not the Israelis?

Mr. HART. I wouldn't give it; I would loan it.

I think we ought to get away from the give away business.

Mr. FULTON. Thank you.

Chairman GORDON. Mr. Hays of Ohio.

Mr. HAYS of Ohio. In your statement you use the word "we" considerably, "we of the National Economic Council." Can you tell us who "we" is?

Mr. HART. The National Economic Council is a nonprofit organization formed under the laws of the State of New York. We have upward of 2,000 members in all parts of the country, not a large membership.

We are run by a board of directors of about 30, and an executive committee of about 6 or 8. The substance of what I am saying here has been prepared very carefully with the consultation of most of the members of our executive committee and one or more board members.

Mr. HAYS of Ohio. Now I know just as much as I did before. I understand you are pretty reluctant to expose the list of contributors who furnish you with the wherewithal that makes your organization function; is that correct?

Mr. HART. Well, we don't give it out any more than any other organization gives it out, unless we have to. We were compelled to do it by the lobby investigation of the late Mr. Buchanan in 1950, and thereupon some of our "friends" who didn't agree with what we were

saying promptly proceeded to canvass them, which we think was the purpose of the investigation. We had nothing to hide. They gradually tried to persuade our supporters to discontinue giving, by promise, by threat, or whatever. But I don't know of any organization who voluntarily offers the list of those who contribute. We are not ashamed of anyone who contributes. Nobody contributes but Americans.

Mr. HAYS of Ohio. Mr. Chairman, in view of the past history of this organization before the Congress, and in view of the definite anti-Semitic tone it has taken, and anti-British and anti a great many friends of the United States, I just want to say that I am going to examine this paper very carefully, and if I find my position on this resolution coincides with the position of Mr. Hart in any instances, I am going to reevaluate my position pretty carefully. That is all.

Chairman GORDON. Mr. Jackson.

Mr. JACKSON. Mr. Chairman, in the light of the ecclesiastical and historical erudition of my colleague, Mr. Fulton, I am struck dumb. I have no questions.

Chairman GORDON. Mr. Byrd.

Mr. BYRD. I have no questions, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. FULTON. Would you yield a moment, Mr. Byrd?

Mr. BYRD. I shall be glad to yield to my distinguished friend, Mr. Fulton.

Mr. FULTON. May I say to Mr. Hart I did appreciate the exchange and his firm answers. I felt he answered from his own point of view, and I credit him with an honesty of purpose. While his views did not coincide with mine, nevertheless I respect his statement of his views.

Chairman GORDON. Mr. Morano.

Mr. MORANO. Mr. Hart, do you believe in trying to uplift the standards of peoples who desire to be free all over this world?

Mr. HART. Yes.

Mr. MORANO. You do?

Mr. HART. Yes, sir.

Mr. MORANO. Do you agree with me that the standard of living of the Israelis was at a very low point in 1947?

Mr. HART. Well, I don't know much about what the standard was then; but most of them, of course, were newcomers. They were probably getting started.

But as for the standard of living before the Israelis began to come in, before the Zionists came in, the standard of living in Palestine was, on the whole, fairly good. They had a big tourist business, and I understand it was very good. I had never been there then, but so I am told.

Mr. MORANO. Your testimony talks about the squalor. It says here, "In 1948 700,000 Palestinian Arabs, most of whom were living in squalor," and so on.

Mr. HART. Yes. Many of those people, before they were driven out, were people of means. They had jobs. They owned their own farms, their own houses, many of them. And the squalor is to be found in the Arab countries in the refugee camps which they have been obliged to live in, this six or seven hundred thousand of them.

I visited some of those camps.

Mr. MORANO. You would agree, then, that you want to uplift the standards of living of the peoples all over the world, and that would include the Israelis and the Palestinian Arabs and all the other Arabs in the Middle East?

Mr. HART. Well, the State of Israel is something that we have constructed, and it is a thorn in the flesh of peaceful relations between the United States and the Arabs.

Mr. MORANO. That is not my question. I am not talking about whether it is a thorn in the flesh; I am talking about the people.

You said in the beginning you wanted to uplift the standards of living of peoples all over the world. Now you don't want to refute that statement or withdraw it, do you?

Mr. HART. I don't want to withdraw it, but I am certainly excepting the people who invaded that country and forcibly have driven out the people who lived there for centuries.

Mr. MORANO. Do you know anything about the Jordan development plan?

Mr. HART. In a general way.

Mr. MORANO. What generally do you believe it includes?

Mr. HART. Well, right there, as I understand it the great opposition to that comes from the fact that the Arabs are so nettled with having the Israelis, who have seized their own properties—and many of them came from Palestine and are now living in Jordan—that that is the great obstacle that we have had in trying to get that scheme through.

Mr. MORANO. We have some Christian shrines in Palestine, have we not?

Mr. HART. Of course.

Mr. MORANO. You wouldn't want us driven out of there, would you? Or have our Christian shrines destroyed and the people taking care of them driven out?

Mr. HART. The Christians have been driven away from some of their shrines in Jerusalem. But most of them are in the Jordan side.

Mr. MORANO. By whom?

Mr. HART. By the Israelis.

Mr. MORANO. I never heard that before.

Mr. HAYS of Ohio. I think that statement is open to doubt, that question of yours.

Mr. MORANO. But the point I am trying to make is, you say that you would like to lift the standards of living of peoples all over the world, and yet you would want to cut off private money from this country or any other country from going into an area where it can be used to uplift the standard of living and block progress; is that what you want to do?

Mr. HART. I will say in answer to that that so long as we permit these huge sums to be sent over there—which is all that keeps the State of Israel going—we may expect continued trouble with the Arabs, and we may expect the Soviets to continue to make headway with them.

Mr. MORANO. Let's get to that for a minute. You say in one place in your statement that the Russians are making headway because of the creation of Israel; is that right?

Mr. HART. Well, I believe that.

Mr. MORANO. You say that communism is making headway because of that fact?

Mr. HART. Yes.

Mr. MORANO. And they are trying to get control of that area because of that fact?

Mr. HART. Because we have driven the Arabs into the hands of the Soviets.

Mr. MORANO. In the next paragraph you say, "Russia both under the Czars and the Soviets has long had its eyes on the Middle East."

Mr. HART. That is true.

Mr. MORANO. "Has long wanted a warm-water port and has long sought to cut the lines of communication to the Orient."

When you say, "long sought," I assume you mean back before 1947?

Mr. HART. It goes back 200 or 300 years, part of it.

Mr. MORANO. Isn't your statement in contradiction or in conflict?

Mr. HART. Not at all. I mentioned those desires of Russia, whether under the Czars or under the Soviets, because we had those to reckon with, anyway. Then we went to work and by reaching in and setting up this state which is so abhorred by the Arabs, we have added one more Russian aim which is perhaps enough to tip the scales.

Mr. MORANO. Whose side did the Arabs fight on in World War II?

Mr. HART. They were on the British side, after Lawrence of Arabia rounded them up.

Mr. HAYS of Ohio. That is World War I.

Mr. MORANO. I didn't ask you about that. I asked you about World War II.

Mr. HART. I think it was mixed in World War II.

Mr. MORANO. Whose side was Israel on in World War II?

Mr. HART. Well, Israel didn't exist then.

Mr. MORANO. Didn't they have a force fighting on the side of the allies?

Mr. HART. They might have had a small unit, but I think you will find that the Arabs also had some troops fighting on the allies' side. I think it was very mixed, then.

Mr. MORANO. Whose side were the Arabs on when Mussolini invaded Ethiopia?

Mr. HART. Frankly, I don't know. But then England didn't have the nerve to do anything.

Mr. MORANO. On what basis do you make the statement that Israel is not a democracy?

Mr. HART. Well, what is a democracy, Congressman?

Mr. MORANO. I am asking the questions. You are on the witness stand.

Mr. HART. But what is a democracy? There are as many definitions almost as there are people who try to define it. It means a government by the whole people. We know perfectly well we don't have government by the whole people.

Mr. MORANO. You want people who are free all over the world to keep their freedom?

Mr. HART. Yes, but that isn't done under a democracy.

Mr. MORANO. Do you want to enlarge the areas of freedom all over the world?

Mr. HART. Of course.

Mr. MORANO. Then your answers are contradictory to what your statement says here.

Mr. HART. I don't think so, sir.

Mr. MORANO. No further questions, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman GORDON. Mr. Selden—

Mr. SELDEN. Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Hart, whether or not this issue should have been raised is debatable, but the issue was raised when the President requested this resolution. Under these circumstances, and should Congress fail to act on the President's request at this time, in your opinion, what effect would that have on the nations principally affected by the resolution, both our friends and our enemies?

Mr. HART. Well, I assume the Congress will take some action in response to the President's request.

Mr. SELDEN. Would you favor such action?

Mr. HART. I would favor some action, in a reserved way.

Mr. SELDEN. In other words, you would favor generally the resolution except for the time limit on it?

Mr. HART. No, I think it is entirely too broad. I think it is an abdication of power by the Congress.

And as for it being left to the President to decide when this resolution shall expire, when he decides that conditions are all right, we might wait a very long time indeed.

I don't think the Congress should abdicate all its part of the power in the question of whether there is to be peace or war. And I think this is one of the times when Congress ought to act and stand up. Of course, it is more true with the Senate; but nevertheless this is something that is to be a joint resolution. I think it places the problem right squarely before the Congress: what is the Congress going to do about the Middle East? Is it going to let the present situation drift as it has been drifting?

Now when you think of it, Congressman, the only money, the only help that most of those refugees, of whom there are 600,000 or 700,000—the only help they get, as I mentioned in my paper here, is 9 cents a day, which comes from the United Nations. That money has to be stretched pretty far to give them anything. That has gone on for nearly 9 years. No wonder it is a sore.

Mr. SELDEN. Let us put the question this way, then: Suppose Congress passes a resolution that is so different from the President's request that it has no real resemblance to it. What effect do you think that would have?

Mr. HART. I assume Congress would not pass a resolution that would be so at variance with the President's ideas that it would not have some effect, but I don't think the Congress is going to do any good just by giving the President whatever he wants, because sometimes he wants too much. I am not talking about this particular President; I am talking about any President, any Chief Executive.

I think the Chief Executive of the United States has had too much influence in foreign policy. We think that the provisions of the constitution that give to the Congress, certainly the power of the purse, and in the case of the Senate, the power of advice and consent, I think they have been too much ignored.

Mr. SELDEN. I have no further questions.

Chairman GORDON. Mrs. Church—

Mrs. CHURCH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Hart, your organization started out against high taxes; is that true?

Mr. HART. Yes.

Mrs. CHURCH. Do you include in your appeals now the anti-Semitic expressions that you have expressed here this morning? Has your organization changed its fundamental character, and do the people who subscribe to it know of your position on this issue?

Mr. HART. Mrs. Church, that doesn't worry us at all.

Mrs. CHURCH. What doesn't worry you, sir?

Mr. HART. This fear that some of our supporters will think we are anti-Semitic.

And I would just like to challenge that word. What on earth can the word "anti-Semitic" mean when we are talking about the Arabs and the Jews, both of whom are Semites, one just as much as the other. How can you be anti-Semitic there.

Mrs. CHURCH. I would accept the correction in semantics. I was using the term in its popular usage, perhaps because of my amazement at the extent of your feeling on this matter, when you yourself have never been to Israel.

My question was not meant to be in any sense insulting, sir, and I hope you will not so take it.

Mr. HART. I realize that. But while I have never been in Israel, I have been all around its frontiers, and in the Jordan part of Jerusalem.

Mrs. CHURCH. The point is this: I had not realized until this morning that you had this violent feeling, anti-Israel, and I was merely asking whether or not all of those who contributed to your organization shared your feeling, whether it was made a basis of common sympathy, "consciousness of kind," as professor Giddings used to say.

Mr. HART. Mrs. Church, I think they all feel the same, and I think there are a multitude of people in this country who feel the same way.

Mrs. CHURCH. The other day the recent Secretary of State made a remark here—I refer to Mr. Acheson—that I thought indicated a realistic approach to the problem. He said it was not a question any more—and I am paraphrasing loosely—of whether or not the State of Israel should have been established, that we had to look upon it as an entity which actually existed.

And I would like, if I might, sir, to go a little bit beyond what you have said. You think that no further aid should be given from this country, public or private, to Israel.

Do you think that the Government could actually cut off the private donations that are given by Jewish people in this country out of their sympathy and devotion to Israel? Has the Government a right to do that?

Mr. HART. Yes, certainly, in the national interest.

Mrs. CHURCH. Do you mean that a law could be proposed—I do not say that it could be passed? Do you think that it would be constitutional for a democracy to legislate against private giving to any cause which people wish to give to?

Mr. HART. I think that could be done in the public interest, and I think the public would support it.

May I say, too, I don't think we are a democracy. That is that same old question. I think we were designed to be and still are a republic with a division of powers.

Mrs. CHURCH. I think that most of us still want it to be. I think that we can agree on that one point.

But, sir, if you went beyond your proposal here this morning of cutting off all aid, private or public, it would indicate an attempt to deny existence to Israel; wouldn't it? Do you not think that Israel would cease to exist? And, if so, could you possibly justify what would happen to the thousands of people who have gone there in hope, through no fault of their own, and were urged to do so, and who have accomplished so much in that country? How can you possibly obliterate from your mind anything of the human element involved?

Mr. HART. I think this country can and should do anything of interest to the national survival. We are getting close to a question of national survival, overextended as we are everywhere, on every side. We have a threat now of more great spending fields to be opened.

Mrs. CHURCH. The question is not only one of overextension. I am wondering whether you are not attacking something which is basic to our concept of freedom.

Mr. HART. I can answer your question, Mrs. Church, by telling you of an American diplomat, and naturally I cannot and will not tell his name, but who knew the Middle East and who told me this. He said, "Israel is not a nation. Israel is a contraption that is kept going by the money collected in New York, London, and Johannesburg."

Mrs. CHURCH. That might be his description of it, but assuredly not mine.

Mr. HART. So it isn't as though this was a young nation that started out and was doing wonderfully well; it is still largely supported in a most artificial way.

Mrs. CHURCH. Its viability is probably assured by what comes, but let me assure you this: If you had been to Israel as I have been, no matter with what feeling you went, you could not come away with anything but a sense of respect, respect for the courage, not necessarily agreement with their policy—I am not urging that on you—but respect for their courage and respect for what they have done under even so much of a free system as they have, to prove that our American system can be made to work, the free-enterprise system.

If you go into weighing points of this and points of that, that is one thing. But if you go into Israel today, I do not think even you, sir, could come out with a feeling that you could sacrifice human beings who have accomplished so much, and I think Mr. Zablocki would agree, that you would stand with them for the kind of freedom that we would like to see them obtain.

I think that I would be untrue to something that I believe in myself, if I did not urge you to reconsider your willingness to sacrifice hundreds of thousands of human beings, which your argument certainly lends itself to do.

Mr. MORANO. Would you yield?

Mrs. CHURCH. I will be glad to.

Mr. MORANO. Mr. Hart, you say that America is a Republic and therefore you are for this Republic.

Mr. HART. Yes, sir.

Mr. MORANO. Then you ought to be for Israel because Israel is a Republic, too. It says so, "the Republic of Israel."

Mr. HART. Soviet Russia is the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, too.

Mrs. CHURCH. Mr. Hart, may I just finish by saying this: I would not want you to think that any of us fail to see the basic problem;

but we still hope wisdom will be given, if prayerfully asked, to help us to find a solution that will accept the situation as it is and somehow or other do away with the animosities, at least, obliterate them to the extent that opposing peoples can learn to live together. Very frankly, I hope that you will reexamine your position on this.

Mr. HART. Well, Mrs. Church, I have given my position a great deal of thought, and I shall certainly continue to consider it. But I realize perfectly that to cut off aid would mean hardship on many individuals. But the alternative may be the wrecking of the American Republic.

Mrs. CHURCH. I think the first interpretation of the action which you recommend naturally would be that we were indicating weakness on our part rather than strength. That is something for us to think about, too. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman GORDON. Mr. Pilcher—

Mr. PILCHER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Hart, do you think that this worldwide Zionism is any threat to the independence of this country?

Mr. HART. Yes, sir, I do.

Mr. PILCHER. Does your organization believe in the United Nations?

Mr. HART. We are not particularly favorable to the United Nations. The United Nations has led to war and will lead to more wars, in our opinion.

Mr. PILCHER. Would you be in favor of this country pulling out of the United Nations?

Mr. HART. Yes, at the right time. I don't think it is doing us any good whatever. It was our associating with the United Nations that led to our ultimate defeat in North Korea. It is a sort of screen behind which things go on that the American people can't see. Perhaps Members of the Congress can't see everything that goes on. I don't think the United Nations, sir, can continue and survive, with the American Republic surviving, too.

Mr. PILCHER. Did your organization agree with the foreign policy of the Roosevelt administration?

Mr. HART. No, sir, not so far as it got us into war.

Mr. PILCHER. How about the Truman administration?

Mr. HART. No, sir; not so far as it got us into the Israel war.

Mr. PILCHER. Does it agree with the foreign policy of the Eisenhower administration?

Mr. HART. In some respects, but in some respects not.

Mr. PILCHER. Do you think that the bases we have scattered all over the world are any protection to us against Soviet Russia?

Mr. HART. Of course, they are supposed to be. Some of them are and some of them are not. But, when I see the Icelanders come out and tell us to get out after we have been there for a few years on their invitation, and we actually were ready apparently to get out, and then somehow they decided they wanted us to stay, I wonder how many other bases we can be invited to get out from.

Suppose the Arabs of North Africa could take umbrage in what we did or did not do and asked us to get out. Are we going to fight to stay in?

Mr. PILCHER. Well, if we said we are opposed to the giveaway that people call mutual security and foreign aid and cut that off entirely,

how would we maintain these bases we have scattered around the world?

Mr. HART. Well, of course, I thought you were speaking of the economic features.

Mr. PILCHER. I am talking about the protection of the United States from Soviet aggression.

Mr. HART. I wouldn't say that we could certainly make a wholesale withdrawal from these bases, but I am more afraid that we will get thrown out as, for instance, in Iceland, than I am that we will withdraw. We are terribly overextended around the world with our troops. In the event of war a good many problems would arise, I take it.

Mr. PILCHER. Well, war is bad, but isn't slavery under international communism worse than war?

Mr. HART. Yes; it would be. We have been opposed to communism. We were called cranks back in 1936 when we started talking about the dangers of communism. We think it is a danger that is infinitely greater today.

One of the things we have to do is not necessarily spend so much money but try to get some friends. The money we have scattered around the world hasn't bought us many friends. We have seen many instances of that. That is all the greater reason why it is a pity that we should throw away the friendship of the Arabs accumulated over a century, and in effect issue an invitation to Soviet Russia to come into the Middle East.

Mr. PILCHER. You don't think that our mutual security program has helped raise the standards of living of people in other places of the world?

Mr. HART. It may have, but it has been at the expense of inflation here in the United States. That story isn't told yet.

Mr. PILCHER. Aren't the majority of the people of the United States much better off today than they were 25 or 30 years ago?

Mr. HART. Yes, but with the increasing inflation and the threat of greater debt we are in really a difficult position here in the United States.

Mr. HAYS of Ohio. What about the President's statement that inflation has been checked? You say it is increasing.

Mr. HART. It was checked over a period of 2 or 3 years.

Mr. HAYS of Ohio. In his State of the Union message he said it had been checked. I assume he meant up to that day.

Mr. HART. If you measure the inflation by the figures for the prices, the cost of living, I think that in the last half of 1956 inflation grew some. Maybe since then it has been extended. But here we have been having the most tremendous business activity. We don't know how long that is going to keep going. We are living on borrowed money.

Chairman GORDON. Mr. O'Hara.

Mr. O'HARA. Mr. Hart, I understand that you are advocating that we should go out and win some friends; is that your thought?

Mr. HART. Yes, sir.

Mr. O'HARA. You are suggesting that the best way for us to win friends is to cut the throat of Israel; did I understand you correctly?

Mr. HART. Well, I wouldn't put it that way, but I think we are cutting our own throats by—

Mr. O'HARA. No. I want to know, is that what you are advocating, cutting the throat of Israel?

Mr. HART. You are contending, sir, if America's support was withdrawn, Israel would collapse.

Mr. O'HARA. Let's get down to some simple language. Is that what you are advocating, cutting the throat of Israel?

Mr. HART. No, I wouldn't put it that way.

Mr. O'HARA. Mr. Hart, you represent 2,000 Americans?

Mr. HART. Yes, sir.

Mr. O'HARA. And you have 2,000 contributors?

Mr. HART. Yes, sir.

Mr. O'HARA. And they come from all over this great country of ours?

Mr. HART. That is right.

Mr. O'HARA. Would you say there are more than these 2,000 Americans who agree with you?

Mr. HART. A great many times that number.

Mr. O'HARA. But as far as you know, basing your estimate on the number of persons who have declared themselves, only 2,000 Americans agree with you?

Mr. HART. I wouldn't agree to that.

Mr. O'HARA. The 2,000 have proven their agreement by giving you a little money?

Mr. HART. Yes.

Mr. O'HARA. Do you send out circulars periodically asking for donations?

Mr. HART. Yes.

Mr. O'HARA. And on those donations you have come down here to Washington?

Mr. HART. Yes.

Mr. O'HARA. Is that your means of making a livelihood?

Mr. HART. Well, as a matter of fact, I have come down here on my own expense. I may be reimbursed sometime, but we are not rich by any means.

Mr. O'HARA. I am asking this question respectfully: Have you any other means of livelihood, other than anti-Semitism?

Mr. HART. A few directors' fees, and a few more things like that; not much.

Mr. O'HARA. Mr. Hart, I think your being here and having been listened to so patiently and respectfully by this committee, whose members I would say are not in agreement with you, is symbolic of our democracy. The distinguished and brilliant Congresswoman, Mrs. Church, did try to lead you to sinner's bench but you ducked gracefully but with much determination. I have no questions.

Mr. HART. And I would not agree that I have come to the sinner's bench or to the penitent's bench.

Mr. O'HARA. I hope you do before it is too late.

Mr. HART. No.

Mr. FULTON. Would the gentleman yield to clear up a question there?

Chairman GORDON. Mr. Fulton.

Mr. FULTON. I believe there was a question inadvertently put to you that you didn't hear fully. You were asked if you had any other livelihood or means of making a living other than, I believe it was stated, anti-Semitism.

Mr. HART. No, I didn't hear that.

Mr. FULTON. I thought that should be called to your attention. I think you are answering the question on what you heard: Did you have any other means of making a livelihood other than appearing as a witness for your organization, or working for your organization.

Mr. HART. I am obliged to you, sir, for calling that to my attention. I didn't hear the remark about anti-Semitism.

Mr. FULTON. There is no criticism, but my comment is aimed at fairness.

Mr. HART. As I stated to Mrs. Church, we think the word "anti-Semitism" is utterly meaningless. We are for America and for the preservation of American independence, and we think it is in great jeopardy. As a matter of fact, 90 percent of the work of the National Economic Council has nothing to do with Zionism or Israel. We deal with many subjects, both in our Economic Council publications and in appearances before congressional committees.

Mr. O'HARA. I thank the gentleman from Pennsylvania for putting that in the record because I would not want the witness put in the wrong light. I would not try to trick him into a confession. Your answer was an acknowledgment that you are practicing and preaching anti-Semitism. Now, if you are not, clearly you should have an opportunity to clear yourself, to get off the hook.

Mr. HART. Well, Congressman, I think putting it that way is really an insulting remark, in view of what I have said about anti-Semitism. Let me say to you that there is no such thing as anti-Semitism. If you mean "anti-Zionism," why not say that?

Mr. O'HARA. It is not my thought nor has it ever been the practice of this great committee to accord to any witness any less than a courteous and respectful hearing. I must confess, however, that I did resent your suggestion that good men and women, among them constituents of mine, were not within their rights and within the boundaries of good morals, in contributing their money to keep Israel free.

Mr. HART. May I say ahead of Israel and any other country in the world we place the United States of America. We are for that first. And it is time that this country gave more attention to its own security and its own independence. If we don't, I think we are going to be in grave danger.

Mr. HAYS of Ohio. Do you yield, Mr. O'Hara, just for one question?

Mr. O'HARA. Yes.

Mr. HAYS of Ohio. You commit your semantic acrobatics. Let me say "anti-Jewish." You don't have trouble differentiating between "anti-Jewish" and "anti-Israeli."

Mr. HART. I didn't get that.

Mr. HAYS of Ohio. You talk about the semantics of anti-Semitism. To get away from any possibility of misunderstanding, would you say that you are not anti-Jewish and not anti-Israeli?

Mr. HART. I would certainly say I am not anti-Jewish. We have many Jewish supporters and friends; men like—not that he is a supporter—Alfred Lilienthal, who has written the book, "What Price Israel." Have you read it, sir?

Mr. HAYS of Ohio. No, I have not.

Mr. HART. It would be illuminating to you.

Mr. HAYS of Ohio. That may be, but it is one of those I have missed.

Mr. HART. Another book by Rabbi Berger, Who Knows Better Must Say So.

Mr. HAYS of Ohio. Are those books those that you send to the Congress every once in awhile, that you pay for and send without any cost?

Mr. HART. We don't send any books to the Congress.

Mr. HAYS of Ohio. You don't send any at all?

Mr. HART. I don't think we ever have at any time. Every Congressman gets our Economic Council letters. I think you recognize them.

Mr. HAYS of Ohio. My staff knows what to do with them.

Mr. HART. I didn't hear that, sir.

Mr. HAYS of Ohio. I am familiar with what they look like, although I don't see them any more. My staff knows what to do with them, and they don't bother me with them.

Mr. HART. Mr. Chairman, I would like to say again that I am not, and never have been, anti-Jewish. I know few Americans who are. I have Jewish friends and for years had a Jewish partner. The Economic Council has Jewish members. However, I am unequivocally anti-Zionist, as are many of my Jewish friends. Some members of this committee seem not to differentiate between Jews and Zionists, but there is a world of difference. The Zionists are dedicated to promoting Israel, while non-Zionist Jews have America as their only allegiance.

Chairman GORDON. Mr. Fountain.

Mr. FOUNTAIN. I have no questions, sir, but as a member of this committee I am very glad to get the benefit of your thinking.

That is all, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. BYRD. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Chairman GORDON. Mr. Byrd—

Mr. BYRD. Mr. Hart, let me say that while I do not agree with all of the premises in your statement, and while I disagree with most of your conclusions, I want you to know that I, as one member of this committee, do not impugn your patriotism, nor do I question your sincerity of purpose or your honesty in presenting your views.

I think that you have every right to state your opinions as an American citizen, and it takes a great deal of courage to present them as you have today.

There is justification for some of the things you have said.

May I say again that you have done a good job of it.

Mr. HAYS of Ohio. Will you yield to me for about a half a minute, whoever has the time?

Mr. FOUNTAIN. I yield to the gentleman.

Mrs. BOLTON. Mr. Chairman, may I inquire if we are under the 5-minute rule?

Chairman GORDON. We are under the 5-minute rule.

Mrs. BOLTON. May we stay under the 5-minute rule.

Chairman GORDON. Mr. Fountain has the time.

Mr. HAYS of Ohio. I think it is a fact that everybody on this committee thinks you have a right to say whatever you want to say, but in view of the fact that we have allowed you to come here and take nearly 2 hours' time before the committee to air your views. Although I may violently disagree with most of the things you say, I don't think that Mr. Byrd meant—and if he did, I want to clear my posi-

tion—that we don't think you have a right to say it. I just wanted through my questioning to try to point out what I consider to be some rather weak positions that you have taken.

Chairman GORDON. Mr. Fascell—

Mr. FASCELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. HART, do you believe that Zionism is a religion?

Mr. HART. I didn't know there was a religion called Zionism.

Mr. FASCELL. Do you believe it is a political ideology?

Mr. HART. Yes.

Mr. FASCELL. Do you believe that communism is a religion?

Mr. HART. It might be called so.

Mr. FASCELL. Do you believe it is a political ideology?

Mr. HART. Yes.

Mr. FASCELL. Do you believe that either a religion or ideology can be extinguished by killing the people who believe in it?

Mr. HART. I am not advocating killing anybody.

Mr. FASCELL. I didn't say you were. I merely asked you for your opinion on whether or not an ideology or religion can be extinguished by killing the people who believe in it.

Mr. HART. Not necessarily. It probably helps at times.

Mr. FASCELL. Helps at times to extinguish it or perpetuate it?

Mr. HART. I think sometimes killing the advocates of a religion frequently helps the religion.

Mr. FASCELL. To perpetuate the religion and not to extinguish it?

Mr. HART. That is the whole idea of the prophets of old and the early Christian martyrs.

Mr. FASCELL. Do you believe that economic and political instability in other nations in the world creates a potential problem to the security and independence of the United States of America?

Mr. HART. Not necessarily; no. There was insecurity in many other countries in the world for centuries. There never had been anything else. We got along; in fact, we grew. We grew because of our marvelous system of government.

Mr. FASCELL. Then you believe, sir, that the United States of America, as long as it is economically stable and politically stable, regardless of what happens to any of the people in the rest of the world, can survive?

Mr. HART. Well, I think that is a different question.

Mr. FASCELL. That is the converse.

Mr. HART. I think we probably can if we will mind our own business enough so that we don't go broke trying to save the whole world.

Mr. FASCELL. That is restating the same proposition.

Mr. HART. In other words, sir, my thought is, what America has done, the great service it has done has been the example it has set. An example of freedom and the ability to render that example is now being placed in jeopardy.

Mr. FASCELL. By expenditures of money?

Mr. HART. By overextending.

Mr. FASCELL. By expenditures of money and political intervention in other places in the world?

Mr. HART. Yes.

Mr. FASCELL. Let us examine your statement for a moment on page 1.

Arab diplomats have pointed out that the only deterrent to Israel imperialist ambition is the fear of Russia.

Do you and your organization also concur in that statement?

Mr. HART. I think there is a great deal to that.

Mr. FASCELL (reading):

Therefore, if the United States neutralizes Russia in the Middle East, this to the Arabs would mean giving Israel the green light to attack her neighbors and extend her domain from Suez to the Euphrates.

That statement presupposes the existence of Russian power in the Middle East as of right now; is that not true?

Mr. HART. There is no doubt that Russia has infiltrated to a certain extent, especially in Syria, of course.

Mr. FASCELL. You mean by achieving some power in the governments that exist there?

Mr. HART. In Syria, maybe, yes. Yes. I think it is a growing danger.

Mr. FASCELL. But it is not a thing which you would definitely say exists in full at the present time as your statement would seem to presuppose?

Mr. HART. No; I do not think it exists at the present moment as much as it can exist and, of course, our object is to try to stop it before it gets too far.

Mr. FASCELL. Well, what interpretation do you put on the fact that Israel along with France and Britain was requested to pull out of the area after they have made an attack?

Mr. HART. I have not had the full explanation of that, Congressman. Maybe you know, but it certainly has been a messed-up situation.

Mr. FASCELL. Well, I just wondered what you thought the position of the United States was in view of that fact and in view of the statement which you have just made in your testimony.

Mr. HART. I suppose that when we called on them to withdraw, because of our great prestige, because of the hope of further financial help, they thought they had better do it. I guess that was it.

Mr. FASCELL. So it might not be such a green light as you seem to indicate?

Mr. HART. Well, yes. I think it would be a green light but I am quoting some of these Arab diplomats.

Mr. FASCELL. Well, you concur in the statement so I just wondered how you felt.

Mr. HART. I simply say there is probably something to it.

Mr. FASCELL. Now you go on to say—

if this resolution were adopted the chief cause of dissension in the Middle East would still remain utterly unaffected by anything authorized by this resolution, and you are speaking of the State of Israel, and then you propose that all aid would be cut "both governmental and private" to Israel which, as I understand your theory would then cause Israel to cease to be a factor—to use your own words—would build up the Arab States, would drive them back out of the Soviet arms and put them right back into our arms. Is that a fair paraphrasing of your positions?

Mr. HART. I do not think that what the Arabs fear is the Israelis as of today but they think with continued and probably increased aid from the United States, the Israelis will want to expand and occupy a great deal more of the Arab lands. They are crowded now, where they are.

Mr. FASCELL. How is that a fair assumption in view of the fact that Israel has concurred and is withdrawing in the present attack?

Mr. HART. That may be just a tactic that has been decided upon. Perhaps Israel is afraid. Perhaps Israel was afraid of that intimation the President made when he said something about possibly freezing Israeli assets here in the United States.

Mr. FASCELL. All right, sir, now let us ask another question: Now let us assume what you have advocated has actually taken place and that is that all aid to Israel has been withdrawn and that Israel has ceased to exist as a factor. Do you honestly believe that the Russians would cease to be interested in the Middle East?

Mr. HART. No; not entirely, but I think it would probably tip the scale in favor of the Arabs staying with us.

Mr. FASCELL. Do you mean numbers of people or armies or material wealth, or just what do you mean?

Mr. HART. I am talking about the thinking of the Arab people. The fear, the sentiment, whatever you want to call it.

Mr. FASCELL. Do you honestly believe what the Arab thinks would keep the Russian out of his country?

Mr. HART. Yes, if it were enough.

Mr. FASCELL. Without arms?

Mr. HART. I repeat, I do not think we can hold the Middle East against the Soviet Government if we continue to antagonize the Arabs.

Mr. FASCELL. Well, sir, now that presupposes, because we are talking about great principles and ideals—that the United States would arm all of the Arabs in order to keep the Russians out of the Arab countries.

Mr. HART. Well, we could not arm all the Arabs.

Mr. FASCELL. Do you agree they are certainly not armed now?

Mr. HART. Two or three of the countries have already refused any aid from us, as I understand it. The Arab countries.

Mr. FASCELL. And are getting it from the Russians?

Mr. HART. I do not know, maybe that is it, but they would rather get it from us, I am certain of that.

Mr. FASCELL. Would you agree that if what is done, according to what you suggest, that there would still be a great deal of doubt left—probably a lot more than there is now—that anything would be accomplished?

Mr. HART. I do not believe there would be a great deal of doubt left if we would stop aiding Israel. I think the Arabs would no longer—if they were convinced that we were not going to aid Israel any more, I think the Arabs would be convinced that we were their friends, as we were for a long time.

Mr. FASCELL. I do not know what greater assurance you could give a country than to call off an attack on the country, that you mean to be fair, impartial, and friendly. You want to go one step further than that, which I do not comprehend. What further assurance do you have to give people than to say you have an international body, you have an international police force, and in addition to that you have a country that has been your friend for over a century, as you say, which has stepped in and said, "Now let us stop this attack and let us sit down and see if we cannot work it out."

What more evidence of friendship do you want?

Mr. HART. Have you been in the Middle East, have you been in these countries?

Mr. FASCELL. No, sir; I do not have to go anywhere to be logical.

Mr. HART. I know there is a great deal in that but the Arabs have a perfect obsession with the idea that Israel is going to be built up from the rear, from the United States and from other countries, and it is going to be built up into a government that will overwhelm many of the Middle Eastern countries, and they have no liking for that.

Chairman GORDON. The time of the gentleman has expired.

Mr. FASCELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman GORDON. Mr. Coffin—

Mr. COFFIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. HART, do I take it you at least agree there should be some sort of a resolution wherein it is stated that the United States will use force to defend Middle Eastern countries against overt, armed aggression?

Mr. HART. Of course, that is not what the resolution is. It must be aggression by a Communist dominated country.

Mr. COFFIN. Would you agree with a resolution that said that we should use force to defend a country against overt armed aggression without naming whom the aggressor might be?

Mr. HART. Not unless something were done about the aid to Israel.

Mr. COFFIN. And assume further that we stop all aid to Israel. Would you go along with a resolution—

Mr. HART (interposing). I think now you are approaching it, sir.

Mr. COFFIN. Now assume that that is done, that we stop all aid to Israel; that notwithstanding that, Israel somehow manages to exist as a nation. Assume further that a country around Israel becomes obviously dominated by communism, or assume that it is dominated by its own nationalistic urges but nevertheless aggresses against Israel.

Now with a new resolution that you would favor along with stopping aid to Israel, would you say that then we should carry that resolution out and go to Israel's aid with our Armed Forces?

Mr. HART. Well, I think that if aid were withdrawn from Israel, that Israel would, just as I have said in my statement, cease to be a factor.

Mr. COFFIN. Don't change the ground rules, Mr. Hart. I say assuming by greatest intestinal fortitude it manages to survive as a nation sufficiently long to be attacked by someone else. Do you think we should then go to Israel's defense?

Mr. HART. That would depend, Congressman. That would depend. That is something the committee should consider. I think there are a great many supposes in that and it is rather hard to answer them.

Mr. COFFIN. If you were to make the decision at that time it would not be a very happy decision for you to make, would it?

Mr. HART. Well, as I say, there are so many ifs and supposes in that that it is pretty far ahead.

Mr. COFFIN. But under your resolution as you would like to see it, that is still a possibility, that this country would find itself helping with its Armed Forces to defend a country which you would like to see wither on the vine by the cessation of our economic aid.

Mr. HART. I think it would be best for that whole area, if it did.

Mr. COFFIN. That is all.

Chairman GORDON. Mr. Farbstain—

Mr. FARBSTEIN. No questions.

Chairman GORDON. Thank you, Mr. Hart, for your statement.

We will call on the next witness.

Mr. HART. Thank you Mr. Chairman and ladies and gentlemen, very much.

Chairman GORDON. Our next witness is Mr. Carmen, national commander, Jewish War Veterans of the United States of America.

STATEMENT OF WILLIAM CARMEN, NATIONAL COMMANDER, JEWISH WAR VETERANS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Mr. CARMEN. My name is William Carmen. I am the national commander of the Jewish War Veterans of the United States of America. My home is in Newton, Mass., and the national headquarters of our organization is located at 1712 New Hampshire Avenue NW., Washington, D. C.

Allow me, first to express my appreciation to this committee for the opportunity to appear in behalf of our organization and to express our views with regard to House Joint Resolution 117.

Let me begin by saying that we support the proposals in House Joint Resolution 117, designed to develop economic strength of nations in the general area of the Middle East for the purposes of maintenance of their national independence and improving their living standards.

We further support the proposal to authorize the President to employ the Armed Forces of the United States as he deems necessary to secure and protect the territorial integrity and political independence of those nations, requesting aid against armed aggression from any nation controlled by international communism, particularly in the light of the proviso in House Joint Resolution 117, that such employment shall be consonant with the treaty obligations of the United States and the Charter of the United Nations.

We are likewise in wholehearted agreement with the proposal to authorize appropriations for the purpose of carrying into effect the economic aid and the military provisions embodied in the resolution.

If the situation in this area had not disintegrated to the point where it presently is, these proposals might be enough to accomplish the purpose designed. Unfortunately, however, the situation in the Middle East has been allowed to deteriorate to a point where these proposals are not enough. Communism can never gain a foothold in a healthy political organism. The fact that it has been able to make the headway that it has in this area is because of the conditions which have been allowed to exist. The conflict in the Middle East within the last 2 months has demonstrated the fact that the Sinai Peninsula was intended to become a staging area for a Communist base in the Middle East. The threat of Soviet volunteers in itself exposed a basic flaw in the thinking and implementation thereof on the part of the free world, a flaw which, in our judgment, this resolution if properly implemented will go a long way to relieve. There are many problems, however, in this area which cannot be solved by the measures the resolution presently provides.

Actually, the resolution will in the sense in which it has been defined by the Secretary of State create a wall around the Middle East. Reliance on walls, as demonstrated by history, has been unfounded. Take, for example, the Maginot line of the French and the Great Wall

of China. Each created a delusion which ultimately resulted in disaster. A wall is not enough. The problem always is what is permitted to exist behind the wall. It is behind the wall that we must do everything within our power to make the area a healthy, a vital, a dynamic one, an area of peace where the peoples within it will have equal opportunity, each family to have enough bread, a decent place in which to live, and in which the fundamental rights to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness are to be the right of all. It has been demonstrated that the chief source of friction in the Middle East has been the inability of the nations in the area to establish a way and a standard of living which would permit the peoples thereof to enjoy the fruits of progress as other nations have. Statistics recently published have shown, for example, that in this area the average income is the lowest in the world.

In our judgment, it is essential to realize that no prospect for peace exists unless the nations of the Middle East can come to an agreement—Israel with the Arabs, and the Arabs with Israel. It is, therefore, imperative in this resolution or in any other resolutions which the Congress may find it necessary from time to time to enact in the implementation of this program, to recognize the necessity of dealing with the vital questions, aside from the creation of the wall of protection against outside aggression which this resolution as it now stands envisages.

History shows that the area now occupied by Israel was the road between the East and the West, between Asia and Africa, that when the use of this road was free and untrammelled, and the nations which it served were at peace one with the other, it served as the granary of the world. Through their exchange of goods and services one with the other, and the development of commerce between these nations and the rest of the world, there was established and maintained an economy which permitted the highest standard of living in the then known world. Today this is the lowest subsistence area on earth.

At the risk of repetition, I must again call your attention to the fact that assurance from Communist aggression from without as contemplated by this resolution does not insure the peace of this area nor will it prevent Communist subversion from within. Already apparently a new weapon has been created by the Communists; namely, the threat of volunteers. So today we have the infinitesimal Kingdom of Yemen threatening to call volunteers from the Soviet countries in the pursuit of its quarrel with the United Kingdom.

As the nation which was ultimately responsible for bringing its moral weight into the scales and thereby securing the passage of the United Nations resolution of November 2, 1956, we must recognize that that resolution called, in addition to the withdrawal of the Israeli forces and the British and French forces from Egyptian territory, on the Egyptians themselves to meet certain conditions which they have not yet met. Notwithstanding the armistice agreement of 1950 and the tripartite agreement of 1950, Egypt has continued to declare that a state of war exists between herself and Israel and pursuant to that declaration has denied Israel the use of the Suez Canal and the Straits of Tiran.

This resolution which you are considering must recognize the fact that one of the responsibilities of the United Nations and of the United States, as a member of the United Nations, is to bring about a realiza-

tion of an actual status of peace and freedom of navigation in accordance with international law so far as international seas and canals and straits are concerned. A failure to recognize this fact, and an enactment of the resolution with only the provisions therein contained, can result only in the perpetuation of the status quo, a status of undeclared war, of unbalanced budgets, of the use of the limited resources of these nations in an arms race rather than in developing a better standard of living for their peoples.

We submit this earnestly for the consideration of this committee. In taking this position, we believe that we voice the sentiments of the veteran community of the United States.

In our statement of policy issued shortly after the commencement of hostilities in the Middle East in October 1956, we pointed out that the major questions in our mind were, Will the developments in the Middle East increase or decrease the Soviet Union's influence in that area? We asked what would be the United States future foreign policy in relation to the Arab world and Israel. We questioned whether democracy, as represented by Israel, would lose or gain ground. We asked whether the United Nations would gain in power and prestige by its actions in the Middle East. We took certain definite positions. We supported the action of our Government and the United Nations in their efforts to bring about a real peace in the Middle East. We stated that we stood by Israel in its effort to negotiate a real and lasting peace with its neighbors, and we deplored the closing of the Suez Canal to ships of any nations.

At their annual conventions, the Veterans of Foreign Wars and the American Legion took certain positions with regard to the denial of the use of the facilities of the Suez Canal to any nation and declared that such denial was not consistent with world peace and with the obligations imposed by the Charter of the United Nations.

What I have discussed and the suggestions that I have made thus far deal primarily with the future. I have deliberately refrained from discussing the present situation, particularly the present manifestations of Communist practices including some borrowed from the Nazis.

We are witnessing a revival of the practices of the Nazis from 1932 to 1938, a practice which in subsequent years resulted in genocide. This was the pattern which preceded Hitler's attempt for world conquest. Henchmen of Hitler, of Goebbels, and of Goering, have been identified as the Egyptian advisers. This technique, as we now know, was adopted by the Communists in their anti-Semitic campaign which resulted in the murder of thousands based simply on the fact that they were Jewish. Is Egypt to be the scene of another Buchenwald and Dachau? Can the world, can the United States, witness this without calling for an immediate cessation of these practices? Are people to be deported in the fashion which Egypt is presently deporting the Jews resident in that country for generations, deprived of everything they own and thrown on the charity of a world? Remember that all doors are closed to them except one—Israel. And how consistent is it to allow this practice to continue, and, at the same time, permit Egypt and the other Arab nations to say, as they have said since 1948, that Israel must be destroyed?

I submit that while this resolution may not have as its primary objective the relief of this condition, it cannot be consistent with the

future peace of this area and the world to permit these deportations and deprivations and threats of genocide to hang over the heads of these people. Some way must be found for the will of the world as declared by its instrumentality, the United Nations, to become effective.

Chairman GORDON. Thank you very much for your statement, Mr. Carmen. As I said before, we will recess until 2:30 when the members will present their questions to you.

(Whereupon, at 12:35 p. m., the committee adjourned to reconvene at 2:30 p. m., the same day.)

AFTERNOON SESSION

The committee reconvened at 2:30 p. m., in room 1301, New House Office Building, Hon. Thomas S. Gordon (chairman) presiding.

Chairman GORDON. The committee will come to order.

This is a continuation of this morning's meeting.

Mr. Carmen, will you resume the witness stand? As you know, this is the period for questioning by the members. I am sorry that many of the members are detained, but we will carry on with the ones who are present this afternoon.

Mr. Carmen, I have a question: What can the Congress say in some resolution which will bring about peace between Israel and the Arab states? Have you any idea?

Mr. CARMEN. I would like to suggest, whether it be in a resolution or whether it be an act by the President of the United States, or from the United Nations, I think that generally the end result might be some kind of a conference which would be convened at which we would have representatives of the State of Israel and the Arab nations and where the United States might take the lead, or the United States might take the lead through its ambassador in the United Nations and try to resolve some of the differences at the peace table where we have been so instrumental.

I might make reference, as a matter of fact, to House Joint Resolution 600 which was introduced by a member of this committee, by Congresswoman Edna Kelly; and I would like to make reference also to a telegram that our organization submitted to the President with a similar suggestion. We hope that such a conference will be in the offing in the not too distant future.

Chairman GORDON. Do you believe that a statement of the United States' policy on the right of Israel to ship through the Suez Canal would help in solving the differences between Israel and the Arabs?

Mr. CARMEN. I certainly do. I feel very strongly that passage through the Suez Canal and every other international waterway in the world is the right of every nation, including Israel, of course, but every nation.

I think that should be the recognized right of every nation of the world.

I think the few major differences which are still unsettled between the representatives of the nation of Israel and the United Nations, are by and large with relation to waterways: The Straits of Tiran and the Suez Canal. I think these probably are more than 50 percent of the problems of the moment.

Israel's lifeline is shipping out of its northern ports and its southern port, each of which is pretty much restricted, one by the blockading of the straits, the other, by blockading of the Suez Canal.

Chairman GORDON. Mr. Merrow.

Mr. MERROW. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Carmen, I am glad to hear you say that you support the proposal in House Joint Resolution 117.

On page 2 you go on to say that many problems are in this area which cannot be solved by the resolution as it is presently phrased.

You then give reasons why. Do you have additional phrasing, or ideas that you would write into this resolution as such?

Mr. CARMEN. I, the members of our organization, and the people we represent would like to see brought into this resolution solutions to some of the existing problems. In other words, we can talk about how we can prevent problems in the future, but if we have not solved the problems of the past, we may not be coming to the conclusions we need for solution of the problems of the future.

We make reference, of course, to the internal problems. I specified one which I think is urgent right at the very, very moment, and that is the internal problem within Egypt, the problem confronting the Jews who are now being shipped from Egypt, and people, many of them, without a country.

That type of problem must be solved, and I think the thing we just referred to, the shipping problem, should become part of this resolution. Whether we mention Israel or not, I think there should be specific reference to the freedom of all waterways throughout the world. We know it is a problem in the Middle East.

The things that the United Nations have asked of Egypt have not been followed out, in spite of the fact that we have had a withdrawal from Egyptian territory by Britain and France, and the Israelis are moving out according to schedule.

I think that these things should be brought into this resolution. We should get all nations involved to do as the United Nations has instructed.

Mr. MERROW. You have developed no language to cover it?

Mr. CARMEN. I have no specific language to add to the resolution.

Mr. MERROW. You have mentioned in response to questions, and you also mentioned on page 4 of your testimony, the deportation that is going on in Egypt. Do you have any facts on that problem?

Mr. CARMEN. I would be glad to give you what information I have.

To begin with, I think this is a well-thought out and well-calculated program. It goes back many, many months. As a matter of fact, the Egyptian Government, even when we thought that it was primarily interested in building educational institutions and helping all the people of their own country, all of their own citizens including these Egyptian Jews, even at that moment they had in their governmental employ such men as Karl Eichman, a former collaborator of Joseph Goebbels, Willy Beisner, a former Nazi S. S. police chief who was setting up their internal S. S. program, and Johannas von Leers, who is a former employee of Goering and who was an expert in anti-Jewish affairs.

These people have for many, many months been setting up the program which has now just gone into operation.

I have had the opportunity to speak to an individual who has recently come here from Egypt, an Egyptian of the Jewish faith whose business was taken from him and whose family is still in Egypt.

I have received firsthand a report of the circumstances. It is very evident that the plan was well thought out by the Egyptians, that the experience of the Germans in eliminating 6 million Jews, were made use of. Through this experience they knew the pitfalls and how to try to avoid the errors of the Germans. They have managed to keep a hostage out of every family they are shipping out of Egypt, and therefore you get great reluctance from any of these people to speak too freely out of fear of the lives of the members of their own family.

Unfortunately, there is no country in the world that has accepted these refugees without a country. Those that were nationals of Britain, of course, have gone to Britain. Nationals of France have gone to France. It happens that in Egypt there are people who have been there for generations and have never become citizens of Egypt. But many of those who were Egyptian citizens, and those who became citizens since 1800 have had their citizenship taken away from them. They are now people without a country. Many of them who had citizenship prior to 1900 have had their citizenship taken away from them on one false premise or another. They are without a country and have nowhere to go, with the exception of Israel. That is why I pointed out that when Egyptians talk about eliminating Israel, if they eliminated Israel and shipped the Jews out of their own country, where then would they go?

There have been reports from newspaper people, unfortunately not too many American newspaper people, but I have read some firsthand reports from Swedish newspapermen and others, who have spoken of this internal situation. It is very bad. And it is expected that within the next year or so all the Jews in Egypt will have left that country or will have been forced to leave the country.

Mr. MERROW. Do you have any figures as to how many were in the country, how many have lost their citizenship, how many have been deported, and so on?

Mr. CARMEN. To my recollection there were approximately 50,000 Jews in Egypt. The division was about one-third foreign nationals and one-third Egyptian citizens and about one-third people who are citizens of no country.

The exact number who have already been shipped out is not accurate because they are being shipped daily, but there have been occasions when, within the last week, a shipload of 985 arrived in Italy; so it is probably now running into several thousands. And I would judge that about a third of these stateless people have either been interned as prisoners of the Egyptians or have already been shipped out of the country.

Mr. MERROW. You say those who had citizenship in Egypt had their citizenship taken away?

Mr. CARMEN. That is right, by decree. As to Jews who obtained citizenship since 1900, laws were passed to deprive them of that citizenship. It goes back now over those generations. If they had obtained citizenship during that period, the decree provided a method whereby citizenship could be taken away.

If their families were there prior to 1900 they may still retain their citizenship.

The people arrested first, of course, were the leaders of the Jewish community of Egypt, the leaders of all the various Jewish organizations, the religious and spiritual leaders. Of course, those are the people who could protest and were in the best position to organize the Jewish community in protest. Those people were rounded up first and, of course, it left the Jewish community somewhat without any leadership to fight back.

Mr. MERROW. That is all, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman GORDON. Mr. Carnahan.

Mr. CARNAHAN. Mr. Carmen, I believe you deviated from your statement right in the beginning to say that your organization is one of the oldest veteran organizations. Would you care to make a brief statement for the record concerning your organization?

Mr. CARMEN. Yes; I would be pleased to.

The Jewish War Veterans was founded in 1896. By virtue of the fact that the GAR is no longer active we are now the oldest active war veterans organization in this country.

We represent roughly 850,000 Jewish war veterans, men of Jewish faith who fought for our country, and have a membership of something just under 115,000 paying members, with posts in some 33 States clear across the country.

I guess the rest of it is in the statement, unless there is something specific that you would like to know about the organization.

Mr. CARNAHAN. Has your organization made several representations before congressional committees?

Mr. CARMEN. Yes. Our organization is active in its appearances before various committees where we can express the opinions of our membership and talk on subjects in which we have major interest. We have been strong supporters of foreign aid and have appeared through our representatives, our legislative representative who is sitting with me here, I believe before this committee.

Mr. CARNAHAN. Do you have an associate with you?

Mr. CARMEN. Yes, Mr. Bernard Weitzer, who is our national legislative director.

Mr. CARNAHAN. Mr. Weitzer, you made a presentation before the Subcommittee on International Organizations and Movements?

STATEMENT OF BERNARD WEITZER, LEGISLATIVE DIRECTOR, JEWISH WAR VETERANS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Mr. WEITZER. Yes, I did. For a matter of 10 years now, I think, ever since the Marshall plan was first proposed and the aid program for Greece and Turkey, I have appeared on behalf of our organization in favor of those plans and the Mutual Security Pact, NATO, the foreign aid programs in the Far East, the SEATO program, and all of the programs that were proposed in connection with foreign affairs that would help strengthen the security of our Nation and insure the peace of the world.

For example, by vote of our membership I have testified in support of the activities of the United States in technical assistance programs, both those it conducts through bilateral arrangements with various countries, as well as those that are carried out through the United Nations.

We have appeared as well before the Armed Services Committees on scores of defense bills, the Banking and Currency Committee on housing and economic policy bills, Education and Labor Committee, Ways and Means Committee, Judiciary Committee and, of course, the various Senate committees and House committees dealing with veterans' affairs.

Our interest is not limited to the particular problem that you are considering just now.

As our national commander's statement indicates, we feel very strongly that this resolution which you are considering fits in very well with the pattern of the programs that we have supported, at least during my period here of 10 years in Washington, to strengthen the economy and security of our country and to insure world peace.

Mr. CARNAHAN. Before my time is all gone, I would like to get back to Mr. Carmen again.

I note with appreciation in your statement you say that you are in wholehearted agreement with the authorization of appropriations to carry on economic aid and military aid in the Middle East.

Do you feel that perhaps economic aid or military aid may be as important as the guaranty of the uses of our Armed Forces in the area?

Mr. CARMEN. I think economic aid is certainly equally as important. I think that economic aid must be shared and shared alike. I have no illusions that we should privilege any particular country with the economic aid, with the restriction, of course, that they be free and independent.

Mr. CARNAHAN. You believe that economic development in the area will lessen the strain between the Israeli people and the Arab world?

Mr. CARMEN. I think so. As a matter of fact, I feel very regretful that the aid that has been given, in a large measure—if I may go back to the country of Egypt—has not been used more for the benefit of their people. If a good part of this money had been spent for—and we hear a lot about them—the refugees in the Gaza strip, those people who dispossessed themselves from their homes in Palestine—if money had been spent to educate these people to a better way of life, to resettle and rehabilitate them, I am sure that the problem would have been solved by now.

Unfortunately, they have been used as a psychological weapon, been kept in darkness and hunger, to be pointed to consistently as one of the doings of the country of Israel.

I am certainly in favor of economic aid.

Mr. CARNAHAN. That is all, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman GORDON. Mr. Vorys.

Mr. VORYS. I don't believe I have any questions.

Chairman GORDON. Mr. Hays of Arkansas.

Mr. HAYS of Arkansas. I am sorry that I was not here to hear Mr. Carmen's statement. I have just read the statement and I assure you that I am very sympathetic and appreciate your contribution.

Chairman GORDON. Mrs. Kelly.

Mrs. KELLY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I, too, was unable to be here this morning. However, I have had a chance to read your statement. I welcome you to the committee and compliment you for your very good statement.

Furthermore, I would like to say that I am delighted that you mentioned my resolution, House Joint Resolution 600. It is now in the 85th Congress as House Joint Resolution 45; so please remember the number. It is very important.

Mr. HAYS of Arkansas. Will the lady yield at that point?

Mrs. KELLY. I yield.

Mr. HAYS of Arkansas. While we are plugging for authorships here, I wonder if the gentleman has seen my resolution of last year, House Concurrent Resolution 222?

Mr. CARMEN. On a similar subject?

Mr. HAYS of Arkansas. Yes.

Mr. CARMEN. I will be glad to read it.

Mrs. KELLY. I don't know whether Mr. Hays' resolution is identical with mine, but if it deals with the solution of the basic problems in this area, I will endorse his resolution, too.

I would like to refer to House Joint Resolution 117, page 2. Your organization has endorsed the purpose and the basic ideas in House Joint Resolution 117. But do you realize, Mr. Carmen, that as far as the action of the United States is concerned that if Israel is attacked by Egypt or possibly Syria, unless it was proven that Syria was under the control of international communism, that the United States would take no action?

Mr. CARMEN. Yes. I am familiar with that. Of course, I think it is important to note that—I don't know whether we mentioned it here or not—we feel that the supplying of arms, or volunteers, which we did mention, I am sure, as far as we are concerned, should be defined as aggression under this resolution.

Beyond that I don't think we have too much to worry about as far as Israel is concerned. It probably is not our problem; it is one for the United Nations, if a country is attacked improperly. And I would hope our United States would press vigorously for action.

By the statement of the Israelis themselves and by the proof of their performance in the past, they evidently can take pretty good care of themselves when they don't have to contend with a major power supplying either arms or men.

An act of aggression, however, can still be taken before the United Nations. And I would assume should Israel be attacked by one of its neighbors unjustly, or should one of the Arab neighbors be attacked by Israel unjustly, it would come before the United Nations as the attack of October 29 did, and would be straightened out by the United Nations.

Mrs. KELLY. Further, I would like to ask you: What do you mean by your statement on page 1, that the Sinai peninsula was intended to become a staging area for a Communist base in the Middle East? Would you comment on that?

Mr. CARMEN. Yes. During the Sinai campaign the Israeli forces were fortunate enough to move in very quickly. The Egyptians were so taken by surprise that they, as you probably know, had insufficient time to withdraw their forces and lost a great many troops as prisoners and specifically had absolutely no time in which to withdraw any of the supplies that had been stored up on the Sinai peninsula.

There is a single-track railway, and even if they thought they had time certainly they didn't have the facilities to move out.

The result was that along 18 miles of track there were warehouses that were captured in their entirety, intact, and they were completely full of Russian equipment.

As a matter of fact, the amazing thing was that they found there even such items as blankets and equipment that would probably not be used in desert fighting, and much equipment that was of a technical nature which could only be used by the Russians, equipment that had never been sold to the Egyptian Government, with the technicians that were necessary to teach the people to use them.

There were tanks and heavy artillery captured in that area—in storage facilities, that is—that were far superior to that which the Egyptians were using; which led one to believe that this was for use at a future date by Russian volunteers. I consider that to be a Communist base, certainly a Communist military base.

Mrs. KELLY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman GORDON. Mrs. Bolton.

Mrs. BOLTON. I have no questions, Mr. Chairman. I am sorry to have been late.

Chairman GORDON. Mr. Byrd.

Mr. BYRD. There seems to have been quite a number of references to the Scriptures this morning, and if I might be pardoned for referring to them at this point, I can think of one very appropriate passage which says that a word fitly spoken is like apples of gold in pictures of silver.

While I haven't heard your presentation in its entirety, I have had the opportunity to read your prepared statement. It was read this morning; and I think yours is a very excellent presentation, as far as that goes. Did I understand you to say that your organization is opposed to the passage of House Joint Resolution 117? Is that a fair question?

Mr. CARMEN. I don't think you should infer that from my statement. We are in favor of the resolution. I think we repeated our approval several times. We would like to see the resolution implemented, of course, by including our suggestions.

Of course, if it came to a choice of accepting it as it is or not seeing it passed at all, we would be in favor of the present form being accepted.

I presume that is the reason we have met here, to see whether or not you gentlemen might not want to make some proper changes, and we have made our recommendations for additions.

Mr. BYRD. I think you are right in your presumption as to the purpose of our meeting here. Perhaps my impression from your statement was gotten partly from the paragraph on page 3 wherein you state—

assurance from Communist aggression from without as contemplated by this resolution does not insure the peace of this area nor will it prevent Communist subversion from within.

So you do differ, then, with the Secretary of State and with others who have appeared before this committee during which appearances they expressed the opinion that the passage of this resolution would insure the peace of the area and would even prevent Communist subversion from within.

You go on to say that already a new weapon has been created by the Communists, namely, the threat of volunteers.

I asked Secretary Dulles the other day if the passage of this resolution would not be efficacious in dealing with volunteers. He stated, if I recall correctly, that any organized movement of volunteers would be interpreted as an overt act of aggression and of course this resolution would deal with such overt acts.

Then, may I ask you again, you do feel that it is necessary for the Congress to pass, if not this resolution, certainly some kind of resolution stating to the peoples of the world that America is ready to use its fortunes and its blood to meet and confront and defeat any overt act of aggression in the Middle East, do you not?

Mr. CARMEN. That is right. Yes. Certainly.

In answer to your question, again I can only repeat, if we had no choice but to accept or reject this resolution as it is now written, I would say we must accept it. I say, however, since we do have a choice and we can accept it with modification, it is very nice and fine for the Secretary of State—and it may be he is correct—that they would interpret an organized movement of troops as Communist aggression, but why leave it to chance? There may be some question as to whether it is organized or unorganized, and I think we should be more specific relative to those two factors. The movement of troops—that is the movement of volunteers, the movement of any troops in any form, providing they are Communist or Communist-supplied, and the movement of arms, Communist made and supplied, or either.

I think that should be added to this resolution in some form.

Mr. BYRD. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Again I want to say that the gentleman has made a very excellent presentation.

Chairman GORDON. Mr. Selden.

Mr. SELDEN. I have no questions, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman GORDON. Mr. O'Hara.

Mr. O'HARA. Yes; I have a question.

When the Secretary of State was before us I asked him this question. Having in mind the success of this proposed program, if authorized by the Congress, would depend upon its acceptance by the Arab States and upon the cooperation in the program by the Arab States, was there a possibility that to obtain the acceptance and the cooperation of the Arab States, concessions might be made to them not to the interests of Israel? The Secretary of State answered that question, I thought, to my satisfaction. I would appreciate your comment.

Mr. CARMEN. Of course, that is a touchy subject. We are primarily interested in the United States. We represent an organization here whose members have proved by service to their country, the United States, that our primary interest is in our own country. Certainly the people in Israel are our coreligionists, and we have an interest in them on that account as you gentlemen have an interest in them as citizens of a fellow democratic nation.

We would dislike very much seeing any concessions that would hurt their future. I think the primary thing we have to be concerned about would be concessions that would impair democracy. For example, a concession that might bar them the use of international waterways, which would be against all the laws of free people, is one we would oppose. I don't think that we should allow that kind of concession to be made.

Now there is another kind of concession,—and I think that since you brought the subject up, we could think about it—and I suppose it

might be considered an un-American concession in a sense—a concession that was made at one time to the Saudi Arabian government. The Jewish War Veterans spoke out against it. That is the concession which kept from the Dhahran Airbase in Saudi Arabia, the American airbase, any soldier or any airman of Jewish faith. We felt that was a concession which ought not have been made, because it was un-American, because in a sense it committed the United States Government to practice discrimination against members of the Armed Forces who were of Jewish faith.

I would dislike any such further concession, certainly. Our organization has constantly cried out against that particular concession as it still exists, as a matter of fact.

Now beyond that I don't know what kind of concessions you might be thinking of. If it is territorial concessions you might be thinking of, I think those things might be ironed out best around the peace table with the United States Government represented along with Israel and the Arab nations.

Mr. O'HARA. Denial to Israel of the right of use is a discrimination. We agree on that, do we not?

Mr. CARMEN. Yes.

Mr. O'HARA. Can we proceed with negotiation with the Arab States looking toward their acceptance of this program and their cooperation, unless that question is settled?

Mr. CARMEN. No; I think that question has to be settled. I think that is primary, and it is prerequisite to the settlement of this whole issue.

Again, the waterways of the world must be free to all nations. If the Egyptian Government states bluntly that under no condition will they allow an Israeli ship to go through the Suez Canal, I think we meet a stumbling block. It is a stumbling block but certainly the United States Government should not back down.

Mr. O'HARA. Would we make any further progress if that should be the position taken by Egypt?

Mr. CARMEN. I can repeat what has often been repeated before. I likened the Egyptian Government, today, to the Nazi Government of the thirties. There were those who said you can't do business with Hitler, you will recall in the thirties. There were those such as Chamberlain who tried to do business with Hitler. I think if we have such tactics we have to meet the problem head on. If we can't do business with the Communist Government—that is the whole basis for this resolution—and if we are going to have the same kind of tactics on the part of the Egyptian Government, I would say they have fallen too far under the influence of the Communists, already, and maybe we won't be able to do business with them but I would certainly want to give them a chance.

Mr. O'HARA. I appreciate your remarks and the statement you made. I wish to assure you that my questions were asked of you not because you are a Jew by religion but because you are an American by the life you have lived, and your patriotic heart. I am not a Jew, but I am tremendously interested in Israel because I see Israel as a democracy in that area similar to our own in our area and I think there should be a continuing friendship between Israel and the United States. That is not on religious ground but as yours on patriotic, sound, American grounds.

Thank you.

Chairman GORDON. Mr. Fountain.

Mr. FOUNTAIN. Mr. Carmen, I notice on page 4 you made the comment—and I think you referred to it just then in answering Mr. O'Hara's question—that we are witnessing a revival of the practices of the Nazis from 1932 to 1938 and so forth. Then in your next statement you say—

Henchmen of Hitler, Goebbels, and Goering have been identified as the Egyptian advisers.

I wonder if you would elaborate a little bit on that statement.

Mr. CARMEN. Well, I did in a previous question propounded by Mr. Merrow. I will be glad to repeat it for you, though. It is very brief.

We have reliable reports going back many, many months before these incidents, which only go back to last October, and to the deportations which only go back now 4 or 5 weeks, that in the employ of the Egyptian Government are such men as—and we don't know them all—Karl Eichman, who was a propaganda specialist for Joseph Goebbels; Willy Beisner, who was a former Nazi police chief with the SS and who is quite expert in arresting Jews. He had a great deal of experience arresting hundreds of thousands. Johannas von Leers, who is a great expert in anti-Jewish affairs and who was the No. 1 man in Germany under Goebbels in preparing anti-Jewish methods and propaganda and so forth.

Now these people have been leading the way and have been preparing the way; and the proof of it is, when the actual campaign started not too many weeks ago, many of the errors of the early thirties had been eliminated because these people had the experience. I mentioned the fact that I have had personal contact and have met with one of these refugees who came to this country and whose family is still in Cairo, a rather successful Egyptian businessman whose business has, of course, been taken away.

To give you an idea of their methods, in the first 2 weeks after he left he had word from Cairo that if he wanted to come back he could come back and run his business and they would give him one-third of the profit. A few weeks later, of course, after he told them he was not coming back, his business was completely confiscated.

I understand from authentic reports that for many, many months Jewish business concerns, such as the large department stores in Cairo that were Jewish owned, had been under study by the Egyptian Government and they had even studied the various jobs. When they took over the business, they had people all prepared, even to the point of buyers and junior executives and executives. They had people from their own military forces prepared in these particular jobs, and they moved right in and took over the store and kept it operating.

I also stated that the first people to be arrested were, in addition to the business leaders, the leaders of the Jewish community, the religious community, and organizational community. The Jewish people have a way of being well organized from the organizational point of view. They belong to many organizations and are very active in charitable and other organizations, and they lead the community to a large extent.

I am sure if there was such a thing as a Jewish war veterans' organization in Egypt, or veterans of Egyptian wars, the leader, my

counterpart, would have been one of the first to be arrested, you see. It would take away from that organization its leadership. Those were the people who were arrested and, of course, the business people are the ones who have been deported first in order to get the capital and get that which they have left behind. They have had to sign statements, those that have been anxious to get out of the country, and knowing the experience of the German Jews, where 6 million were slaughtered, they have been anxious to get out and they have had to sign statements that they will never come back to Egypt nor will they ever lay claim to any of their possessions that have been taken from them. I don't know whether it will stand up in court eventually, but that is, of course, to save the Egyptian Government the reparations which the German Government had to pay eventually.

Mr. FOUNTAIN. What form does your proof take and if you do have documented proof has it been turned over to our Government?

Mr. CARMEN. Are you speaking now of these individual people?

Mr. FOUNTAIN. These former employees of Hitler, Goebbels, and Goering. I think it should be of tremendous interest to our Government whether or not these people are or have been recently in Egypt advising the Egyptian Government.

Mr. CARMEN. Well, of course, most of the sources are fairly confidential, they come, some from diplomatic channels, some are personal, some are hearsay from people who have come from that country and who know something of what is going on. You meet an outstanding businessman who comes from the country and when you do, he obviously has an idea of what is going on. Whether or not that kind of evidence is acceptable would be another matter.

Mr. FOUNTAIN. Has this evidence, such as you have, or such as has been brought to your attention, been turned over to our State Department? We are now engaged in the process of setting policy which will affect that area and it seems to me that the State Department ought to have the benefit of any such information as might be available.

Mr. CARMEN. As a matter of fact, we would think, and Mr. Weitzer mentions a good point to me—we would expect and think that our own State Department through its Intelligence would have that information before we would. We would be very glad to get the authentic background of this material and turn it over to the State Department if they would like to see it. We have constantly volunteered to be of assistance to the State Department and to the President and we do it whenever we think we can be of help.

Mr. FOUNTAIN. Would you be willing to turn it over to the committee?

Mr. CARMEN. I certainly would.

Mr. FOUNTAIN. Gentlemen, I think the committee would be interested in that information.

Mr. GORDON. We will be happy to receive it.

Mr. FOUNTAIN. That is all, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman GORDON. Mr. Fascell.

Mr. FASCELL. The other day in hearings Mrs. Bolton asked this question:

Then in Egypt, do they have any of the leftovers of the Germans who were down there training the Egyptian armies?

Admiral Radford answered:

We do not know whether they are there or not. Their time was about up. We do not know whether they were kept there or not. We think they were being pushed out of the picture by the Russians.

Are you familiar with the letter written by Philip M. Klutznick of the B'nai B'rith organization of January 15 submitted to the Secretary of State which said,

We have recently received a report from a special correspondent of The National Jewish Monthly, the B'nai B'rith publication, which tells in detail the frightening circumstances of Jews in Egypt. A copy of this report, together with prints of photographs which accompanied it, are enclosed.

It goes on and submits a report. In the report it names names and gives pictures of individuals among whom are—commanding the state security cadre in Egypt is Lt. Col. Al Nacher who was formerly, or is, Leopold Gleim, one-time chief of the Nazi Security Guard. Also mentioned is a Lt. Col. Ben Salem who is chief of the political section of the state security cadre, secret police, who was formerly Bernhard Bender in the German secret police.

They have, this report goes on to say, established five concentration camps in Egypt for Jews.

Were you familiar with this report being submitted?

Mr. CARMEN. I am familiar with the fact that it was submitted though I didn't see it. We heard of it, as a matter of fact, yesterday. It is dated yesterday, is it not?

Mr. FASCELL. Yes.

Will your organization join in the request being made by B'nai B'rith that our Government investigate these facts and determine whether or not they are true and to do whatever we can in order to either condemn them or use such moral force through the United Nations or otherwise as possible to stop it?

Mr. CARMEN. I want you to know that when it comes to cooperation amongst the Jewish agencies, we have an organization made up of the 17 major Jewish organizations in the United States and we practically always agree in unison on these particular things, particularly where our own Government is concerned and certainly with B'nai B'rith we are always in accord.

Mr. FASCELL. Thank you.

I would like to submit, Mr. Chairman, a copy of this letter I have been talking about along with eight photographs for the record, which comprises part of the report which was transmitted to the Secretary of State. I would suggest, along with Mr. Fountain that the committee would be interested in determining whether or not these actions are taking place and what we can do about them if anything.

Chairman GORDON. Without objection, that will be put in the record.

(The photographs referred to will be found in the permanent records of the committee.)

(The document referred to is as follows:)

B'NAI B'RITH,
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT,
Park Forest, Ill., January 14, 1957.

HON. JOHN FOSTER DULLES,
Department of State,
Washington, D. C.

MY DEAR MR. DULLES: B'nai B'rith has heretofore called attention to the plight of Jews in Egypt. We are grateful for the inquiries and representations

made by our Government in this matter. We must now report that certain information on the subject has come to our attention which we regard as terrifying in its implications.

We have recently received a report from a special correspondent of the National Jewish Monthly, the B'nai B'rith publication, which tells in detail the frightening circumstances of Jews in Egypt. A copy of this report, together with prints of photographs which accompanied it, are enclosed.

For reasons of his own personal security, the identity of the correspondent must be protected. At the same time, we have satisfied ourselves to the extent that it is possible that the material contained in his report is substantially accurate.

In view of the grave situation described in the report, we respectfully urge that our State Department seek a prompt investigation of its statements through the resources of the United Nations and our own Government's facilities.

We realize the political complexities of the moment. It would appear, however, that the immoral conduct of the Government of Egypt toward its citizens and residents of the Jewish faith is a matter of world concern. Our Nation's high moral purpose cannot be served unless it is met with some semblance of morality by those with whom we seek good international relations.

The parallel between this report and the incidents preceding World War II is too striking to be disregarded. There is every indication that Colonel Nasser has for some time been developing a program calculated to terrify and to mulct Egyptian Jews, as well as those of foreign nationalities resident in that country. The report discloses that anti-Jewish policies were legalized by the Nasser government a year ago—or long before the outbreak of hostilities between Egypt and Israel in the Sinai Desert. Thus, the repeated assertions by Nasser that the events of Sinai and Suez forced this program to be created in the name of security appears to be a major falsehood.

Our compassion for the Jews of Egypt is deepened by a fear that they, not unlike the martyrs of the late thirties and early forties, represent the vanguard of a determined attack against the free world. We appeal to you, sir, to exhaust every possible avenue of the United Nations and of our Government to give immediate attention to this critical matter.

Sincerely,

PHILIP M. KLUTENICK.

Mr. CARMEN. You make an interesting point when you refer to Admiral Radford who says the Nazis are moving out and the Russians are being moved in. I am sure from a military point of view the Egyptians would never let these Nazis go, whom we know, we must admit, are experts in military affairs.

Mr. FASCELL. The admiral was talking about military training only and made no reference to security police, and so forth.

Mr. CARMEN. I am speaking of military now and I am certain they would never let them go if they did not have equal or better replacements. It may be that the Russians insist on their taking over if they are going to bring in their Russian arms, I don't know.

Mr. FASCELL. Now one other point, Mr. Carmen. From the standpoint of intelligence and facts, it would be interesting to know whether or not this actually is taking place.

The fact is that Jews are either being deported or they are not. The fact is that their property is either being sequestered or it is not. The fact is that they are either being killed or they are not, and frankly I do not think it makes any difference whether it is the Nazis who are doing it or whether the Egyptians are doing it, if it is morally wrong.

Mr. CARMEN. I agree from the moral point of view.

Mr. FASCELL. Or from the legal point of view.

Mr. CARMEN. Or from the legal point of view.

Mr. FASCELL. Therefore it calls upon the United States if we are going to take a moral position, to take a position, after we have once established the facts as such; is that not correct?

Mr. CARMEN. I agree.

Mr. FOUNTAIN. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. FASCELL. I yield.

Mr. FOUNTAIN. However, if the Egyptians are doing that, such might influence me quite a bit in voting on the economic-aid legislation.

Mr. FASCELL. They are doing it directly or indirectly with the Nazis or without them. I think the point is we should establish the facts if possible.

Mr. CARMEN. I will make an effort to get as much of the facts to this committee as possible in addition to what we have already supplied.

Mr. FASCELL. Thank you very much. We would like to have a copy of that B'nai B'rith. I tried to get one today and it just was not available.

Now one other question and I am through. You state that the resolution, you would like to see it go further and deal with the basic problems in the area in order to lay down some plan for possible settlement in the future. One of those, of course, deals primarily with the difficulties between Arabs and Israel.

Do you think that the United States should support the United Nations' international force in the area and go even further than that and say in effect "Look, we are going to slap the wrist of anybody who starts any trouble there, until we have some sensible means of arriving at a solution, whether it be Arab or Israel."

Mr. CARMEN. I certainly think that would be, at least, until such time as we come up with something final and concrete, the thing to do. We know and we have heard from both sides that there have been violations of the agreement of November 2 and that we have had guerrilla raiders coming over into Israel and there are claims, some claims, that there are Israelis going into Egyptian territory. It would be, of course, a difficult thing to do, between all the various countries, Syria, Lebanon, and Egypt—in addition to Egypt. We would have to have quite a number of troops. I think if it were handled properly we might at least stop this thing, stop this friction from developing.

Mr. FASCELL. In other words, your organization would probably support a firm position by the United States taken through the United Nations which would just tell everybody, whether it be an attack in force or whether it be raids or anything else, to stop the killing until such time as the people can sit down and try to work the thing out.

Mr. CARMEN. That is right, and I am of the opinion that all veterans organizations would be as the—from my discussions with every national veteran leader—I am of the opinion they would all be in agreement on that particular action.

Mr. FASCELL. Thank you. That is all I have, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman GORDON. Mr. Coffin—

Mr. COFFIN. Mr. Chairman and Mr. Carmen, you made some mention of a conference, including Israel and the Arab nations with the United States, possibly through its representative to the United Nations, taking leadership.

We have heard some testimony to the effect that a conference in the immediate future would not be a practicable thing to try to hold because of the tensions that do exist.

What is your feeling on that point?

Mr. CARMEN. Well, of course, I think if there were no tensions we probably would not need a conference at all. I think tensions are rather comparative. And the fact that they may be worse today than they were yesterday, in my opinion, makes it all the more imperative that we have a conference. I think the question is whether or not the people will sit down together. I think that you do not know unless you ask.

Mr. COFFIN. Do you think we should try to initiate a conference before we have taken some affirmative action, such as Mr. Fascell has outlined, maybe creating a larger United Nations force in that area, and it might even include taking a neutral zone for the time being, which would consist of land, partly that claimed by Israel and partly that claimed by Egypt, and sufficiently broad so that that force could insulate one country from the other. Do you think that that is a wise proceeding?

Mr. CARMEN. It is probably an excellent proceeding but whether or not it could be worked out practically in a swift manner is something else again. I have never seen the harm of trying to sit down in the meantime and iron out some of the differences. I do not see why the things could not be done simultaneously.

Mr. COFFIN. Do you have any indication as to what Israel's attitude would be if the United Nations were to decide to attempt to occupy a neutral zone with its force?

Mr. CARMEN. Well, I cannot tell you what the Israel Government thinks, but from their general statements they have constantly said that they are willing to do anything, or do anything that is reasonable, to bring about peace. I think they ought to be taken up on that challenge or at least on that statement and they should be asked.

Mr. COFFIN. Thank you.

No further questions.

Chairman GORDON. Mr. Saund—

Mr. SAUND. No questions, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman GORDON. Thank you very much, Mr. Carmen. I thank you for your appearance.

STATEMENT OF PAUL B. JOHNSON, FRIENDS COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL LEGISLATION

Chairman GORDON. Our next witness is Mr. Paul B. Johnson for the Friends Committee on National Legislation.

Mr. Johnson, you may read your statement or present it for the record.

Mr. JOHNSON. I prefer to read it, with the chairman's permission.

Chairman GORDON. As you wish.

Mr. JOHNSON. My name is Paul B. Johnson, and I am here to testify on behalf of the Friends Committee on National Legislation on the subject of House Joint Resolution 117, which would give the President advance authority to send United States troops to the Middle East and would authorize certain military and economic programs in the general area of the Middle East.

My views reflect the position of the FCNL, an organization of the Society of Friends, or Quakers, which seeks to represent many of the concerns of Friends, but which of course does not claim to speak for

all Friends, since the democratic structure of the Society does not lend itself to the use of official spokesmen.

My views also reflect personal experience. I have spent over 5 of the past 7 years in the Middle East as a volunteer overseas staff member of another Quaker organization, the American Friends Service Committee, engaged first in directing refugee relief in the Gaza Strip, and later for most of 4 years directing a small social and technical assistance program in Jordan.

While I am in no sense an expert on the Middle East, these experiences have given me a close and personal view of the life of ordinary Arab people, as well as an opportunity to deal, officially as well as personally, with government officials in Jordan and in Egypt. I have a warm feeling for the Arabs as individual human beings—and frequently human beings in distress and confusion of mind and spirit. I have, further, an extremely strong feeling that increased understanding of the background of the Arabs, their societies and their problems, is a necessity if the United States is to contribute to a solution of the tensions in the Middle East.

Continuing problems and crises in the Middle East: As I see it, there are at least 3 continuing problems and 2 current crises in the Middle East, and the pending resolution does little or nothing to meet any of them.

The three continuing problems are:

(1) The necessity for building stable, new social and political institutions, capable of handling the intensified 20th century pressures generated by closer international associations, population growth and the demand for improving living standards, and accelerated discovery and exploitation of natural resources under western auspices. The conflicts between old and new social, economic, and cultural patterns within each national society in the Middle East are intense, as old habits tend to be replaced by new, and entrenched interests fight against loss of privileged status. This is a job primarily for the people of the region themselves. We in the United States cannot do much to help this process, but any tendency on our part, through economic or political emphases, to freeze the status quo, can seriously hinder the process of change.

(2) The necessity for recognizing the passing of the era of imperialism and colonialism which has left a legacy of western positions of strength and vested interest, as well as an attitude of superiority on the part of westerners and their governments.

The West must now be willing to renegotiate these vested interests in a spirit of mutuality, as Middle East nations grow in determination to handle their own affairs. The West must now fully abandon this attitude of superiority, however costly and painful it may be, for it is a legacy of a past century and does not even approximately represent the truth. On no other basis can the United States look forward to happier relations with nations of the Middle East.

(3) The necessity for resolving the present bitter contest for leadership within the Arab world. The conception that this is mainly a power contest between Egypt and Iraq by no means explains its full character. Nor can it be regarded merely as a contest between monarchical and republican forms of national government. It must also be viewed in the light of the important fact that the West, deliberately and for its own benefit, split the Arab world into manageable pieces

after the First World War. This form of irresponsible and selfish interference in the area has not been forgotten by the Arabs, and United States policies even in 1957 tend to be examined in its light.

Only as progress is achieved toward solution of these three basic problems can peace and happiness return to the people of the Middle East. Furthermore, it might be pointed out that Israel's future, as well as that of the Arab States, depends upon a satisfactory solution of these problems. Israel's future will be dark indeed if it must continue to exist behind armistice borders, with no economic relations with its neighbors, and subject to the continuing uncertainties that go with existence in a region filled with turmoil.

The two crises, in addition to the problems, as this House committee is well aware, concern the Suez Canal and the complex and bitter Arab-Israel dispute.

All of these problems and crises are built-in features of the life of the Middle East in meeting the demands of the 20th century. All would be present regardless of the issue of possible Communist subversion or attack. Meeting the crisis constructively and making progress toward solution of the problems are the sure ways to eliminate the likelihood of communism's gaining a foothold in the Middle East.

The pending resolution is said to be aimed at preventing an increase in Communist penetration in the Middle East. The State Department and the Foreign Affairs Committee perhaps have information on this subject not possessed by the general public. As for my own experience, I have not been impressed that this is a major problem in the Middle East. It is perhaps pertinent to recall that 6 years ago in 1951, when an attempt was made by the United States Government to establish a Middle East defense organization, it was also said to be necessary because of the Soviet Union's demonstrated aggressive attitude in the area.

Comments on House Joint Resolution 117: Turning to the resolution itself, I would like to comment briefly on the request for advance authority to send United States troops to the Middle East, for the provisions for military assistance and for the development of economic strength.

(1) The Constitution gives to the Congress the power to declare war. While I am not a lawyer and do not feel competent myself to comment on constitutional questions, it would seem desirable to retain in Congress the power to declare war and thus keep this most vital power as near to the people as possible. It would seem to be an extremely dangerous practice to strengthen the views that Congress should relinquish this right in advance and in effect give the President an undated declaration of war.

(2) The proposed military assistance program is designed to arm nations of the Middle East against the Soviet Union. However, the people of the Middle East are primarily conscious of tensions relative to the Arab-Israeli dispute and relations with the former colonial countries. One danger of this proposed policy is that the United States may be contributing arms to both sides of the Arab-Israeli conflict.

In addition, these sections of this proposed resolution would seem to reinforce rather than dispel misconceptions current in the Arab world as to the purpose of the United States there. The following

examples are offered bearing, I may say, upon considerable personal experience:

(a) Continued United States reliance on military solutions will further convince the Arabs of our inability to think beyond pacts and military defense. Mutual-defense agreements were concluded by the United States with Lebanon on March 23, 1953; with Iraq on April 21, 1954; with Pakistan on May 19, 1954. Taken together with the Baghdad Pact, these agreements constitute a web covering most of the region for which the new legislation is now proposed.

The present legislation will only tend to reinforce the Arab view that we place most of our reliance upon sterile military agreements.

(b) In the absence of positive moves to settle the Arab-Israeli dispute, the current legislation will be regarded as a United States attempt to freeze the status quo, to make the present armistice agreements permanent.

(c) The West is widely criticized in the Middle East for originating policies based upon Western interests and presenting them to Middle East peoples without prior consultation. Despite the inclusion of the provision for United States military action only at the request of a Middle East nation, the current legislation is a case in exactly the mold expected by the Arabs.

(d) The United States has been temporarily enjoying an enhanced reputation in the Middle East as a result of our recent forthright moves within the United Nations framework to help stop the military action in the Suez Canal zone. This new reputation may well fall disastrously with seeming proof, in this legislation, that we are preoccupied with a danger which the Arabs cannot recognize and which seems to relate to our own affairs, rather than theirs. One indication of the lessening of United States prestige is found in the story in this morning's papers of Egyptian attacks upon the program proposed by this resolution.

(3) Long-range economic development in the Middle East is absolutely essential. We support the program as outlined by President Eisenhower in his special message suggesting the spending of \$200 million a year for fiscal years 1958 and 1959. We note that House Joint Resolution 117 provides for a maximum of \$200 million for fiscal 1957 from funds already appropriated, and Secretary of State Dulles' testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee yesterday gives the impression such funds will be used only for short-term purposes such as lost oil royalties and payment of some nations' armed forces rather than for long-range economic development.

We hope a program of long-range economic development in the Middle East is contemplated and that it will be cast in an entirely new frame. In our opinion, it should be:

(a) rigidly divorced from military programs;

(b) undertaken on a regional basis wherever a program affects more than one country;

(c) preceded by an exhaustive regional survey of resources and needs, carried out by an international authority within the framework of the United Nations in which all donor and recipient countries would be fully represented;

(d) based upon a system of priorities and approved plans set up by this international authority, which would be endowed with power

to initiate, supervise, and recommend termination of individual project operations; and

(e) composed of individual projects to be carried out through operating arrangements concluded directly among the countries concerned. Actual project operation might be undertaken by an international authority only when a country arrangement proved impossible and priorities demanded early action in conformity with an overall plan.

In our view, economic development is valid as an end in itself and must not be either a prize for cooperation with United States policies or a political instrument of the United States Government, or a secondary partner in some emergency program with a central military purpose.

Bypassing of United Nations: We regret that the policy set forth in House Joint Resolution 117 as interpreted by administration spokesmen seems to lessen United States reliance upon the United Nations. The wide acclaim and approval throughout most of the world of the United States policy in late October and November of the past year seems to be due in large measure to United States reliance upon the collective judgment of the world as expressed in the United Nations during that crisis period. It would be regrettable if the United States in a future similar situation should decide to take military action on a unilateral basis.

Conclusion: In a more personal way, it is an intensely moving experience to live closely with persons of a culture radically different from one's own and to sense, at times, our deep inability to plumb these differences.

We who are so blessed with freedom have failed so far to grasp the essential qualities of the nationalism now growing to maturity in the Middle East. The long search for dignity we have not recognized. The drive for opportunity to manage one's own affairs has too often seemed to us to be merely perverse unwillingness to cooperate. The simple humanity of a mutual feeling of equality has escaped us amidst the alarms, the crises, the urge to do things bigger, better, and faster.

We who are so wonderfully endowed with natural resources have failed to understand what happens to a people who have had to fight an eternally losing battle against poverty and hunger. The built-in conservatism of a society for centuries too close to starvation to be able to afford flexibility or change has exasperated us but we have not understood it.

We whose country has never known invader or occupier have failed to see deeply into the sullenness and despair which result from foreign control, the outrageous demands of the tax-gatherers from whom there is no recourse. The hatreds and suspicions of people for government, carried over from the bad past, are still active in the not-so-much-better present. Since 1775 we have known little of this. It is largely gone from our national consciousness. With the Arabs it is within the memory of half of the men now living.

We who have been one nation, with hatreds and discriminations happily a very small part of our lot, have been unable to take in the enormity of the divisions within the Eastern societies. In most of these societies the only real units are the family and the village. Beyond families and villages, ties are almost nonexistent, and the age-old habits of suspicion, competition, and defensive conflict are still the

rule. We must use a more powerful effort of imagination than we have yet summoned to grow to understanding of these conditions so different from our own. We in the West must remember that we are in a minority. The village societies of part of Europe and of all of Africa and Asia are of the type described as atomized. We pray that we of the West may grow wise enough to help in making the world whole.

Chairman GORDON. Thank you, Mr. Johnson, for your statement.

Before we proceed for questioning, I will ask you for the record, the functions of your organization and how you operate.

Mr. JOHNSON. The Friends Committee on National Legislation is a committee of the Society of Friends, or Quakers, but it is not a delegated committee. It is a group which seeks to represent the concerns of Friends in the field of legislative action and in education of our membership and others with regard to legislative action. It was formed in 1943. It has on its governing general committee, 160 members representing almost all of the yearly meetings of Friends in the United States. None outside. We had a budget last year of \$70,000. Year before last, it was \$80,000. It has offices and a staff here in Washington. It testifies frequently on matters of concern to Friends, here in Washington, on a variety of subjects which I will be glad to list if the chairman wishes.

Chairman GORDON. For the record, please.

Mr. JOHNSON. We have supported the United Nations, plans for disarmament, refugees, certain immigration matters. We have testified in favor of constructive foreign aid programs and the exchange of persons program. We have testified with regard to certain military legislation which affects the peace activities of Friends, such as universal military training, the draft, and so forth. Our position in this respect has been negative. We have testified on questions of civil liberties, civil rights, and American Indian legislation. These are the most recent testimonies, I believe.

Chairman GORDON. Thank you.

I am going to at this time reverse the order of calling on members for the questioning. I will start with Mr. Saund.

Mr. SAUND. I have no questions, Mr. Chairman.

I wish to commend Mr. Johnson for his very remarkable statement. That is all.

Chairman GORDON. Mr. Merrow—

Mr. MERROW. Mr. Chairman and Mr. Johnson, House Joint Resolution 117 states that—

Whereas, the peace of the world and the security of the United States are endangered as long as international communism and the nations it controls
* * * in the general area of the Middle East.

I quote that and then refer to what you have said at the bottom of page 2. Do I understand from your testimony that you don't think that such danger as referred to in the resolution now exists in the general area of the Middle East?

Mr. JOHNSON. No; I should make myself clear certainly on that, Mr. Merrow. I am quite clear that the danger of Communist subversion exists and the danger to world peace exists.

I do not believe that there is a demonstrable danger of overt Communist aggression in the Middle East.

In addition to my personal and the organization's total rejection of Communism and what it stands for, I have, however, had experiences in the Middle East with persons, particularly in Jordan, which lead me to believe that in assessing the danger of communism in the Middle East we must carefully redefine the word.

I know a number of young men in Jordan who claim to be Communists. These young men are not acquainted with Russia or Russian doctrines. They are not Marxists. They are young men who have become thoroughly frustrated in an effort to feel free in Jordan when in fact the country is in an extremely difficult situation and is dependent upon the West for its continued life.

To these young men, anything which upsets the West is communism. I hesitate to adopt that definition for myself, and I know the committee will not adopt that definition. But when the word "communism" is so frequently used in the Middle East, it sometimes means a different thing from what we mean when we use it.

Mr. MERROW. You have one section of the testimony you have given entitled "Bypassing of United Nations," on page 4. The resolution states that:

Provided, That such employment shall be consonant with the treaty obligations of the United States and with the Charter of the United Nations and actions and recommendations of the United Nations,

and so on.

Do you still think that if this resolution is passed it bypasses the United Nations?

Mr. JOHNSON. If I am correct, Mr. Merrow, article 51 of the United Nations relates to the privilege of unilateral action when the United Nations has failed to do a job.

My comments are based partly on that understanding and upon comments which I believe took place before a committee of the Congress yesterday, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, to the effect that once started on a job of preventing Communist aggression in any area, we could count upon the United Nations not being able to stop us because we had veto power.

These things, frankly, confuse me. I believe the legislation is not clear enough so that we can know specifically what is intended and what exactly will happen with relation to the United Nations.

I believe also that it would be better to establish channels for economic development and for assistance of needy nations through or in association with the United Nations, rather than unilaterally as may take place under the current resolution.

I feel further that the establishment of further bilateral military pacts in the area, now that the United Nations has begun to take what I personally consider to be hopeful action in the creation of a police force, would be a reversion to a time when we did not have that hopeful action on the part of the United Nations.

Have I made myself clear?

Mr. MERROW. I believe so. I would just like to say in connection with that, and ask one more question, the United Nations has no stronger supporter than myself, but I would like to ask in reference to this matter of military action on a unilateral basis if you don't conceive of a situation where it might be necessary, in the interests of the United States, for us to have to act unilaterally?

Mr. JOHNSON. I am quite clear that the United States must retain for itself and its own sole judgment and hopefully the judgment of the Congress, a decision whether and when such action is necessary, particularly defensive.

I would not hamper that in any way.

Mr. MERROW. I have questioned the phrase that is in this bill, "actions and recommendations of the United Nations," as possibly hampering our actions. The opinion seems to be that it doesn't.

May I ask this: Are you opposed to House Joint Resolution 117 as such?

Mr. JOHNSON. In its present form; yes, sir.

Mr. MERROW. And in order to get, then, a resolution that you would agree with, it would have to be along the lines you set forth on page 4; is that right?

Mr. JOHNSON. Page 4 is largely concerned with the development of a long-range economic development program. I would like to see action taken in that direction, but I cannot say now that either I or the Friends Committee on Congressional Legislation would oppose more general action toward the aims of House Joint Resolution 117.

Mr. MERROW. You are opposed to the resolution as such, but you have not, then, a proposed draft of any kind to take care of the problems that are set forth in the resolution?

Mr. JOHNSON. We have not prepared a draft of a substitute resolution.

Mr. MERROW. Thank you Mr. Chairman.

Chairman GORDON. Mr. Coffin—

Mr. COFFIN. Mr. Chairman and Mr. Johnson. I think I speak for several of us when I say that we feel that your statement is an excellent one, particularly in the thinking that you have demonstrated on the economic aid program.

I don't think there has been presented to us in such detail the type of constructive thinking that you and your associates have done.

In preparing this or in making this recommendation did you do so with the knowledge of the work of Mr. Rostow who, with an associate, just published a book on foreign aid?

Mr. JOHNSON. I am sorry, I have no knowledge of that. I have seen an article by him in a local newspaper within a few days. Before that I was unacquainted with him or even with his name.

Mr. COFFIN. It seems that some of your basic thinking is along the same lines as that which was contained in that article which I believe was in the Post yesterday.

Mr. JOHNSON. I think it was over the weekend, wasn't it? This testimony was drafted some days before that.

Mr. COFFIN. Now in undertaking any such sort of long-range development plan, and this comes back to Mr. Merrow's question, I think some of us on the committee are concerned about the proper vehicle for accomplishing all these objectives.

I am interested, as I think Mr. Merrow was, in the extent to which this approach should be part of the resolution that is now under consideration. Do I understand that you have no opinion on that?

Mr. JOHNSON. Merely as an opinion, I would suggest that if this kind of long-range economic development program were to be undertaken it would take much more preparation than the committee would feel it was desirable to give to this, which was provided as an emergency job, as I understand it. It is certainly up to the committee.

Mr. COFFIN. Would this be in accordance with your thinking, that in the present resolution there be adequate attention paid to long-range development, but admittedly very general, as far as the objectives for which the United States might be striving?

Mr. JOHNSON. I do.

Mr. COFFIN. With the blueprint to follow on later legislation for particular economic development?

Mr. JOHNSON. This would meet, I think, every thought I have had, except I hope long-range economic development matters may be thoroughly separated from military plans and programs.

Mr. COFFIN. When you say that economic development is valid as an end in itself, do you mean by that that it is valid as an end in itself and at the same time it would be in our own self-interest?

Mr. JOHNSON. I do. I have a fairly strong feeling that in the end any investment we make in economic development in these areas of tension and difficulty and low living standards will redound to our benefit, not only politically but basically economically in the end.

After all, the people with whom we do business, so to speak, internationally are the nations who, like ourselves, have highly developed economies, high standards of living where trade and commerce flourishes.

Mr. COFFIN. Would you consider your recommendations a departure from past economic aid policy?

Mr. JOHNSON. I should rather think of them as an addition to it. I believe several of the aims of economic aid have been served by quite different instruments. Point 4 is one of those instruments. Economic aid has been channeled into military or associated channels which must have a quite different purpose from this.

I do not think that this replaces point 4 or the U. N., the technical assistance program, or anything that I now know to be in existence.

Actually, of a comparison would be possible, and it is only a partial one. I would think of my proposals here and their aim as being more of the type of thing which the Colombo plan has attempted to do rather than any of the other present programs.

Mr. COFFIN. Many citizens and Members of Congress are deeply concerned about the failure of our past programs to create more good will than they apparently have created.

Do you feel this type of approach would, in the long run, bring us more good will?

Mr. JOHNSON. Yes. I do. I think some of the problems of the creation of good will are likely to be problems which any person or group which has resources is likely to encounter when dealing consistently with people who don't have resources.

We in the organization with which I am connected, the American Friends Service Committee, are keenly aware that in a relief situation, for instance, we have no right to expect gratitude from people who receive. The condition in which they live and the relationship which we have toward them does not create that kind of good will.

But I hope that with the kind of program suggested here in which both recipient and donor countries participate in an advance planning stage, and on a condition of equality, I hope that it will establish a degree of good will and understanding which does not now always exist.

Mr. COFFIN. Of course, the only hitch is, you speak of donor countries. Can you think of any other donor countries besides ourselves who would be apt to engage in this program?

Mr. JOHNSON. I think so. I have been acquainted with the very interesting if not too extensive activities of Norway, for instance, in technical assistance programs. The British have been engaged in technical assistance programs under other names for many years.

Religious groups from other countries have been engaged in a similar type of work over a period of many, many years. I assume also there are other nations who contribute to the United Nations technical assistance program, contributing both their experts and their money so that one would, I think, necessarily assume that this kind of broader development program would find support outside the United States. I would hope so.

Mr. COFFIN. Thank you. That is all, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman GORDON. Mrs. Bolton—

Mrs. BOLTON. No questions, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman GORDON. Mr. Fascell.

Mr. FASCELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Johnson, I would like to say that I think your statement is very constructive and certainly well thought out with respect to the problems in the Middle East and the crisis that exists and the possible solutions.

I think you will not find too much disagreement with the idea that long-range development on a mutual basis between the countries would lead to economic stability, good will, and political stability.

Obviously, as you have already pointed out and as everybody knows, House Joint Resolution 117 does not deal with long-range development projects designed to do those things. It deals with a short-range economic crisis that exists right now, which the resolution attempts to fulfill. As the Secretary of State said in the Senate, it deals primarily with loss of revenues and funds to those countries, with the possibility that they might fall and the possibility therefore that the Russians could step in and some other form of government take over.

That means, in a sense, therefore, that we are interested at least temporarily in the status quo. Don't you think that that is a fair statement?

Mr. JOHNSON. Well, we surely are. We are not interested in upsetting it, certainly. But I wish to express the opinion, I think, that growth, and particularly in the area of the Middle East, will have to take place before a really satisfying condition exists there.

Mr. FASCELL. I couldn't agree with you any more, but I just wanted to clarify the record and have it understood that, while we have to realize the fact there is a strong national urge and that conflicts between the old and the new and the East and the West are taking place, and that the freedom of expression must be given to the people in each country, to stabilize our own Government and to arrive at a political level which would suit them, that until that eventually takes place, at the present moment the United States must be certain that the Communists don't take over. Are we agreed on that?

Mr. JOHNSON. I should think so.

Mr. FASCELL. Don't you also agree that that seems to be the only reason for House Joint Resolution 117? In other words, you see no reason for overt armed aggression at any point? And the President

in his message has made it explicitly clear, that is, the message which followed this resolution, that we have already stated on April 9, 1956, that the United States will, within constitutional means, oppose any aggression in the area. And he went on to state there is our declaration of November 29, 1956, that a threat to the territorial integrity or political independence of Iran, Iraq, Pakistan, or Turkey would be viewed by the United States with the utmost gravity.

I think we are on the record with respect to armed aggression by the Russians in this area that would be vital to the free world. And so we seem to have indications that this is not the primary purpose. We are restating an old policy with respect to overt armed aggression, but that the serious problem lies in the fact that not through subversion at this particular point but through the financial bankruptcy of the governments themselves there might be a tendency for the Communists to move in, and that this requires some immediate reflex by the United States.

Now, I won't disagree with you that these other things are necessary, but let me ask you this question: We talk about the lack of understanding by the American people, of the feelings and what not of the people in the Middle East.

But is not the converse of that also true, that there is a lack of understanding on the part of the people of the Middle East as to what our desires and intentions really are?

Mr. JOHNSON. I would agree. I would make it, however, a difference in kind, a distinction in kind. There is much more opportunity for people in the Middle East—

Mr. FASCELL (interposing). To misunderstand?

Mr. JOHNSON. No; to understand. The reading matter of the Middle East, the radio material of the Middle East is very largely from the United States. Movies are all from the United States. Conversely, if I say there is an opportunity to understand, I must agree with you there is an opportunity to misunderstand. But Americans by and large are totally unacquainted with the Middle East.

In speaking to most Americans I have discovered when I come home, speaking to my fellow Americans in words which mean something to me, they don't mean always the same thing to them, and in describing situations which exist among the people in the Middle East, it just doesn't get across. It may be my poor powers of description, but I would prefer to say that we have less opportunity because of less contact with the culture of the Middle East to understand them and their background than they have to understand us.

Mr. FASCELL. Now, if I understand your interpretation of this correctly, then there is more opportunity for the people in the Middle East to understand us than there is for Americans to understand the people in the Middle East.

Then can you tell me why any fear exists in the Middle East of the purposes, aims and desires of the United States?

Mr. JOHNSON. I think the main reason why there is fear or distress on this subject—there are two reasons. First, that the experience of the Middle East people has been primarily with our friends, Britain and France, in the past hundreds of years, at whose hands there have been experiences of occupation, of financial control, and so forth, and they lump us. We are considered to be one body.

Mr. FASCELL. Do you mean to say they do not take any recognition of the recent event on the part of the United States that has dealt with practically the political independence of the entire Middle East? That they give no credit or recognition to the fact?

Mr. JOHNSON. What actions are you citing in this case?

Mr. FASCELL. Well, I can name a whole host of them but I am thinking of our willingness to enter into economic programs of any kind—whether they be tied in with something else or not may be debatable. Our desire recently to call off the conflict there and to get our own close allies, France and Britain, to back off and to take another look at this situation. Our willingness to give some recognition to the national movements within those countries, as long as they are not directly or indirectly affiliated with the Communists.

Are we completely lacking in any support for the things that we are trying to do?

Mr. JOHNSON. Not by any means, completely. It is a matter of degree, again. Britain and France are completely lacking, I believe, in this activity in the Middle East. We are in a much better position. But we have disappointed the Middle East on a number of occasions. We have done things which have not been understood and which have resulted in a great deal of distress and difficulty in the Middle East.

Mr. FASCELL. That is the point I am getting at. We understand what we are trying to do in America and I certainly do not think we have any ulterior motives and I cannot for the life of me understand with all the facility they have to determine what our moves are, that they should misunderstand, or that they should mistrust us.

Now, if there is, mind you, then I think we need to do something else along with this long-range economic development project, or short-range, or other things, and that is,—when we consider the basic solution of all these problems;—a mutual understanding which comes about through what? An interchange of culture and education? Perhaps we in the United States should adopt a new course, dealing not only with long-range economic development but to make it absolutely sure that while we are doing this, that the people actually understand what we are doing.

Mr. JOHNSON. One great problem which we have had in the Middle East and which I think is still a factor which afflicts us is that we tend to move too fast, to demand too much, to insist on the getting of results in our pattern and not in theirs.

Mr. FASCELL. Then this is basically an educational problem not only for us but for them too?

Mr. JOHNSON. Yes, you are quite right.

Mr. FASCELL. Thank you.

Chairman GORDON. Mr. Fountain—

Mr. FOUNTAIN. Mr. Johnson, there are many, many questions I would like to ask you. I am a new member of this committee. I find myself going to school, seeking and getting information, in preparation for making decisions on some of these matters. Of course I do not have time to do that, but when one has lived in that area, as you have, I think it is most helpful to those of us who have not been in the area to get the benefit of your experience and information.

I will simply ask you to elaborate a little bit further upon a very significant statement which you made. You said:

I have an extremely strong feeling that increased understanding of the background of the Arabs, their societies and their problems, is a necessity if the United States is to contribute to a solution of the tensions in the Middle East.

Now, you have been giving some of that background in answer to questions of Mr. Fascell. For the benefit primarily of those of us who are new members of the committee, will you elaborate upon that statement more fully?

Mr. JOHNSON. I will be very glad to. I hope I can be reasonably succinct in this. There is one basic factor behind the present cultures and economic and social organizations in the Middle East which accounts, to a very considerable extent for their present—shall I say—backward character, from our point of view.

That is, they are, or were derived from the desert. From a condition of productive life and physical relationship which is vastly different from anything which is in our background.

The present economic organization in the Middle East is derived from an economy of scarcity and from a psychology of scarcity. It is derived from living for many centuries in a background, a natural background, so niggardly that it has created into people a number of feelings which are vastly different from our own. One is the feeling that man cannot do anything for himself. That is to say that ambition and enterprise and vigor are not part of a man's necessary equipment for life. That instead he must take what God wishes to give him and be satisfied with it. This has resulted, I think, in a form of religious outlook which characterizes the area, which does not make a man ambitious or wish to do anything for himself. He does not believe there is anything he can do for himself. Actually, a careful description of the conditions, the rainfall and soil conditions from which these societies originated in the Saudi-Arabian Desert would go far to convince us that it is true, that a man cannot do anything for himself. He has lived under such niggardly conditions, such hopeless conditions, that he really does not feel he can do anything for himself. He has created a society which in responding to those conditions has built-in conservatism and rigidities about it which again are very different from ours. Think of the great Nation we have and the great pouring in of American ambition from all over the world from people who made this Nation and pushed it across the country. Nothing like that is possible in the desert from which these people came and, for that matter, in the country with which I am most familiar, Jordan, which is only 5-percent cultivated at the present time and of which another 5 percent might be cultivated if the Johnston plan and all other possible improvements can take place. Jordan can never expect to be cultivated more than 10 percent.

This kind of background, this kind of religion which resulted from the background, has put the people in an attitude and in a condition which it is difficult for us to understand or know how to meet.

I have lived in villages for several years among people who had more than average resources and who had a technical assistance program which we were trying to bring to them and the problem of moving them to use the resources which were available to them or potentially available was something that just stumped me right up to the time when we left. We achieved some results but not too many.

I do not mean to go on in this line but those are the kinds of things I have had in mind.

Mr. FOUNTAIN. Do you feel that the economic assistance which we have been giving, though somewhat limited in many of the areas, has been reaching the people themselves or has it been used primarily to make the governments politically stable or for the benefit of the small percentage of people who operate the government?

Mr. JOHNSON. I take this as related to point 4?

Mr. FOUNTAIN. Yes.

Mr. JOHNSON. I limit my answer to Jordan. It has not been limited to a few people. The benefit has spread very widely over Jordan both in direct terms and in terms of employment and in direct results in terms of education and training and participation in widespread programs. The point 4 program has also created a number of very important resources—roads, and so forth.

Now, a fuller description of that question would require quite a further assessment, but I think this is the basic character.

Mr. FOUNTAIN. Do the people know and understand that such help has come from America?

Mr. JOHNSON. Yes; it is quite clear. There is no mistaking an American in Jordan. An American is likely to be dressed in old clothes and be out in the field. Other foreigners who are alleged to be assisting Jordan are likely to be behind desks in the capitol. This is a broad distinction, but it is a good one.

Chairman GORDON. Mr. O'Hara.

Mr. O'HARA. I should like to comment that I have a profound respect for the Friends. That I suppose is natural, since my sons, from their mother's mother, are descended from Quakers of Philadelphia. In my district in Illinois I have many Friends and they are fine, sincere people.

I am much impressed with your philosophy. I have always doubted that there is any vital force in force itself. We make headway only when we reach the hearts and minds of people. I have found that among men and nations the show of superiority retards rather than helps in reaching into the inner recesses of the brain and of the heart.

What you have said, I agree with entirely. I have always thought that a race of armaments ends in war itself.

As a young man, when France and England and Germany were arming, in the early years of the century, we in the United States wondered why they were doing it and why they could not see that they were taking the money that should be used in increasing their national economies and doing things for people, but instead they were spending it on armaments. The race of armaments resulted in a war that destroyed the British Empire, destroyed the power of France, and destroyed Germany. Now we look for a race of armaments to bring to us peace. I wonder if history that time will reverse itself. I wonder and I doubt.

Now I want to think out loud. I am a member of the party of opposition. The President of the United States has come before us and said what he is asking for now is, in his judgment, the best way to peace. He asks us to pass this resolution not as a gesture to war, but as an effort toward peace.

Now, if you were in my position and this presentment was made one in the philosophy of which you agreed; but there was upon you the responsibility as a member of the committee voting to give or to

refrain from giving to the President of the United States that which he believes to be the most promising of the tools of peace, what would be the nature of your thinking?

Mr. JOHNSON. You recognize this is an extremely difficult question, I am sure.

I may say I am glad as an American citizen that the decision on such matters as this rests in the hands of men who are willing to ask this question and the other questions that are being asked here this afternoon. If I may interpolate, I have never even seen a congressional committee in action before. I am a neophyte and I am very much impressed with what I see. Whether I can do justice to this very important question, I do not know.

Mr. O'HARA. You have made a very splendid witness and I think I can speak for every member of this committee in saying all are very earnestly searching for the wisest and best course to take.

None wants a war. We do not want to do anything provocative. We do not want that. We do want to reach the hearts and minds of people and we want to be known as a country of peace. Yet here we have a situation and we are told by our President that to promote peace, in his judgment, that it is advisable that this resolution be passed and passed quickly and by as near a unanimous vote as possible. It is a large responsibility and you and the other witnesses are making a large contribution to our thinking.

That is all, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman GORDON. Mr. Byrd.

Mr. BYRD. Mr. Chairman, I, too, want to compliment the witness on a very excellent presentation of the views of the Friends Committee and on his Christian attitude. His statement will be helpful to us as we grope and feel our way in attempting to find in our own minds and hearts and souls the proper action to take upon this resolution.

Now, Mr. Johnson, in your statement you say that economic development is valid as an end in itself and must not be either a prize for cooperation in the United States policies or a political instrument of the United States Government.

I wonder how you would view that statement, were you in my position, representing a great district containing 446,000 people, a district which has known penury and poverty and hardship, a district in which thousands of coal miners have been thrown out of work; a State in which nearly 275,000 out of a total of less than 2 million people have been forced to keep body and soul together on surplus food commodities distributed by the Federal Government during the past 3 or 4 years.

I wonder if, under such circumstances, one might not be pardoned for taking the view that moneys spent for foreign economic aid should rightly be used as an instrument of foreign policy, realizing that such a purpose is legitimate, and not unmoral, or immoral. Your statement is idealistic, but we must recognize that there is a great gulf between realism and idealism. As idealistic as your statement is, that does not take anything away from it. I still compliment you on it. Nevertheless, we members here have to look at realities too. I have just very briefly painted for you in my poor way a realistic picture of my own situation as a representative of a great people who have given and given and given and who are still willing to give. Yet they are people who believe that charity begins at home and that we

have a right to expect something in return from those countries that we are helping.

Moreover, if I might be pardoned for appearing to lecture rather than to seek information, sometimes it is, I think, beneficial for the members to express themselves, too. I think it enables the public to better realize the problems that we have to cope with and perhaps it will enable the public to arrive at a solution in its own collective mind as to what might be the proper course.

You have expressed regret that this resolution seems to lessen United States reliance upon the United Nations. Now, like my colleague, Mr. Merrow, I am a supporter of and a believer in the United Nations. However, in view of the inability of that organization to deal with the Hungarian situation recently, I have now come to the conclusion that we certainly do not want to close all doors to the possibility and perhaps the necessity of our having to take unilateral action in the best interests of our own national security and welfare at some time.

I personally cannot find fault with the resolution on that score. On the other hand, I would find fault with it if it did not provide for some course of unilateral action should the need arise.

It seems to me that the United Nations does an excellent job when it is dealing with countries that have respect for law and order, but it is not nearly so efficacious when it attempts to enforce its recommendations upon the Soviets.

I will say in conclusion that any resolution which the Congress in its wisdom does ultimately pass must not eschew the United Nations; yet, there must remain open a course for our country to exercise whatever unilateral action may be necessary to protect the freedoms and the liberties of our own land and the freedom of our allies.

Again, I say you have made a splendid presentation. I hope that what I have said might be of some benefit to you in helping you to better understand our position in the matter, too.

Mr. Chairman, I would like permission to include in the record an article which appeared on the front page of the January 14 Wall Street Journal. The article is entitled "Mid-East Aid." It deals specifically with the resolution before us.

Chairman GORDON. Without objection, that may be inserted in the record.

(The article referred to is as follows:)

MID-EAST AID—U. S. PLANNERS MULL COSTLY PROJECTS TO PROP SHAKY ECONOMIES—IRRIGATION IN IRAQ; HOMES FOR ARABS; LOANS AND ROADS; ASWAN DAM'S BACK AGAIN—THE COST: \$600-MILLION-PLUS

By John R. Gibson

WASHINGTON.—The Eisenhower administration already is busy figuring how to spend the Middle East aid cash it hopes to get from Congress. Officials aim to pour the money into giant projects to build up dramatically the economies of lands from Egypt to Israel to Iraq.

The likely magnitude and duration of these projects make it all but certain that in the end the Middle East aid program will cost much more than the \$600 million now mentioned and that it will linger on far longer than the 2 or 3 years that officials now talk about.

SPREADING IT AROUND

Though the exact projects that will get the cash haven't been decided, such schemes as these rank high in the consideration:

Development of Iraq's ancient Tigris-Euphrates Valley with irrigation and other projects.

An improved system of highways and railroads connecting Middle Eastern nations.

A longstanding scheme for developing the Jordan River Valley, which involves squabbling between Syria, Jordan, and Israel.

A sort of TVA for the entire Nile River Valley. This power and irrigation project would harness the 4,000-mile river all the way up to its sources in central Africa and Ethiopia, as well as along its length in Egypt and the Sudan.

A scheme for low-interest loans to farmers in the region, with the aim of boosting farm production and income.

Widening and deepening of the Suez Canal to increase its capacity and accommodate many of the supertankers now being built.

A batch of land-reclamation projects, mostly in the form of irrigation projects, which would provide new homes in Egypt and elsewhere for many of the 1 million Arab refugees who fled Israel after the Arab-Israeli war of 1948.

WHO WILL PAY?

"Altogether we've got perhaps two dozen rather detailed projects we could use," says an official of Uncle Sam's aid-dispensing International Cooperation Administration. Taken together, they would cost far more than the cash the administration has or is even asking for Middle Eastern use, but the United Nations, the World Bank and the recipient countries are expected to shoulder part of the load.

The Chief Executive wants Congress, right now, to let him spend with no strings attached \$200 million of aid money already appropriated for this fiscal year, ending June 30. Then, he has served notice, he will ask Congress to give him similar \$200 million allotments for the Middle East in both the 1958 and 1959 fiscal years—a total of \$600 million for free-handed spending in all.

As foreign aid administrators explain it, the \$200 million to be spent the rest of this year would be on top of roughly \$30 million worth of technical cooperation already slated. That consists of United States help for schools, health projects, and the like.

Although the lines aren't clear, the \$200 million would probably include any large-scale development projects already planned for the Near East. Congress gave the administration \$250 million for such projects in the Near East, Africa, and Asia this year, with original planning calling for up to \$60 million of this to go into the Near East. The Suez Canal seizure puts a halt to any such spending in the region, and it has never been made clear what big projects originally were planned.

BARBS ON SPENDING

Eisenhower men are asking Congress to let them spend \$200 million in the Middle East pretty much as they want. That means removing two principal restrictions. The planners want to be free from a congressional restriction that requires 80 percent of Middle East aid for building big projects within a single country to be loans instead of grants. The other chief restriction bars Government spenders from laying out more than 20 percent of their aid appropriations in May and June of each fiscal year; this is designed to keep aid men from a last-minute rush of spending for fear of losing already appropriated funds.

In selling the aid portion of the Eisenhower Middle East resolution to Congress, the President and Secretary of State Dulles have publicly emphasized the cash is aimed at thwarting Communist infiltration. But that task is more a matter of legislative strategy than a full disclosure of intentions.

The policymakers who helped draw up the aid ideas and the men who will administer them have much broader ideas. They see the aid cash as an important weapon in solving basic Middle East troubles—Arab-Israeli bad blood and the anticolonial hatred of Arab countries principally Egypt, for Western nations.

"UMBRELLA OVER AID"

"The military force part of the resolution would be an umbrella over the aid," explains a high Dulles assistant. "That's what NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) was originally planned to do in Europe—remove the Russian threat so economies could be repaired."

More explanation comes from one of Uncle Sam's knowledgeable Mid-East officials. Says he:

"In order to get the resolution through Congress, you have to play down the aid as a solution to basic Middle East problems. Congress is a hornets' nest on that subject."

He adds: "It would look like we were trying to undercut the United Nations if we came out and said we wanted the aid money to patch up basic troubles out there. We're backing U. N. Secretary General Hammarskjöld in his efforts."

Indeed, the Administration is currently in the process of trying to stave off a determined move in both the House and Senate to sever the President's Middle East aid requests from the authority he wants for use, if necessary, of armed forces in the region.

Secretary of State Dulles has vigorously criticized a Democratic proposal for a congressional resolution that would omit the aid part of the scheme. "It (the Democratic proposal) does not touch at all upon the economic phase of the problem which is of extreme importance and urgency," the Secretary declared.

"Without the aid, you would be closing only half the stable door," is the way an Administration official puts it more directly.

What Administration officials say they want is a free hand to promise economic aid to a country or group of countries quickly any time the diplomatic situation suddenly turns favorable.

TOOLING WITH CASH

Specifically, the diplomats see increased freedom in using the cash as a tool to help settle Arab-Israeli feuding. Right now, say Mideast experts, the Arabs won't talk about a joint economic project because they're angry at Israel and because some Arab countries are angry at others. They say poor economic conditions within the troubled countries underlie most of the discontent.

"It's a vicious circle that the aid freedom might give us a chance to break," contends a Dulles aide.

An ICA insider talks of three broad purposes of the spending projects the Administration plans.

The first aim is to ease tensions fast. Chiefly, this means getting refugees from the Arab-Israeli war of 1948 out of United Nations camps in Jordan, Lebanon and Syria and into productive work of their own. Old Middle East hands at the State Department narrow the reason for much of the discontent in Arab countries to ugly animosities against Israel stirred up in the Arab refugee camps. The United States and the U. N. currently have plans in the works for irrigating and reclaiming large sections of arable land on Egypt's Sinai Peninsula and in Jordan as homes for many of the refugees.

EXCITABLE PEOPLE, EASE OFF

The second, longer-term purpose is to help large economic groups, such as farmers, in Mideast nations in an attempt to keep tension down. "These are excitable people," a United States theorist says of the Middle Easterners. "But if they see you're trying to give them something, they ease off."

This situation calls, in the eyes of United States planners, for more irrigation and land reclamation. It also calls for farm-to-market roads in a region where highways, as well as other forms of transportation, are scarce. And the United States planners foresee a possible scheme for lending individual countries large amounts of cash which would be reloaned at low interest to farmers for agricultural work.

The third aim is still broader and longer-range: To lift per capita incomes and living standards of whole countries in the poverty-plagued Middle East through projects of nationwide impact. These might include multipurpose river valley developments, railroad construction, and big industrial enterprises.

Administration officials won't give a complete rundown on the schemes they have in mind chiefly because they don't want to be besieged with cries for help from the countries involved. As Secretary Dulles explains it, disclosure of what projects the United States intends to underwrite makes the countries involved think they have a vested interest in the project.

But it's clear the foreign aiders have a batch of big specific projects lined up for potential use.

ASWAN'S BACK AGAIN

For instance, there's Egypt's \$1.3 billion Aswan Dam, a proposal which intermittently dies and comes back to life. Officials who call it "dead as a doornail" one day admit the next that there's still a chance the United States may help pay

for it. The dam's fate depends, apparently, on how friendly Egypt becomes with the free world.

They now call much brighter, however, the prospects for a United States hand in a development project for practically the entire Nile River. Whereas the Aswan Dam would have blocked the Nile in its comparatively lower reaches, the big development scheme would go into the Nile's headwaters for irrigation and power projects. These would benefit not only Egypt, but also the newly independent Sudan, Ethiopia, and British-controlled central Africa, where one branch of the Nile starts in Lake Victoria.

Uncle Sam's strategists also eye the Tigris-Euphrates River Valley system in Iraq. The home of ancient Babylon and the cradle of modern civilization, the valley had a rich, highly advanced culture thousands of years ago. Developers would like to help the valley toward new preeminence, principally with more irrigation.

Most likely of all the schemes to win United States funds is the beleaguered Suez Canal, assuming Egyptian President Nasser agrees to play ball with the West. The State Department and the World Bank, of which the United States is the biggest member, are studying cash outlays to Egypt for widening and deepening the 105-mile desert waterway. Experts estimate the cost at up to \$1 billion.

RESOLVED: PRESERVE SUEZ

Many international strategists consider a loan for this work as potentially desirable because of the strategic location of the canal on the heavy oil-shipping route connecting the Middle East and Western Europe. They seem resolved to keep Suez the main artery for this oil flow.

Neither Egypt nor any other country will get its aid just for the asking. Administration officials make clear privately, although they don't say it openly, that they want various assurances that the cash will prove effective before they dole it out.

For the Suez development, as an example, Uncle Sam wants Egypt, Britain, and France to agree first to a settlement of their Suez differences. Our diplomats expect to offer cash for expansion of the canal as a come-on, if necessary, to a final settlement by the three countries directly involved.

That's the way they expect to use many of their other aid schemes too. They'll make clear to disputing Middle Eastern nations that we're ready to help raise their living standards and boost national income, if the countries will just work together on the projects. This squabbling which the United States wants to end not only embroils Arab countries with Israel, but, as well, Arab countries with each other. Our diplomats note, for instance, that Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Syria are constantly trying to pull oil-rich Iraq away from her friendship with Britain. And both Iraq and the Egyptian bloc are contesting for weak little Jordan's allegiance.

Not all Uncle Sam's Middle East aid dollars will go for economic schemes, of course. Some will go for military aid that President Eisenhower wants to promise the countries. The President wants to give Middle Eastern countries arms and other military help, so they can beef up their own forces against Communist threats. Leaders of Iraq already have indicated they've already been promised added United States arms aid.

But our planners say military help would take only a minor part of the \$200 million that Mr. Eisenhower wants freedom to spend this year and the \$400 million he wants in future years, let alone money to be spent still later.

Chairman GORDON. Mr. Carnahan—

Mr. CARNAHAN. Mr. Chairman and Mr. Johnson: You said in your statement that as you see it there are at least 3 continuing problems, together with 2 current crises. The third of those continuing problems you say is the necessity of resolving the present bitter contest for leadership within the Arab world. Then you state the concept, that—

This is mainly a power contest between Egypt and Iraq by no means explains its full character. Nor can it be regarded merely as a contest between monarchical and republican forms of national government.

You say:

It must also be viewed in the light of the important fact that the West, deliberately and for its own benefit, split the Arab world into manageable pieces after the First World War. This form of irresponsible and selfish interference in the area has not been forgotten by the Arabs, and the United States policies even in 1957 tend to be examined in its light.

Would you care to break that down a little further for us, the fact that the West deliberately and for its own benefit split the Arab world into manageable pieces after World War I?

Mr. JOHNSON. I refer, of course, Mr. Carnahan, to the dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire following the defeat of Germany and Turkey and the First World War, and the tussle which went on between nations of Western Europe for hegemony within the Middle East. The assignment of mandates over sections of the Ottoman Empire, including the then created Lebanon, Syria, Palestine, Transjordan, and Iraq. They are the manageable pieces to which I referred, and the governments assigned.

The opportunity of the United States to participate in that decision was somehow in a manner I don't know, lost in the Versailles peace conference when the report of the King-Crane Commission sent out by this country by President Wilson to determine the facts in the case, it was never even brought up for consideration.

This report, which was a remarkable document, as I have read it, urged that the United States itself take a forthright interest in the mandate situation and report it among other things that the Arabs of Syria and Lebanon of all things did not want France as the mandatory power. They might accept Britain but would much prefer the United States.

There is in the background of that discussion and that difficulty, a long series of promises and secret arrangements made by the British and the French during the war for the purposes of obtaining maximum support from various people. That was the McMahon correspondence with the king of the Hejaz in Saudi Arabia which promised the Arabs freedom and a free nation of their own.

There was the Balfour Declaration given to the Zionists which promised them a national home for the Jews. There was the secret Sykes-Picot agreement between Britain and France which carved up the Middle East and assigned the pieces to its members. This is a case of a kind of secret diplomacy which characterized the era. But the fact that the Middle East is carved up into, to some extent, economically senseless portions and was placed under the mandate authority of Britain and France, at that time, is a black page in Western history.

I am not surprised that the Arabs haven't forgotten it. I am sure I am repeating something you already know, Mr. Carnahan, but that is the background of my statement.

Mr. CARNAHAN. Just one other short question that perhaps you can answer rather quickly.

On page 4 of your statement, the first paragraph on the page, it seems to me that you are expressing a fear that the provision in House Joint Resolution 117 for the use of \$200 million in fiscal year 1957 which is already appropriated may be a transfer of funds intended for economic aid to military uses.

Is that true?

Mr. JOHNSON. No, sir, this is not what I had in mind. I do fear that in the public mind—and this may represent lack of information or an unwillingness to study the situation—that there is a confusion between economic aid and long-term economic development. People will think that \$200 million granted in House Joint Resolution 117 is a contribution to the long-term economic development. I am not at all sure but what it is the intention of certain people who have testified for the Government in connection with the Senate hearings.

Mr. CARNAHAN. I want to compliment you on your statement. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman GORDON. Mr. Johnson, you have mentioned in discussions here, the interest you have in, and your participation in the refugee program. How would you propose to settle the refugee problem in the Middle East?

Mr. JOHNSON. How long is the committee sitting?

I have been rather closely connected with that problem since 1949, when I first began directing the relief program of the American Friends Service Committee in the Gaza Strip, at the behest of the United Nations. This is a complex and tremendously difficult issue which has a lot of heat in it. I think it can be settled only in connection with a political settlement of the Arab-Israeli difficulty, and probably an assurance of its settlement, but not the actual settlement, itself. Assurance of a way to settle it is one of the first things which must be found.

I feel, however, that it would be extremely difficult to suggest a settlement of the refugee condition by itself, except in the broadest outline, and in the context of a belief that the political problem must also be settled.

There is, I think now, as of 1957, more hope that a sound basis exists for the settlement of the refugee problem than at any time in the past. This hope rests in the fact that one country in the Arab world—Iraq—has been using 70 percent of its oil money through an Iraq Development Board which has United States and British participation, in an extremely intelligent way.

I have not myself been to Iraq but I have talked to people who have known the Board intimately, known the men on it, and have seen some of the works. It is creating new resources. It is fast putting Iraq in a position where it will be underpopulated. There will be a re-creation of some of the agricultural and irrigation resources which existed there 2,000 years ago, more or less. It is on the basis of the creation of such new resources that I think it is worth while to undertake the discussion of the political aspects of the Arab-Israeli problem, in order that the two may go along, together.

I have some thoughts on the settlement of the Arab-Israeli problem. I am not sure at all they are germane to your discussion here, now, but if they are, I will be glad to go into it.

Chairman GORDON. You may present that.

Mr. JOHNSON. My feeling is that one of the elements in the present situation which must be eliminated is the tremendous amount of heat between the contestants or disputants. I have the feeling that heat has been increasing over the last year or two, rather than decreasing.

The first necessity, I think, is for a cooling-off period, hopefully enforced by a mutual willingness in the area, and a United Nations Police Force. So that some of this heat may be dissipated.

I believe that the second necessity—perhaps I should put it a little more humbly: A suggestion for a next step might be in the development, either through the United Nations, or in direct discussions, of a panel of neutral and respected countries which would undertake preliminary discussions privately with the disputants, to discover what would be the rockbottom minimum which they will accept. Not discuss it in public with them so that we get wild statements from officials and others who know they must meet the prejudices of their people. But private discussions undertaken in such a way that the real rockbottom possibility for settlement will come out.

I think that it might be necessary for this panel of neutrals to be submitted in advance to the disputants so that we and that they would be sure that the persons who went to talk to Israel and the persons who went to talk to Jordan—nations, I mean, of course—who went to talk to Egypt were acceptable, in a sympathetic kind of a way, so that the real truth would come out.

I think if the rockbottom minimum for settlement for these two groups could be obtained and made a matter of record, and if the heat could be pulled out of that situation for a year or so, so that the border was reasonably peaceful, that then there would be prospects of a political settlement.

I have not been on the inside of this political discussion. These are the thoughts of one who has been in the area but not of one who has had a political responsibility. They are obviously only preliminaries. By implication, of course, I am saying to you that I think the United States, Britain, France, and Russia should be absent from these preliminary negotiations, that they should be undertaken under authority outside of these major countries, because these four are suspected in the area. Whether correctly or not is beside the point, really.

But if we and the other western countries can be mature enough to make quite clear to ourselves and to the United Nations that we will support action taken toward a compromise solution, that we will not take unilateral action, or not undermine the group plan arrived at, I feel there is a better chance for solution than if it is approached directly by the major powers.

Chairman GORDON. Thank you very much, Mr. Johnson.

Does your organization have any activities in the present situation in Hungary?

Mr. JOHNSON. I didn't understand.

Chairman GORDON. Did your organization participate in any way in the Hungarian refugee problem?

Mr. JOHNSON. The organization for which I am an overseas worker is active in the Hungarian refugee situation. The body for whom I testify here is not involved in that.

Chairman GORDON. Mr. Fascell.

Mr. FASCELL. Your discussion of the political settlement of the Arab-Israel problem presupposes the Arabs will accept Israel as a state; is that true?

Mr. JOHNSON. Yes, it does.

Mr. FASCELL. Therefore, also, we have the right to infer from your observation that the Arabs will eventually accept Israel?

Mr. JOHNSON. It is my impression that part of the rockbottom demands of these parties will be these: The Israeli will demand recog-

nition of the State of Israel and its protection from continued pilfering at the borders and an opening of commercial relations. The Arabs on their part will demand that the State of Israel shall—that it shall be guaranteed internationally that the State of Israel shall not grow in size, that perhaps some form of control over the immigration in that state may be necessary in order to keep the immigration and the productive resources in balance, and that the right of the refugees to return, or to be compensated, shall be recognized without important qualification.

It is my personal belief that the refugees would not want to return, and that it therefore does not constitute a serious problem for Israel to recognize their right to return.

I am sure that safeguards would have to be placed by both sides around this process and neutral umpiring and supervision would be greatly necessary.

Mr. BYRD. Mr. Chairman, might I ask one further question? Just how amenable are the refugees in Jordan to any solution other than that of being returned? I think you just made the statement that they are not so much interested in being returned as they are in some other solution. Just how amenable are they to any other solution?

Mr. JOHNSON. If you undertake a public discussion, that is to say, if in public you were to ask this question of the refugee leaders you would get a thoroughly negative answer. They are not willing for anything except this one thing to happen.

If the question can be asked other than in public discussion, and if it can be asked in the context of the meeting of the minimum demands of the leaders of the group, I think there is a chance of their coming together, and there is a chance of amenability on the part of the Arab refugees.

This is a personal opinion, and I assure you I haven't ever saved a world yet and I may not be able to do it this time.

Mr. SAUND. May I ask one question?

Chairman GORDON. Yes, Mr. Saund.

Mr. SAUND. Mr. Johnson, if your proposal to solve the problem of the Israeli-Arab conflict were presented to the United Nations, what do you think would be the reaction of England and France to that? Are they in a position or are they in a state of mind today that they will without reservation accept your proposal, or do you think they have some ulterior interest in the region to cause them to put stumbling blocks in there? Do you get my point?

Mr. JOHNSON. I think I do, Mr. Saund.

Mr. SAUND. You mentioned four major powers: Russia, the United States, England, and France. We don't expect much from Russia. But I have no doubt that the United States will be willing to cooperate and bring about a solution to that problem. Do you think England and France, knowing the situation as you do, would be also willing and have no reservations in their mind?

Mr. JOHNSON. I have nothing in mind on France. My guess would be that England would be amenable to this kind of approach. I think England has been in pretty serious difficulty in the Middle East, economically and politically. Furthermore, I have considerable respect for her present purpose in the Middle East and for the kind of adjustments, by and large, which have been recently made in the former

empire. I except some current problems rather sharply but on the whole I feel there is a pretty constructive attitude in England at the present time, or willingness to be constructive.

This is pure opinion, Mr. Saund. I wish I were an expert, to pontificate, but I am not.

Mr. SAUND. That is all.

Chairman GORDON. Mr. Johnson, I certainly want to thank you. You have made a fine witness, today. You have been very informative.

Mr. JOHNSON. May I thank the chairman and the committee, on my first appearance before a committee. I have had a very interesting afternoon.

Chairman GORDON. The committee stands adjourned until 10:30 tomorrow morning in this same room.

(Whereupon, at 5 p. m., the committee adjourned until 10:30 a. m., tomorrow, Wednesday, January 16, 1957.)

ECONOMIC AND MILITARY COOPERATION WITH NATIONS IN THE GENERAL AREA OF THE MIDDLE EAST

WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 16, 1957

**HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
*Washington, D. C.***

The committee met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10:40 a. m., in room 1301, New House Office Building, the Honorable Thomas S. Gordon (chairman) presiding.

Chairman GORDON. The committee will come to order. Ladies and gentlemen, we are meeting to continue hearings on House Joint Resolution 117. Our first witness this morning will be Congressman Celler of New York. Mr. Celler is a lawyer by profession who has served with distinction in the House of Representatives since 1922. He also has the honor to be chairman of the Committee on Judiciary.

Mr. Celler, we are very glad to have you with us this morning and appreciate your taking time out to give us the benefit of your views on this pending resolution. Mr. Celler.

STATEMENT OF HON. EMANUEL CELLER, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF NEW YORK

Mr. CELLER. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I take this opportunity to congratulate you after many years of service in reaching the summit of this committee. I certainly, as a chairman of a coordinate committee of the House, knowing of the difficulties surrounding a job like a chairmanship, wish you well.

Chairman GORDON. Thank you.

Mr. CELLER. I take this opportunity to note that one of our New York Members is one of your newest additions to your committee. He has had a brilliant career in our New York Legislature, I am sure he will be a credit to you and to the Congress.

Mr. FARBERSTEIN. Thank you, Congressman.

Mr. CELLER. I would wish to thank you, Mr. Chairman and the members of the committee, for the opportunity this committee has given me to express my views on the so-called Eisenhower plan for the Middle East area. I have welcomed this opportunity because for years now I have had a special and active interest in the development of that region and it is my fear that the plan outlined by the President may and can be used as an oversimplification of one of the most complex problems that faces us today.

I wish to start off by saying that it is well for the United States to place the Soviet Union, as well as the rest of the world, on notice that the Middle East area is of active and vital concern to its national security. This was a belated conclusion on the part of the administra-

tion. It was obvious to many of us when Soviet arms over a year ago started pouring into Egypt that we had failed to see the significance of Soviet penetration. With 1 step forward and 2 steps back, Secretary Dulles, in the handling of the Suez seizure by Egypt, succeeded only in convincing the American public and the world that the United States was not seriously interested in a region which, as President Eisenhower now has pointed out, bears directly upon the safety of Western survival.

I do not wish to belabor the points of nonfeasance on the part of our administration, but the public estimates made by both Mr. Eisenhower and Mr. Dulles on the Suez situation and the penetration of Soviet influence in that area have direct bearing on the resolution now before us. A year ago, Mr. Dulles said, "The problem of the Suez has been successfully resolved." He listed the evacuation of the British among the events which, he said, made the Suez situation "better and brighter." And in April, the President detailed Suez as one place where we were winning the cold war.

Permit me also the luxury of quoting a few instances of "the clouded crystal ball" as Time magazine peered into it. On January 3, 1955:

Dulles is the man of 1954 because, in the decisive areas of international politics, he played the year's most effective role * * * Regionally, 1954's greatest area of success for American diplomacy and the man who runs it was the Middle East * * * After decades of dispute, the status of the Suez Canal area was settled more firmly than ever before.

And on August 6, 1955, Time reported:

The United States had speculated that Egypt's Nasser might seize the Suez Canal in retaliation but State—meaning the State Department—did not rate the chances very high.

On July 30, 1956:

On the broad chessboard of international diplomacy, the United States moved decisively last week in a gambit that took the breath of professionals for its daring and won the assent of kibitzers for its intrinsic rightness. John Foster Dulles advised Egypt's President Gamal Abdel Nasser that the United States is no longer interested in building the \$1.3 billion Aswan High Dam. The risk of Soviet penetration was no greater than the risk of having Nasser go on with his fast-and-loose game in the precarious Middle East. It was highly possible that Chessmaster Dulles had his opponents in check.

Then, of course, it is difficult to forget the use of the "peace" theme in a recent campaign. Now we are faced with a delayed reaction on the part of the administration. But I fear that again we are not being asked to look at the whole picture and see it whole. Can we realistically divorce the problem of Soviet penetration, or the possibility of overt Soviet aggression in the Middle East, from the regional problems, which problems are being used by the Soviet Union as a lever for its entrance into that area? The division is made in the proposal before us between overt Soviet aggression and the problems of Suez and the Arab-Israeli dispute. No such division can be made.

Moreover, it has seemed to me—and I know that my viewpoint is shared by millions of our constituents—that the administration has never made clear what it means when it uses the term "aggression." History does not begin at any set hour of the day; it is a stream that flows around many bends. What was the provocation that led to the intervention of England and France in the Suez? What was the provocation that led to the Israeli intervention? Was not the seizure of the Suez by the Egyptian Government, without notice, in itself an

act of aggression? Was not the failure of the Egyptian Government to guarantee free access to all nations an act of aggression? Were not the border raids by Fedayeen, the ignoring by Egypt of the United Nations resolution demanding free access to Suez to Israel, acts of aggression? The United Nations has never clarified, nor has the administration lent its collective mind to an examination of what constitutes "aggression."

The Suez and the Arab-Israeli dispute, we are told, are to be left to the United Nations. Until the United Nations has means of enforcing its resolutions, has means of acting to stem the defiance of these resolutions, the United Nations can play no greater role than moral persuasion permits it. The United Nations was able to prevent the extension of the war in Egypt only because England, France, and Israel voluntarily accepted its resolution; but it could not end the Soviet aggression against Hungary. It could not make Nasser live up to the terms of clearance of the canal, which was not to be dependent on the withdrawal of foreign troops, but upon the actual order of cease-fire. It has been helpless to stop the fedayeen raids against Israel. It has been impotent in forcing the puppet Government of Hungary to accept the presence of United Nations observers. When Egypt denied transit through the Suez Canal to Israeli ships, sent commando raids into Israel, and violated the Treaty of Constantinople, the United Nations could not act. Even now, it is impossible for the United Nations to negotiate with Nasser. It is Nasser who sets the terms and the United Nations police force is there on sufferance of the Egyptian dictator.

The United States cannot then leave the decision on these important matters, which must be United States responsibility, up to the United Nations. That is ducking responsibility.

The United States will not have discharged its full responsibility by saying we stand behind the United Nations, for the United Nations can only be as strong or as weak as the United States chooses to make it. To say "Let the U. N. do it" is not policy; it is a way to avoid making hard and difficult decisions. In common parlance, it is passing the buck.

Viscount Cherwell, nuclear scientist, in the House of Lords recently sought to dispel exaggerated notions of the great power of the United Nations. He said:

In the Assembly, 5 percent of the world's population can carry the day against the other 95 percent, and 10 percent could claim a two-thirds majority * * * Half the population of the world is represented by 4 delegates, the other half by 75. Some are the most highly educated and civilized countries on the planet. The inhabitants of others can scarcely read or write. * * * The vote of 400 million (East) Indians or 160 million Americans is equated to the vote of 4 million Bolivians.

As for the U. N. Police Force in Egypt, Viscount Cherwell stated, "it * * * could be swept away by one brigade of Israelis and probably even by 2 or 3 divisions of Egyptians." To be "of any use," a U. N. police force would have to be stronger than any nation or combination of nations. What "sort of force would be required to turn Russia out of Hungary, of America out of Formosa, should the Afro-Asian bloc, voting with the Latin American or the Iron Curtain countries, secure an Assembly vote to this effect?"

Small wonder the New Yorker calls the United Nations the "United Nations."

How, then, can these problems which affect the entire world—these problems of Suez and Arab-Israeli relationships—be left to the United Nations, when they constitute the tinder box from which world conflagration can start? The Arab-Israeli dispute is obstructed by a Soviet veto in the Security Council and in the General Assembly we have the Arab-Afro-Asia Soviet bloc forming a coalition to frustrate the best of intentions. How far from simple this problem is when we consider that the United Nations presses Israel to withdraw from Sharn el Sheikh in the Sinai Peninsula. It was here that the Israelis stopped the batteries which shelled United States and British vessels in the Gulf of Aqaba. Can we stop communism from literally walking into the Middle East if, with Communist weapons, the Egyptians control the Gulf of Aqaba which becomes significant as an alternate route to the Suez?

True, the Soviet Union will be placed on notice by this resolution that the United States is determined to protect its national security in the area of the Middle East. But this constitutes only one step, and it is no more than that. This we must recognize lest smugness overtake us in the mistaken belief that we have devised a policy, rather than having made just a beginning toward reaching a realistic coordinated policy which includes all these variants.

I call the Eisenhower plan only a beginning, and this the Congress will surely recognize. What part do we play in assuring that all nations shall have access to the canal and the Straits of Aqaba? What role do we play in insuring that the Arab world will recognize and acknowledge the existence of the State of Israel? Let us not forget that in that region the Arab-Israeli dispute—if I can use so weak a word—is of greater immediacy to them than any potential Soviet threat.

The plan is only a beginning toward a workable policy. The proposal is that we deploy troops to the Middle East only when there are overt acts of aggression by the Soviet Union or a Soviet dominated country and then only upon consent of the threatened nation. It leaves out of consideration completely the problem attendant upon subverted governments. Once a government has been subverted—and there is the usual Soviet putsch—we can hardly expect that it will ask for our aid against Soviet domination.

How clearly this matter of oversimplification stands out when we consider the Middle East itself. We are dealing here with nations of diverse composition, economically, socially, culturally. Yemen and Jordan, for example, are hardly viable states, dependent as they are upon foreign government subsidies. Iraq and Saudi Arabia, despite the enormous oil royalties which they receive annually, are, as far as the people themselves are concerned, underdeveloped to a point of misery.

Egypt has a degree of political maturity lacking in such countries as Saudi Arabia, Jordan, or Yemen. Again, it is only a beginning because it leaves out of account the various rivalries that exist among the Arab nations themselves. The one note of unity, and the only note of unity, exists in their attitude toward Israel. In the Middle East we find one country oriented toward the West, politically mature, a practicing democracy, with skilled technologists, a managerial class, and a background of science and experimentation—which is Israel.

At this point I wish to direct the attention of the committee to some facts which I believe will have total relevance to the examination of the proposal before it. The figures I am going to give you I have obtained from State Department sources.

The Arab countries receive a total of \$83.8 million each month from the petroleum industries in the form of royalties, taxes, or other payments. Saudi Arabia, based on 1955 figures, will have received each month during 1956 the equivalent of about \$24 million, in dollars, pounds, and francs, paid to it by Aramco which is owned by Standard of New Jersey, Standard of California, the Texas Co., and Socony-Mobil. In other words, American companies contributed totally to this figure.

Iraq will have received, in the year of 1956, approximately \$18 million per month from the petroleum industries, 23.75 percent of which is from American petroleum interests. Iran will have received about \$13 million per month, 40 percent of which comes from the American oil industry.

Kuwait will have received \$25 million each month of the year 1956 from the petroleum industry, 50 percent of which is American. Qatar will have received about \$3 million per month, 23.75 percent coming from American petroleum interests.

Bahrein will have received approximately \$800,000 each month during 1956 from the petroleum industry, all of it derived from American interests.

The total received by these four countries is over a billion dollars a year.

I note that King Ibn Saud will visit with the President. In discussing the conditions of his country with him, the President can, perhaps, determine how much of oil royalties are used for the betterment of Saudi Arabia economically. It is well, however, for the President to hear first-hand reports from the heads of these governments and it would not be amiss for the administration to invite the Prime Minister of Israel, David Ben Gurion, likewise, to give first-hand reports of the fears and the tensions in the Middle East.

I should like to quote from U. S. News & World Report which, after all, cannot be said to be unfriendly to the administration. In discussing the Eisenhower plan, it says:

Does this increase the chance of war? The idea is that, by warning of American intent to resist aggression, the United States will restrain Soviet Russia. Will it mean American troops for the Mideast? No. This is just to be a warning to Russia to keep out. Will it mean bigger United States Armed Forces? No. United States already has powerful naval forces in the Eastern Mediterranean and very powerful Air Force strength not far away in the Western Mediterranean. Will it call for marines to patrol the area? There is no thought of that. Will United States be committed to move in on local wars? Not necessarily. That would be a United Nations job. What's it all about, then? The latest United States move primarily is designed to warn Russia against new adventures.

It is not that this warning should not be given; I believe it should be given. It is only that we must recognize that, in and of itself, it cannot insure peace. The United States must make its position equally clear vis-a-vis Egypt. It must leave neither side guessing in the Arab-Israeli dispute, of the United States conviction that Israel is here to stay; that the United States is firm in its stand that the Suez must be held accessible for all nations, bar none; that it will insure the territorial integrity of the nations in the Middle East as against

each other as well as against the Soviet Union; and to the end of promoting peace in that area, it will impose an embargo on all arms to the Middle East and demand all nations do so. An embargo, not including the Soviet Union, however, could do great mischief.

The question, too, must be asked: "Are we going it alone?" It cannot be gainsaid that the oil from the Middle East is the lifeblood of Europe; that European interest in that area is equally urgent. Must we not ask ourselves if this is not a further downgrading of England and France, whose stake in the continuance of civilization is certainly as great as ours?

Again we must take a close look at the program for economic aid as outlined in this resolution. Economic aid designed as a crisis program must fail, in and of itself. The tragic economic plight of the Middle East needs no recounting here. But must we not examine the dangers inherent in a blanket allotment which can be manipulated politically, which is withdrawn from standards placed upon its spending by the Congress? Must not the Congress assure itself that these moneys will be spent for the region as a whole, such as the Johnson irrigation plan which has been rejected by the Arab nations because, while it will be of benefit to themselves, will also be of benefit to Israel? There are other plans that could be considered on a regional basis.

The administration at times has appeared to adopt a philosophy of abstention, conciliation, and pacification—all virtues at times, but any of which, under certain circumstances, can be a vice. Peace at any price is fraught with evil. One may speculate whether the price the Nation will have to pay in the long run, even for its present domestic tranquillity, in terms of moral stagnation, intellectual sterility, issues unrecognized and problems unsolved, may not be too costly and excessive in the end.

It has been the Dulles and Eisenhower policy to avoid problems—push them under the rug—in order to preserve a false front of uninterrupted tranquillity. But in the end the difficulty of solution becomes exacerbated. You cannot keep these difficulties under the rug.

The resolution does not come to grips, as I have tried to emphasize, with such agents of destruction and obstruction as Nasser; does not come to grips with the pouring of Communist arms into the Middle East; does not come to grips with our self-interest in maintaining a democracy like Israel in the Middle East; does not come to grips with the real economic woes of the whole region. And I wish to reemphasize in my conclusion that this resolution is not a program, but only the beginning of one; and while these problems cannot be met properly in the form of the resolution requested of Congress, most certainly the members—and this I want to emphasize—of this distinguished committee can set this forth in the report accompanying the resolution so that there will be for all the world to read that the United States is not unmindful of the complexities, not unmindful of the mistakes heretofore made, not unmindful of what yet remains to be done.

My position is this: the military warning expressed by the President might have a restraining influence on any rash Russian action. In that sense the Eisenhower Doctrine may be commended—but only in that sense.

The second part of the doctrine involves a blank check—blanket authority to spend \$400 million within 2 years for economic aid. I hope the committee will separate the two proposals and treat them separately. I want the military warning to Russia to be given. But I don't wish to be stampeded or bludgeoned into granting this huge sum for so-called economic aid under these conditions. Are we again yielding to the old business of blackmail without any assurance that our aid will be used for real social and economic reform in 10th-century feudal Arab bailiwicks. We have seen the evidence of vast sums siphoned off by Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Kuwait, and Bahrein. Kuwait is the only sheikdom which spends that money wisely for the social and economic betterment of the fellaheen.

Senator Knowland, Senate Republican leader, said yesterday before the Joint Committee of Armed Services and Foreign Relations in the Senate: "I am greatly troubled by the request to include economic aid in the measure."

It would be difficult to recite how President Eisenhower could spend an additional \$200 million each year for 2 years in the Middle East—the angry Middle East.

Saudi Arabia is bursting at the seams with oil money at the rate of \$288 million each year (figures for 1956). Iraq gets \$216 million in oil royalties each year. The President, in addition, under the Baghdad Pact has great sums to bolster the defenses of Iraq.

Syria is fast becoming a Soviet puppet, if she is not such now. Already she has refused our dollar aid at Russia's urging. Nasser, in Egypt, is making great anti-American noises. Cairo radio and press daily denounce us and call the Eisenhower doctrine "American Imperialism." Jordan may go the way of Syria. Anyhow, Britain subsidizes Jordan with \$35 million a year. Britain might resent our replacing her. Mr. Dulles admitted before the Senate Joint Foreign Relations and Armed Services Committees that we would not pick up the "tab" for Britain's subsidy of Jordan. Actually, Israel is the only nation left, plus Lebanon and Yemen. \$400 million would not be spent on these three nations. Where, I ask, is this taxpayers' money to go and how?

Indeed, most intensive hearings should be used to inquire how, when, and why this money is to be spent. We dare not buy a pig in a poke. Mr. Dulles must be subjected to sharp questioning in this regard. In the absence thereof and in the absence of adequate answers, I am extremely doubtful of this request for blanket, unqualified economic aid.

Finally, Mr. Dulles has yet to outline the projects for which money will be spent. It is no answer to say that the whole area would be lost unless the money is forthcoming. That is nonsense. If true, where was Mr. Dulles the month before? Such a debacle must have been discernible and danger signals set over a year ago. He was derelict a year ago or is just indulging in sophistry and mere debate now. He should be compelled to spell out a well-defined, long-range, short-range economic aid or programs for the Middle East. He only has given the committee vague assumptions. When he has been severely questioned, as was the case recently, he talked differently. The Senators closely interrogated him, and he has offered to restrict the broad proposed language and use the money for such things as paying security forces in the Middle East nations, tiding them over budget

deficits due to major impending cuts in the oil royalties because of the closed Suez and blown-up pipelines.

He should be asked to give, if he can, reasons other than which he gave yesterday and the day before as to the use of this money.

It is incumbent upon you to recall him so that he unfolds to you just how this money will be spent. Don't let him frighten you with his crass announcement that unless \$400 million is forthcoming all will be lost.

That is my statement. I will be very glad to present myself for interrogation.

Chairman GORDON. I am going to call on our next witness. At this time I want to introduce to the members, our good friend and fellow member, Representative Multer from New York.

Mr. Multer is also a lawyer and a distinguished member of the Banking and Currency Committee, which has so kindly loaned us this room for our hearing. Mr. Multer has been a Member of Congress since the 80th Congress. We welcome your appearance and shall give your views our most careful consideration. We will hear Mr. Multer's statement and then question Mr. Celler and Mr. Multer together under the 5-minute rule.

STATEMENT OF HON. ABRAHAM J. MULTER, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF NEW YORK

Mr. MULTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for that generous introduction. May I first express a similar word of commendation and congratulations to you upon your taking over the chairmanship of this great committee, and say that I am most appreciative of the opportunity you again give me to appear before your committee to present to you my views with reference to the important problem that now confronts us. I am sure that much of the factual information at my disposal will be spread upon your record before you close these hearings.

There is no doubt in my mind, and there should be none in the minds of our allies or of our enemies, present and potential, that every member of this committee and every Member of both Houses of Congress is sincerely devoted to the establishment of world peace, and when I say "world peace" I mean peace in every part of the world, a peace that will prevail not only between nations but between all peoples within each nation. That being so, while we may differ in our methods of approach, we certainly should be able to agree upon the form of a resolution which will state that purpose, not only so that all will understand, but so that none can misunderstand.

In approaching this problem, we cannot overlook the fact that under our Constitution the burden, the responsibility and the leadership in making foreign policy is, in the first instance, upon our President.

If he has failed us in that respect, if indeed as many have claimed—and with some justification, that he is now, to use the vernacular, "passing the buck" to the Congress, then let us assume that responsibility and move forward. Let us fill the void that has existed these many years, created by a lack of foreign policy of the United States, and positively, affirmatively, and without cavil or quibble, announce such policy, in one-syllable words, if necessary, so that freedom-loving people everywhere will know where we stand and, what is more im-

portant, those who would subjugate the world and enslave its people, will know that a Patrick Henry has risen among the nations, renewing the clarion call, "Give me liberty or give me death," knowing that free nations have ceased to engage in oratorical displays and are finally and at last ready to fight, if necessary, for that freedom.

It would be well if this committee, and its counterpart in the other body, could avoid the pressures being exerted upon us by the President and his Secretary of State for immediate action on the resolution you have before you, and that such action be postponed until such time as the appropriate committees of the Congress have entered upon and completed a thorough investigation of the conduct of our foreign affairs. With the election campaign behind us, and another presidential campaign 4 years away, this is the time to conduct such a study.

The American people are entitled to know why we have been repeatedly told by the highest responsible officials in our Government that all was well at home and abroad, only to have each such statement immediately followed by another crisis. We are entitled to know why the highest officials of our Government have dared to say to the American people and to the Congress that they had no advance knowledge of what our friends and allies were doing nor of what our potential enemies were doing.

You must agree with me that it was their duty to know these things. I say to you, that they had the means at hand at all times to know these things and to properly evaluate them. If you disagree with that statement then I say, conduct the investigation I suggest.

If our Secretary of State stayed at home long enough to read the reports and the dispatches that are on file in his office, he and our President would have had advance knowledge of many of the things about which they pretended ignorance. Their lack of knowledge must be attributed primarily to refusal to read and to listen and to understand.

I suggest to you that if you called upon our intelligence agencies to submit to you copies of their factual reports, if you called upon our Security Council to give you such reports, if you called upon our Joint Chiefs of Staff therefor, if you called upon our Secretary of State to submit to you the reports he has received from our Embassies, you would after reading them come to the same conclusion that I do, that all of the information they needed was always at hand upon which to base firm policies and to make them known in time to have prevented trouble.

It should be unnecessary for me to remind this committee of the grand and glorious history of our country, or to point out that after our country was born out of a war of revolution, we have never hesitated to fight for liberty, not only our own liberty, but for the liberty of all freedom-loving people. In that Revolutionary War we accepted not only the encouragement of people from outside the confines of this continent, we accepted their financial help and their military aid. We welcomed and used the Lafayettes, the Pulaskis, the Kosciuskos and all other "foreigners" who came to our aid.

How different from what we did when, after encouraging the Hungarians to rebel against their Communist dictators, we turned our back on them, giving them nothing but sweet, but very empty, words.

We asked no country's consent to enter the War of 1812 to fight for the freedom of the seas. That endeavor was not only for our own

personal advantage but to establish an important principle of international law. We asked no country's consent when in 1898 we fought with Spain for the freedom of Cuba.

We asked no country's consent when we wiped out the pirates of Tripoli. We asked no country's consent when we sent General Pershing at the head of the United States Army into Mexico, where they stayed for some 11 months routing out Pancho Villa and his bandits who had dared to cross our border and kill six Americans.

Are we now going to rewrite history and label the United States the aggressor in all of those, and in many other instances in our history? Are there any among us who will say that those actions were not justified by moral law, as well as international law? If we follow the thinking of Mr. Dulles as applied to our friends and allies in the Middle East, we must rewrite all our traditions. If he really doesn't know the difference between self-defense and aggression; if he doesn't know the difference between self-preservation and aggression; if he doesn't know that a people or a nation which refuses to allow itself to be robbed, even if it uses force to prevent the thievery; is neither morally nor legally an aggressor; if he doesn't know that a people or a nation which will disarm its enemies who have threatened to annihilate it, is not an aggressor, then, indeed, ladies and gentlemen, this Congress cannot move fast enough to present a resolution which will clearly define the differences for him.

Obviously, Mr. Dulles has not learned the lessons of history. He refuses to acknowledge that among the major mistakes we made in the recent past was standing idly by as Manchuria was conquered, as Ethiopia was ravaged, as Poland was raped, and as Hitler was appeased and even now as Hungary is destroyed. Apparently he thinks that appeasement of Nasser of Egypt has not brought us to the threshold of world war III.

I say to this committee that when the history of these times is written, one of the darkest blots upon its pages will be recording the shameful conduct of our country in rising up in the United Nations to join with our sworn enemy, the Communists, to denounce our sworn friends, the British, the French and the Israelis.

I say to you that the only thing wrong about what the British and the French did was their delay. They had a right to move in and take the Suez Canal from Nasser the day he nationalized it. When they withheld such action, at the suggestion of Mr. Dulles, they did all that could be expected of them. They complied with his suggestion for a London conference. When that failed, and the United Nations failed to take positive and firm action against Nasser with reference to the Suez Canal, they had every right to move in and put Mr. Nasser in his place. I understand our President claims to have been very much annoyed by the fact that he was not consulted in advance of that action. He denied himself the right to be consulted about it.

All the world knew that Britain and France were moving planes and tanks and troops into Cyprus in preparation for moving on Nasser if he didn't live up to his international obligations. During all these long days of preparation by the British and the French, why didn't the President or his Secretary of State convene the Security Council, not for the purpose of preventing Britain and France from protecting their lifeline, but for the purpose of bringing international pressure to bear, world opinion as they say, upon the international

brigand who was stealing that which belonged to the international community.

Let me recall to you the words of our President. Mr. Eisenhower said that international law must be the same for the big nation as for the little nation. International justice requires that the same rule apply to the small nation as it does to the big nation. We must agree.

The trouble with that statement is that it comes very late. Too long, have we been condoning international thievery under the euphonious title of "nationalization." Long before we wrote into our Constitution the prohibition against the taking of property, even for public purposes, all moral law, which must be considered a basis and a part of international law, prohibits such taking.

Now let's apply this doctrine which the President has so properly enunciated. What would you do if the President sent us a message stating that the Republic of Panama had nationalized the Panama Canal? I doubt whether this Congress would have waited for a message from the President before it acted. You would have acted the minute the news came to our attention. What's the difference in the two situations?

Geographically, the Suez Canal runs right through the middle of Egypt. Similarly, the Panama Canal runs right through the middle of the Republic of Panama.

The Suez Canal is an international highway, made such by the solemn obligations of duly executed treaties of many of the most important sovereign nations of the world. As a matter of fact, the State of Egypt owes its very sovereignty to the acts of most of those nations.

The Panama Canal is an international highway pursuant to the solemn obligation of a treaty entered into between the Republic of Panama and the United States of America.

No Panamanian money built the Panama Canal. No Egyptian money built the Suez Canal.

Although unilateral action of the Egyptians blockaded the Suez Canal, little or no Egyptian money will be used to clear it. And let no one say that the sinking of the ships by the Egyptians in the Suez Canal was an act of self-defense. It was a deliberate act of sabotage. It was a cold-blooded statement by Nasser to the user nations that he was taking their property and he would destroy it before he'd let them have it back.

If the Republic of Panama acted similarly with reference to the Panama Canal, is there an American anywhere in this country who would say that we should consult with any other nation before we moved in on the Republic of Panama and took the canal back? I doubt it.

What we would do with the Panama Canal, we should have done to help Britain and France and the rest of the free world do with reference to the Suez Canal, and we may yet have to do it.

To those who would say that one of the provisions in the treaty covering the Suez Canal is that title to the canal will pass in a matter of years to Egypt, I say that when the time comes, the free nations of the world will abide by that covenant. However, if they have any sense, in the meantime they will either build another canal in that area or pipelines through countries like Israel and Lebanon, supplemented with sufficient large-sized tankers so that the free world will

be in a position to negotiate with a Nasser, if one still be around at that time, for the perpetual internationalization of that canal.

In that connection, some of you may say that there were pipelines running through Syria and when this struggle started those pipelines were destroyed. Such is the fact. Whether they were destroyed by the Syrian Government, or by Communists aided and abetted by the Syrian Government, is unimportant. A Secretary of State who was alert to protect the interests of a free world should have presented that matter to the United Nations for appropriate action and, if necessary, we should have moved into Syria, yes—with Armed Forces, to protect that property.

This is not a new theory. Do I have to remind you that that is precisely what we did, in substance and in effect, in Guatemala? We consulted with none of our allies. We moved on Guatemala, despite the protests of Communist Russia, because we believed the Communist threat in Guatemala was an imminent danger to our security and the security of our neighbors in this hemisphere.

Let me pass on to another facet of this principle. At this very moment there is fighting in the Middle East, between Yemen and the British Protectorate of Aden. Is there any doubt but that the Yemenite invasion of Aden's borders is Communist inspired, supervised by Communist "technicians," and fortified by Communist arms? Or is this another matter, knowledge of which is lacking to our Secretary of State because he hasn't had the time to read the dispatches? What are we doing about it? Why hasn't our Secretary of State instructed our delegate to the United Nations to bring the matter forthrightly before the Security Council and, if necessary, before the General Assembly? Or is this a matter to be talked about in secret executive session?

I, like some of the members of this committee, am fed up with this so-called executive-session business. It is labeled "top secret" by the Administration. All the world knows about it, and you read it in the newspapers in the first editions on the streets after the close of the executive session. Not because of any leaks from the committee, but because it is either leaked by the Department of State or it is dug out of the Department by alert reporters who will not be denied the information they have a right to present to the public, and which the public has the right to get authentically, in the first instance, directly from responsible Government officials.

I can understand that matters of high policy involving our national security and defense should be presented to certain congressional committees behind closed doors.

It is high time, however, that our Government officials realized that secret diplomacy as to policy affecting the attitudes and conduct of governments has long since lost its usefulness. It accomplishes nothing except to create suspicions and ill feeling, and produce more grist for the false propaganda mills of the Communists.

There is no doubt in our minds about our sincerity in seeking world peace. There is no doubt in our minds that we want no colonies and that we want to subjugate no people.

Our only desire is a free and peaceful world. Any and every plan working toward that end can be and should be freely, fully, and completely discussed in the open, without reservation. Any other approach gives the Communists the right to cry that we are being deceit-

ful, and gives the neutralist the right to suspect not only our motives but our goals. We will not gain any friends by pretending that the policy or doctrine which we intend to apply to such friends or with such friends must be negotiated secretly.

Let me assure those who are fearful that the plans of the enemy may be made known, or that the enemy may find out how much we know about his plans, the enemy knows his plans. We can talk about them publicly, first, to alert our friends, and, secondly, to let our enemy know that we are wise to him. Every last word that is uttered to any committee of the Congress with reference to the allegedly new doctrine that you are asked to endorse should be publicized so that our friends will know that we mean to help them and so that our enemies will know that we intend to deter them.

Now, let's talk for a moment or two about the resolution and what it seeks to do. The idea seems to be to tell the Communists that we will stand for no more of their incursions upon the rights of free peoples and, at the same time, to show our friends that we are ready to help them economically. If I have read the newspaper reports correctly, our Secretary of State has conceded, at least before the committees in the other body, that the President already has the full authority to do the things asked for by this resolution. I believe that, in answer to the question as to why these things have not yet been done, he says that if we have been late in doing them, let's at least do them now.

Ladies and gentlemen, when I returned from the Middle East in December of 1955, I told everybody in our Government who would listen to me about the situation as I found it there. You will find much of the story in my testimony before this committee on May 8, 1956.

There cannot be any doubt but that the authority which the President now seeks he has always had. He has merely failed to exercise it.

You remember that only a few days ago he told a joint session of Congress that this country had security pacts with 42 nations and pacts of a similar nature with 3 other nations. The Baghdad Pact between Turkey, Iran, Iraq, and Pakistan was brought into being by the United States and at its instigation. When those countries asked the United States to join that pact, the excuse was given by our Secretary of State that to do so would antagonize some of the other Arab States, and particularly Mr. Nasser, of Egypt.

The State of Israel has repeatedly asked for a security pact, indicating that she would need no additional arms if she had such a security pact. Mr. Dulles' excuse for not giving the State of Israel such a security pact was that he couldn't do that without giving a similar security pact to the other Arab States. When asked why we didn't enter into such security pacts with the other Arab States, the answer came back: They won't take such a security pact because an important feature of each such security pact is an undertaking that the country will not engage in acts of aggression against any of its neighbors. The country that will not enter into such a covenant, labels itself a potential aggressor.

Economic aid throughout the Middle East, to the Arab countries as well as to Israel, has been available for many years. It has been offered to the Arab States and to Egypt repeatedly. From 1948 to 1952 none of the Arab States would take such aid from us because,

as a condition of giving such aid, we insisted upon a firm obligation being entered into by the recipient to recognize the existence of the State of Israel, and to agree not to be an aggressor against it or any other neighbor.

For the last 4 years the policy of our State Department has been different. It has tried to buy the friendship of the Arabs by offering aid without insisting upon peace treaties and without insisting on covenants against aggression.

The result has been more and more and more aggression by Egypt, Syria, and Jordan against Israel. If you will read the Congressional Record of the 84th Congress, you will find that hardly a week went by without my inserting a list of the incursions and invasions and ravagings and murderings by Arabs against Israelis on Israeli territory; the guerrillas, fedayeens, and commandos being armed by the Egyptians and the Arabs, and crossing from Egyptian and Arab territory into Israel and then returning home after their escapades of destruction.

Whether these were the acts of their Governments is as unimportant as it is obvious. In any event, those acts were the responsibility of the Arab governments. When those governments did not suppress and effectively prohibit those raids, the State of Israel had every right to use force to stop them. Israel had as much right to do that as the United States had to send General Pershing and our United States Army into Mexico to rout out the Mexican bandits when the Mexican Government either could not or would not stop their depredations.

I do not remember a single instance when our Secretary of State went before the United Nations and asked that that kind of conduct by Egypt and Syria and Jordan be stopped. I do remember how he first insisted that the Egyptians must get more arms to create a balance of power as between it and Israel. I also remember how he first urged Canada and France not to send arms to Israel, and then reversed himself and urged that they do send arms to Israel.

Any sensible person would have known that the arming of the Egyptians meant that they would use those arms, and that the very type and quantity meant they would be used for aggression. Similarly, any sensible person must know that the Israelis—if pushed as hard as they were—they would use their arms in self-defense, and by self-defense I mean going into the neighboring countries and disarming those who threatened Israel with annihilation.

Ladies and gentlemen, you have a great opportunity as a result of some "buck passing." I hope you will grasp the opportunity and bring forth a resolution which will be resolute and specific. You can use some, if not most, of the language of the resolution presented to you by the State Department. You must, if you will do your full duty, make some important changes, and you must add some important limitations.

I hope you won't believe me too presumptuous in submitting to you herewith the language which I think you should use in this resolution. Permit me to summarize my changes briefly.

In the first paragraph, instead of indicating the granting of a new authorization, my resolution indicates that we are merely confirming the authority that the President already has.

In the first whereas clause, I have inserted language to show that we are not going to limit our high principles by the United Nations Charter but that we are standing firm in our principle for a just and enduring peace and will seek it by every means available, including the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations.

In the third whereas clause, I have made it clear that the Communist threat exists all over the world but has recently been accentuated in the Middle East.

In section 1, instead of pretending to give the President new authority, my language confirms the authority that he now has and makes it clear that such authority extends to the Middle East.

I have stricken from section 2 the words "requesting such aid."

If this resolution is to mean anything, it is essential that it be realistic and forthright. There is no longer time to hedge or double talk. We are either prepared to fight for our liberties or we are not. Such of us, if any there be, who think that we can any longer sit silently by and let any part of the world be enslaved by the Communists, cannot vote for any kind of a resolution on this subject, whether it be that proposed by the President or any modification thereof.

If we are to wait for a request from a country attacked, before we move in to prevent Communist aggression, the task that will confront us will not be one to prevent the aggressors from getting in but rather the almost impossible job of driving them out.

Who will make the request of us in that area?

Israel has been making similar requests and being ignored.

Syria, which is fast being completely dominated by the Communists, tells us that she will not make the request and wants no part of this resolution. There is good reason for that, and apart from her feud with Israel, Syria has never given up the idea that Lebanon has no right to be a free and independent sovereign nation. Syria insists that Lebanon must eventually be a part of Syria. She would love to have the opportunity and is even now being urged by the Communists, to prepare for the day when Syria can incorporate within her boundaries, all of Lebanon. If Syria should decide to march on Lebanon, it will do so under the leadership of Communist "technicians" and by the time we receive the Lebanese request for aid, it will be necessary for us to move in to drive the Communists out of that country.

Will Egypt ask for our help when she has mortgaged her economy for the next 50 years to pay for Russian arms?

The only effective policy we can have for that area must be as firm and as definite and as precise as the Monroe Doctrine was.

We will have to make the decision of whether the Communists are the aggressors, and we will have to make the decision of whether or not we will go to the aid of these countries in the Middle East, and which of them will be sincerely attempting to avoid subjugation by the Communists.

We must serve notice now that we will not permit the Communists to enslave any of those peoples or subjugate any of those countries, and we must serve notice that, if necessary, we will move our Armed Forces into those countries to prevent the Communists from taking them over. Nothing less than that will stop them. If we don't intend to do that, we should take our 6th Fleet out of the Mediterranean,

recall our marines from that area, and let the world know that we don't intend to act; if we do intend to act and to use those ships and troops, we should let the Communists know in no uncertain words that an infringement upon the liberty of any people anywhere in the world is an infringement upon the liberty of all the free peoples in every part of the world.

I add a new section 3, which limits sections 1 and 2 so that no aid, military or economic, may be given to any country, except and upon condition that it first agrees:

1. That it will not be an aggressor nation;
2. That it will not permit its citizens or residents to engage in acts of aggression, guerrilla or otherwise, or in raids and pillaging, or in causing injury, death or damage to any of its neighbors;
3. That it will faithfully abide by and fulfill its international obligations and abide by the ethics and principles of international law, and will not discriminate on account of race or religion.

The one country in this world which has failed to answer the questionnaire on slavery as requested by the United Nations is Saudi Arabia. It is the one country today which is a slave nation. Its peoples are slaves in every sense of the word. It is the only country on the face of the world that has not advised the United Nations as to that condition.

It is the one country that refuses to allow an American citizen who is a Jew while wearing the uniform of our Armed Forces to enter an American base in that country. It goes further and will not let a chaplain in the Armed Forces wear the insignia of his office, the crucifix, upon his uniform when in Saudi Arabia. Yet it is the King of this country who is shortly to visit with our great President. I wonder what they will discuss.

4. That it will negotiate in good faith, peace treaties with its neighbors; and

5. That it will not submit to domination by any foreign nation.

It should be made crystal-clear in your report on this resolution that a nation seeking to enforce international obligations is not an aggressor; that a nation defending itself against acts of warfare, guerrilla or otherwise, is not an aggressor; that a nation which disarms a potential killer is not an aggressor; that a nation which blockades international highways is an aggressor; and that a nation which violates international law is an aggressor. Your report should also indicate, without equivocation, that negotiation in good faith of peace treaties requires the parties to meet around the peace table and confer about all of their problems with a view to settling all thereof, without either party to the controversy in advance of the meeting insisting upon an agenda which will include or exclude any parts of the controversy or delimit the extent of the negotiations with reference to any thereof.

It is utter nonsense for our Secretary of State to say that the United States is prepared to guarantee the boundaries of the countries in the Middle East if and when they will agree upon such boundaries. The requirement must be that the parties in good faith must meet in an attempt to agree upon such boundaries.

The same applies to the question of the resettlement of refugees and compensation that may be due to the parties or any of their nationals. Those are all matters about which the parties must confer

and compromise between themselves, without advance commitments or limitations as to what they will or will not talk about with reference thereto.

I have changed section 4 so as to require the President to advise the Congress fully concerning any new uses as and when he approves them.

I have modified section 5 so as to provide that the resolution shall expire 2 years after its enactment unless extended by the Congress. This is a much safer way of handling the matter, than continuing the authority until such time as the Congress by concurrent resolution may terminate it. A fixed termination date will require the Congress to review the entire subject matter after the program has been in operation for a fair period of time.

Again, ladies and gentlemen, thank you for the courtesy of listening to me. If there are any questions you may care to address to me, I shall try to answer them.

(The resolution is as follows:)

[H. J. Res. 106, 85th Cong., 1st sess.]

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

January 16, 1957

Mr. MULTER introduced the following joint resolution; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs

JOINT RESOLUTION

To confirm the authorization of the President to undertake economic and military cooperation with nations in the general area of the Middle East in order to assist in the strengthening and defense of their independence.

Whereas a primary purpose of the United States in its relations with all other nations is to develop and sustain a just and enduring peace for all, in accordance with the will of God and the desire of mankind and in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations; and

Whereas the peace of the world and the security of the United States are endangered as long as international communism and the nations it controls seek, by threat of military action, use of economic pressure, internal subversion, or other means, to attempt to bring under their domination peoples now free and independent; and

Whereas such danger now exists and has now been accentuated the general area of the Middle East: Therefore be it

Resolved by the Senate and the House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That the authority in the President, be and hereby is confirmed, to cooperate with and assist any nation or group of nations in the general area of the Middle East, as well as elsewhere, in the development of economic strength dedicated to the maintenance of national independence.

SEC. 2. The authority of the President is hereby confirmed to undertake, in the general area of the Middle East, military assistance programs with any nation or group of nations of that area desiring such assistance. Furthermore, he is authorized to employ the Armed Forces of the United States as he deems necessary to secure and protect the territorial integrity and political independence of any such nation or group of nations against overt armed aggression from any nation controlled by international communism: *Provided*, That such employment shall be consonant with the treaty obligations of the United States and with the Charter of the United Nations and actions and recommendations of the United Nations; and, as specified in article 51 of the United Nations Charter, measures pursuant thereto shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security.

SEC. 3. Neither economic nor military assistance shall be given to any country except and upon condition that it first agrees:

(1) that it will not be an aggressor nation;

(2) that it will not permit its citizens or residents to engage in acts of aggression, guerrilla or otherwise, or in raids and pillaging, or in causing injury, death or damage to any of its neighbors;

(3) that it will faithfully abide by and fulfill its international obligations and abide by the ethics and principles of international law, and will not discriminate on account of race or religion;

(4) that it will negotiate in good faith, peace treaties with its neighbors; and

(5) that it will not submit to domination by any foreign nation.

SEC. 4. The President is hereby authorized, when he determines that such use is important to the security of the United States, to use for the purposes of this joint resolution, without regard to the provisions of any other law or regulation, not to exceed \$200,000,000 from any appropriations now available for carrying out the provisions of the Mutual Security Act of 1954, as amended. This authorization is in addition to other existing authorizations with respect to the use of such appropriations.

SEC. 5. The President shall within thirty days after his approval of any new use or allocation of funds hereunder report to the Congress his action.

SEC. 6. This joint resolution shall expire when the President shall determine that the peace and security of the nations in the general area of the Middle East are reasonably assured by international conditions created by action of the United Nations or otherwise, but in any event two years after the enactment hereof, unless extended by joint resolution of the Congress.

Chairman GORDON. Mr. Multer, I want to thank you for your strong and impressive statement. We will now begin the interrogation of both Congressman Celler and Congressman Multer. Mr. Celler, I have just one question. On page 6 you suggest that the United States impose an arms embargo on the Middle East. How would such an embargo be enforced?

Mr. CELLER. I think first a declaration must be made by the United States that it will act in concert with all nations not to supply any arms to any Middle East nation.

I don't want the situation to develop where Russia will keep sending arms to Egypt as she has and then we not send arms to Israel to set up a balance.

When there is a balance of arms, there is usually peace. How it shall be enforced, I would suggest that first the matter be presented to the United Nations in form of a resolution to be voted upon by all nations.

If, on the other hand, the United Nations fails to act expeditiously or is unable for any reason to act in that regard, then a Western embargo would be useless.

Chairman GORDON. Would you favor United States Armed Forces to be used to insure the territorial integrity of the nations of the Middle East as against each other?

Mr. CELLER. The United States has a tripartite agreement effectuated, I think, in 1950 between France, Great Britain, and the United States. Mr. Dulles yesterday in his testimony said that as far as the United States is concerned that tripartite agreement is still in effect, although he indicated that France and Great Britain had felt it had been so chipped away as to be ineffectual.

If it is not effective, then I think a new agreement should be made with those nations and ourselves whereby we would guarantee the sovereignty of the borders of all these Middle East states.

Chairman GORDON. Thank you, Mr. Celler. Mr. Vorys.

Mr. VORYS. Mr. Celler, on page 5 of your statement you said—

Yemen and Jordan, for example, are hardly viable states, dependent as they are upon foreign government subsidies.

Mr. CELLER. Will you repeat that, John? I didn't get it.

Mr. VORYS. It is in the second paragraph. You say—

Yemen and Jordan are hardly viable states, dependent as they are upon foreign government subsidies.

Israel is also a state that is dependent upon foreign government subsidies; isn't that correct?

Mr. CELLER. I wouldn't say that is quite correct. I would differentiate. It is true that American Jewry and world Jewry does contribute a great deal to Israel. I imagine that is what you have in mind.

Mr. VORYS. I have a report of a special study subcommittee from our Foreign Affairs Committee which says that the United States Government aid reached a high in aid to Israel of \$72,800,000 in fiscal year 1953, that in 1955 it amounted to \$54.5 million. That is Government aid. And of course the sale of bonds, and so forth, is in addition to that.

I heard on the radio this morning an estimate of way over \$100 million that came from the United States. In any case, whether you call it subsidies or not, if it came from the United State Government and its citizens, Israel would not be a viable state without it; isn't that correct?

Mr. CELLER. I don't think that is correct. Israel has a tremendous potential. She is developing her technological, cultural, and economic frontiers.

Israel is receiving great numbers of new immigrants every year. She is keeping her doors open to the distressed wandering Jew who has been tossed about like dried leaves through the years. She is viable despite that. She gets this aid primarily to take care of those who are coming in. She needs that aid to keep those doors open.

If Israel closed her doors, I don't think she would have any trouble maintaining herself without governmental aid, without the aid that she gets from American Jewry, provided there is peace. If there is peace in that area, Israel would be able to balance her budget and bridge the difference between exports and imports. But those doors are kept open and for good reason. There is a constant stream of new seed immigration coming in. She must house them, clothe these people, feed them. She must receive them economically, provide jobs for them. That, of course, needs outside help. But Israel has tremendous potential.

Mr. VORYS. I thought you were not talking about potentials; I thought you were talking about viable states right at the present time. While apparently you disagree with my own view I think that in the same way that these other states are dependent upon outside support, Israel is not viable at the present time without outside support.

Mr. CELLER. I don't agree with you. I will make this distinction. I would say that Yemen and Jordan could not possibly exist without outside aid. Israel could exist. She would tighten her belt and she would maintain herself with tremendous sacrifices. Any one of you who have been there will realize she is willing to do this. In that sense I would say she is viable. She would have difficulty.

Mr. VORYS. I would say a portion of this money is being used to develop the arid areas in the south. She is a state with agricultural

projects flourishing, industry advancing, and science harnessed for progress. You cannot compare Yemen and Jordan with Israel in speaking of nonviable states.

Mr. VORYS. On the same page you use the phrase, "American companies contributed totally to this figure." You don't consider that the payment of royalties, for oil that is sold for a profit, are a contribution in the sense that we think about subsidies or contributions in these other cases, do you?

Mr. CELLER. I didn't say they were the contributions to be looked upon as the same thing as subsidies from governments. But it indicates there are vast sums of money pouring into Saudi Arabia and in these other countries. What is happening to these moneys?

Mr. VORYS. You used the word "contributed." I am sure you didn't mean that it was anything except a payment that you would expect to make when you buy oil.

Mr. CELLER. That is right. As Mr. Multer just said, it is like a gratuity from another state. I think this is the first time these figures have appeared. They are very important in your consideration.

Mr. VORYS. Mr. Chairman, is it your purpose that we question Mr. Multer at this time?

Chairman GORDON. Yes. You can question Mr. Multer.

Mr. HAYS of Ohio. A parliamentary inquiry. How much time is each member going to be given?

Chairman GORDON. Five minutes for each witness.

Mr. MORANO. Did you say 5 minutes for each witness?

Chairman GORDON. That is correct.

Mr. VORYS. I have only one question for Mr. Multer. On page 3 of his statement he lists a lot of times when the United States has gone to war without any other country's consent, and then says—

Mr. Dulles has not learned the lessons of history. He refuses to acknowledge that among the major mistakes we made in the past was standing idly by—and then gives a series of instances.

Mr. Multer, do you mean by that "major mistake" business and "standing idly by" to conclude or infer that we should have gone to war with Japan in 1931, with Italy in 1935, with Germany in 1937, and Russia in 1946?

Mr. MULTER. If we didn't intend to live up to the principle that we urged be primary covenants in the setting up of the League of Nations, we should never have sponsored the League of Nations. We should never have urged the making of any of those covenants.

Mr. VORYS. We didn't enter the League of Nations. I thought we should have but we did not.

Mr. MULTER. You are correct on that. What I meant to say was that the same covenants or principles which we had enunciated and lived by all through our history and which we sought to have written into the covenants of the League of Nations would have required us to take firm and positive action in Manchuria—

Mr. VORYS. By "firm and positive action" you mean to fight?

Mr. MULTER. Yes.

Mr. VORYS. Thank you. On page 2 you say that we ought to have reports from the CIA, the Joint Chiefs, and so forth. I, with members of this committee and other Members of Congress from both sides of the Capitol and both parties, was in the White House on

August 12, October 9, and January 1, and I can assure you that we had such reports before us.

While you apparently have sources of knowledge of all of this which is not available to our Government, yet the Members of Congress received the reports that you refer to.

Mr. MULTER. May I respectfully suggest that this committee and the Members of the House and the Senate have as much availability to the sources of information as I have, both inside and outside the Government. I am sure that many of you have learned about all of the matters I referred to.

The statement I made before this committee on May 8, 1956, was not telling the committee anything it did not know and had not been able to get from official and unofficial sources that I had gotten, but it was a story that had not been publicly told and has since been ignored by the Secretary of State.

Mr. VORYS. I just wanted to let you know that the Members of Congress have had information of the type that you describe, although it is not the same information that you portray in your statement. Thank you very much.

Chairman GORDON. Dr. Morgan.

Mr. MORGAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to commend the two distinguished gentlemen from New York and colleagues in the House for their very forceful statements. I am sure every member of this committee had listened to their statements and will find them very helpful in making their decision on this resolution.

Mr. Celler, you feel the resolution should be divided into two parts, one on policy and the other on economic?

Mr. CELLER. Correct.

Mr. MORGAN. Do you feel the statement of policy in the Eisenhower resolution is strong enough?

Mr. CELLER. I think it is strong enough, but I would humbly suggest it be in the form of a concurrent resolution rather than a joint resolution.

Mr. MORGAN. You feel the resolution as written by the State Department would be a sufficient statement of policy?

Mr. CELLER. I do.

Mr. MORGAN. Do you feel that the economic aid mentioned in the Eisenhower resolution would be sufficient to do the job over there?

Mr. CELLER. Would do what?

Mr. MORGAN. Would be sufficient to do the job, the \$200 million.

Mr. CELLER. I don't know what the job is to be done. I think we ought to find out from Mr. Dulles or some other responsible source exactly what the money is to be used for specifically, and why it is to be used for that purpose and whether there is a reasonable degree of success in the use of the money.

Mr. Richards, the very distinguished former chairman of your committee, is scheduled to go over. Why not wait until he comes back and makes his report? He is a man of great astuteness. He will find out what the situation is. He will be sent over after the money is to be authorized. I want to find out where this money is going. I think the money should be used, if I may say at the threshold here, for regional development.

I mentioned, for example, the Johnson plan for irrigation, which was a very good plan. Everybody who had read it approved of it.

The Arabs refused to accede to it because it might afford some help and benefit to Israel. Therefore, they rejected it. I would like to know more about plans for the use of the money. Is this plan envisaging a general irrigation and water plan for that area? Water is so desperately needed there by all these Arab nations, which would be of great benefit and make that area fructify like a rose.

I hope it would envisage a proposal such as that, but we don't know. I think we ought to be told what it is all about. I don't know.

It ought to be a simple matter for Mr. Richards when he comes back to tell us. It ought to be a simple matter for Mr. Dulles to outline. When closely questioned, Mr. Dulles departed from his original statement, which was a statement that he was impervious to giving any detailed information as to how the money was spent. Yesterday he said it would be used to make up certain deficits that these countries might experience. They may experience those deficits because they are unduly buying arms.

Are we going to make up deficits for the purchase of arms? Those arms might be purchased from Soviet Russia. I would like to know. We are just like blind men in a dark room looking for a black hat. That is my complaint. I don't object to the aid. I want to know what the aid is.

I don't object to the military matter. I think it is long overdue. I think it must be given. That is my position.

Mr. MORGAN. Mr. Celler, these figures that you incorporate in your statement as to the oil royalties, you said you got those from the State Department?

Mr. CELLER. Yes. They are very impressive figures.

Mr. MORGAN. That is all, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman GORDON. Mrs. Bolton.

Mrs. BOLTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank you both for your statements. I really have no questions. However, I would like to say that I think anyone who has been to Israel knows the tremendous energy that is being poured out by the people of Israel to build their country. Just the terracing of the hills is very dramatic and very exciting in relation to the future. They are not just doing it for today. The figures on the terracing that they gave me when I was there a year ago were that it cost at least \$200 an acre just to terrace, which was the preface to any possible planning.

I think the world at large will give great credit always to the zeal and the energy being expended by the Israeli people. I just want to add my word of recognition at this meeting. I really have no questions, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. CELLER. I was in one of these settlements, a kibbutz, and said to a dweller there: "You have wonderful potatoes." They were large, solid potatoes. I asked him, "What do you mix in your soil?" He thought a minute and said, "Brains." That is the answer.

Mrs. BOLTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman GORDON. Mr. Carnahan.

Mr. CARNAHAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to express my appreciation to our two colleagues for their carefully prepared statements.

Mr. Celler, in your opening sentence you say—

I wish to thank you for the opportunity this committee has given me to express my views on the so-called Eisenhower plan for the Middle East.

Is there any particular significance to the use of those words, "The so-called Eisenhower plan"?

Mr. CELLER. No.

Mr. CARNAHAN. I would like to ask your reaction to a statement attributed to Mr. Dulles. In the New York Times of this morning there is an article under the headline, "Dulles says planning averting a war." It is by William S. White. I would like to read the first short paragraph:

WASHINGTON, January 15.—John Foster Dulles asserted today that the alternative to President Eisenhower's Middle Eastern program would be a "very great likelihood" that United States troops would have to fight there.

Would you care to give your reaction to that statement?

Mr. CELLER. I think Mr. Dulles is using rather tall language. He was trying to bludgeon some of the Senators into accepting the plan in its entirety, including economic aid.

He was closely questioned yesterday on the reasonableness of his request for that economic aid. I think he used that language so as to force or frighten the Senators into accepting the whole program.

He said that unless the aid were given, together with the warning, that there would be a war, or there would be sending of troops. I don't think that is true. He probably used it as a result of the emotions that probably developed because of the very close questioning that was directed to him.

He was in a pretty tight spot at times before that very vast group of intellectuals which comprise the Armed Services and the Foreign Relations Committee.

I don't wish to infer by that that this committee is not equally intellectual.

Mr. CARNAHAN. Mr. Multer, you have suggested a House joint resolution. We appreciate your suggestion. I wanted to ask: Have you introduced your resolution?

Mr. MULTER. No, sir; I have not. I will introduce it today.

Mr. CARNAHAN. Do you have any particular preference, apparently you must have, between a House joint resolution and a concurrent resolution?

Mr. MULTER. I followed the form as closely as I could as suggested by the Department. You will notice that I put a termination date in it. There has been talk about the resolution as sent up, that even though it is a House joint resolution it should have a termination provision, not only by proclamation of the President, but also a provision permitting termination by concurrent resolution.

I put in a fixed termination date, 2 years after its enactment. I do that for the sole purpose of requiring the entire matter to come before the Congress again for review.

Mr. CARNAHAN. You are also stating in your resolution that we are merely confirming the powers the President already has?

Mr. MULTER. Yes.

Mr. CARNAHAN. That is all, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman GORDON. Mr. Merrow.

Mr. MERROW. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Celler and Mr. Multer, I want to join with my colleagues in saying that we are very happy to have you with us this morning and appreciate your coming before the committee to give us the benefit of your views.

Mr. Celler, you have stated that the program or the resolution before us is just a beginning, and also indicated that you are in favor of the military warning, and on page 7 have listed the various things which the resolution does not provide for.

Am I right in inferring that you are in favor of this resolution even though you think perhaps it doesn't go far enough?

Mr. CELLER. That is correct. I hope you will recite very strongly in your report something of those items that I refer to.

Mr. MERROW. One thing more. On page 4 you spoke about the United Nations and said, "Small wonder the New Yorker calls the United Nations the 'United Notions.'"

Do you mean to be extremely critical of the United Nations or may I put it this way: Don't you think that the United Nations has made a great contribution to the solving of some of our problems?

Mr. CELLER. It has done what you say. It may have in some respects, but it has dwindled more or less into a debating society as we know it now because of the inherent defect involved in the Soviet veto.

We are probably as much to blame for demanding the veto as the Soviets, because I don't think we could have gotten it through the United States Senate without that veto. I stress the fact that in addition to the veto we have now the development, probably after those good things were done by the United Nations, the development of the Asian-Afro-Communist bloc, which can work its will anyway it wishes and render abortive anything that we may want to do.

Unfortunately we were in bed with those nations when we offered and abetted the resolution of condemnation against Britain and France and Israel, which I think was an egregious blunder and historians will mark it as such.

Of course, the United Nations has done a lot of good, but it can't be used to solve all problems. These are some of the problems that can't be solved. For example, how can you say it can solve the Israeli-Arab problem when we had a solemn resolution passed by the United Nations as to Egypt on shipping. Nothing happened. Nasser just thumbed his nose at the United Nations resolution. Did naught concerning it. I can't say that is much of a success.

I repeat it can do great things, but it can't solve everything.

Mr. MERROW. I agree it can't solve everything. Don't you think its prestige has been increased in recent months by the turning of the United States to the United Nations and working through the United Nations?

Mr. CELLER. No; it has not. Its prestige has been decreased, not because of the United States attitude, but because of the inherent difficulties that grow out of its rules and regulations.

There is proof positive. For example, it has recommended sanctions against, in the debates at least, Britain and France because of its action in reference vis-a-vis the Suez after it passed a resolution of condemnation branding those countries as an aggressor. It branded Russia an aggressor against Hungary. The United Nations assumes a double standard. Russia with no sanctions although it is an aggressor. Britain and France and Israel sanctions although it is an aggressor. In that sense the United Nations has shown a real weakness.

Mr. MERROW. But it does seem to me, and probably you wouldn't agree, that the marshalling of opinion in the General Assembly does

have some effect throughout the world; and although it may not be able to enforce everything it decides, in fact it does marshal public opinion more so perhaps now than in the past, and with the support of the resolutions that the United States has presented is of great value.

Mr. CELLER. We have yet to see the results of our forceful support of the United Nations. Up to this point I don't think it has been greatly successful in solving all problems. I repeat it can solve numbers of problems. But there are some problems that it can never solve. Witness the fact that we ourselves don't have all faith and confidence, total faith and confidence. We make these separate arrangements. We have made all kinds of pacts, SEATO, NATO. I don't know how many there are outside the United Nations. We have done that ourselves, which is indicative that we don't place total confidence in the United Nations to solve all of the world's problems.

Mr. MERROW. You would agree we should work through it as much as we can?

Mr. CELLER. Of course I do.

Mr. MERROW. Mr. Multer, on the first page of your statement—

Mr. CELLER. May I just say something else. This very plan, this Eisenhower doctrine itself is outside the United Nations. It is a unilateral action, isn't it?

Mr. MERROW. Well, the resolution provides that the action shall be consonant with the United Nations. As a matter of fact, the resolution states—

Provided, That such employment shall be consonant with the treaty obligations of the United States and with the Charter of the United Nations and actions and recommendations of the United Nations.

I have no quarrel with a plan that operates outside of the United Nations when the security of the country is at stake.

Mr. CELLER. Then you do agree that all these problems cannot be solved by the United Nations?

Mr. MERROW. I don't think all problems can be solved, but I thought it had increased a good deal in its prestige and power, and I hoped that would be the pattern of the future.

Mr. CELLER. I don't think there is any difference between us; it is only a matter of degree. I am sorry I interrupted.

Mr. MERROW. Thank you, Mr. Celler. On the first page of your statement, Mr. Multer, you state—

In approaching this problem, we cannot overlook the fact that under our Constitution the burden, the responsibility and the leadership in making foreign policy is, in the first instance, upon our President—

with which I think we agree.

Then you went on to say, "If he has failed us in that respect, if indeed as many have claimed," and so on. Do I infer from that statement that you feel the President has failed to exercise his constitutional powers in giving leadership?

Mr. MULTER. I do, sir, in this very area. I say that if he had entered into security pacts with the State of Israel or directed his Secretary of State to negotiate a security pact with the State of Israel and security pacts with the Arab nations that would have taken them, we wouldn't have this difficulty.

Mr. MERROW. Don't you think he exercised leadership in going to the Congress and asking for the passage of a resolution to put into

effect the policies that he advocates in reference to the Middle East?

Mr. MULTER. You mean, this resolution?

Mr. MERROW. Yes.

Mr. MULTER. That is not leadership. He has the power to do those things. He should have done them affirmatively. I am sure the Congress would back him up. He doesn't need this authorization to do this from the Congress.

Mr. MERROW. For the sake of argument, and we agree that he has the power, doesn't that put us in a much better position before the world, to have the Congress backing the Executive in the statement of United States policy?

Mr. MULTER. Unfortunately the atmosphere is being created in foreign circles that unless the Congress approves this resolution that we will be differing with our President on these matters of principle. I say that it is unfortunate that that impression is being created.

Of course, we are going to back our President when he is right. On matters of principle as he enunciated here, he is right and we will back him. We will have to indicate to the world that there is unanimity of opinion between the President and Congress on these important matters of high principle.

I say again, just as in the past, many Presidents have acted on matters of foreign policy and come to us and said, to all the world, "Here is our policy and here is what we are going to do." He could have done the same thing.

Mr. MERROW. He asked for power in the Far East, which we passed with an overwhelming vote. That, it seems to me, was the exercise of great leadership. Though, there may be a difference of opinion, it would seem to me it was the exercise of great leadership, even though he has the power, to come to Congress and ask the Congress to go along with him, so that in the eyes of the world the executive and the legislative branches are together.

Mr. MULTER. May I remind you, sir, on that occasion, too, there were many of us who agreed that he didn't need to go to the Congress to back him up at that time. Then, too, we were put in a position that if we didn't give him the resolution somebody might interpret it abroad that we were disagreeing with him and that we were not unified.

The Congress was assured that that action would not be taken as a precedent for a President coming to the Congress again in the future under similar circumstances and saying, "Authorize me to do that which I have the authority to do," and now that very instance is being given to us as a precedent for repeating the action today.

Mr. MERROW. Don't you think that had great psychological effect?

Mr. MULTER. I don't think so. I think it would have been stronger if in each instance the President had enunciated the policy of this Government and said, "Here it is, Mr. Communist," and I am sure that every Member in the House and Senate would have risen to his feet and applauded, instead of going through this procedure of passing a resolution that we were behind our President. Not only the Congress but the people of our country would indicate approval.

Mr. MERROW. On page 3, Mr. Multer, where you criticized our action in reference to Hungary, I would like to ask if you would just comment on that. Do you feel we ought to have gone to war over the Hungarian situation?

Mr. MULTER. If we didn't go to war, the least we should have done was to supply those people with the arms to fight the Communists. Even if that is an act of war, we owe it to the Hungarian people to give them the wherewithall to fight the tyrants and dictators. That is how this country came into being. We should help every other freedom-loving people to do the same thing. We did just that for Russia when fighting Hitler, before we got into World War II.

Mr. MERROW. You feel we should have gone certainly much farther than we did?

Mr. MULTER. Yes; and I say the major part of the responsibility rests upon us, the Government of the United States, in getting those people to rebel.

It is all right to say that Radio Free Europe is a private institution and that what they said was not American doctrine nor said for American officialdom. Everything they said was attributed by those people to our United States Government; just as everything that comes out of the Voice of America is attributed to the United States Government; everything that comes out of the USIS is attributed to us.

If we don't want Americans going abroad stirring these people up, we ought to tell them so and keep them at home. Just as the American University in Beirut is no more an American University than any other private university in this country. There isn't a man abroad who doesn't say the American University is a United States institution. There are Americans as trustees running it but it is not under our Government's control. They don't draw a distinction between the American University in Beirut and any other American institution.

Chairman GORDON. Your time is up, Mr. Merrow.

Mr. MERROW. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman GORDON. Mrs. Kelly.

Mrs. KELLY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to compliment both of my very able colleagues from New York for their forthright and factual statements.

I would like to ask both if you believe that this resolution should be in the form of a joint resolution? I notice Mr. Multer's own proposal is in such form. Do both of you agree that this should be a joint resolution?

Mr. MULTER. For myself, I am more concerned with the principle and substance than the form. I don't think it matters too much whether it is going to be a joint resolution, which will then be signed by the President, or a concurrent resolution giving him what he has asked for, provided the Congress retains the right to review this program.

I say the Congress should impose the duty upon itself to review this program by putting in a fixed limitation as to how long the resolution will run.

Mrs. KELLY. Then you do not think the measure before us is strong enough?

Mr. MULTER. It is stronger in that before it becomes effective it requires the signature of the President and has the force of a statute.

So far as the form is concerned, whether we pass a concurrent resolution or a joint resolution, the world will understand what we have done here once we have done it.

Mr. CELLER. I believe that it would be preferable to have a concurrent resolution. I will accept the joint resolution, but I feel a concurrent resolution would make it more or less the sense of the Congress. It might jeopardize or have the effect of jeopardizing the powers of the President.

I think the President has most of these powers that you have recited in this matter of military warning. I don't think it is necessary therefore to rise to the height of a joint resolution, which must be signed by the President.

I think also there may be a little danger in a joint resolution in the sense that foreign nations will think the President hasn't such power unless he gets that power from Congress by way of a joint resolution. Unless there is a joint resolution forthcoming, they may get the impression that the President hasn't such a power. He has the power. We simply reaffirm it by a concurrent resolution.

Mrs. KELLY. Mr. Celler, you stated that you believe that the provision for a request for aid by a nation should be eliminated.

Mr. MULTER. That was my suggestion.

Mrs. KELLY. My question would be to Mr. Celler. You agree with Mr. Multer, that requested aid—

Mr. CELLER. I am willing to accede to the superior judgment of my colleague.

Mrs. KELLY. Have either of you any idea, I know Mr. Multer used the term "we," who will decide when a country is Soviet dominated?

Mr. MULTER. I meant the United States acting through its President.

Mrs. KELLY. Do you agree with that, Mr. Celler?

Mr. CELLER. Yes, I agree with that.

Mrs. KELLY. On page 3, Mr. Multer, you refer to the fact that Hitler was appeased. I presume that is the time in history of Chamberlain at Munich?

Mr. MULTER. Munich is the outstanding example of appeasement of Hitler.

Mrs. KELLY. That being the case, the onus of Munich on Mr. Chamberlain should possibly be removed at this point in history since we have condemned the action of Mr. Eden in moving in.

Mr. MULTER. I think rather than getting into the question of who should be condemned and who is right and who is wrong, let's learn the lessons of history and move forward from this point and not repeat those mistakes.

Mr. HAYS of Ohio. Would you yield to me at that point?

Mrs. KELLY. Yes.

Mr. HAYS of Ohio. I can agree with that. We have heard a lot of sanctimonious approbation from the other side of the aisle about "Let's not get into recriminations about who got us into this mess." But insurance companies do not, after a driver has a dozen wrecks in a row, give a person money to buy a dozen Cadillacs. They take away his insurance, and usually revoke his driver's license; and I think that would be a good thing to do with our Secretary of State.

Mr. MULTER. May I say that we in this House have no say about that. The recommendations coming from our side of the aisle wouldn't be taken on that matter.

Mr. HAYS of Ohio. We don't have to buy the Cadillacs.

Mrs. KELLY. Do you believe from this resolution it is definite that the United States is going it alone in this area?

Mr. CELLER. I think at times it is necessary for the United States to act alone. Just as I believe it was essential for France and Britain to act without the United States, because they met with considerable rebuffs from our Secretary of State and they acted alone.

We condemned Britain and France for acting more or less alone when we seek to act alone here. I think sometimes it is necessary to act alone.

Certainly, for example, as Mr. Multer put it, if somebody interfered with the operation of the Panama Canal, we certainly wouldn't wait for any cooperative action but would act immediately. There are occasions when we must act alone.

Mrs. KELLY. Do you believe that we should pay for the clearing of the Suez Canal without guarantees from Egypt that this should be an international canal?

Mr. CELLER. Foregive me. I didn't quite hear that.

Mrs. KELLY. We are to pay, have agreed, have guaranteed we will pay for the clearing of the Suez Canal. Do you believe we should do this without—

Mr. CELLER. We are facing a fait accompli. It is busted up. It is blocked with ships. I think it is essential for our own self-interest to get that canal cleared.

France and Britain and the others haven't the wherewithal to defray all the expenses. We should help. I think it is incumbent upon us to help pay those expenses. It is unfortunate. I think, however, as I set forth in my statement, we should not do all this unless we have some reasonable assurance that Mr. Nasser, who is a sort of megalomaniac, suffering delusions of grandeur that he will become a modern Pharaoh, will leave it open to all shipping without interference. We haven't those assurances.

Chairman GORDON. Your time is up. It is 12:30. We will recess until 2:30 this afternoon, at which time we will continue the hearing.

Mr. CELLER. Do you want us to return?

Chairman GORDON. Yes. We would like to have you back this afternoon at 2:30 in order that we may finish the questioning.

We will have as our first witness Mr. Roosevelt, who is patiently waiting. We will start with him.

Mr. CELLER. Is it possible for me to be excused? I have a conference with my counterpart on the Republican side, Mr. Keating, concerning the appointment of committees.

Chairman GORDON. I can't interfere, Mr. Celler.

Mr. FULTON. Could we add in the record that we thank you for coming and that I personally was interested in your presentation of your views.

(Whereupon, at 12:33 the committee recessed, to reconvene at 2:30 p. m.)

AFTERNOON SESSION

(The committee reconvened at 2:30 p. m. in room 1301, New House Office Building, Hon. Thomas S. Gordon (chairman) presiding.)

Chairman GORDON. The committee will be in order.

Our next witness is Mr. James Roosevelt, a Member of Congress from California.

As the able son of our great President, Mr. Roosevelt needs no introduction.

Mr. Roosevelt, I am indeed happy to welcome you to be with us this afternoon and shall be very glad to have the benefit of your views on the pending Middle East situation.

Mr. HAYS of Ohio. Mr. Chairman, a parliamentary inquiry.

When do the rest of us, who did not get a chance this morning, get to question the previous witnesses?

Chairman GORDON. Mr. Roosevelt will make his statement and we will go back to Mr. Multer to proceed with the questioning. Mr. Roosevelt, you may proceed with your statement.

STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES ROOSEVELT, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

Mr. ROOSEVELT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank my colleagues very much for giving me this opportunity to go ahead at this time.

Mr. Chairman and ladies and gentlemen of the committee, in coming before you and the members of this great committee, I come only because of my deep conviction that the subject matter of the resolution you are considering deeply affects every American that we as Congressmen represent. Each of us individually will have to report and explain our vote on this resolution in its final form. It may well be the most important vote that any of us will be called upon to cast in the 85th Congress.

It seemed, therefore, that it was my responsibility to raise certain questions before this committee and to ask that certain matters be clarified, both in the presentation of the report of the committee and in explanation on the floor.

First, let me repeat what has been said by others. Is there here a serious and important constitutional question?

Stripped of its frills, divorced from the somewhat tortuous explanations of Secretary of State Dulles, this resolution in the form requested by President Eisenhower boils down to an undated congressional declaration of war to become effective at a date chosen, not by Congress, but by the President, not against a nation named by Congress, but one named by the President and under circumstances not judged by the Congress, but judged solely by the President. In other words, Congress is being asked to abrogate its constitutional function. To justify this serious step, if indeed it can be justified, there must have been made a clear case of great emergency.

To the contrary, Mr. Dulles, in a statement before a joint committee of the other body, indicated only a threat of infiltration and subversion, rather than overt aggression. This threat may very well be, as Secretary Dulles said, the gravest we have faced in 10 years. So far as the American people have been told, and so far as this Member of Congress has been told, the threat on January 15, 1957, is no graver than it was last October.

There may be urgency for military action. If so, the resolution requested does not even itself so indicate, for its language is not the language of a resolution designed to cope with an immediate situation. As described by the President, we shall use armed forces if Soviet

Russia, or if a nation dominated by Soviet Russia, attacks a nation in the Middle East, and if that nation in turn requests assistance.

That, to inherit a phrase, is too "iffy."

Whatever it is, it is not a forthright declaration; a declaration suggesting fast, emergency action.

If such an emergency should govern us, then it is up to the administration either to tell us, or to act to meet the emergency. Neither course has been followed.

History records many instances where Presidents have used troops, either to fight or to occupy territory, to protect what was considered the vital interest of the United States, without first coming to Congress to seek a conditional declaration of war.

President Truman, who thinks Congress should adopt this resolution, did not come to Congress and request a resolution when the Communists invaded South Korea. Even before the United Nations acted, Mr. Truman ordered naval and air units in the area to help the South Koreans because he believed the vital interests of the United States were threatened, and he justified it because he had the constitutional powers to do so, in his opinion.

To carry out that policy, and to meet our commitments to the United Nations, Mr. Truman came to Congress many times for authority and money in connection with the rearmament program.

President Roosevelt issued orders to the Navy to "shoot to kill," and he sent troops to Iceland without coming to Congress, because he felt such action was necessary to protect United States interests in the face of unrestricted U-boat warfare in the Atlantic.

As a result of these and other actions he, of course, had to come to Congress for money and authorizations. Congress generally then ratified what he had done, although one issue of ratification—the draft extension—passed by but one vote.

The Eisenhower administration itself a few years ago was thinking out loud of using troops in Indochina. The President said "No" but had he said "Yes" at Denver there was no indication he would have come to Congress.

If we have a serious and emergency threat in the Middle East now—and I do not say we do not have—or if one develops at some later date the President can and should act immediately. In the absence of proof of immediate emergency at this time, we must assume no urgency is attached to this declaration of war.

Does not the President himself in the very body of his message to us, indicate the possibility, and to my mind, the desirability of maintaining the constitutional prerogatives of both the executive and legislative. The President stated to us:

If, contrary to my hope and expectation, a situation arose which called for the military application of the policy which I ask the Congress to join me in proclaiming, I would of course maintain hour-by-hour contact with the Congress if it were in session. And if the Congress were not in session, and if the situation had grave implications, I would, of course, at once call the Congress into special session.

The words speak for themselves.

We will be consulted, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, after the act has been done and not before. We are now asked to simply again write a blank check although we will be graciously told about it after the check has been used.

And I should like to respectfully suggest that if this committee has facts to justify such a far-reaching proposal, then it should present these facts to the membership of the House—and the American people.

There are other aspects to the military side of this so-called Eisenhower doctrine, quite apart from the fundamental question of necessity.

An important aspect is our ability to fulfill these blanket commitments. If we can't—and there is reason to question our ability—then this becomes nothing but another gigantic bluff, something we cannot afford. If we can afford to add to our existing commitments, which certainly are pretty wide, I think we need more specific information from our military forces to satisfy the many questions of responsible Congressmen.

The avowed purpose of the administration's military policy, we have been told, is to maintain a force that would not concern itself with "brush fires," but would lay back and wait for the big one.

Now it is suggested that we may have to fight a number of brush fires, and presumably, we are not equipped to do so, unless we borrow from the forces earmarked for the "big one." Have we cut too deeply to be able to fight a series of brush fires, or will we cut into our forces earmarked for the "big one," and then leave our homeland to the mercy of the enemy? The American people are vitally interested and have a great stake in the answers to these questions.

Serious doubts also exist as to the use our military aid may be put to in the Middle East. I wonder whether the nations to whom we give such aid will be able to use it, and if they can, will they use it to repel Communist aggression alone or to attempt to destroy Israel, the one Democratic oasis in the entire area. If so, we are playing directly into the hands of the Communists who depend upon the age-old rivalries to so weaken the area that it can be added to the Kremlin orbit with ease.

The published and spoken words of Colonel Nasser and many other governments of the Middle East, including some of those within the orbit of the Baghdad Pact, have repeatedly declared that their primary aim, now and always, would be to drive the people of Israel into the Mediterranean Sea. I cannot believe that the American people would want to contribute in the slightest manner to such a possible catastrophe. Indeed, I believe they realize the importance to our own country and to the principles of freedom everywhere that Israel should be protected from aggression and encouraged to contribute her already proven ability to raise the standard of living of all the peoples of the Middle East.

There is ample reason to wonder, too, whether the governments of the Middle East can make most effective use of modern weapons that we would be shipping there. Egypt had received a number of deliveries of arms from the Communists when the Suez crisis erupted last fall. We all know how easily they were captured by Israeli forces. I believe some of you are familiar with the well-known story told immediately after this happened when somebody said that Colonel Nasser called up the Kremlin to ask if he could now be replenished with another set of arms and the Kremlin was supposed to have said to him if Mr. Ben Gurion wanted more arms he could call him direct on the phone and, of course, I think that is very obvious from what happened there.

Are we to allow American arms to fall as easily to Russian domination?

If there is ground for doubting the urgency of the military aspect of the Eisenhower doctrine, there is extremely little justification for speed on the economic side, although, in my opinion, economic aid is the greatest tool we have to build a just peace, not only in the Middle East but throughout the world.

President Eisenhower has already informed us that he will need no additional funds for the current fiscal year. For the 2 subsequent fiscal years he asks for the modest sum of \$400 million. This can be studied later; it can be a part of our regular foreign aid bill.

But we have been asked now, as an emergency proposition, to grant a blank check, again, beyond June 30. Considerable clarification is required. We should know where the money shall be spent, and in what manner. We should be advised what the individual nations of the area want and perhaps, above all, can use. I suggest no more than an extension of the "partnership" philosophy into the field of foreign development.

As of now, we in the Congress are completely in the dark. There has been no official indication of how this economic assistance is to be used.

We have had some speculation that we shall take over the \$35 million payments Britain once made to Jordan. There have been vague mentions of the Jordan River development, and some vague press speculation about Aswan Dam again, in Egypt, as well as developments down in the Euphrates area—and our off-again-on-again tactics in connection with this project contributed a great deal to the current sad state of affairs in the area.

These might be very wonderful projects. Certainly, the harnessing of the Jordan probably could make a tremendous impact on the economy of the area. However, we all agree that it alone can never go forward until the Arab States and Israel settle all their main problems. This, as the President noted, is not even in the slightest way affected by this resolution.

Until those problems are settled, there is little hope that local interest will jell, insofar as a Jordan Valley Authority is concerned, because more than one nation is involved. We in the West are more than familiar with the age-old struggle for the waterhole. In southern California we have recently lost a struggle where water was the central issue, and we in the Congress can appreciate the forces that make it so difficult for two areas to reach agreement on division of the benefits.

It has been suggested that Congress has no alternative but to go along with the President. We do have an alternative. We can—and I think we should—go to the United Nations and encourage the formation of an adequate security force to handle overt aggression anywhere in the world, and especially where they are in essence brush fires, and specifically Communist aggression in the Middle East. A congressional expression of opinion might be of tremendous value in promoting such a force.

Once such a force is established we should support it, and provide some of the manpower. One of the weaknesses of the United Nations intervention in Suez today was that the Secretary General raised an Army without help from us, and in his dealings with Nasser the

Egyptians acted in the light of a promise by President Eisenhower that our troops would not be involved. Yet, today, strangely, it is suggested we go it alone in that area.

At the same time we should encourage the various United Nations programs—those in existence as well as proposed—for economic development. Our aid should and must be worked out as part of a joint United Nations program, even though we administer it ourselves.

Neither the additional drive we would then develop through the United Nations, nor our own participation, necessarily, should infringe upon our right to make our own foreign policy, nor to deploy our military forces where national interests require them. But to the greatest extent we should use the United Nations to help us carry out our own policy. And, Mr. Chairman, I submit that this is not properly spelled out in the resolution which has been proposed to this committee.

Now if the United Nations security forces are inadequate to halt aggression, there is no reason why the United States should not fill the gap in the Middle East or any other area vital to us. But with our full cooperation we increase the chances for the success of a United Nations security force, which is, it seems to me, the one hope around which can be built the hope for eventual worldwide disarmament.

Similarly, in the case of economic development. If assistance is not forthcoming from the United Nations—or if it is blocked by the Soviet group—then the world shall know where responsibility lies. We can stand ready to fill that gap also.

I insist, we need a reaffirmation of the position Congress has held traditionally. The President makes foreign policy. The Congress implements that policy. If we disagree, we do not implement. We can and should resolve; we should not—and I hope will not—legislate in the field our Constitution says belongs to the responsibility of the President.

A decade ago the foreign policy of this country took an affirmative course in opposing Communist expansion, either by military aggression or by political and economic infiltration. In fact, the very area of our concern now, the Middle East, was a major factor in acceptance of the Truman doctrine, and its implementation by voting assistance to Greece and Turkey.

President Truman, by his deeds in Korea, proclaimed that United States policy included armed intervention if necessary to halt Communist aggression. Congress implemented that decision time after time.

This is a new Congress. And I would like at this point to insert in my prepared text that it seems to me very important to recognize the difference between a concurrent resolution and a joint resolution. A concurrent resolution is an affirmation of policy by the Congress, and it seems to me would fit properly into what I have been talking about here; whereas the joint declaration is very clearly writing substantive law, and having the Congress invade the President's prerogative. An expression, reaffirming the traditional position of previous Congresses and previous Presidents, may be of value, as well as reaffirming what we know to be the President's powers. The need for such an expression indicates that our traditional opposition to Communist expansion and aggression has been weakened in the most recent past. In fact, it points up the inherent weakness of a policy of drifting and dreaming.

If such a declaration by the Congress is needed to let the world know that this time the Administration means it, it should not be in a form so broad, so endless, nor so servile as the President has requested. It should be stated in the time-tested fashion of American policy. Its force will be as strongly deterrent to irresponsible Soviet Russian action and it will encourage, not discourage, those new partners we so earnestly seek in the fight for freedom if they are sincere and trustworthy.

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, may I just add that I think the committee has been doing a tremendous service in examining so carefully into this really historic undertaking.

I thank you, sir.

Chairman GORDON. Thank you very much, Mr. Roosevelt, for your fine and interesting presentation. I am indeed happy to have the benefit of your comments and judgments on the pending Middle East resolution.

We will now proceed with our witness of this morning, Congressman Multer. Our next member to ask questions, I believe, is Mr. Fulton. Mrs. Kelly finished this morning, and it is with you, Mr. Fulton.

Mr. FULTON. I want to congratulate my good friends, Congressman Multer and Congressman Roosevelt on their fine statements, as well as Congressman Celler, who appeared this morning. It is direct statements such as these which give us the different points of view, and give us the impact of the various sections of the resolution that we should look into.

I do feel that, as you three men are personally very much interested in this Middle East section, we should have your views, because they come from places as far apart as California and New York.

I would like to ask each of you whether you feel that House Joint Resolution 117 is properly couched when there is provision for going through United Nations procedures, first. Do you think that is a gain, or do you think that is a defect? From what you have said of the United Nations actions, I wondered whether at a particular point it might not be a retarding circumstance or condition, in your opinion. If you would like to comment, I would like to hear it shortly.

Mr. MULTER. Well, my own opinion, sir, in that connection is that when emergencies of this kind come upon us, we cannot wait for the United Nations to talk about it until ready to decide what to do. We must be there first. We have to get in and act and hope that their judgment will coincide with what this country thinks, and that they will approve of our actions.

Mr. FULTON. The United States has that power already, under our mutual assistance agreements, as we act bilaterally with a particular country. Under article 51 of the United Nations Charter, we likewise can have collective actions as a regional group for mutual self-defense without first clearing it with other member nations.

Mr. MULTER. It is with that in mind that I have been urging, through the years, security pacts with each of the nations in this area.

Mr. FULTON. You would strongly, as I do, recommend that we have a mutual assistance pact, both military and economic, with the State of Israel?

Mr. MULTER. With all of the states in that area. With all who will enter into them. As I said this morning, the state that will not

enter into a pact such as that, with us, labels itself a potential aggressor.

Mr. FULTON. Then the United States should go individually to each of the states in this Middle East area, rather than try to make a collective defense pact such as the Rio Pact, or Southeast Asia Pact, or even entering into the Baghdad Pact.

Mr. MULTER. Theoretically, the regional pact is by far the better thing to do but we must be realists about this and face the situation as it is. It is impossible to get the Arabs and the Israelis to sit down across the table and talk about their own immediate troubles. Surely we are not going to get the Arabs and the Israelis to join into one single pact. I would love to see it done, but I think the realistic method is to approach them separately and get separate pacts with each nation individually.

Mr. FULTON. Do you think that if the President of the United States would request that these nations in this area come to a conference prior to action under this resolution that we are speaking of, it would help? A Mid-East conference under our United States sponsorship where we try to get all these countries to put their representatives around a table to discuss regional development. Do you think that would help?

Mr. MULTER. Yes; I do, in December 1955, I brought back from Arab leaders the information that if the United States took the firm position and moved forward in that direction and said, "We must have these pacts, we must have peace, here, and we insist that this be done, that you sit down and talk about these things and enter into proper treaties and pacts," the Arabs would have fallen in line and done it. I reported that to the high officials of our Government and nothing was done along that line. It is not yet too late.

Mr. ROOSEVELT. I would thoroughly agree with both Mr. Multer and your own comments, but I would want to stress again that I believe the Secretary of State testified before this committee that the urgency of this immediately is not in the light of armed intervention that is contemplated or feared even at this time and that therefore certainly our every effort should be made at the present time to avert the necessity of our ever having to act alone. What I am afraid of is that unless we harken more specifically to existing avenues of prevention such as the United Nations armed force in the area, that we tend to discourage these deterrents and we emphasize that the only deterrent is unilateral action by the United States.

Mr. FULTON. As you realize, House Joint Resolution 117 does not affect a situation where there is not overt armed aggression and, of course, it does not affect the situation where the particular country acted against does not request us to act. So that where there is the major premise that you speak of, where there might be internal subversion by a Communist force taking over a government by peaceful means, this resolution has no effect whatever. Would you agree the way is clear for our American policy to act, independent of this resolution, in those areas?

Mr. ROOSEVELT. I think it is absolutely clear as of today, and I think what we need to do now is to perhaps reaffirm that the President has these powers, that the Congress would expect him to use them and that, however, we hope they never will be used because we feel we should redouble our efforts to build through the United

Nations a system which would make it unnecessary for us to ever have to use that force.

Mr. FULTON. In closing, would you gentlemen favor using the term "Mid-East," which I have suggested, instead of "Middle East". The term "Middle East" is a British term and I believe it better if we coined our own American phrase for the area. I would like to put in an amendment to supply \$100 million for Austria—for the Hungarian refugees to take care of them. I understand Austria can't afford the expense any more. Likewise, I would recommend \$20 million for the refugees in this area caused by the Egyptian crisis. Would you agree to something of that kind, expanding this resolution?

Mr. ROOSEVELT. I would not want to pass judgment on that. That would be up to the committee. I would certainly welcome it. I would also welcome an affirmation of appreciation on the part of this country of the tremendous job that Austria has done, when we think that she undertook the load, has had the load to carry, and compared to her resources, it seems to me, has accomplished almost a miracle.

Mr. FULTON. Thank you. I agree with you in many respects.

Mr. MULTER. For myself, Mr. Fulton, in answer to that question which I think you addressed to both of us, I think it would be an extremely bad thing to take a resolution of this kind and ignore the Hungarian situation. If you could add something to it which would show our interest and our determination to help that situation, it would strengthen rather than weaken this resolution.

Mr. FULTON. We might refer to the refugees in Austria and the Egyptian-Israeli area.

Chairman GORDON. Mr. Hays of Ohio.

Mr. HAYS of Ohio. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

My congratulations to both of these gentlemen and also to Mr. Celler for their statements. I think, taken together, they have contributed a great deal to pinpointing what most charitably you can term the neglect of this situation by the State Department in the period immediately after the 6th of November and perhaps at worst you could call it criminal negligence.

Now, Mr. Dulles said over on the Senate side in open session that he proposes to use some of this money that he wants from this resolution as direct budgetary payments to the Arab governments, and he mentions two specifically, Egypt and Syria, which are suffering because of the closure of the Suez Canal and the blowing up of the pipeline.

Direct budgetary payments means, of course, that we give them a cash grant to make up any lack of cash that they may have in their own treasuries.

Do you think it is conceivable then and probable and possible that we could be contributing money which Mr. Nasser could use then to pay Soviet Russia for arms and with which Syria could pay Russia for arms they are getting?

Mr. MULTER. I do not know that we would deliberately contribute money for them to pay for the arms they are getting, but we would certainly help them bolster their defense budget, and if they did not use the money we gave them for that purpose, by using that for bolstering their economy, that releases other money for their treasury to put into the defense fund.

Now you can be sure that the last Egyptianization of all industry, banks, insurance companies, and private industry in Egypt is just another word for nationalization. They will take those funds, dump them into the Egyptian treasury and use them for offense.

I do not think anybody will argue that the arms and munitions dumps that were built in the last 2 years in Egypt were needed for the defense of Egypt. They were specifically intended for offensive purposes. Now that that has been destroyed or taken from them, we certainly ought not to help them rebuild for offense.

That is why I say no matter which of the countries in this area are to be helped, in a resolution like this, you should write into the resolution very specific restrictions and limitations and at least, if nothing else, get the written signed commitment from these countries that they will not be aggressors and that they intend to live in peace with their neighbors.

Mr. HAYS of Ohio. I think we can agree on the terminology here: If our money were not used directly in payment to Russia, then it would be used to replace money that had been and the substance would be about the same, would it not?

Mr. MULTER. Yes; I agree with that.

Mr. ROOSEVELT. And, if I may add to that, Mr. Hays, is it not also true that that would be very probably true about some of the arms we would ship to them? Would it not simply mean that instead of having to get them from the Communists they would get them from us?

In the last Congress we were assured over and over again that the American arms that were being shipped to Iraq were only arms that were going to be used in the internal security, for the police force of the area. Only about a week ago there appeared a picture of those arms in the newspapers in the United States. What were they? 155 millimeter cannon and very large tanks were certainly things that could not be used for internal police security. I, for one, just do not trust the people we are sending them to, and, secondly, I do not think we have the ability to control where the money would be spent or what the arms would be used for.

Mr. HAYS of Ohio. I have another question: Do either of you know of any democracy in the countries of the Near East, excluding the Baghdad Pact area, except perhaps in Lebanon and Israel? Do you know of any other country there that we could call a democracy, or to get away from semantics, a republic, or anything that we commonly consider popular government?

Mr. MULTER. I know of no other there, sir, that in actual practice is a democracy. They went through a form of election in Egypt of electing Nasser President but it was just form.

Mr. HAYS of Ohio. You had two choices. You could vote for Nasser or you did not vote for anybody.

Mr. MULTER. It was like the Communist form of voting "da" (yes) or go to jail.

Mr. HAYS of Ohio. Having established that fact, and I doubt that anyone would care to argue that it is not a fact, I am asking this for my own information. If you do not have the information and you very well may not, I would like the staff or someone to try to get it. I would like to know the per capita income from outside sources for Israel and for Saudi Arabia, for instance. There has been a good

deal of talk here and it might be well to get the income from outside sources for Lebanon, too, and Israel getting money from outside sources.

Saudi Arabia got the sum of \$186 million from oil royalties. That is money that came in from the outside. I would guess that that is a greater per capita income than any other country in the Near East has. And yet the condition of the population of Saudi Arabia, except the king and his immediate family, is probably the worst of any country in the Near East. You might exclude from that the employees of the Aramco Co., who are a great minority of the population.

Do you not think it significant that the American people ought to know before any money is granted to Saudi Arabia, to pick out one example, that such a condition exists and that the money there in all probability would not be used to better the conditions of the population there or create any democratic conditions?

Mr. MULTER. I do not know what the figures are on the income from outside sources for any of those countries. I know there is a large sum raised in this country every year by the United Jewish Appeal for Israel which is in the nature of a charitable contribution.

Mr. HAYS of Ohio. I have been to Israel and you have been to Israel, and I have also been to the Arab countries. I would have to say, in all fairness, that in Lebanon and Israel—one is an Arab nation and one is not—that the people there live with a degree of dignity and have a standard of living which is in a degree comparable to our own, and you certainly cannot say that for the mass of the population in any of the other countries.

What I am trying to establish is that there is difference in the way that the money is being used and we should not pour any more money into fastening tighter upon those people a government which certainly does not care very much about their welfare.

Mr. ROOSEVELT. Could I suggest it might be helpful not only to find out how much money from outside sources was being received into those countries but what the comparable income per capita was of the individuals in that country. That, I think, will be the real test. In other words, that will show you just what they are putting their money into, whether it is going into the pockets of a few people or being used for the welfare of all of the people in the country.

Mr. MULTER. Take Turkey, which is a 98 percent Moslem country, and Lebanon, which is an all-Arab country, but half Christian and half Moslem, and Israel, which is Arab and Jewish, with the preponderance today of Jewish inhabitants. The three countries are improving their standards of living and have been doing it consistently. Because they have been trying to live at peace and improve the conditions and the welfare of their people. There is not any doubt about that. The only excuse we get for helping Saudi Arabia at all is that we need a military base there. Now there isn't a doubt in the world that our people here at home, and everyone in the Secretary of State's office, including the Secretary, know that it is a slave state and there is no attempt on the part of the King to improve the condition of his people or remove slavery or improve the standards of living of his people. Now, if we do not need that military base there we should stop doing business with them. If we do need it, we have no alternative but to say: "We have to trade with this particular dictator, with this King, in order to maintain that base there for our own security."

There is no other excuse in that area.

Chairman GORDON. Mrs. Church.

Mrs. CHURCH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Multer, I have read your statement with interest. I would like to say that too to Mr. Roosevelt.

Some of us have been making an intense effort to determine the truth about the present oppression of Jews in Egypt and to find out what steps should be taken or are possible.

I am wondering if your proposed limitation upon gifts as outlined on page 2, section 3, would cover the situation of internal oppression?

Mr. MULTER. You are referring to section 3 of my proposed resolution?

Mrs. CHURCH. On page 2; yes, where you put limitations upon, or prohibitions against, giving economic or military assistance. I wonder if any of those proposals seek to deal with the internal situation in a country.

Mr. MULTER. They do very definitely deal with internal situations.

Mrs. CHURCH. Would you point to the phrase in this section which would provide for such protection?

Mr. MULTER. When I say, "It will faithfully abide by"—subdivision 3, section 3—"and abide by the ethics and principles of international law and not discriminate on account of race or religion."

Mrs. CHURCH. I think that the connotation, unless otherwise defined here or extended might seem to put the limitation on international obligations because of your typewritten insertion of the words "will not discriminate on account of race or religion."

The supposition is that this would operate only in an international situation. Should a clarifying clause be inserted to definitize the inclusion of cases of internal suppression?

Mr. MULTER. I intended to mean that in that specific language. I have no objection to using the strongest possible language to implement that and to show precisely what we mean. While ordinarily any country has the right to say to us, "You mind your own business as to how we run our affairs internally—" it is the moral obligation of all people in the world to talk up and be heard when any particular group of people, whether they be Christians, Jews, or Moslems, are being discriminated against or being persecuted. It is our duty to talk up. And while we cannot go into those countries and say, "You stop this," we certainly can say to them, "We will deal with you and make obligations and treaties with you and give you money and help and loans, only if you abide by the moral principles that are recognized by civilization."

Mrs. CHURCH. You would not object to a clarification of the paragraph to ensure exact interpretation of your meaning?

Mr. MULTER. On the contrary, I would welcome clarification.

Mrs. CHURCH. If the resolution, House Joint Resolution 117, should be passed out of this committee in its present form, would you both feel obligated to vote against it?

If that is an unfair question, you need not answer it.

Mr. ROOSEVELT. I think it is a fair question. If the resolution is not changed and there are no modifications such as have been suggested before this committee, I would find it most difficult to vote for it.

Mrs. CHURCH. Well, now do you think there is any substance to the fear that has been expressed here that failure to pass the resolution would weaken our authority? I mean, that we would possibly be weakening the prestige of the President and of the Administration and of this country, which, after all, is the ultimate thing, if the authority sought by the President were not granted.

Mr. ROOSEVELT. Well, Mrs. Church, I, for one, in explaining my vote, would reassert that the President has the powers he asks for; and, as an individual Congressman, in voting "no," I am not voting that the President should not use his powers against aggression. In fact, I would urge that he use them, and I am only objecting to the kind of resolution which has been submitted, which I do not feel does the job that ought to be done, and I am protesting against that.

Mrs. CHURCH. Do you subscribe in toto to Mr. Multer's resolution? Have you seen it before and studied it?

Mr. ROOSEVELT. I am sorry I have not had a chance to study it. In essence, I would find myself in agreement with it.

Mrs. CHURCH. Thank you.

Mr. MULTER. May I say, in answer to Mrs. Church's question, I could not bring myself to vote for the resolution as it appears in 117, in that form, but that is not what will be submitted to the Congress, if I may be so bold, because on the other side Mr. Dulles himself has already indicated to the Members there in committee that he was ready to accept various modifications. I am sure that it is not going to get to the House or to the Senate in the form in which it has been submitted.

I think that this committee itself will, as it has the right to do and should do, modify that resolution.

I do not think the Members are going to be called upon to vote for that precise resolution, or none. I think you are going to give us a resolution by which we can show to the world we are standing with our President in supporting these high principles.

Mr. ROOSEVELT. And I would much prefer that, Mrs. Church.

Chairman GORDON. Mr. Byrd.

Mr. BYRD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I would like to address my remarks and questions, first of all, to my colleague and friend, Mr. Multer.

Mr. Multer, I have had quite a number of letters from my constituents advising me to vote against this resolution. I have yet to receive a single letter in support of it. But I am going to vote for some kind of a resolution. On the basis of the information that I have, and as I think I see the facts, I feel that we are going to have to pass some kind of a measure.

I am constrained to believe that it was a mistake for the Administration to ask for passage of this resolution because I think that virtually every witness who has appeared before us has expressed the belief that the Administration is asking for power that it already has.

I go further to say that the Administration's action might eventually be recorded by historians as being not only a mistake but also a disservice to our country, because if this resolution should be defeated or if a close vote on it in either House occurs, it could be and would be interpreted by the Communists and our friends around the world as meaning that the American people are unwilling to pit their forces against an overt act of aggression. That would be a mistaken in-

terpretation because the American people have shown their willingness before and they will do it again. Mr. Multer, do you believe that the military and economic features of the resolution might well be separated and that they are not really companion pieces at all?

Before you answer that question, let me say, if I remember correctly, the Secretary of State has indicated to this committee that this resolution is not phrased to cope with acts of subversion and covert aggression. The Secretary and other witnesses have gone on to say that they do not expect or anticipate any overt acts of aggression to be committed.

Then if the resolution purportedly will not deal with subversion, and only deals with an overt act, and if the overt act is not anticipated, and if further they say they expect no limited wars to be fought, then can we not rightly suppose that the military features are in reality but a subterfuge? Maybe the word "subterfuge" carries the wrong connotation, but can we not be excused for taking the position that the military features are but a subterfuge offered to secure that which the administration really wants most, and that is section 3 of the resolution, the authority to transfer funds for economic assistance from other areas to the Middle East?

Mr. MULTER. Mr. Byrd, I regret the 2 things are wrapped in 1 in this case, or together in this resolution. However, I again ask you whether we should argue as to whether or not there should be 2 separate resolutions or 1 resolution. I am concerned with the important principles involved, as I am sure you are, too.

There is not any doubt that this can very easily now be interpreted as a resolution attempting to soften the use of military forces by offering economic aid. It can easily be interpreted as the big fellow coming along with the stick in one hand and the money bag in the other: "You take it under my terms or you don't."

That is not the impression we want to create.

I have been urging as many other members have since 1947 before there was a State of Israel, that we must go into that area with economic aid if we are going to prevent that area from going Communist. In 1947 I started urging that. I still urge it and I urge it today. I do not care how it is done. Whether we wrap them together or do it separately. But if we are going to prevent the subversion that the Communists have a knack of accomplishing, we must go in and help these people in that area, even against their will, to improve their standards of living.

Now the military purpose of this, I think, could have been much better done with a forceful statement of policy by the President of the United States. I think we would have backed him up to a man. We are now confronted with the situation as he gave it to us. We cannot afford to let either our enemies or friends abroad be mistaken about our unity at home, as to our desire to accomplish both the prevention of Communist aggression and the helping of our friends to improve their conditions of livelihood.

Chairman GORDON. Your time is up, Mr. Byrd.

Mr. BYRD. Mr. Chairman, I understood that we were to be given 10 minutes.

Chairman GORDON. Five minutes.

Mr. BYRD. I thought I had 5 minutes with each witness.

Chairman GORDON. You have 5 minutes with Mr. Multer and now you have 5 minutes with Mr. Roosevelt.

Mr. BYRD. Thank you.

Now, Mr. Multer, if we are agreed, as most of us seem to be, that the President as Commander in Chief already has authority to use American armed force, why have a termination date on any resolution that we finally pass?

Mr. MULTER. To use the vernacular, we in the Congress have been put in a box. Now, let us start pitching. If we put a termination date on it, it will require us to review this very program again within 2 years.

Now, if he did not want us to take jurisdiction and have continuing jurisdiction, he should not have given it to us in the first place, but now that we have it, let us keep it.

Mr. BYRD. If we put a termination date on it, are we not in a sense saying that he has that power only through congressional authority, rather than through constitutional authority?

Mr. MULTER. I do not think so. Any statute we enact to limit the powers of the President as given to him by the Constitution might just as well not be enacted because whether they have a date or not they are unenforceable and will be declared void when tested.

Mr. BYRD. Can you briefly give me an answer to this: Is the kibbutz a democratic institution?

Mr. MULTER. The kibbutz is the Hebrew word for village and there are many types of kibbutzim, or villages in Israel.

There is the so-called collective kibbutz where the people gather together and pool all their interests and the title to everything is in the village, in the municipality. It is the ideal socialistic state where the community owns everything and everyone works for the community. That type of kibbutz is in the minority in the State of Israel. It has not taken on just as it did not take on in many places in this country, such as Oneida, N. Y., and Zion, Ill. It has never spread beyond that because it is not a very popular way of making a living. All over the world men are individualists. We want to own what we acquire and produce. Most of the kibbutzim or villages in Israel are municipalities of the same type we know here.

Mr. FULTON. And there is freedom of choice to join in such communities.

Mr. MULTER. There is freedom of choice in every respect even in the collective kibbutz. No one is compelled to join it, nor to stay in it.

Mr. FARBERSTEIN. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. BYRD. I hesitate not to yield to my colleague, but I do want to say one other thing.

Chairman GORDON. Mr. Byrd has the floor.

Mr. BYRD. Mr. Chairman, I want to compliment Mr. Multer and Mr. Celler. I have not read Mr. Roosevelt's statement but I know the usual kind of excellent presentation that he makes.

Mr. Multer, if you will recall last year I, on the floor of the House of Representatives, opposed and almost stood alone in opposing the proposal to ship arms to Israel, and I did it because, after having been to Israel and the Arab countries, I felt that Israel could take care of itself very well militarily against any combination of Arab powers. My position was misinterpreted and misunderstood, perhaps, but I

felt that in the best interests of the United States we should not send arms to Israel at that time. I think that subsequent events have proved my position to have been right because the Israelis have pretty well taken care of themselves militarily in the more recent past.

Let me say to you today that I think your statement is bold and forthright, and it is a good presentation. Someone has said, "Be bold, and mighty forces will come to your aid."

You have made one mistake, as I see it, in your presentation, and that is on page 4 where you say that the only thing wrong with what the British and the French did was their delay.

I think the British and French were in error in doing two things. First of all, they should never have attacked Egypt. Israel could have done the job much better itself. The second mistake that Britain and France made was in pulling out after they had gone in. They should have completed the mission of destroying Nasser first.

Mr. Multer, I say to you that I agree with you today that Nasser is a menace, and I am not anti-Arab, but the sooner this Government of ours takes off its kid gloves in dealing with him, the better off we are going to be and the better off Israel and the other free countries of the world are going to be, and that includes the adjoining Arab States and Egypt as well.

Thank you very much.

Chairman GORDON. Mr. LeCompte.

Mr. LECOMPTE. I do not believe I have any question, but I do want to express my appreciation to Mr. Celler and Mr. Multer, whom I heard this morning—I did not get to hear your remarks, Mr. Roosevelt, but I will read them very carefully. It is fine when Members of Congress come before this committee and assist us who are laboring with the problem of foreign affairs and give us the benefit of your thoughts on the subject.

I have no further questions, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman GORDON. Mr. Selden.

Mr. SELDEN. Mr. Chairman, before I begin my questions, Mr. Farbstain would like to ask a question and I will be glad to yield to him.

Mr. FARBSTAIN. Mr. Multer, in connection with your description of kibbutz, would you make any distinction between a Socialist or co-operative organization? Could we just as well call that a cooperative as well as a Socialist organization, this kibbutz of which you are speaking?

Mr. MULTER. Yes. There are also cooperative kibbutzim in the State of Israel.

Mr. FARBSTAIN. In other words, all the property is owned by the individuals, just like people buy apartments in a building. They each have an undivided share.

Mr. MULTER. That is the way they live in some of their established villages and towns.

Mr. BYRD. Will the gentleman yield to me?

Mr. SELDEN. I yield.

Mr. BYRD. May I say, Mr. Multer, I did not ask that question with any intent of being critical. I was merely struggling for a correct understanding of the word and the system. I think that you have helped me a great deal.

Mr. MULTER. Mr. Byrd, I have always respected you for your sincerity of views and I did not attach anything but that to any of

the questions you have asked or to the statement you referred to earlier. I think on the floor, at that time, I said in so many words that I respected you for your views and for your sincerity in presenting them.

Mr. BYRD. Thank you very much.

Mr. SELDEN. Mr. Chairman, I would like to direct a question to my colleague, Mr. Roosevelt: Do you think that the failure to adopt a resolution along the lines the President has recommended, although you believe that he is asking for power that he already has, would or might cause some dangerous miscalculations on the part of our potential enemy?

Mr. ROOSEVELT. Well, Mr. Selden, I think that largely in agreement with what Mr. Byrd said earlier and especially due to—if I may use the word—propaganda which the administration put out before this came up to the Congress and since, that if no resolution was forthcoming along these general lines and for these general purposes, that it might well be misinterpreted. I think so much emphasis has been put upon the need for national unity, being behind the President in his policy, that it particularly would be seized by the Communists and twisted, if some resolution was not forthcoming. Therefore, I would thoroughly agree, and I sincerely hope that a strong resolution will be forthcoming, but not the resolution in exactly the form in which the President has presented it to us.

Mr. SELDEN. In other words, you do not favor the wording of this resolution but feel it should be along the general lines recommended by the President.

Mr. ROOSEVELT. I think it should be along the lines of the President's right to exercise such powers, and I say that we intend to stand behind the President, but we do not intend to make the decisions for him. That is not our job.

Mr. SELDEN. In that event, wouldn't we have to change the resolution substantially if we did not go along with his request to authorize the use of troops?

Mr. ROOSEVELT. No, I think it is an important point not to authorize something that he can do but to affirm our knowledge that he has the right to do it.

In other words, as you know, and from the past history of many governments, when little by little, one branch of the Government refuses to exercise its duties and the other takes it over, eventually that power is lost. While the view has been expressed that the President would always have those powers, it might become such a precedent in time that it would be felt that the President could never exercise the power without a resolution by the Congress for him to do so. And if that ever grew up to a precedent that would be accepted by the people, even though the Court might sustain somebody who violated that precedent, a weak President would feel that he had to come to the Congress, and we might not always be blessed with someone with vision enough to act when he should act. Therefore, I am afraid of the precedent unless it is couched in the proper form.

Mr. SELDEN. In other words, you would change the wording so you would not authorize him to use our Armed Forces but you would state in the resolution that he already has that right?

Mr. ROOSEVELT. I would even go so far as to say we hope he will do so.

Mr. SELDEN. Mr. Multer, is that your feeling?

Mr. MULTER. Yes. I have been presumptuous enough to suggest my own form of resolution where I suggest just that. A confirmation of his authority.

Mr. SELDEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman GORDON. Mr. Pilcher.

Mr. PILCHER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Multer, you are so familiar with the Israeli problem over there, do you not agree that the whole problem in the Middle East or Mideast—call it whatever you want to—is the Israeli-Arab situation? In other words, anything that we do that does not take into account trying to settle that, we would not ever have peace over there until that problem is worked out?

Mr. MULTER. Mr. Pilcher, up until last year I felt that was the only problem, but with the coming to power of Mr. Nasser, there is an additional problem.

Mr. PILCHER. That is an Israeli-Arab problem, the Nasser problem?

Mr. MULTER. No; the Nasser problem is peculiarly the problem of the entire area and of world peace. Mr. Nasser is determined, as you will find if you read his book, which is almost a rehash of *Mein Kampf* by Hitler—he is determined to be the Hitler of that whole area. He wants to consolidate all of that area. All of the Arab countries and Israel under his leadership. And one of the steps to bring him to that point of power is his taking of the Suez Canal. Whether there was an Israel there or not, he would have done that, once he felt his oats and felt he was then strong enough to take over and dominate that whole area.

So we have that additional situation there. As I say, I believe that up until last year, the Arab-Israeli dispute was the sole source of trouble there, but now we have something much more serious. Wipe out Israel tomorrow, which I hope will not happen, and if Nasser stays, world war is just around the corner.

Mr. PILCHER. In other words, you agree with what Britain did?

Mr. MULTER. Most emphatically. Only I think they did it too late. I also agree with Mr. Byrd that once they moved in, they should not have moved out.

Mr. PILCHER. Do you think that when Mr. Nasser took over the canal, that our Government should have joined with the British Government automatically right then and told him that he could not do it?

Mr. MULTER. Yes; and we could have stopped that act by Nasser. The first time he said Israeli ships cannot go through the canal, we should have said they will go through. When he stopped British ships, Greek ships and Italian ships, we should have said, "You cannot do this. This is an international waterway."

If we did that he never would have dared take over the canal.

Mr. PILCHER. How far do you think our relations with the United Kingdom have been strained?

Mr. MULTER. They have been strained, but not to the point where they cannot be rebuilt and strengthened again. I think the British are our natural allies. I think free people all over the world are our natural allies, and we should do everything possible to make sure that they understand that we want them as our friends and we want to be their friends.

Mr. PILCHER. I agree with you.

Mr. ROOSEVELT. Mr. Pilcher, if I may add to that, I spent about a week, a very few weeks ago in England, and I had an opportunity to talk with the new Prime Minister, to Mr. R. A. Butler, and to a number of the other people there, and I would say there is no lessening in the desire to have a firm partnership and friendship with the United States on the part of the British people or the people in the Government and the people out of the Government, the people on the labor side. But I think there is a very real feeling of disillusionment and of distrust of the present Secretary of State. I think, to be very honest and very frank about it, that as long as he is there and as long as he is the one who is in charge of our contacts there, there is very grave question as to how close our relationships with our allies will be.

Mr. PILCHER. Thank you.

No further questions, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman GORDON. Mr. O'Hara.

Mr. O'HARA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

This to me has been a very profitable and inspiring day. The contribution that Congressman Celler, Congressman Multer, and Congressman Roosevelt have made to our discussion has been immeasurably beneficial to us all.

It seems to me one of the benefits we are deriving from the introduction of this resolution has been that in its consideration instead of responding to a demand for quick action, and without adequate deliberation and exchange of viewpoints, in the wisdom of the chairman of this committee, this hearing has gone on for many days and we have been hearing expressions of opinion from all sides.

As I stated before, mine is an open mind. I came as a new member to this committee with a sense that what we now are facing is a fight to save Western civilization. I think that the period we are passing through is that serious. In the 81st Congress, I voted against armed aid to Europe because I did not believe that the road to peace was in a race of armaments. Having lived in the early years of this century, when France and Germany were in a race of armaments, I remembered how we in the United States who then were far away saw the folly in such a course. We wondered why the money they placed in a race of armaments was not more profitably put into building the foundations of peace by improving their own economies. Because we were so far away, and so disinterested, we clearly could see the end. As then we foresaw, the race of armaments ended in destroying forever Britain as a world empire, it destroyed Germany and France.

Now we follow the same course, hoping to reach a happier termination than any race of armaments in all history has ever recorded.

When it was suggested that we should arm peoples in Europe, I thought if Russia were arming the Mexicans and the Nicaraguans and the Costa Ricans, our people would start getting excited, and when we got sufficiently excited we would take the arms away from those close to us as neighbors, which a power far from our hemisphere had given them.

Now I see we are spreading arms all over, and as has been brought out in the testimony today we do not always know what use is being made of these arms, these weapons of destruction that we are spreading all over the world and we cannot control their use.

I am merely reciting that as though I were thinking out loud with you. I am here now on this committee. I am a member of the party

in opposition. The President of the United States—not the President of my party, but the President of the United States, of us all, has said that a grave crisis exists and he is asking us with almost a unanimous vote to adopt this resolution, and he thinks that in this will be a way to peace. It has been presented to us that at the present time Russia is not in a position to fight a world war, that we reasonably can expect that Russia will seek for the next 2 years to avoid a third world war, but if in the next 2 years because of the vacuum now existing in the Near East area, we permit Russia without fighting a war to obtain these large oil resources and the geographical advantages, that then in 2 years we will be faced with a world war under disadvantageous conditions.

Now that is the way it is presented to us. We all are reaching out for peace.

The Secretary of State has said that he felt that without the passing of this resolution war was very likely and by a war, he meant a major war, and not a brushfire war.

I have been very much helped by the testimony of you, my three colleagues, for whom I have esteem and affection. You have expressed many thoughts that are my thoughts. My mind is still open on how to vote on this resolution. I have no question to ask but I thank you all for the fine contribution you have made to our meeting today.

Chairman GORDON. Mr. Fountain.

Mr. FOUNTAIN. No question, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman GORDON. Mr. Fascell.

Mr. FASCELL. Gentlemen, I ask these question jointly and I would like to get your opinion on them:

I think we can all agree that on the affirmation of the question of armed force that once the problem has been presented we ought to go ahead and reaffirm it. I think it is justifiable, however, to discuss the problem as to whether or not we will abrogate any constitutional authority if we do so, and also it is very wise, as Mr. Roosevelt has pointed out, not to establish a precedent by which we would weaken ourselves in future cases. But the testimony has been very clear before this committee and also before the other body that we are not talking about direct overt armed aggression at this time. This is not the primary purpose of this resolution and, as the President has stated in his own message in sending it down to Congress, it is nothing but a reaffirmation of a statement that he had made twice in 1956 with respect to armed aggression in that area. So we have nothing new there. It is just a question of Congress joining in and echoing statements the President has already made.

However, it has been made very clear here before this committee and also in the other body that there is great fear on the part of the administration with respect to section 3 of the resolution should it fail and that deals with \$200 million. Specifically, it exempts that \$200 million from any provisions of the Mutual Security Act.

Now, I point out some facts in relation to what you gentlemen have testified to: First of all, it has also been made very clear that we are not talking about long-term development economic projects, to stabilize the economy of the people in that area over a long period of time. It has also been made very clear by the witnesses that what we are talking about are emergencies that deal with the economic

situation in those countries. Primarily from the loss of revenues and because of certain military assistance.

Now let us assume for the moment—furthermore, I might add that the Secretary of State testified here that he is not seeking any authority beyond this fiscal year, June 30. Any \$400 million or other appropriation beyond the \$200 million, would be sought in subsequent acts before the Congress. So we are talking now about removing the restrictions and the limitations on the use of \$200 million so that the administration can use that money as it sees fit, where it sees fit, and under the conditions it deems best for the country.

These things raise several very important questions and we are getting down now to the root of the problem and what I want to get your opinion on:

Would you, Mr. Multer, in your case, attach the same strings and restrictions that you have laid out in your resolution to the use of the money under these emergency conditions?

MR. MULTER. I would, sir. And let me say that some of these things, I suggested to this committee last May, that they be incorporated into the authorization bill we were then considering. You saw fit not to do so. Some of the things were referred to in the report, some of these limitations and restrictions.

MR. FASCELL. Mr. Multer, suppose the administration came right back and said, "While these are fine ideals, it is impractical and unrealistic to think that we are going to go around there with an open pocketbook and get a lot of conditions and commitments when what we are trying to do for the present is retain the status quo so these governments do not just collapse from bankruptcy and the Russians come in."

MR. MULTER. Which countries that exist there do we want to prevent collapsing? We do not agree that if any government collapses, the Communists will walk in because of that. In the present Syrian Government, if it collapses and a new government comes into being that is Communist controlled, it is because of the Communist subversion that has been going on there for 3 years at least in Syria.

If the Nasser government collapses, the Communists are not going to come in there and take over that government because Nasser is out. We will get another government there and maybe a better government. But are we now, without any conditions, going to give Nasser as much money as he needs to balance his budget after what he has done? After he has run out on the very commitments he made to the United Nations? He invited the United Nations armed forces to come in there to keep the peace. After they arrived he said they are going to get out of there as soon as he tells them to get out.

There was no condition imposed at that time that the clearing of the Suez Canal would be started when all of the foreign troops are out. That was to be started as soon as the British and the French got out. As soon as the British and the French got out and the U. N. armed forces got in, he then came along with a new condition. He now says, until Israel gives up the Gaza Strip, no clearing of the Suez Canal. What is the connection between the two except the desire of Mr. Nasser to show who the boss is.

You cannot deal with that kind of a man except you say to him, if we are to help you sustain your economy and balance your budget, you must do this, that, and the other thing.

We were told for years while Nasser and his predecessor were carrying on, and saying the one aim they had in life was to annihilate and destroy Israel, we were told, "That is just for home consumption. They do not mean it. Let them talk. It is just to keep their people amused."

Actually it was more than amusement they were talking about. They were talking about deadly destruction.

Now, if Nasser is not going to agree, as a condition of getting even \$1 of this \$200 million, that he will not be an aggressor nation, he should not get the dollar.

Mr. FASCELL. I think I got your position quite clear, which is you would not want to remove any restrictions from the use of their money so that our Government can deal with the governments over there anyway they want to without any agreements or pacts or any understanding of what actually the current financial situation is in those countries.

Mr. MULTER. That is my position.

Mr. ROOSEVELT. I would agree with that, and I think if you will think back as to whether or not this \$200 million is going to save any government from collapse over there, on an emergency basis—first of all, you have not been told by I think your own admission what those governments would be. Secondly, I think you have already heard from the governments of most concerned, Egypt and Syria, that they are against this whole project anyhow. They are not going to ask for any money from us anyhow on that basis. So where is the emergency on this thing? Who is asking for it? Who is about to collapse? I do not think that point has been proven in any way, shape, or form. If there is that emergency perhaps you should grant it. But until that emergency has been proven and it has been shown that certain governments friendly to us will remain friendly if they get our aid, that would be one thing, but I do not think that has been shown.

Mr. FASCELL. No; it has not.

Mr. ROOSEVELT. Therefore, is not the real problem a long-range economic program that will really do something for the people so that the governments who do come in will be democratic governments because the people will be benefited in the long run?

Mr. FASCELL. I do not think there is any argument about that and I think most members have expressed their concern about stability over a long period of time but how do you answer the American people when the President of the United States says in his message—

Nevertheless, weaknesses in the present situation and increased danger from international communism convinced me that we ought to take this act—

and the Secretary of State backs it up by saying, "If you do not give us section 3," which is the economic part of this thing and the heart of the whole movement, "if you do not give us that, the whole thing will fail."

How do we answer the American people?

Mr. ROOSEVELT. I think you answered that, that the Congress still has a responsibility to the people to have justification for its acts in backing up the President. If the President in other instances felt he needed money, he came and told why he needed money. If it is impossible to spell it out, then, believe me, the money isn't needed; and I think the Congress has the duty to tell the people that in

sufficiently clear form that the propaganda machine can't override it.

Mr. FASCELL. As I understand it, you would favor the idea of expressing the sense of Congress in concurring with the President on our policy with respect to aggression and Communist control, but separating the question of economic assistance.

Mr. ROOSEVELT. I most certainly would, sir.

Mr. FASCELL. You feel the same way, Mr. Multer?

Mr. MULTER. I would prefer to see them dealt with separately, but I would not object to taking them together if there were restrictions imposed.

Mr. FASCELL. Do you see any danger in the fact, now that they have been lumped together that if the Congress should separate them, that it might be subject to misinterpretation around the world?

Mr. MULTER. No; I think the important enunciation of principle we must make is that we are against and will continue to be against the Communists and Communist aggression.

Mr. FASCELL. All right, sir. Let me ask another question, now: Do you think the separating of these matters as has been suggested will have any important effect upon the people of the United States?

Mr. MULTER. I would say that if you separated them and very promptly announced your position on the matter of Communist aggression, the country at large would certainly applaud. If you took your time about making the announcement or pronouncement about economic aid and what you would do and took your time and had a thorough investigation and legislated on that in the usual way, again the American people would applaud because there you are hitting their pocket?

Mr. ROOSEVELT. I would thoroughly agree with Mr. Multer.

Mr. FASCELL. How do you reconcile the fact that an announcement was made yesterday that all men in the National Guard, now, commencing April 1, because of military considerations at the present time, will have to serve 6 months on active duty?

Mr. ROOSEVELT. Could I reply to that? How on the other hand do you justify a new Reserve policy which cuts down the training period of everybody and intimates we don't need to get so excited about it? It seems to me one contradicts the other.

Mr. MULTER. I might facetiously offer the suggestion that we use the same answer as when we sent 3,000 marines to join the 6th Fleet in the Mediterranean Sea. It was announced by our Government officials that that was just a routine practice engagement.

Mr. FASCELL. One other question and then I am through: Would both of you gentlemen agree with the idea that we ought to support the principle of a strong U. N. force in the area, in order to use that as a basis for achieving a settlement of the Arab-Israel dispute?

Mr. MULTER. Let's put it "to keep the peace."

Mr. FASCELL. Until such time as we can go further.

Mr. MULTER. I would heartily approve of such act.

Mr. FASCELL. If the resolution adopted by this committee or proposed by this committee would include that, you would support that?

Mr. ROOSEVELT. I would personally welcome it, as I said in my testimony.

Mr. FULTON. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. FASCELL. I certainly will.

Mr. FULTON. I believe the purpose of this House Joint Resolution 117 was to insure that it would make less the need for United States troops.

Mr. FASCELL. U. N.

Mr. FULTON. On the previous comment you gentlemen were making, it might have been a little partisan about reducing the amount of training necessary for United States troops. You talked about the 6-month period of active service for the Reserves.

Mr. FASCELL. I just commented on the fact that an announcement had come out which stated that because of military considerations, all men in the National Guard, commencing April 1, would have to serve 6 months on active duty.

Mr. FULTON. I thought that you were thinking the United States was letting down our armed force strength.

Mr. FASCELL. One of the witnesses brought up the question about the Reserves.

Mr. FULTON. The point I would make is that if we pass this resolution there would then, according to the Secretary and the President, be less need for American troops being used in this area than there would be otherwise. Isn't that really within the purposes of House Joint Resolution 117?

Mr. FASCELL. It might be if you didn't have a countervailing announcement that all National Guardsmen would be on active duty. I mean I don't see how you can have one and the other at the same time.

Chairman GORDON. Mr. Fascell, your time is up.

Mr. Coffin.

Mr. COFFIN. Mr. Multer, if I understand your answer to Mr. Fascell correctly, you would prefer to leave the resolution with a statement of policy and take up the economic aid in a more orderly, planned way?

Mr. MULTER. Yes.

Mr. COFFIN. If that were done there would not be much sense in having this a joint resolution, because that would be leaving us with just a statement of policy on what we felt the President was now authorized to do.

Mr. MULTER. I completely agree. If you take out the economic aid you are making a declaration of policy which would be more appropriately a concurrent resolution. If you are making a legislative authorization it should be a bill or a joint resolution requiring the approval of the President. You are quite right, sir.

Mr. COFFIN. That would be your preference?

Mr. MULTER. Yes.

Mr. COFFIN. It seems to me from reading your statements that Mr. Roosevelt's chief emphasis is on giving military assistance and giving economic aid through the United Nations, whereas your emphasis, Mr. Multer, is on building up a series of pacts on specific conditions.

Mr. MULTER. Yes.

Mr. COFFIN. You did say you would welcome a U. N. police force in the area to keep the peace?

Mr. MULTER. Yes.

Mr. COFFIN. Mr. Roosevelt, would you go along with the inclusion in any economic aid programs, of the restrictions that Mr. Multer has specified?

Mr. ROOSEVELT. Yes; I certainly endorse them heartily.

Mr. COFFIN. Would either of you think that including these specifications might indicate to the nations of the Middle East that here we were again holding out the big stick and the big purse that could only be availed of if very definite strings were tied? I mean isn't that a danger when you lay down five restrictions, that you are negating any good will that you might seek to build up?

Mr. ROOSEVELT. I don't think so, Mr. Coffin, for this reason: I think the first point is that most nations who object to restrictions object to them because they take away from that nation some sovereignty, something that belongs to them or impose something for the sole benefit of the nation putting on the restrictions.

In this case what Mr. Multer has suggested is actually only the insurance of the application of recognized international principles of civilized governments and therefore no one could properly object to them in my opinion.

Mr. COFFIN. Isn't this a possibility that no one would object to them? That a man like Nasser would perhaps leap to the opportunity of signing a pact agreeing to these five things? Isn't it something like requiring the loyalty oath that most patriotic Americans would be very glad to sign, but those who are subversively minded would also sign it because the oath doesn't mean anything to them?

Mr. ROOSEVELT. I think that is true, but I think it is also true that because we have an organization of nations, today, in the world, that it is necessary to spell certain things out in order to develop that world opinion that needs to be behind us. And if it isn't spelled out, and if a nation doesn't then specifically break a firm engagement that has been entered into, you are not so likely then to get that world opinion, which is not sophisticated in world affairs. It hasn't had the opportunity yet. But they do understand that once a country agrees to do something and breaks that agreement, it is an outlaw, and I think we have to be able to point that finger very specifically in these cases.

Mr. COFFIN. Of course, you realize that in any event that might arise under a pact with Egypt or Syria or any other country that might sign it with internal reservations, there would always be an argument as to whether they had or had not broken their agreement, but you still feel a pact would have some importance.

Mr. ROOSEVELT. I think an example of that is Nasser's seizure of the canal. He has tried to justify it, but there is no question about it that world opinion has ruled against him, that it was an actual seizure.

Mr. COFFIN. One final question: The suggestion was made yesterday to this committee that perhaps one of the first things that could be done, aside from the police force to keep the peace, is to proceed by a conference in which we would not be members and neither would Britain or France or Russia, but other nations, 5 or 6 neutral nations, would sit down with the disputants in that area and on a private basis try to develop the rock-bottom demands of each area to see whether or not agreement could ultimately be reached.

What do either of you gentlemen think of such a suggestion?

Mr. MULTER. I am for any kind of a conference that will bring these disputants together, or even in separate rooms, get them talking about grounds on which they can meet and enter into peace agreements. No matter how it starts, either by neutral nations or any other source—anything that would get it started would be good and only good could come from it.

Mr. COFFIN. Do you think that would be a practical suggestion, from your own knowledge of the Middle East?

Mr. MULTER. I know from discussions with Arab leaders that if somebody had only come along—particularly they named the United States—and said, “Look, you have to sit down and come to an understanding on these problems,” they would do it. All we had to do was give them a means of saving a little face as far as their own people are concerned. Whether it has gone too far or not, I don’t know, but I still think we must make the effort.

Mr. ROOSEVELT. Mr. Coffin, may I just add to that, any way to start getting them to sit around a table to settle their differences would certainly be acceptable but at some point if there is such great interest on the part of the United States and Russia and England and France on all those problems, I don’t see how you can exclude them on a permanent basis. At some point they have to enter into those discussions. Who starts the negotiations doesn’t make much difference. Let’s get them underway.

Mr. COFFIN. I only hope when I appear before your committees I will be as well versed as you have been in appearing before us.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman GORDON. Mr. Farbstein.

Mr. FARBSTEIN. Not alone are your statements complimentary to yourselves, gentlemen, but the fact that you have been kept here for so long a period and caused to engage in discussion in the fashion you have is evidence of what the committee thinks of the views of you gentlemen, and your opinions.

There are different phases of this resolution which seem a bit puzzling in this sense: It was said—and I don’t recall whether the Secretary of State did so—that the prime purpose of the resolution was more psychological in nature insofar as the Soviet is concerned.

Now if that is so, if all we are seeking to do is to warn Russia to stop, why do we need section 3 dealing with economic aid?

As against that, knowledgeable opinion has come before us and has said “I don’t think that we need concern ourselves about the Soviet Union making a military move or aggressing overtly in the near future, but that the main cause of tension is the existence of strife and tension between Israel and the Arab States.”

Now that would seem to negate the need for warning Russia to stay away. If the latter, that is strife between Israel and the Arab States, were the real need for a resolution, why was any reference to agreement between these groups omitted?

Mr. MULTER. Assume Israel’s destruction, tomorrow, which I hope will not happen. The trouble in Syria, the trouble in Egypt, the desires of Nasser of Egypt, the trouble in Jordan would still exist. You’ve got a bad situation that is being made worse daily by the Communists. There isn’t any doubt about it. Our State Department should have known it for at least the last 3 years. There has been infiltration and subversion in Egypt and Syria and Jordan for the last 3 years at least and they have been making headway and they are making headway in Lebanon. Now there isn’t any doubt about that and they would be doing that whether there was a State of Israel or not.

Mr. FARBSTEIN. Would you say that the prime fear we should be concerned with is the Soviet Union coming into the area, or would

you in your opinion say that it is the existence of tension and strife between Israel and the Arab States?

Mr. MULTER. Both problems exist, today, and both must be faced forthrightly.

Mr. ROOSEVELT. Mr. Farbstain, may I add to that, the proof they are tied together is Russia's antagonism to Israel. Israel is and has been one of the prime targets of the Russians. If she in any way can use this crisis to get rid of Israel, that fits in with the Russian plan. It seems to me you can't divorce them. They are all part of the same picture but not exclusively so. Anybody who says there is just one simple part to this question I think is underestimating its complexity.

Mr. FARBSTAIN. If both phases of the situation are a presently existing condition, do you feel there should be something in this or any other document or paper—call it resolution, a joint or concurrent resolution, containing a direct statement in connection with the existing Israeli-Arab situation?

To make it a bit more definite, Senator Fulbright had some language of this type:

And further under the United Nations Charter, strive toward reduction in tensions between Israel and the Arab States, the resettlement of refugees, the protection of holy places and the conclusion of treaties of peace, and until these purposes are accomplished, seek the continued intervention of the United Nations police force between Israel and Egypt.

Mr. ROOSEVELT. I believe Mr. Multer's resolution says it more simply and perhaps more understandably, in that it would pledge the United States to resist acts of aggression against any aggressor nation. I mean by any aggressor nation, against any nation in the Middle East, which would therefore include Israel. And as of today, except for the tripartite agreement about which there is some question as to whether or not it does still apply, there is no evidence that the United States is willing to stand up and be sure that Israel is included in the prohibition against aggressive action.

Mr. FARBSTAIN. I think it was yesterday that the Secretary of State said insofar as the United States is concerned, any disputes between Israel and the Arab States have got to be handled by the United Nations and we will have no part of it.

I think he said that before the Senate committee.

Mr. MULTER. It is a most unrealistic statement.

Mr. ROOSEVELT. It is almost stupid because obviously if Communist arms came into Egypt as they did and are used by any nation against Israel, why it is still Communist aggression.

Mr. FARBSTAIN. I want to take one other phase of it and then I will be through: Do you think that form rather than substance is of prime importance, here, whether it is a joint resolution, or a concurrent resolution? In other words, supposing we were to give the President the joint resolution that he asked for and incorporate within that joint resolution those amendments which we deem desirable in order to cover those problems which the Congress feels are facing this Nation?

Mr. MULTER. Mr. Farbstain, as a legislator with a tremendous amount of experience—I think you were the senior member in the New York State Assembly before coming here—you know, to get something enacted into law, you will not quarrel about form. The legal draftsman leans toward the technical form, but to get the principle over,

what difference does it make whether we call it a concurrent resolution or a joint resolution? We have the idea. Let's do it.

Mr. FARBSTEIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman GORDON. Mr. Saund.

Mr. SAUND. As I look at this resolution, and recall the inferences I have drawn from listening to the testimony so far, I see in the resolution nothing more than a notice and a declaration of policy on behalf of the Congress saying to the Communist nations that we are not going to put up with any more nonsense in the Middle East. When they divide the resolution into two parts and when the President asks for authority for armed intervention, he is asking for nothing more than he already possesses as Commander in Chief.

Let's take just one aspect of it. Do you agree with my supposition?

Mr. MULTER. I think you are absolutely correct, sir.

Mr. SAUND. Under those circumstances, if the President of the United States feels that there might be misunderstanding in the minds of the peoples of the world, and particularly the Communists, that the Congress may not be back of the President, because of what was said during the last election by different candidates, and because of the fact that while the President received an overwhelming vote of confidence, he did not succeed in getting his party elected so that they could have charge of the Congress.

Under those circumstances, why shouldn't we give that notice?

Mr. MULTER. I am in hearty agreement with giving that notice in such language as this committee will recommend and the Congress will deem appropriate and proper under the circumstances.

Mr. ROOSEVELT. If I may say it, I think earlier we both replied to a question by Mrs. Church that we feel there are changes necessary in this communication by the President and that it does not in any way mislead anybody to have proper changes made and that it is an abdication by the Congress if we fail in our responsibility to make those proper changes, providing the final result still says in essence what the President wants said to the Communist world.

Mr. SAUND. The President wants to have the limitations removed on the spending of the \$200 million. If the President believes that it is necessary right now for him to give some financial aid to the governments of those countries where there might be trouble, unemployment, or unrest because of the situation existing in the Suez Canal, why should there be so much objection to giving him that authority? Is it a fact that President Eisenhower has not been too anxious to use the Armed Forces of the United States of America in the emergencies which have arisen during his term of office? Now I am not an apologist of Mr. Dulles, at all. I think he has made many serious mistakes and maybe we would not be in this present state of emergency in the Middle East if we had some man who had more vision as Secretary of State during the past 4 years. But the President is asking for that authority. Is it not the fact that he has been very reluctant to use his authority to deploy the Armed Forces of the United States in many instances?

Mr. MULTER. I wonder, Judge, if I am to assume from your statement, that because of his reluctance to use the Armed Forces, therefore that makes out a case for removing the restrictions for the use of the money?

Mr. SAUND. No; not necessarily so.

We are bringing so many other matters into this resolution. I think the President justifies by his conduct in the last 4 years our giving him the authority he asks.

Mr. MULTER. I think it is necessary for you as a legislator to review requests of the President. It is the function of the Congress to legislate on these matters of authorizations, as to how much shall be spent and all the details thereof. The President sent his budget message to the Congress, today. Do you think if he insisted that the matter be taken care of today that the Committees on Appropriations would throw everything aside and report his bill? I don't think they would.

You ask shouldn't we rely on the President and have confidence in him and give him what he asks. I say not until he indicates that he has given us all the facts whereby you can say "I must now remove all restrictions and let him use \$200 million in any way he pleases, without restrictions."

I as one member am unwilling to do that. Not because I have no confidence in him. I want to know, as Mr. Celler said this morning, how he is going to use it, where he is going to use it, and what proper limitations, if any, he intends to impose. I think we should give him the standards that he should follow.

Mr. SAUND. Mr. Roosevelt, you have been sitting with your colleague from New York and I want to ask you this question: Do you agree with him and would you condone the action of England and France in what they did in Egypt during October?

Mr. ROOSEVELT. I have given much thought to that. My own feeling is that there is some excuse for what they did, because of the fact that I think the record will show that they were misled and that they were prevented from taking action through the United Nations which in my opinion they should have taken. I do not agree they took the right action. I think they should have taken action through the United Nations much more forcefully and that we should have supported it. However, I do agree that once having gone in, they made the ultimate mistake in not finishing the job. I do not agree they were initially justified in taking the action.

Mr. SAUND. Do you or do you not condone the action of England and France in taking the action which they took, when they did not even inform their best ally, the United States, about their intentions?

Mr. ROOSEVELT. I do not condone it, but I dispute the fact that they did not inform us. I think the record of history will show that they did inform us, that we knew about it, that every agency of our Government knew about it and that in order to cover up our own mistakes in having led them into the action, that we unfortunately sold our own allies down the river. I do not however condone their action and I think it was wrong.

Mr. SAUND. Thank you.

Chairman GORDON. Before the witnesses leave, Mr. Carnahan has a question for Mr. Roosevelt.

Mr. CARNAHAN. This question would be for both of the gentlemen.

I wanted to read something from the President's address before the joint session and then I am going to ask your opinion of what he was saying in this language. I read now from the President's address:

If, contrary to my hope and expectation, a situation arose which called for the military application of a policy which I asked the Congress to join me in proclaiming, I would, of course, maintain hour-by-hour contact with the Con-

gress if it were in session and if the Congress were not in session and if the situation had grave implications, I would, of course, at once call the Congress into special session.

I am wondering if the President is saying that he means he will use his constitutional powers and meet aggression in the Middle East if we pass House Joint Resolution 117, or is he saying that even though we pass the resolution, he will seek even further sanctions from the Congress before using his Executive powers.

Mr. MULTER. I don't think either of us has a right to talk for the President and indicate what he meant by that statement.

Mr. CARNAHAN. What would you interpret that to mean?

Mr. MULTER. May I call it oratorical rhetoric. That is my humble opinion.

Mr. CARNAHAN. Mr. Roosevelt, would you care to comment?

Mr. ROOSEVELT. As I pointed out in my previous statement to the committee, I interpret what the President said as indicating that he would still need congressional action in order to carry out powers which are vested in him as President; that he would call us back and that he would try to make us feel that we were always in on the picture at all stages, even after he had exercised the powers which he wants us to join with him in reaffirming, here.

I think it was a very clear piece of politics to make us all feel that "don't worry, fellows, I am not forgetting about you, just because I am asking for your cooperation, now, I will continue to ask it later," and I think it was quite effective.

Mr. CARNAHAN. That is all, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman GORDON. Thank you, Mr. Multer and Mr. Roosevelt.

Mr. SELDEN. May I make just one observation?

Chairman GORDON. Yes.

Mr. SELDEN. On page 4 of your statement, Mr. Roosevelt, you refer to economic aid, and state that we had been asked as an emergency proposition to grant a blank check beyond the 30th of June.

Just for clarification I would like to point out that in this resolution as presented to us, it does not go beyond the 30th of June, it merely authorizes the administration to reshuffle what has already been appropriated up to \$200 million.

I asked specifically the question whether or not this authorization would go beyond the 30th of June and neither Secretary Dulles nor Mr. Hollister could give me an answer on it.

Mr. Hollister said he did not think that the authorization would extend beyond the 30th of June but he would make that information available for the committee before we actually considered the resolution.

Mr. ROOSEVELT. I would be most interested in his answer because I think that the impression is that it is \$400 million to be taken away from what the Congress previously authorized and directed in a certain direction and now they want to do it any way they please. \$200 million in each of 2 fiscal years, as I understand it.

Mr. SELDEN. Only \$200 million is affected by this resolution—Mr. Hollister stated specifically that any additional funds would be asked for in the mutual security bill. I thought you would be interested in that information since you touched on it in your testimony.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman GORDON. Thank you, gentlemen.

Mr. MULTER. Thank you for the privilege of being here.

Mr. ROOSEVELT. I thank you, too, very much.

Chairman GORDON. Our next witness is Mr. Kenneth M. Birkhead, American Veterans Committee.

STATEMENT OF KENNETH M. BIRKHEAD, AMERICAN VETERANS COMMITTEE

Mr. BIRKHEAD. Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, it is imperative that the United States act quickly in facing the danger of Communist inroads in the Middle East.

It is equally imperative that we comprehend the political upheavals which are taking place in the nations of the Middle East and the interplay of these with the desires of the Soviet Union to secure a dominant hold in that area.

Today, the Middle East is the world's greatest danger spot—capable of erupting into world war III unless we take definite, positive, and forceful action.

This is not to minimize the depravity of the Communists in Hungary, Poland, and the other satellites. It is not to disregard the critical problems in reuniting Germany. Communist domination of large areas of Asia are also of vital concern. We must make sure that in focusing attention on the Middle East, we do not forget or lead the nations of the world to believe we have forgotten these other problems.

Nonetheless, the immediacy of the crisis in the Middle East calls for us to devote our immediate attention in that area.

The President in his five-point proposal to Congress is facing up to the crisis in that area.

His recommendations merit the most serious consideration by the Congress. Partisan political desires must be set aside as Congress debates and makes its decision in response to the President's recommendation. The verdict of the Congress should carry neither a Republican or Democratic label. This is the time for true bipartisanship.

Under the Constitution, the President has the duty of making foreign policy and it is the duty of the Congress to enact the legislation to enable the President to carry out his policy. Nonetheless, in enacting the legislation to put the President's Middle East recommendations into force, the Congress must consider all the facts surrounding the crisis. Action without considering these factors may be little better than no action at all.

It is a principle of law that when one includes one thing only, all others are excluded. By emphasizing the United States concern with Soviet armed aggression in the Middle East, Congress must consider whether we are encouraging the belief that we will not interfere in other kinds of situations which could be more destructive to the interest of the West than the fear of Soviet armies on the march.

There is abundant evidence to indicate that Soviet domination of Middle Eastern nations may come about without the use of any force and that nations which may appear on the surface to be without Soviet domination are actually under the thumb of Communist dictators. The President's proposals set forth no definition of what constitutes a "nation controlled by international communism."

Congress should consider whether "nations controlled by international communism" should not be clearly defined.

In this same proposal the President suggests the "employment of the Armed Forces of the United States" in behalf of the Middle East nations. Nowhere does he delineate the meaning of the "use of the Armed Forces." It is fair to ask whether this would include the use of nuclear weapons? If it does, is Congress ready to grant the use of nuclear warfare in the nebulous manner in which the President's proposals are set forth?

The President's recommendations deal with "the general area of the Middle East." The boundaries of the "Middle East" are not set forth and information available to the public indicates that in a question directed to the Secretary of State on this point, he declared that he would rather give these boundaries in "executive session."

It seems to us that this is a dangerous position to take since it will leave great uncertainty as to those areas we consider to be within our realm of interest and may lead the Communists to believe that they can attack in certain areas without any opposition by our Government.

There was considerable debate a few years ago about whether American interests extended to Korea. The charges were made that Russian aggression occurred in Korea because it had not been clearly defined as falling within the American defense perimeter. There are inherent in the President's proposals similar possibilities.

Congress should consider clearly defining the area to be governed by the Eisenhower proposals.

The President has asked for authorization to use funds available under the mutual security program and has requested additional funds in future budgets to be used in the Middle East. The rapidly developing conditions in that area call for some latitude in the use of any funds which are available.

However, Congress must consider whether this blank check for funds is fully justified. Undoubtedly, the American withdrawal of funds for building the Aswan Dam did much to precipitate Nasser's move to close the Suez Canal. The question naturally arises whether Congress, in endorsing a blank check, might not be giving its implied approval to other such actions in the future.

There is much that could be done in the Middle East with the proper distribution of economic aid. Through the technical assistance program, the backward areas of the Arab nations could be materially aided in improving their standards of living. This can be vital in securing the deep friendship of these people. Properly handled, this program can offset the inroads made by the Communists who are active in the area.

American funds could be used in financing U. N. action in the resettlement of the Arab refugees now in the Gaza strip.

The clearing of the Suez Canal will be an expensive undertaking. The use of American funds in this work would have a beneficial response from all of the peoples in the Middle East as well as the peoples of much of the world to whom the Suez Canal means a vital lifeline in moving goods. Any American action in helping to reopen the Suez Canal should be predicated on making the Suez Canal a free passageway for use by all of the nations and not for a selected few.

President Eisenhower's recommendations deal with an immediate problem. They do not deal with those facts which continue to cause the problem. There is no recognition in his proposals of the strong flow of Arab nationalism. It is naturally difficult for us to place our-

selves in the position of citizens in the Arab States whose leaders are arousing them to seek a "place in the sun."

This particular problem needs full and comprehensive study by the Congress to determine the true nature of the feelings of the people of the Arab States which will lead them to join in mob action, and even to being parties to support of the aspirations of the Communists in the area. The understanding of the true nature of so-called Arab nationalism is vital in making a realistic and adequate decision on the Middle East.

The President's recommendations fail to face up to the present dangers faced by our only continuing friend in the Middle East—Israel. The Secretary of State, in answers to questions raised before this committee at a recent session, appeared to minimize the aid which the President's proposal might provide for Israel. The denial of the Suez Canal to Israel shipping has been an overwhelming burden to that young nation throughout its existence.

The threat to Israel of the Gaza Strip continues to be of vital concern. Israel is completely surrounded by unfriendly nations. Only recently, Egypt, Syria, Yemen, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia have entered into military pacts which can only be considered as directed against Israel.

Despite the armistice agreement between Egypt and Israel, the Egyptian foreign minister has told the Security Council of the United Nations—

The Egyptian-Israeli general armistice agreement will not be interpreted by us as terminating in any legal or any technical sense the state of war between Egypt and Israel.

Egypt is carrying on a campaign of terror against British, French, and Jews. These unfortunate people are being uprooted from their homes, and their businesses are being confiscated. A lifetime of labor is being snuffed out in one fell swoop by the Nasser government. They are being deported from the country with little else than the clothing on their backs.

The President, in his message to the Congress setting forth his Middle East recommendations, stated that there were these "other problems of the Middle East." He said that these problems which were being dealt with by the United Nations and the United States would support the U. N. actions.

The Congress must consider whether it can endorse United States action in the Middle East along the lines recommended by the President and disregard these other problems. What will be the reception of the United States program in the Middle East when these other problems are apparently shunted off to debate in the U. N.? This is a very serious question which cannot be avoided by the Congress in enacting the legislation requested by the President.

Another factor which must be realistically weighed is the possibility that the President's proposals may mislead some, and be distorted by others, into a belief that we see little chance of peace in the Middle East and are preparing for open conflict as the means of settling the Middle East problems.

Congress should, in endorsing the President's program, make abundantly clear that it does believe peace is possible in the Middle East, and its endorsement of the Eisenhower recommendations does not in

any manner rule out continued and redoubled efforts to achieve a peace.

Last spring, the American Veterans Committee, as an American affiliate of the World Veterans Federation, met in general assembly in Brussels, Belgium, with the representatives from veterans' organizations throughout the world. Included in this assembly were the representatives of the leading veterans' organizations of Egypt and Israel.

These delegates from these opposing nations joined in supporting a resolution calling for keeping the door open for possible settlement of the difficulties which exist there.

There was no discouragement on the part of these representatives of the veterans of these two nations over the possibility of securing a peaceful settlement of their dispute. If this view exists among the veterans of these nations, it seems to us it would be well for Congress and our Government to consider building on this favorable view.

The United States does not take this new step in the Middle East with completely clean hands. We have sometimes appeared to be the sole champion of a status quo which would mean nothing but a continuation and even worsening of the Middle East dilemma.

At other times we have appeared as the friend of those nations which have broadcast their anti-American feelings and have been the tools of Communist infiltration in the area. Appeasement of these nations has won us little. In fact, it appears that these nations have moved closer to international communism.

We have denied our friend, Israel, arms, refused her a mutual-security pact, and left her surrounded by enemies. When she has attempted to protect herself she has too often found our Nation facing the other direction. We often seem to fail to realize that the nation of Israel is here to stay.

No one will say that a simple answer is possible in the Middle East. No one will say that United States action alone can solve the problems existing there.

All forces must be brought to bear—the U. N., friendly nations who have a stake in peace in the Middle East; and world leaders, who may be able to command a hearing from those who are at war in the Middle East, must move and move quickly.

Our organization recently addressed an open letter to Prime Minister Nehru, of India, through the columns of the New York Times, urging that he use his influence to help the Middle East choose peace, as one means of trying to arouse a leader in the Asian-Arab area to work for peace.

In this message for which we bought space in the Times we said:

You, Mr. Prime Minister, advocate peace in principle. Why not peace in practice—in the Middle East?

We pointed out that Americans had been disturbed by India's role in the Middle East, and particularly by its opposition to U. N. proposals seeking direct peace discussions between the Arab States and Israel. We urged the Prime Minister to reverse his position and help the Middle East choose peace.

The complex nature of the Middle East crisis must not deter us from failing to take action. If President Eisenhower has proposed a major project with minor ideas then Congress must rectify this situation. It

is our considered opinion that it cannot ignore the factors which we have tried to set forth in our testimony.

May I again emphasize our strong feeling at this time that partisan political desires must be set aside, that the verdict which the Congress comes up with would carry neither a Republican nor a Democratic label, that this is the time when bipartisanship should be important.

One thing that we hope the Congress will make clear in its decision on the President's recommendations is that we are not excluding from our consideration the possibility of peace in the Middle East, that in taking this position and in endorsing the President's recommendations we are not letting the world think that the only possible solution is the use of arms in that area.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. HAYS of Ohio. Mr. Chairman, how long are we to sit tonight, and are we to be precluded from asking these people any questions?

Mr. BIRKHEAD. I would be perfectly willing to answer questions, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. HAYS of Ohio. I had a question I would like to ask him in relation to the very brief statement. My question is this: You talked about true bipartisanship, and I suppose nobody can find any fault with that, but do you intend to rule out at this time any searching inquiry into how we got into this situation, so that we might profit by the mistakes of the past and not make them over again in the future?

Mr. BIRKHEAD. I would not rule that out. In our statement we say we feel there are many other considerations of concern in the Middle East, and that the Congress should consider very carefully these various other problems.

Whether the President's recommendations actually get into such matters as subversion in the Middle East, whether they deal properly with some of the causes of the crisis in the Middle East, we wouldn't rule these out.

I think our concern has been that we have seen in some of the newspaper stories about a Democratic proposal or a Republican proposal. We think there should be no question in the minds of the people that this is a proposal endorsed by the whole Congress, by as much of the country as possible, and not a partisan, political decision.

Mr. HAYS of Ohio. That leads me to another question, then: Do you think it is bipartisanship when we are not advised of any of the things that the State Department does, and then in fact we are told up until a few short weeks ago that everything was wonderful and now we are told that it is in a terrible situation and, "Boys, just give us the money and trust us and we will do the right thing"?

There seems to me to be a good deal of doubt on the part of the Members of Congress as to whether or not we should give this sum of money without finding out what is going to be done with it.

I am sorry we haven't had the benefit of your statement before, and I can't question intelligently on the contents of it because I haven't read it, but what do you think about that?

Mr. BIRKHEAD. I think there is not only that concern on the part of the Members of Congress; I think that concern would also be on the part of the people of the country. We have suddenly found out

that the situation in the Middle East is serious, when it wasn't too long ago that I remember stories that things seemed to look better in the Middle East.

Our statement and our feelings are that we have made mistakes, and maybe we have not been fully informed. I do not want to leave the wrong implications in my statement, if that implication is there.

Mr. HAYS of Ohio. You wouldn't consider it a violation of bipartisanship to ask for detailed information about what they expect to do with this money, would you?

Mr. BIRKHEAD. I think that would be the appropriate way of doing it. I think it should be explored as to what uses will be made of this money.

Chairman GORDON. Mr. Carnahan.

Mr. CARNAHAN. I have just glanced through the first part of your statement, and you say today the Middle East is the greatest danger spot, capable of erupting into world war III unless we take definite and forceful action.

Do you believe some action is necessary on the part of Congress toward taking such definite and positive and forceful action?

Mr. BIRKHEAD. I feel the President probably has the authority to take action in that area. As to exactly the extent of his authority, I don't feel capable myself to say, but I think it would be of immeasurable value in trying to achieve peace in that area to show that the Congress was cognizant of this problem in supporting the President as they thought they could support him, to what extent they felt they could support him.

Mr. CARNAHAN. That is all.

Chairman GORDON. Mr. Fascell.

Mr. FASCELL. I have just one question, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Birkhead, you stated in your statement—

Nonetheless the immediacy of the crisis in the Middle East calls for us to devote our immediate attention in that area.

But you don't say anywhere in your statement what the crisis is.

Mr. BIRKHEAD. I think we tried to detail the critical situation.

Mr. FASCELL. What is it?

Mr. BIRKHEAD. I think Soviet moves in the Middle East, the continuing Israeli-Arab difficulties, and these other problems are of such a nature that they could bring on a war, the kind of war that could spread.

We had only recently the moves of England and France in that area. Their feeling was strong enough that they felt they should move in with their armed forces.

Mr. FASCELL. Is it your understanding that the emphasis is on the Communist move or other difficulties in the area itself?

Mr. BIRKHEAD. I feel that the two of them interplay. The Communists are taking advantage of an area which is in turmoil, brought about by the differences between the Israeli and Arab peoples.

Mr. FASCELL. You say that they are or they might?

Mr. BIRKHEAD. I think that they are.

Mr. FASCELL. That is all I have.

Chairman GORDON. Mr. Fulton.

Mr. FULTON. May I refer you to the last paragraph of your statement. You say—

The complex nature of the Middle East crisis must not deter us from failing to take action. If President Eisenhower has proposed a major project with minor ideas then Congress must rectify this situation.

What are the ideas of the American Veterans Committee which are major ideas?

Mr. BIRKHEAD. I think the concern, Mr. Fulton, is that there have been reports that maybe the situation is not as serious in the Middle East as the President expressed it in his speech, and possibly his proposals do not deal with all of the problems which are faced in that area, and maybe it should be expanded to deal with some of these other problems.

In other words, he has made a major proposal, but it doesn't go far enough.

Mr. FULTON. Would you expand this resolution to include \$100 million for Hungarian refugees, to help Austria out, and likewise expand the resolution to take care of refugees that are in this Egypt-Israeli area that were brought about by the disturbances there?

Mr. BIRKHEAD. I don't think we can disregard the needs of the Hungarian refugees, nor of the refugees in Egypt. Whether this particular action should be expanded to include Hungary and the plight of the Hungarian refugees I think is a question Congress would have to decide, but I certainly think that Congress should take some action.

Mr. FULTON. We are trying to get some direction on policy, and this particular vehicle, House Joint Resolution 117, is the quickest way to get action for refugees.

Within the next few days the borders of Austria may be shut to Hungarian refugees. The committee for European migration is running out of funds. Their secretary announced January 15 that they could not further bear the expense as there are no funds.

Don't you think this might be a good policy, to insert such an authorization in this particular resolution?

Mr. BIRKHEAD. If it is the only way it can be done in time to take care of the problems there, yes. I would hate to see Congress forced to vote upon a resolution which combined the problems of Hungary with the problems of the Middle East. There might be some desire in some cases to oppose the particular recommendations that were made in connection with the Middle East and at the same time a desire to help the Hungarian refugees face the problems that they have.

Mr. FULTON. The "Middle East" to me is an indefinite term and, as you know, Webster's Geographical Dictionary doesn't even attempt to define it. Webster says that it is a term previously used by the British and has no official United States State Department sanction. Anybody can define the Middle East and be right.

I define the area as Mid-East and would define the area generally as everything on the Mediterranean east of Gibraltar, and carry the area clear to India and Pakistan.

The British have used the term "Middle East" to include everything west of Singapore to Suez. When you personally used Middle East, you were assuming through your statement to limit it, I would say, from your remarks, merely to what has been known previously as the Levant or the Near East, or Asia Minor as we used to know it in the old geography books.

Mr. BIRKHEAD. I didn't realize it might cover such a large area, and I didn't realize there was a possibility that the President's pro-

posals that he made in his special message to Congress in the resolution would go so far as to cover Hungary.

Mr. FULTON. India would pretty clearly be included. Likewise Pakistan would be included, and that includes the northern part.

Mr. HAYS of Ohio. You say India is included in the Middle East?

Mr. FULTON. Yes.

Mr. HAYS of Ohio. I will dispute that. I don't think anybody ever intended that. I never heard of it being included in the Middle East.

Mr. FULTON. I asked that the area be worked out publicly, and our chairman ruled it should be done in executive session.

Mr. HAYS of Ohio. Mr. Dulles defined it over on the Senate side in public session and he didn't include India, as I understand it.

Will you yield to me for a question?

What is the difference between Middle East and your definition of Mid-East? Is it just a change of terminology for the same area or do you have a different area?

Mr. FULTON. That is a good question. The Middle East was an old British term that was one that extended from Egypt to Singapore. That was the British use of the term. Our State Department historically avoided the use of the term because it had no official sanction with us. We have a term in America called the Midwest which we have developed from American usage. I have suggested in a statement which you have now before you that we develop a new term which has an American connotation rather than a British, or a British policy connotation, and call it the Mid-East.

Mr. HAYS of Ohio. I understand that, but what does your new term of Mid-East encompass?

Mr. FULTON. I would take the eastern Mediterranean area as a beginning and move the area as far east as the administration felt that this particular trouble involved, so that if it went as far as Pakistan and India, it would be by administration action to determine.

As you know, under the terminology in our State Department, or in our usage, Middle East is not determined.

I had asked whether Middle East went down into Africa and how far it went.

Chairman GORDON. Mr. Fulton, may I interrupt. We can talk that point over when we are in executive session. We have two witnesses here and time is getting late.

Mr. HAYS of Ohio. Mr. Chairman, I don't want to make this a formal motion, but these two witnesses who are about to appear are people I have heard a great many members say they would like to hear and question them.

Mr. FULTON. Mr. Chairman, may I yield to Mr. Fascell, if I have the time.

Chairman GORDON. It is not our fault if the members didn't stay here.

Mr. HAYS of Ohio. It is not customary for a committee to sit after 5 o'clock.

Chairman GORDON. The questions that are coming up here do not concern the witness. We can straighten those questions out in the committee.

Mr. HAYS of Ohio. All right; I am willing to defer that, but I would like to have these witnesses come back at a more convenient time.

I have some other commitments and some other things to do.

Chairman GORDON. We have a schedule of witnesses and I wouldn't want to change that any more than we have already.

Mr. FULTON. May I yield to Mr. Fascell?

Mr. FASCELL. I was just going to say, Mr. Fulton, since the President uses the phrase "Middle East" in the resolution, and it confuses everybody, why don't we all adopt our own definition of what the Middle East is and then we will really confuse the enemy.

Mr. FULTON. Everybody here seems to have a different idea of what it is, and nobody is allowed to say what it is because we have been told it must go into executive session, every time we go to discuss it as members of the Foreign Affairs Committee.

I say, rather than adopt a British term, let's adopt a new American term and have our own meaning of it.

Mr. FASCELL. I am with you.

Mr. HAYS of Ohio. A parliamentary inquiry. If this is going to be defined in executive session, and then we go to the floor and define it as so-and-so in the debate, do I go to jail or not?

Chairman GORDON. This matter will be covered in the report and no classified information will be revealed.

Mr. HAYS of Ohio. I was going to do it and take the chance of going to jail.

Chairman GORDON. The next witness is Rabbi Philip S. Bernstein. Please take the stand.

STATEMENT OF RABBI PHILIP S. BERNSTEIN, CHAIRMAN OF THE AMERICAN ZIONIST COMMITTEE FOR PUBLIC AFFAIRS

Rabbi BERNSTEIN. Mr. Chairman, this statement on President Eisenhower's proposals concerning the Middle East will reflect, I trust, the concern of many Americans, Jews and non-Jews, for peace in that troubled area, for the preservation of the State of Israel and for the defense of freedom.

Recent developments demonstrated that peace is indivisible and that the fate of the whole civilized world was bound up with the disposition of a small body of water in that area: The fate of the Jews also seems to be indivisible. Israel not only solved the problems of the survivors of the Nazi holocaust, but seems today to be the indispensable answer to similar problems of Jews fleeing in fear and desperation from Egypt, from Hungary, from Poland.

The survival of Israel then is not only a major issue of moral significance to the free world but continues to be the answer to an urgent humanitarian need as well.

Today I speak as chairman of the American Zionist Committee for Public Affairs. This committee conducts public action bearing upon relations with governmental authorities, with a view to maintaining and improving friendship and good will between the United States and Israel.

We welcome the new Eisenhower doctrine for the Middle East.

We have maintained that lack of clarity as to the firmness of our intentions and the absence of commitments to implement our intentions were responsible for many of the problems of the region. They were conducive to infiltration by communism, to continued war-mongering by Nasser and other Arab leaders, and to Israel's sense of isolation.

Accordingly, while we regard the President's proposals to strengthen and defend the Middle East as an important step, we ask whether they go far enough, whether they come to grips with the basic conflicts in the region which make it so vulnerable to the Communists. I do not see in the President's proposal any contribution to the resolution of the Arab-Israel conflict.

I do not see in it an adequate answer to the problems of subversion, and continued arms shipments. I do not find the promises of economic aid clearly enough spelled out. I do not see the encouragement of the emerging democratic forces in an area largely dominated by feudalism.

The administration has made it quite clear that the critical internal problems will be dealt with by the United Nations, but if that is to be the case, we believe that there should be a clear declaration outlining the policies we shall follow in that body, and that the administration and Congress might write a firm and vigorous statement of principles dealing with such critical issues as the continued Arab war against Israel, the sea blockades at Suez and Aqaba, the continued homelessness of Arab refugees, the dangers of an arms race growing out of the arms competition between East and West in the region.

Failure to do so in our judgment could aggravate the dangers we are seeking to counter, for our silence may be misinterpreted as continued acquiescence in the Arab war against Israel, as resignation for the intolerable conditions which have prevailed in the past.

Testimony by the Secretary of State has indicated that the doctrine does not apply in the event of a renewal of intraregional conflict. The doctrine is meant basically to refer to external Communist aggression.

It would not come into play even if Egypt and Syria attacked Israel with the weapons they have secured from Communist sources. What then has become of our previous commitments such as the tripartite declaration of 1950?

The President, while asking for authority to employ our forces to resist external Communist attack, is not also asking for authority to use United States forces to back up previous assurances and undertakings which we believed to have been guaranties for Israel. Thus we fear that Israel's position may become even more isolated and precarious than ever before.

Take the question of arms. We have always believed that this area has needed economic aid far more than military aid. We objected in 1954, as did many Members of Congress, when our Government started shipping arms to Iraq. After we shipped arms to Iraq the Communists began sending them to Egypt and now Syria.

Under this doctrine, we will undoubtedly send additional arms to Iraq and offer them to Saudi Arabia and other Arab countries. The Communists would be challenged to step up their shipments to Egypt and Syria, but the Secretary of State tells us that we will not send arms to Israel because the United States is opposed to an arms race.

Iraq and Saudi Arabia are publicly, continuously committed to the destruction of Israel. So are Egypt and Syria. The Soviet Union has threatened Israel with ugly belligerency. Nasser has displayed not the slightest evidence of conciliation. In our judgment, the danger of a new outbreak of hostilities will grow. The new doctrine, bent

on stopping aggression from without, leaves this crucial problem much where it was, and since total peace in the area is impossible without peace between the Arabs and Israel, no basic contribution to permanent solutions is being made.

This is equally true with regard to security guaranties. The President's proposals seem to provide an alternative to the Baghdad Pact. While we do not join it, we are virtually guaranteeing it in a manner designed to make our position more palatable to the so-called neutralist sentiment in the area.

But although we have committed ourselves to security treaties with 42 nations, we have steadfastly refused to negotiate such a treaty with Israel. On the contrary, we reaffirm our past position. Such a security treaty must await an Arab-Israel agreement on borders and on other issues. Thus it is blocked by an inherent Arab veto.

Once again we are strengthening Arab States committed to the destruction of Israel and leaving the Israeli leadership and people with the troubled feeling that they stand alone, that their fate is in their own hands. This is not the way to peace.

One cannot separate moral factors from political in these issues.

Israel wants peace with the Arabs; the Arabs want to destroy Israel. Is there moral justification for giving arms aid and the protection of American troops to those who desire war and denying them to those who seek peace?

Can we have faith that those to whom we would give arms and economic aid to deter Communist aggression will not use these resources for aggression against Israel? Certainly there is nothing in their record to justify such faith.

We should set up tests to qualify for aid. These should include a readiness for peace in the area. If the Arab leaders will reply that they will not accept our aid under such terms it will mean in effect that we couldn't count on them anyway. But I am convinced that they could be induced to accept such terms. The lesson of Hungary has not been lost on them. The disassociation of the United States with colonialism is clearly understood by them.

Another crucial test is free and equal passage of all shipping through the Suez Canal. No aid of any kind should be given to Nasser unless he is prepared to make such a clearcut commitment grounded in international law, with international machinery to enforce it.

There should be a similar guaranty covering free passage through the Gulf of Aqaba. The United States, through the United Nations, should not permit Nasser to remount Communist weapons at Sharm el Sheikh, commanding that outlet to the seas of the world, and allowing him to tighten his monopolistic grip of Europe's lifeline.

I do not find in the current Middle East policy the necessary qualitative distinctions. There is apparently a readiness to shore up any kind of feudalism or dictatorship and an equal readiness to ignore democratic patterns and commitments.

The President has invited to the United States the King of Saudi Arabia, an arbitrary feudal monarch of a backward country in which slavery still exists.

This is the ruler who was ready to sacrifice 10 million Arabs to destroy Israel and who inquires into the religion of American soldiers so that he may bar the entry of Jews to the American base we lease at Dhahran.

But there has been little evident disposition to show the necessary concern for Israel's survival. Economic aid remains frozen; arms aid is declared out; a security treaty is subject to an Arab veto; the doctrine does not meet the continuing Arab threat to Israel's survival.

Israel may be compelled, by U. N. pressure, to withdraw from the last strip of Sinai and from Gaza, reopening those areas again to Nasser's raiders, and the resumption of his sea blockades.

Nor, in my opinion, are we utilizing economic aid in such a way as to make for peace. Hostile Arab States should not be allowed to veto such a program as the Johnston plan which is obviously good for all the countries of the area.

The aid should be proffered to those who are prepared to commit themselves to a peaceful solution of the area's problems and should be given them without delay despite the resistance of the belligerents.

If the situation requires Congress to take emergency action to push economic development, it seems incongruous to permit the Syrian Government to keep blocking, month after month, year after year, an undertaking like the Johnston plan, so vital to the economy of Israel and Jordan, and so helpful in the solution of the Arab refugee problem.

Specifically, therefore, I recommend that we—

1. Insist upon direct Arab-Israel negotiations as the best and only method of securing a dependable peace.
2. Recognize the danger of Nasser, cease to appease him, and act realistically toward him by not letting him resume his previous positions and acts of hostility.
3. Offer security guaranties to any nations in the area that are ready to commit themselves to the West and to peace.
4. Give arms aid only on the basis of such commitments and attempt concerted action that will ban all arms shipments by all the powers to all nations in this region.
5. Begin without delay economic aid to those Mid-East nations that desire it for peaceful purposes. Use the economic-aid program to stimulate Arab refugee resettlement.
6. Take strong international action to stop and prevent sea blockades of international shipping.
7. Strengthen the democratic nations both of Western Europe and the Middle East and be wary of providing artificial strength for crumbling feudalisms and desperate dictators.

We realize that you are not legislating a program for the Middle East. You are considering a specific proposal by the President who seeks support for the implementation of a broad and necessary purpose.

But, in our judgment, it is time that we adopted an overall Near East policy—a statement of principles that would guide and govern our diplomacy, our military dispositions, our economic aid, our program in the United Nations.

It is, of course, up to you to determine whether this is best done by the adoption of a parallel and supplementary resolution, by amendments to the pending legislation, or by declarations by the appropriate congressional committees.

Chairman GORDON. Thank you very much, Rabbi Bernstein. We will now start the 5-minute question period. Mr. Carnahan.

Mr. CARNAHAN. Mr. Chairman. Rabbi, I appreciate your seven specific recommendations. I have just one brief question regarding No. 4. You say—

Give arms aid only on the basis of such commitments and attempt concerted action that will ban all arms shipments by and to all powers in this region.

What do you have in mind by "concerted action"?

Rabbi BERNSTEIN. I would approve a program to ban all arms shipments to the area. In other words, I would have our Government use its outstanding influence in the United Nations toward reaching an agreement to ban all arms to that area.

Mr. CARNAHAN. Do you feel that the U. N. would be in a position to be effective in attempting to ban arms shipments to the area?

Rabbi BERNSTEIN. I do not know whether it will be completely effective. That is beyond my present knowledge.

In my judgment, it has not been tried as yet, and I would feel that with the tremendous prestige possessed by our Government, there is some chance of success.

Mr. CARNAHAN. You feel that our Government should lend its support to the U. N. in such an attempt?

Rabbi BERNSTEIN. I do. But short of the success of that attempt, it is our recommendation that arms aid be given to countries that are concerned with peace and not with war.

Mr. CARNAHAN. That is all, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman GORDON. Mr. Fulton.

Mr. FULTON. I wish to compliment you on your statement, as I feel it is a considered statement and covers many of the problems we have been dealing with. Likewise, it does have many specific recommendations which we members are always glad to have on this House Foreign Affairs Committee.

May I refer to page 3 of your statement and your specific recommendation No. 1 where it says—

Insist upon direct Arab-Israel negotiations as the best and only method of securing a dependable peace.

I have from time to time suggested that the President might be asked to call a conference of the nations of this area to discuss the problems at a round table. I believe that it can be done under United States auspices, that is, to get these various nations and their representatives together at a time and a place at least to do some talking about regional economic development.

Do you think that would help? It seems to me that is along the lines of your paragraph 1.

Rabbi BERNSTEIN. In my opinion there is no problem between Israel and the Arabs that is not soluble at a table for peace negotiation. Whether it is refugees or boundaries, in my opinion there is no insoluble problem between them.

The question is the will for peace on the part of the Arab States. Until this point they have been committed to a program for the destruction of Israel. They aren't ready to sit down at a peace table.

If they will be ready to sit at a peace table, then the problems can be resolved and peace can ultimately be achieved.

In my opinion, the United States has not thus far taken as vigorous and firm and clearly committed a position on these matters as it might

have. I think there has been too much appeasing of Arab leadership, too much appeasing in the past of Colonel Nasser.

Mr. FULTON. May I comment right there?

Rabbi BERNSTEIN. Certainly.

Mr. FULTON. Suppose we had something like a recommendation from this committee in the form of an economic regional development plan that we would like to have these nations sit down and discuss! Mrs. Bolton of Ohio and I and other members have had bills for a regional development of the Mediterranean area, in previous Congresses. Do you think that might be something for their own self-interest that might possibly have a better chance of success, rather than just speaking of peace?

Rabbi BERNSTEIN. In my judgment the problem in the Middle East is very stubborn and difficult and complicated, and nobody has an easy or a sure answer.

I think the way to a solution of the problem lies in utilizing the tremendous prestige which our Government has, in utilizing the economic assistance that may be available, toward getting the powers in the area around a table to discuss their common problems, making clear to them in a friendly but a firm way that we will not give support, economic or military, to nations who continue to be belligerent but that we are prepared to give very substantial economic aid to the area, as you suggest, if they are ready to come to terms.

Mr. FULTON. That is the point I am making and it is along the lines you are thinking.

May I compliment you, too, about using your suggestion of an economic aid program to stimulate Arab refugee resettlement. That is one of the problems I feel we should specifically provide for in the resolution.

My recommendation is for \$20 million more funds for the new and the old refugees in this particular area, the Arab-Israeli area.

We in this committee are taking cognizance of that current refugee problem and I hope we are going to help these nations implement a solution.

Likewise, I believe in this economic aid we should see that the areas that can be used for the resettlement of the refugees should get particular help: water, irrigation, homes and assistance of that type.

I want to compliment you, too, because rather unusually you have used in your statement the term "Mideast." I noted that especially in your paragraph No. 5. It is rather an American term that rather springs up without anybody thinking about it.

My recommendation, then, is not mine alone. I am grateful for your own organization recommending it.

Would you object to this resolution being broadened to include \$100 million as emergency action for Austria and the Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration, to keep the borders of Austria open to the Hungarian escapees, and likewise help resettle them just the way we want to resettle the Arab refugees?

Rabbi BERNSTEIN. Although I am obviously in favor of doing everything we can to help the Hungarian refugees fleeing into Austria, I am not sufficiently familiar with all the details of the problem to know whether the two of them should be related in this one particular resolution.

Mr. FULTON. If we are going to proceed by an ordinary bill, we would have to have the authorization first passed and then have an appropriation bill. That would take a long time.

If we merely set aside funds already authorized and appropriated under foreign aid funds for the current fiscal year, we could do it quickly under this resolution.

Rabbi BERNSTEIN. You are discussing technical matters with which I am not entirely familiar. However, I have two opinions. No. 1 is that we should help. We should find a way to help Hungarian refugees. There is no question about that. No. 2 is we should have all the funds necessary to do a real job in the Mideast.

Mr. FULTON. Thank you.

Chairman GORDON. Mr. Hays of Ohio.

Mr. HAYS of Ohio. I have a suggestion for Mr. Fulton. The way he is enlarging geographical boundaries in the Mideast, he has brought the Mediterranean in and now Hungary, why don't you just define it as everything outside of the Western Hemisphere. That would completely confuse everybody. I think it would even be better because then we would know generally what we are talking about.

Mr. FULTON. With all due deference and with no humor at all, would you tell me what you define the "Middle East" to be?

Mr. HAYS of Ohio. We used the term when I was in school "The Near East," and we generally considered it to be the area of the nations that are now the Baghdad Pact nations, Egypt and the nations that lie between Egypt and the Baghdad Pact areas and that is all.

Mr. FULTON. Would you exclude—

Mr. HAYS of Ohio. I would exclude anything. I am telling you what the geographical definition, as I understand it, is. I am not trying to be funny or anything else, but I think we ought to have some kind of a boundary.

Mr. FULTON. You would then exclude Yemen, Aden, the sheikdoms—

Mr. HAYS of Ohio. They are a part of the Arabian peninsula. They were generally always included in my definition.

I never thought of Pakistan and India as being part of it, nor did I think of Gibraltar as being part of it.

Well, we can discuss that more. I have a couple of questions I would like to ask the rabbi.

First, are you familiar with Colonel Nasser's book?

Rabbi BERNSTEIN. Yes.

Mr. HAYS of Ohio. I don't think it is an original description but I have called it a kind of nasty, little vest pocket edition of Mein Kampf. Do you agree with that?

Rabbi BERNSTEIN. I think that is a reasonably correct definition.

Mr. HAYS of Ohio. In view of Colonel Nasser's announced objective in that book, do you think that anything we did to strengthen him would unavoidably help him toward achieving his goals?

Rabbi BERNSTEIN. I think it would be a great mistake, morally and otherwise, to do anything to strength Colonel Nasser. In my judgment he is a mid-middle-Near East version of Hitler. He is seeking domination over the whole area between India and North Africa as far as the Atlantic.

Mr. HAYS of Ohio. That is not only your opinion, but he says that in his book; doesn't he?

Rabbi BERNSTEIN. That is right; he does. In addition, I must say—it wasn't spelled out in my statement—that his behavior now toward the Jews in Egypt is reminiscent of the Nazi pattern. In fact, he has employed a group of ex-Nazis to carry out this program of anti-Semitism against the Jews, which includes concentration camps, it includes expropriation and expulsion.

Mr. HAYS of Ohio. I am asking this because of lack of time. I didn't get to ask it when it first came up, and it wasn't my turn to ask questions then, anyway. But there has been a good deal made of the fact that there is an Arab refugee problem.

Now, is it not true that there were just about as many Jews thrown out of the Arab countries as there are Arab refugees? Is that a fair statement? Maybe 100,000 fewer, but nearly a comparable number.

Rabbi BERNSTEIN. I would say a comparable number; yes.

Mr. HAYS of Ohio. Isn't it true that the State of Israel has opened its doors and taken those people in and helped them to start life anew; isn't that true?

Rabbi BERNSTEIN. The State of Israel has accepted over 1 million Jews, essentially refugees, and most of them in recent years from the Arab countries.

Mr. HAYS of Ohio. Isn't it true that the Arab nations themselves have refused to admit any substantial number of the Arab refugees?

Rabbi BERNSTEIN. That is correct. The Arab leaders have been unwilling to resolve the Arab refugee problem by resettlement in Arab countries because they have insisted on using the refugees as a political weapon against Israel and to carry out their design for the destruction of Israel.

Mr. HAYS of Ohio. That brings me to my final question: Would your organization, or do you know of any comparable organization or any reputable organization who would oppose the United States giving aid to any Arab nation in assisting it in absorbing these people and getting them started over again?

Rabbi BERNSTEIN. May I be autobiographical for a moment? Following the war, when I directed the Jewish chaplaincy program of the Armed Forces, I was invited by the late Secretary Patterson to go to Europe to be adviser on Jewish affairs to the United States military commanders in Europe, at that time General McNarney in Germany and Gen. Mark Clark in Austria; and subsequently I served in that capacity for General Clay in Germany and for General Keyes in Austria.

My primary function was dealing with refugees. I was their adviser on the problem of the Jewish displaced persons. I know, therefore, from my own personal experience, the tragedy of the refugee, of the person who isn't where he belongs and can't get in anywhere else.

My heart goes out to refugees whether they are white or black, brown, or yellow, Jew or Christian or Arab. Therefore, I for one, speaking personally and speaking also officially, am tremendously concerned.

I have the greatest moral concern conceivable for the solution of the problems of these people, and I want them to be solved just as quickly as possible, for their sake and for the sake of peace in that area.

Therefore, we would certainly approve everything possible that could be done for their resettlement. And because we know that Israel

is crowded with refugees from Arab countries, because Israel will be facing this year, probably, the largest refugee influx almost since the state was established because of the Jews that will be coming in from Hungary, from Poland, and from Egypt, because we know that Israel doesn't have the possibilities for the wise resettlement of the Arab refugees in Israel, and because we know that they really belong in Arab countries with their own people who speak their own language, who have the same religion and the same way of life, because we know that the Arab countries are underpopulated rather than overpopulated, we feel wisdom dictates their resettlement in Arab countries, and that wisdom would also dictate the fullest possible aid by our country, by the U. N.—so far as I am concerned, by Jewish groups—toward the humane solution of that problem along those lines.

Mr. HAYS of Ohio. Thank you.

Chairman GORDON. Mr. O'Hara.

Mr. O'HARA. Rabbi, I shall certainly go over your statement with great interest and, I know, benefit. The hour is late and I merely wish to thank you for appearing here and to assure you that indeed you are addressing ears that are sympathetic and friendly.

My whole feeling toward Israel is one of regret that I am about to lose one of my dearest friends and constituents, Rabbi Morton Berman, who is soon to go to Israel.

Rabbi BERNSTEIN. A classmate of mine and a personal friend.

Chairman GORDON. Mr. Fascell.

Mr. FASCELL. I have read your statement and it points out things with which the resolution does not deal and with which the resolution, in your opinion, should deal. Yet you say you welcome this new resolution which attempts to deal with the problem. Yet you point out specifically in your entire statement that it doesn't cover any of the crises which you enumerate.

I would like to ask you what crisis do you think the resolution does deal with?

Rabbi BERNSTEIN. Mr. Fascell, it seems to me the resolution represents a step forward, a step forward specifically in commitments, a growing clarity of policy on the part of our Government toward the Middle East which has been absent until the present time.

Mr. FASCELL. Do you think there is any difference between what is stated in the resolution and the statement made by the President on April 9, 1956, "That the United States will within constitutional means oppose any aggression in the area," and on November 9, 1956, "That a threat to the territorial integrity or political independence of certain named countries will be viewed by the United States with the utmost gravity"?

Rabbi BERNSTEIN. I would be compelled to read those statements in toto before I could really make an intelligent and helpful comment on that.

Mr. FASCELL. It might be logical to assume, however, that the intent is the same. We are restating something by Congress that has already been said before.

Rabbi BERNSTEIN. Yes; except that things have happened since then which perhaps change the context.

Mr. FASCELL. That is what I am trying to get at. In your opinion, what has happened? That is what I am trying to find out.

Rabbi BERNSTEIN. Well, the nationalization of the Suez by Nasser, the invasion of Sinai, the invasion of the Suez.

Mr. FASCELL. Those are past events.

Rabbi BERNSTEIN. And the withdrawal, the further withdrawal of Britain and France from influence in the area. These apparently have made our President feel that a more clear-cut commitment is required at the present time.

Mr. FASCELL. But you point out yourself that the resolution doesn't deal with intraregional problems.

Rabbi BERNSTEIN. That is correct.

Mr. FASCELL. And it deals specifically with external communism. And you don't even touch on the problem of external communism in your statement.

I agree with what you have said in your statement, and the things that we ought to encompass and the things the United States ought to try to do. All I am trying to find out from you is, other than the things you have mentioned, which are specific, basic, intraregional problems that have existed all along, what in your opinion is the crisis, besides these things?

Rabbi BERNSTEIN. Well, it seems to me that a discriminating judgment is possible on a proposal of this kind which sees on the one hand the steps forward and on the other hand the shortcomings, the lacks. That is what I see in it. I see it as a step forward in terms of a commitment on the part of our Government in the context of today's events. I see at the same time the absence from it of specific proposals and plans to deal with some of the most crucial problems within the area.

Mr. FASCELL. I understand your statement better and your position better, now.

Thank you.

Chairman GORDON. Thank you very much, Rabbi.

Mr. FULTON. Could I comment on the Middle East, because I understand the term has been defined publicly by Mr. Dulles.

Mr. HAYS of Ohio. Yes; but I want to point out to you I don't allow Mr. Dulles to define anything for me carte blanche. I don't have much confidence in him.

Mr. FULTON. There is no official definition of the Middle East. This is Mr. Dulles quoting with approval the statement of Mr. Jernegan, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern Affairs.

Mr. HAYS of Ohio. Now we are using another term, "Near Eastern Affairs."

Mr. FULTON. Mr. Dulles quoting Mr. Jernegan:

"However, I think it is safe to say that when the American Government thinks in terms of Middle East defense it is thinking about the area lying between and including Libya on the west and Pakistan on the east and Turkey on the north and the Arabian Peninsula to the south." The reference to the Arabian Peninsula to the south should in my opinion—include the African states which lie for the most part north of the southern end of the Arabian Peninsula, namely, Ethiopia and the Sudan.

There are numerous questions in that definition. Does the word "including" modify Libya alone? Does it mean "including Libya on the west and including Pakistan on the east, and including Turkey on the north and including the Arabian Peninsula to the south"? If the definition intends to include Pakistan on the east, then when it

includes East Pakistan it obviously must include the whole state of India in Mr. Dulles' term, in the defining of the Middle East.

Mr. HAYS of Ohio. Now you are putting words in Mr. Dulles' mouth. He didn't say anything about India in his statement. He said Pakistan.

Mr. FULTON. But you don't know from his statement whether the word "including" refers to Pakistan, too, as well as Libya.

Mr. FASCELL. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. FULTON. I will be glad to.

Mr. FASCELL. However in reading that he says "the territory lying between and including." You have to determine, then, as a proper analysis of the definition, whether he includes that as areas of the boundary or whether he excludes them. He doesn't say whether he includes or excludes Libya, whether he includes Turkey or excludes it. Whether he includes or excludes Pakistan.

Chairman GORDON. I suggest you put your heads together and settle that matter.

Mr. FULTON. If the definition uses the word "include" for the southern part of the Arabian Peninsula as Mr. Hays of Ohio seems to think, then it logically must include India, too, as India is between East and West Pakistan.

Chairman GORDON. Thank you very much, Rabbi Bernstein, for your appearance.

Rabbi BERNSTEIN. I wish to thank the committee for its patience.

Mr. FULTON. I thank you for your good statement.

Chairman GORDON. I want to announce at this time that Mr. Salem Bader has agreed to appear tomorrow afternoon, as the hour is late and we will adjourn at this time, to reconvene tomorrow morning in executive session at 10:30 a. m.

(Whereupon, at 5:15 p. m., the committee adjourned until 10:30 a. m., tomorrow, Thursday, January 17, 1957.)

ECONOMIC AND MILITARY COOPERATION WITH NATIONS IN THE GENERAL AREA OF THE MIDDLE EAST

THURSDAY, JANUARY 17, 1957

**HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
Washington, D. C.**

The committee met at 10:40 a. m., in room G-3, the Capitol, the Honorable Thomas S. Gordon (chairman) presiding.

Chairman GORDON. The committee will come to order. This is an executive session. I understand that you have a prepared statement for release and we will include in the hearings as much of your testimony as you want to release after you have had an opportunity to go over it.

We appreciate your coming over this morning, General, to give us your views on this important situation in the Mideast.

General, we would appreciate very much hearing from you at this time.

STATEMENT OF GEN. ALFRED M. GRUENTHER, PRESIDENT, AMERICAN NATIONAL RED CROSS, AND FORMER SUPREME COMMANDER, ALLIED FORCES, EUROPE (SHAPE)

General GRUENTHER. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I am delighted to be back here to appear before this committee. My first appearance was in August 1951. To give you an idea of how much water has gone over the dam since then, Mrs. Kelly was at the end of the table then, and she is now near the head.

I am appearing today at the invitation of the chairman and not in any other capacity. I hope that you will consider me a consultant who has had some experience with the military aspects involved in this problem.

I have an unclassified statement as follows:

Mr. Chairman, your immediate interest in the Middle East involves a problem which is outside the area of my most recent primary concern, Western Europe; however, the Middle East is a neighbor of Western Europe, and even more than most, these two neighbors are of great importance and interest to one another.

For centuries, there have been close interrelationships between the Middle East and other parts of the free world. These interrelationships have been political and economic. They have existed in peace and in spite of war. They have led to a situation of considerable mutual dependence.

During these same centuries, Russia, in spite of a change from an autocratic empire to a perhaps even more autocratic dictatorship, has maintained a consistent interest in the Middle East. The interest of the Soviet dictatorship is one of harsh practicalities. It is born of a crystal clear understanding of the military—and not less the political—gains that international communism would realize from domination of the Middle East.

The Soviet interest becomes transparent indeed when considered in the light of currently prevailing circumstances. In peace and in war the Middle East is of vital concern to the free world. There must be a free and friendly economic and political relationship between the two areas; this is equally important to both the free world and the Middle East. If the Soviet Union can disrupt and indefinitely interfere with this relationship, it has seriously weakened both areas and opened a route leading toward extending the area dominated by world communism. If the Soviet Union is permitted to continue its trouble-making unchallenged—and under present conditions the United States is the only possible challenger—the cost to the United States and the whole free world would be beyond measure.

As many of you will recall, I have met with this committee several times in the past 6 years to discuss the primary importance of NATO as an organization to preserve the peace. I have stressed that point because the maintenance of this peace is certainly the first objective of NATO policy and United States policy is the same. In my opinion that objective is seriously threatened today by the situation in the Middle East. Without prompt action to change the trend, I fear that the present situation, already serious, can only worsen.

It seems to me that the crux of the problem is the strengthening of the determination of Middle Eastern peoples to resist the inroads of world communism in that area. To do this, we must reinforce our present programs with a capability to take direct, positive action to support the free nations of the Middle East as the situation requires. And let us not forget that there is no single condition that prevails throughout the Middle East. Our approach must have flexibility. In some instances the United States may wish to modify programs of military assistance; in other cases it may be found appropriate to concentrate on economic or technical assistance. The United States must be prepared to administer, with on-the-spot promptness if need be, the type of assistance necessary to bolster these nations so that they can remain free. Without the provision for economic assistance, I consider that the joint resolution would at best lose much of its effectiveness. And at worst, this program would fail.

From all that I have been able to learn, I judge that there is no question about American readiness to accept essential responsibilities in the Middle East. This, in my opinion, is exactly what the legislation you are now considering accomplishes. On that basis, I wholeheartedly urge its full support.

Now I would like for you to consider that the clock has been turned back 2 months because at that time I was in command of this dark area here [pointing], with my headquarters in Paris. I will be referring to the NATO area rather frequently, because it and the area which you are now considering—the Middle East—in connection with the proposed joint resolution are very important to the defense of the free world.

The NATO area extends from here to the eastern borders of Turkey—a distance of 4,000 miles. In NATO we have always been concerned about our right flank, here, where it reaches toward the Middle East.

Coming to the Middle East area itself, I, as a United States commander and a United States citizen, have always felt that, from a strategic standpoint, it is of great importance to the security of the United States.

The reasons for that are as follows:

In the first place, it controls the crossroads of the world here [pointing] and an area which militarily is of considerable significance.

(Discussion off the record.)

General GRUENTHER. From a military standpoint, therefore, the area is of tremendous importance strategically.

I now wish to discuss the subject of oil because one cannot consider even the military importance of an area on the basis of strictly military considerations. One has to consider it more broadly, and from the standpoint of oil resources, the area is of overwhelming importance to the defense of the free world.

(Discussion off the record.)

General GRUENTHER. The Soviets, as you know, now have a tremendous submarine fleet. They have more than 400 submarines. So that this number is meaningful, you should know that the Germans, when they went to war in 1939, had fewer than 75. The Soviets last year built more than 80 submarines.

Mrs. BOLTON. Where do they build them?

General GRUENTHER. They have shipyards here [pointing] and they build them here [pointing]. Strangely enough, some of them have been built here and then the parts have been moved at great expense and moved to ports here [pointing].

That submarine fleet of 400 is a force that disturbs me very much. One can explain why the Soviets have an army. They couldn't be controlling the satellites without it. An army has a very definite cold war value. You can explain why they have an air force also as a cold war instrument. But when you come to explain why they are putting so much money into a submarine fleet, which is basically a war instrument—there is little explanation because such a fleet has very small use in time of peace. There is no cold war value to it—you never see submarines. The Soviets have spent a great deal of money to keep them up, and it is a very, very heavy burden. Considering all aspects then—military, political, and economic—I would say that the security of the United States and of the free world would be seriously endangered if the Middle East should fall under the domination of international communism.

In this connection, I should like to discuss the importance of Middle East oil to the West and particularly to Europe. Europe, as you know, is tremendously dependent on Middle East oil in peacetime. The oil reserves in the United States now are estimated at approximately 30 billion barrels. The oil reserves of the Middle East area are estimated now at about 230 billion barrels.

Before the use of the canal was interrupted, approximately 2 million barrels of oil a day were being shipped from the Middle East to Europe. Europe receives about 80 percent of her oil from this area.

Many of the European countries are heavily dependent on oil as a source of energy. For example in Greece, 73 percent of the energy requirements are in oil. In Denmark, 46 percent of the energy requirements are for oil. These are not wartime requirements; this is in time of peace. Germany is least dependent with a requirement of about 9 percent. You have noticed probably in the press that there is no oil rationing in Germany now. This is because Germany has mainly a coal economy.

Not only is Europe now heavily dependent on the oil from this area, but estimates of requirements for the next 10 years indicate that this dependence will become much greater.

The coal veins of Europe are, generally speaking, running thin. Atomic power is still too far away to make a significant contribution.

In 1950 the oil consumption of the free world was 10 million tons. In 1955, it was 15 million tons, and by 1965 it is estimated that the requirements will be 25 million tons. The great bulk of these requirements must be met from this area.

In view of all of these factors it is evident that the area which you are considering in connection with the joint resolution is vital to the free world.

Turning now to the pipeline situation this pipeline [pointing] which is known as the TAP line, is still open. It carries almost 350,000 barrels a day and that is the only oil now flowing to the Mediterranean.

Europe is getting its oil from that source plus that which goes around the cape, plus that which it is getting from the Western Hemisphere; and plus some indigenous oil. Europe is receiving today from all sources slightly more than 2 million barrels a day, whereas she requires almost 3 million barrels a day. Before the interruption took place, of the 3 million barrels a day needed by Europe, 2 million came through the canal and through the pipelines as follows: 1,200,000 through the canal, 325,000 through TAP line; and about 500,000 through the IPC line. The IPC line is closed, it was sabotaged. The TAP line is open.

The oil shortage affects various countries in different ways. A country depending almost wholly on oil will be vitally affected unless the canal is opened fairly soon or unless some other arrangement is made. And to a greater or lesser extent this situation applies to the various European countries.

Since they are able to curtail automobile driving, the vital needs are not actually 3 million barrels a day at this time. The shortage is, however, beginning to have an effect industrially and that is an important factor. How long the current situation will last, of course, is another question, although it does look now as though the canal should be reasonably clear by the middle of March. You will appreciate that this estimate is still rather speculative.

Another important consideration is that several of the Middle Eastern countries are dependent upon oil for income. One of them [pointing] receives about 85 percent of its income from oil. About two-thirds of this country's income is from oil. The remaining countries are not as dependent although they vary in degree.

Chairman GORDON. Is that broken line a subsidiary oil line?

General GRUENTHER. No; that is just a boundary. The oil lines are here [pointing]. This one, which is now open; this one, which

has been shut for 7 or 8 years because it has a terminal at Haifa, and the Arabs would not allow the oil to go through Israel; and this one, which was previously working but which was sabotaged in November, Authority has not yet been given to clear this latter line.

Mr. FULTON. What is the name of the Haifa pipeline?

General GRUENTHER. I don't know the local names. They are both IPC lines.

I know you are going to have questions. However, before getting to them, I would like to give you some of my observations on the particular resolution that is in front of you. The overwhelming factor, as far as I am concerned, is the prestige of the United States in discharging its leadership responsibility to the free world. That, as I see it, is at stake in this whole matter.

I know that many of you have been concerned as to whether the President already has the necessary powers to deal with the situation. I don't know, and I wouldn't attempt to get into this question. But from the standpoint of psychological impact, I do feel that the free world needs such an affirmation—or reaffirmation if you will. I consider it of tremendous importance that it be a unified declaration by the Congress and by the Executive so that the United States shall serve notice, a notice which the Soviets understand very well.

I do not want to say that it doesn't involve a risk. We are up against some tough competition—the toughest in the world. They aren't going to like it. In fact, the propaganda machine of the Soviets has been blasting all-out on this subject already, just as it has for the last several years against NATO. You can usually tell what moves are effective by analyzing the propaganda output and noticing the ones they condemn. Right now the two principal targets are the proposed resolution and NATO. NATO has been an old theme song, so it doesn't add anything new, but they are going very, very strongly after the Mideast resolution.

I know that the question arises: "Well, in this risk doesn't it mean that American boys are apt to have to go out there?" That is possible, although I think that the risk is substantially reduced by making clear what our position is in this matter. I say this as a father because we have a son who is a captain and a paratrooper. If trouble broke out in the Middle East, he might well be among those sent there. He has a wife and 4 children, the oldest one, 6. He was wounded seriously in Korea. I know of the cold shudder that came into my heart the day that the message was handed to me reading, "The Secretary of the Army regrets to announce that your son has been seriously wounded in Korea."

For some 8 days his life hung in the balance. So I think I am quite sensitive to this reaction of American boys going there because Mrs. Gruenther and I suffered the agony of a near tragedy in our own family. I think that this proposal gives us reasonable insurance. I don't say it gives us a foolproof insurance, and I don't want to try to oversell it. I say that it is necessary action. I say that the alternative is such a grim one that it is a risk that we have to take. The risk will be significantly less if we follow this procedure than if we do not. I say that as a father, aside from my military interest in this area.

I know also of a point that has bothered a great many people, and that is the economic aid provision. I realize that there is some discussion among certain Members of the Congress as to whether the President has the necessary authority regarding the use of funds. I am not competent to deal with this issue. But I do want to say that I consider the economic aspect of this program fully as important as the military. In fact, I am not sure that it may not even be more important than the military. In any case, it is a matter of degree, whether it is "extremely important" or simply "important." I think that the program would be very badly crippled if anything were done to detract from the economic aspect of it.

Basically, as I see it, we are trying to create a climate of opinion. The Soviets are reacting, and this will make our job difficult. They won't take this lying down. I feel that there must be a tremendous degree of flexibility in administering the program, and the administration must have the power to negotiate.

I want to say this also, don't think there aren't going to be mistakes made. With the benefit of hindsight, I am sure that we shall find mistakes. I don't say you shouldn't criticize them when they are made, but let's not be under any delusion that when some of this aid is administered that it is going to be applied with all the wisdom of a Solomon.

I say that, having seen the problem in the NATO. The current situation is infinitely more complicated than anything we have been confronted with before. I have been closely connected with the problem of European security, and I have also had some experience with the difficulties of administering aid in Europe.

But the problem of arranging for aid in the Middle East will be many times more difficult than in Europe.

Dangers? Yes, indeed; there are dangers. I think the dangers are much less under this proposed policy than they would be if we let the situation drift, because there has been a tremendous upheaval here and a withdrawal of power. The Soviets capitalize upon such an atmosphere rather effectively. If they succeed in this case we are in tremendous trouble, even though no war is involved.

On the economic side, admittedly we don't like to get into a situation where the commitments are open-ended. I am not aware that that is what the bill involves. I know that it involves certain risks. There again I think the risks have to be taken, and that we must have faith in the executive department.

I feel that time is of the essence in this matter, largely because of the psychological impact.

I don't want to tell you that I think that the Soviet troops are massing on the Middle East borders, and that if this bill isn't passed by the 25th of January that they are going to move. On that, I have no such information but they do have a strong capability. They are masters at using the threat of force and they have done that skillfully in many areas. Because of the kind of world we are living in now, we must deal from strength.

If we do not have a force potential, we shall be in trouble.

Now you might ask, "Are you going to be able to negotiate the necessary arrangements with country A, country B, and country C?" I don't know for certain whether we are or not. However, I feel that

the chances are good we can. There again, though, I think you have to recognize that the administration may run into difficulties. I see no satisfactory alternative, to the proposed course of action, and I support the program and I support it strongly.

We must bear in mind that the Soviets are liable to miscalculate. They would lose a war if they started it now. We must always have the capacity to retaliate, and, I might add, that capacity has increased very considerably. But we also must have the will to use that capacity if necessary. If they ever make a miscalculation, either as to our capacity to retaliate, or as to our determination to act, then we could be in trouble. They are not always the wisest people in the world. They have made some pretty big mistakes, and you have seen some of their mistakes recently in the satellite areas.

When history is written, I think you will find that they have made another great mistake—the Korea invasion. The man in the Kremlin—it must have been Stalin—who authorized the Korean aggression, has done a great deal to harm the cause of international communism. Military budgets in 1950 in NATO Europe were down around \$6 billion and going down. Now the budgets for the same countries are a little over \$12 billion, and the main development that brought this increase about was the Korean invasion. But it did even more. It developed a unity in the free world that has never existed in time of peace before.

My point is that the Soviets can miscalculate. I feel as a United States citizen who has had some experience in this, that that is one of our big obligations to make our purpose clear enough so they will not miscalculate. They recognize force and recognize it realistically.

I think, Mr. Chairman, with that general statement, it would be more profitable to turn to questions in any way you wish to have them presented.

Chairman GORDON. We will open under the 5-minute rule. I will start off. I ask you what your opinion would be of Secretary-General Hammarskjöld's suggestion mentioned in the New York papers this morning that a complete withdrawal of Israeli forces from Egypt would pave the way for a constructive United Nations action to increase the chances of peace?

General GRUENTHER. You start in with the fundamental hatreds that exist in this part of the world. On one side you have the situation where the Israeli feel that they are going to be continuously subjected to attacks from the Gaza strip.

The Gaza strip is along here, and the proposal to which the chairman has referred is that the Israeli withdraw from there. [Pointing.]

The Israeli, for their part, have indicated that they are going to fall back from all of the Sinai Peninsula except two points, Gaza and the Straits of Tiran.

This is the Gulf of Aqaba, and the Israeli have troops here now. They also have troops on this little island. This is the island of Tiran. These are the Straits of Tiran. The distance from here to here is about 5 miles. These islands belong to Saudi Arabia, and Saudi Arabia allowed the Egyptians to occupy them some years ago. Prior to the 30th of October the Egyptians controlled the straits, and they would not let Israeli ships use the gulf. The normal international rule is the so-called 3-mile limit.

The channel is actually within 3 miles of Egypt and the Egyptians refuse to let the Israeli enter because (a) they said they were at war with the Israeli, and (b) they said it was not an international channel. The Arabs therefore took the position that the Israeli could not use the channel. Now the Israeli are there and of course they are using the waters.

From the standpoint of Israel the Gulf of Aqaba and the Gaza strip are vital issues.

Now, the chairman has asked the question, do I think that the removal of the Israeli troops from these areas would contribute to relaxation of tension. The answer is yes, it would. Of course, Israel would want the proper guaranties that the waterway would be open, and that the strip would not be used as a base for raids.

However, there again no such guaranty has been given as yet. This is the issue before the U. N. this morning and there is a resolution calling upon the Israeli to withdraw from all of Sinai. This is one of those cases where antipathies constitute one of the great difficulties in solving a problem.

I think this very issue illustrates one of the points which I have noticed has been criticized in this joint resolution. You get it on many counts. I see it abroad from reading newspapers of England and France. They say that this resolution does not solve the two basic issues in the area. One is the Israeli-Arab issue, and the other is the maintenance of free passage through the canal. That is completely true. It doesn't. But these issues are not issues that can be solved unilaterally. They involve many other countries, and by the very nature of the problem they are not ones that the United States can say, "We will do this, or that." It is not that simple.

So I do not feel that the criticism regarding these so-called deficiencies is a valid one. I think it would have been a major error to have put in a solution to the Israeli-Arab problem—not that it isn't important, but I don't think it is one where the United States has sole competence. This issue is going to have to be resolved through some other agency, and as I see it, the only other agency is the United Nations, and it is going to take time. But we can't wait to start creating a better climate of opinion.

Now, what the Solomonic decision is going to be in connection with this one that you raise, Mr. Gordon, I don't know.

Incidentally, a very interesting point, Mr. Pineau in the French Assembly, in talking about the Gulf of Aqaba some weeks ago said as follows:

We, the French, are in favor of opening this to international trade and passage.

Then he went on to say in effect that by doing that we will lessen dependence on the Suez Canal, because an alternative oil pipeline route to the Mediterranean could then be developed through Israel.

How much money this would take and where the money would come from he didn't disclose, but of course that is another point.

Whether or not it will be possible to induce the Israeli to withdraw and still give them assurances for their security is something I cannot forecast. But the answer to your question, Mr. Chairman, is that it would increase significantly the chances of peace. But this resolution should not, in my opinion, deal with this thorny issue.

Chairman GORDON. Thank you very much, General.

Mr. VORYS. General, I hope the question period doesn't last so long that we don't get the little parable that you usually give to help us unscrew the inscrutable about the situation.

What is your idea about the significance of Chou En-lai's present trip? It seems to me that it isn't just coincidental that it is happening at this time, and possibly it is intended in some way or other to remind the West that there are a lot of Chinamen involved in this.

General GRUENTHER. That is right.

Mr. VORYS. What are your ideas on that?

General GRUENTHER. China is quite dependent on the Soviets for aid. The Russians unquestionably have an arrangement approved by the Supreme Soviet to give aid to China, and they are using a certain amount of squeeze on Chou. They are using him now to work on Gomulka, and he did a fairly good job. Today he goes to Budapest. I don't know what effect he can have on Kadar, because Kadar is already sold; there is no particular money he can make there. But what they are trying to do is this: The Soviets have a serious problem in connection with these captive people and they must bend every effort to keeping them in line. When we think we have problems, it is well to recognize that there are some gallstones in the Soviet bladder, and the situation in the captive nations is a fine example.

These fellows are tending to break away from the Moscow leadership. With the exception of Hungary they are not too hard, but that is what they want. To curb this, the Russians have Chou En-lai come in here and do a little talking to Gomulka, after which a communique is issued. The communique insisted that realizing Communist ideals, under the leadership of Russia, was still the outstanding objective. The Soviets used him as a hatchetman on that, and he did a pretty good job.

Gomulka's position was inclining toward Tito's position, that communism was a good thing but that each country would exercise its own right as to what kind of communism it would have.

The Soviets naturally don't want that. They want international communism as decreed by Mr. Khrushchev and his associates, and that is the way that Chou En-lai has put it now to Gomulka.

Mr. VORYS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman GORDON. Dr. Morgan.

Mr. MORGAN. No questions, Mr. Chairman. I will reserve my time until later.

Chairman GORDON. Mrs. Bolton.

Mrs. BOLTON. It is good to see you. The problem that we have is so much one of Soviet infiltration of those people. Do you feel that the resolution as it is now worded gives any idea that we are going to get in there on the economic end and on the contra propaganda end, or do you think it could be strengthened in some way to make that a more poignant bit?

General GRUENTHER. I don't think my views on that would be worth very much. I am more concerned with the substance of it and I can't be of much help on the phrasing. There isn't any kind of resolution that you can devise that is not going to be subjected to misinterpretation and directed misinterpretation by the Soviets. They are masters. We are really not specialists in this field of propaganda. We should

be, but we are not. No matter what kind of resolution you have, they are going to misinterpret it. That is one reason why I was so glad to see Mr. Richards designated to go and to explain the United States position to national authorities in the Middle East. In the final analysis it will be the implementation of this doctrine that is decisive rather than wording A or wording B or wording C. In any event, I wouldn't be able to make much of a contribution on the wording.

Mrs. BOLTON. Mr. Chairman, may I ask this? You may reprimand me if I am off base, because we must stick to the resolution.

Chairman GORDON. Proceed.

Mrs. BOLTON. We must also think of the American position in the world.

If we invite Mr. Tito over here, what does that do to the struggling people and the people who really don't want communism? Is that going to make them feel that we are a little wishy-washy about it?

General GRUENTHER. I suppose there will be a certain amount of that. I don't know however that there is an intention to invite Tito here.

Mrs. BOLTON. I don't either.

(Discussion off the record.)

Mrs. BOLTON. Thank you very much, General.

Chairman GORDON. Mr. Carnahan.

Mr. CARNAHAN. I was glad to hear you emphasize the importance of economic aid to the area.

What would be your reaction to dividing the substance of the resolution into 2 separate resolutions, 1 dealing with the military emergency and another dealing with the economic aid?

General GRUENTHER. I wouldn't have enough of a view on that, Mr. Carnahan. As far as I am concerned, it is the substance that makes the difference. Whether that should be passed in 1 resolution or 2 resolutions, I wouldn't be able to advise. But if there are 2 resolutions, they must come out at the same time. There is a necessity to give somebody—and I would think it ought to be the President—the power to negotiate with a flexible policy. And this is one field where the Soviets often get ahead of us. Their power to give rests with about 3 men who make all the decisions. If a decision causes a lowering of consumption and more misery to their people, they make the decision without any qualms or soul-searching. And they do not have to get authority from the Supreme Soviet, the Parliament. There is nobody voting on it.

I do not advocate that way of running a railroad—in fact, I deplore it—but I am saying that their power flexibility in this business constitutes a tremendous advantage. I would hope we would get into a position where we would give the proper authorities much more flexibility than they have now. We have a critical situation in the Middle East. I am not able to set a date when it is going to be super-critical, but it is critical right now.

Mr. CARNAHAN. With the amount of money that we are spending—and I am not objecting to it—\$200 million to allow the President to be in position to counteract international communism in the area, that certainly would be considered a rather insignificant item; would it not?

General GRUENTHER. Of course, \$200 million is a lot of money but it may require a lot of money to meet this challenge. And we must

meet it. I believe you have a responsibility as a Congressman to consider whether it will be ended at \$200 million, and I think you should realize the possibility it may have to go beyond that. Of course, that could be done only with your consent. Compared with the possible dangers, \$200 million is not a high price.

I notice there is a new book out that seems to be widely discussed, a book by Mr. Millikan and Mr. Rostow of MIT, who have been studying this problem of aid. They come up with an approach which would entail much larger sums. And they are not advocating wild-eyed spending. The book is a new one which offers some interesting thoughts.

Mr. CARNAHAN. I read a prepublication version of it. They are not just dealing with the Middle East people.

General GRUENTHER. Their approach is worldwide.

Mr. CARNAHAN. Then I might say, even if we look forward to spending \$200 million a year in this area for a considerable time, it is still, in my opinion, not a very big item.

Would you agree that unless the free world wins an economic war in the area we will have to resort to a military conflict?

General GRUENTHER. I am very much afraid of it.

Mr. CARNAHAN. I wonder if you would care to express an opinion as to whether or not we ought to concern ourselves solely with opening the Suez Canal, or whether we should give some attention to attempting to lessen dependence upon the canal?

General GRUENTHER. I think we should give that a considerable amount of our attention. You are aware, of course, that this is not a short-term solution. A few months ago people were talking about 80,000 to 100,000-ton tankers, and these haven't been discredited yet. There are a number of those being built, but they create tremendous problems in getting them into ports. My own feeling is that they may probably come eventually to something like 60,000-ton tankers, but that is a very uneducated view.

I am very much interested in it because I feel that we should have other means in being whether it be a pipeline coming through here [pointing] whether it be supertankers that can go around the cape and economically compete or still some other solution.

(Discussion off the record.)

Chairman GORDON. Mr. Smith.

Mr. SMITH. General, your testimony, as always, is extremely interesting. I am glad to see you here.

(Discussion off the record.)

Mr. SMITH. I don't know whether or not you have seen the suggestion made by some 40 members of the British Parliament. They came up with what I think is a rather novel idea. They said that the free world should purchase the Sinai Peninsula and there establish a permanent military establishment for the United Nations. If that was done, they say it would accomplish two purposes. First of all, it would establish there a United Nations military force which would bring peace perhaps between Egypt and other countries in the Middle East, and at the same time it would provide an area for a pipeline across the peninsula which would be protected against sabotage. The free world would then have access to the great oil resources in Saudi Arabia.

I have two questions in that connection. First, do you think it would be militarily feasible to set up a United Nations force in that area? A permanent United Nations military force in that area?

General GRUENTHER. It would be feasible, with considerable difficulty. If the area would support it, and the nations had the will to do it, it could be done.

But to what extent you are going to be able to create a United Nations force that is going to be operating over a long period is another question. That is a new doctrine, one that would pose many problems. Of course, that isn't the question you asked me. You said: "From a military standpoint, is it feasible?" It is feasible.

Mr. SMITH. The terrain itself is very difficult and living conditions would be rugged.

General GRUENTHER. You wouldn't get many volunteers for the place. While it may have caused the British certain regrets to leave there, there weren't many Tommies who were sad about it, based on purely personal considerations. It is not a place where soldiers like to serve.

Mr. SMITH. You said in answer to one question that was asked that we could not use economic assistance here so as to force the issue between countries in the area. Do you think that economic aid could be used as a lever in some instances?

(Discussion off the record.)

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you, General. Chairman GORDON. Mr. Burleson.

Mr. BURLESON. This should be off the record.

(Discussion off the record.)

Chairman GORDON. Mr. Merrow.

Mr. MERROW. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is good to have you with us, General. General, I want to commend you upon the brilliance and the clarity and the logic of your exposition here this morning.

In your statement, I believe you referred to the necessity of early action on the resolution that we have before us. Do you not think that continued delay and failure to act quickly on this resolution will decrease its effectiveness when it finally is passed?

General GRUENTHER. It might very well because an important element is the psychological impact of this legislation. I think there are two dangers. One is delay, and the other is a divided vote. I certainly hope that neither is likely.

Mr. MERROW. Without trying to set a time, then it would seem as though we certainly ought to get action within 2 or 3 weeks, if it is to be effective?

General GRUENTHER. I would hope so.

Mr. MERROW. Thank you. That is all, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman GORDON. Mrs. Kelly.

Mrs. KELLY. Mr. Chairman, thank you.

Well, General Gruenther, I would like to waive a few questions and let you tell that parable, but this is such a serious situation that I know the chairman will ask you to tell maybe 1 or 2 later on.

General, I do not think there is anyone in the House who does not recognize the need of this resolution. Any objection to the resolution is its weakness. I feel that by dealing with only overt aggres-

sion and not indirect aggression and internal subversion that we are going to secure the position of the U. S. S. R. in the Middle East, where I feel she already is becoming entrenched, particularly in Syria and in Egypt.

(Discussion off the record.)

Chairman GORDON. Dr. Judd.

Mr. JUDD. General, as you say, you have been before us off and on pretty regularly for over 6 years. I think no witness we have had during those years has been proved more consistently right in his estimates of complicated situations than you have, and regret that you are not still handling our problems over there. I hope your successor at NATO will be as good.

As for this resolution, I started out believing that, perhaps, it should deal with one item alone, the military authorization. All of us would be put on the spot, and there probably wouldn't be half a dozen votes against it, if any. If we put in the economic provisions, it raises all sorts of questions and there might be greater division among the members. That was my original position. But the more I have listened to you and others, the more I have come to wonder if we can or ought to try to separate them. I want to ask your views on that.

We have two problems. One is to deter overt aggression by the Soviet Union by authorizing direct military action against the Soviet Union in the event of aggression by it. In other words, we say, "If you do this, we move." However, the Soviets probably wouldn't want to take direct action, if they could get the countries by subversion. To prevent that is the second problem.

For example, Iraq's big source of revenue, oil, is gone, and that of other countries is reduced. Those governments may have trouble paying their police and civil servants. It was the inflation in China, the inability to pay the civil servants and the armed forces which led to their subversion by the Communists.

So it more and more seems to me that it would be like sending out a man to fight with one hand tied behind him, if we don't also put in the promise of economic aid. We need to tell the Russians directly, "Don't move in by force," and then also give our Government the economic resources to give help during this difficult period, so the threatened governments are not weakened and thereby become easy prey to subversion.

General GRUENTHER. I couldn't agree with you more. I feel strongly about the economic side in this area especially. If I were told that I could have either the economic or the military aid, I would feel the choice is between cutting off the right leg or the left arm, but I would say, "I will take the economic and suffer the handicap of not having the military assistance portion." That is how strongly I feel on the economic aid aspect for the Middle East.

Mr. JUDD. If these were separated—you said you wouldn't express an opinion on the wisdom of that; but do you feel the element of timing is very important?

General GRUENTHER. Very.

Mr. JUDD. To do one now and not do the other for a month—

General GRUENTHER. That would be very bad. The question was asked, Would two resolutions suffice? Mr. Carnahan asked about that.

If they both came out the same day, I could see nothing wrong with that. Some other people might, however, have basis for objection.

Mr. JUDD. The next argument raised by some is: Why should we provide funds when their use hasn't been spelled out to us in detail, how much is going here and how much there and for what purposes? But how can that be done ahead of time? As you said, our former chairman should go over and negotiate in the hope he can make some progress. But how can he negotiate without some cards in his pocket? And without this resolution, he doesn't have the cards he needs. It won't do much good for him to say, "If you will do this, Mr. Arab, and you will do that, Mr. Israeli, I will then go back and try to get the United States to do so and so."

But if he can say, "If you will make certain concessions to each other and to world peace, the President is in a position to move in and undergird such an agreement, that gives some hope." How can he negotiate without that?

General GRUENTHER. I think that is correct. I think it was a stroke of genius that they selected Mr. Richards.

Mr. JUDD. We didn't demand that General Eisenhower, for whom you were Chief of Staff, tell us in advance how, when, where, and with what he was going to invade the European Continent. We knew it had to be done. We gave him the authority, and we didn't stand looking over his shoulder asking for all the details to be published in advance or even spelled out to a congressional committee.

If we want to handle this successfully, so as not to get into a shooting war, doesn't our President and Commander in Chief need that same authority and discretion?

General GRUENTHER. I would feel it very strongly, sir.

Mr. JUDD. Now may I ask one more question: I have some friends out in that part of the world, and they write that a real hot spot is the Kurd situation. As I get it, there are Kurds—look at the map down there—in the northeast corner of Syria and in northern Iraq and the southeastern part of Turkey and western Iran, and then across the border in Russia. There are five countries containing Kurds, some of whom are pretty unruly. Friends out there dealing with the local people in hospitals, and so on, tell me that what they think the Communists are working for is some sort of eruption of the Kurds.

(Discussion off the record.)

Mr. JUDD. In summary, it is complained that it is dangerous to pass this resolution. Well, this resolution, if we pass it, doesn't create the danger; is that right?

General GRUENTHER. The danger exists now.

Mr. JUDD. It is a course which we hope will be helpful in dealing with the danger.

General GRUENTHER. That is right.

Chairman GORDON. Mr. Hays of Ohio—

Mr. HAYS of Ohio. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General, it is always good to have you. I think you make more sense than all the rest of the witnesses put together, because you get directly to the problem.

I might say I am sorry you are not groping downtown with these problems instead of some of the gropers who are groping. But that is not for me to say.

(Discussion off the record.)

Mr. HAYS of Ohio. Mr. Dulles admitted there is more danger from subversion than there is from overt aggression. It seems to me we should do something about it.

General GRUENTHER. I am just not wise enough to know what to do about it. I do not have the specific type of answer you desire.

Mr. HAYS of Ohio. On this economic side, are you familiar with the Hardy report, to the effect that they couldn't even write a comprehensive report on Iran because the bookkeeping was so impossible they couldn't tell what was going on?

General GRUENTHER. No.

Mr. HAYS of Ohio. Don't you think we have a responsibility to the people who are going to pay this bill to make sure that this money and subsequent money which I know we are going to be asked for isn't put in there at the whim of a dictator to be spent for things that he likes to have around him in the way of luxuries? Don't you think we have that possibility?

General GRUENTHER. Yes, sir; and I certainly would hope that in the administering of this we would see that those objectives are achieved.

You mentioned Iran. I am not aware of the Hardy report, but it doesn't surprise me that all elements of these programs are not well handled. Actually, our aid program has helped save Iran from the Soviets. This doesn't mean that I am saying that I want to forgive whatever inefficiency may exist. On the contrary, I would want it corrected. But even with that, we have had a fairly successful policy in Iran.

Now I am predicting that there may well be other instances of inefficiency. I hope they will be able to get the bookkeeping straight, but if I were sponsoring this on the part of the Government—and I am telling you this as a non-Government witness, since I have no Government connection—I would warn you that you had better expect some shortcomings in the implementation of the program. I believe they can be held to a minimum.

Mr. HAYS of Ohio. I have another grave question that I think you can answer with just a word or two. It has been said that many geologists think that the potential of oil reserves in the Sahara Desert may exceed anything in the known world today. Indications being such, don't you think it would be a good idea if we somehow or another got some money going in there to develop that and find out if it is true and, if necessary, to get the supply of oil for Europe from that area, which is much closer and much less likely to be subjected to all sorts of interruptions?

General GRUENTHER. I am sure of that. The French, you know, are trying to do that very thing.

(Discussion off the record.)

Mr. HAYS of Ohio. You said this Rostow book is highly regarded. Would you mind telling me by whom?

General GRUENTHER. I had not intended to say that because I have not read it. I have seen in the press a statement to the effect that it is highly regarded.

Chairman GORDON. Mr. Fulton—

Mr. FULTON. We are certainly glad to see you here. We have seen you in many capacities. I think we members of the Foreign Affairs

Committee might expect honorary memberships in the Red Cross because we have had you as an honorary member of this committee.

I would like to ask you some questions on the area to be covered by this resolution and who should be included in it.

The British recently said they are still adhering to the tripartite declaration of 1950, and that of course would be referable to the Arab-Israeli disputes.

Why shouldn't Congress put something in here saying that the United States is likewise adhering to it and restating it again?

General GRUENTHER. I don't know why it wasn't put in there. I am not much of an authority on that.

Mr. FULTON. It wouldn't hurt, would it?

General GRUENTHER. I would say this. That is a controversial matter right now. If I may go off the record.

(Discussion off the record.)

Chairman GORDON. Mr. Byrd—

Mr. BYRD. General Gruenther, hindsight is always better than foresight, I guess. At least, it is always easier for us to look back and see what might have been than it is to look ahead. Could we very properly have hoped that England and France and Israel might have succeeded in their objective when they went into Egypt, that they might have succeeded in bringing about the overthrow of Colonel Nasser? Would it not have been better for us had they succeeded?

General GRUENTHER. Well, you get into a very fundamental point on that, the question of the right to use force to settle disputes. I feel that the position the United States took is really the only position that it could have taken from the standpoint of helping us discharge our position of leadership.

Mr. BYRD. But nothing succeeds like success.

General GRUENTHER. Nothing fails like failure, either.

(Discussion off the record.)

Mr. BYRD. If that time should come, are we prepared, in view of the drastic cuts that have been made in our military manpower—are we prepared to confront such a possibility? Are we prepared to fight what might be just a limited war?

General GRUENTHER. Our forces are getting more and more of a capability to fight what you would refer to as a limited war. For example, over in Italy we have a task force, an atomic support force. I notice in the budget message this morning that they are providing for six of those forces. So when you ask, "Are we prepared to fight a limited war?" my answer would be "Yes"; and I would add that we are increasing that capability.

Mr. BYRD. In reducing our manpower as we have been doing recently, are we not moving in the opposite direction?

(Discussion off the record.)

Mr. BYRD. Do you feel, if there should be an act of overt aggression in that area of the world, that we are capable of dealing with it without getting into an all-out war?

(Discussion off the record.)

Mr. BYRD. Thank you, General.

Chairman GORDON. Mr. LeCompte—

Mr. Lecompte. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General Gruenther, it is always a pleasure to have you here, and your testimony is always

helpful. I value your statements and conclusions more than those of anybody else we have before the committee. I have no questions. My question has been asked and answered several times in the hearing. But as a military man, I would ask you once more: Do you think under the resolution that we will have to expend more money for the armed services?

General GRUENTHER. I am not able to make a judgment on that, because I don't have the responsibility for the Armed Forces. I know a little bit about this area, but I just don't think I could cope with that question. I just don't know.

Mr. LECOMPTE. The budget message of yesterday proposes the largest peacetime armed services budget we have ever had. People are writing me and saying, "When if ever are we going to be able to reduce taxes if we have this kind of a budget before us?"

General GRUENTHER. I am a taxpayer, too. I would like to see taxes reduced.

Mr. LECOMPTE. You also have the same thoughts on the subject. Well, you could say this: It might be a good deal cheaper to adopt this resolution than not to?

General GRUENTHER. I think you are right.

Mr. LECOMPTE. Thank you very much.

Chairman GORDON. Mr. Selden—

Mr. SELDEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am happy to see you here, General. I always look forward to your visits.

This issue has been raised by the President and it has been presented to this committee and the Congress in the resolution that is now before us. Should the committee or Congress approve a resolution that is substantially changed either in substance or in form, or both? Could that cause some serious miscalculations on the part of our enemies and our friends?

General GRUENTHER. I think the danger would be quite great.

Mr. SELDEN. In other words, you feel that if we are going to enact a resolution both the substance and the form should remain substantially the same.

General GRUENTHER. Now, you may improve it. I don't want to get into the wording, but I think the substance of it—

Mr. SELDEN. Generally?

General GRUENTHER. Generally, yes, I do.

Mr. SELDEN. Thank you. That is all, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman GORDON. Mr. Morano—

Mr. MORANO. (No response.)

Chairman GORDON. Mrs. Church—

Mrs. CHURCH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General, I have been sitting here wondering how we could possibly get your story told just as you tell it, with your analysis of the situation, over to the American people.

It would help us if we could get it to them as you say it.

I have two questions. The first is a rather limited one. I have been concerned recently about the increasing, apparently bad feeling between Greece and Britain. Is there special significance in this situation, as regards this proposed program, and in the fact that we are losing some of our friends around Mare Nostrum?

General GRUENTHER. Yes. The Cyprus problem is still a very, very difficult one. It is not solved yet. You understand, of course, it is a

three-cornered one and that it is more than a matter of interest to Greece and Britain. The Turkish interest is great.

(Discussion off the record.)

Mrs. CHURCH. If you had to defend one or the other, would there be a material effect on the plans being made for this Mideast area?

(Discussion off the record.)

Mrs. CHURCH. That leads very naturally to my next question: Has the time come, or may it come in the near future, when we ought to appraise a situation as a whole and spend more time building up those peoples, who are definitely on the side of the free world, and curtail the pouring out of moneys in areas where the prognosis makes us doubtful of their ultimate support?

(Discussion off the record.)

Mrs. CHURCH. My last question would be: In your judgment are our allies losing force throughout the world because of their adherence to treaties which the other side dares to defy?

General GRUENTHER. I don't think so. Our most pressing problem right now is the Middle Eastern situation, and our difficulties there have not been increased by our adherence to treaties. Neither has that been an adverse factor in NATO. I am proud that we keep our word.

When we consider both sides of the coin, it is obvious that the Soviets are having troubles too. On balance theirs are greater than ours. If we can continue to develop better understanding with the British and French to remove recent sensitivities, I am confident that NATO will be stronger than ever before.

As for the rest of the world, our objectives are clear and honorable. We consider international communism to be a serious threat to freedom, and therefore we oppose the imperialistic advances of that sinister dogma.

Mrs. CHURCH. Is the moment near at hand when we ought to make our appraisal of the world situation merely a military one with regard to our own safety?

General GRUENTHER. I think that has to be a factor, but I don't think it can be the military factor alone.

Mrs. CHURCH. I think of Okinawa, for instance, and our willingness to make concessions because we want to keep good will.

General GRUENTHER. I think we will have to do a considerable amount of that as we go ahead, Mrs. Church.

I would like to say this: The problem of maintaining friends in the world for a country like the United States is a very, very great one. One of the things I have always advocated is that members of the Armed Forces do more to build friendship for us. There are always jealousies that are directed toward a fairly rich nation which has world responsibilities. And we are not always the most considerate in dealing with others. We live on a very high standard, and we tend every now and then to give the impression that we look down our nose at people. We have made great advances in the field of effective partnership in the last 15 years, but we still need more wisdom, and I think we are acquiring it.

(Discussion off the record.)

Mrs. CHURCH. Thank you.

Chairman GORDON. Mr. O'Hara—

Mr. O'HARA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General, I am in accord with Mrs. Church. You have made our task easier.

I would like to ask if I am properly summarizing what you have said. First, the vital importance of the area with the danger in the existing vacuum in this area of authority on the part of the free world; secondly, that the principal benefits to be expected are psychological and that to obtain the maximum of such benefits it is advisable that it should appear to the world that the Congress and the President are of one mind and the raising of a constitutional question as to the relative powers of the President and the Congress would be confusing in the area affected and would be construed as indicating the absence of national solidarity.

General GRUENTHER. Yes, in general.

Mr. O'HARA. Thirdly, that the administration of the program will be flexible. We are in a troubled area. There are many problems, and we are avoiding any discussion of those problems because at this time we do not know the answer, and we will be horsetrading in a sense for good will; that is, we will be feeling our way toward a plane of mutual understanding.

Do I briefly summarize accurately your position?

General GRUENTHER. Yes, sir. However, I am not sure the President has the authority.

(Discussion off the record.)

Mr. O'HARA. I don't like it either, because I don't like bromides, but sometimes for brevity I employ them. You have emphasized the flexibility in the administration. As far as you know, do we have any plans that have not been disclosed?

General GRUENTHER. I do not know, sir. However, I have faith that the administration witnesses have told you everything.

Mr. O'HARA. Thank you very much.

Chairman GORDON. Mr. Prouty.

Mr. PROUTY. General, I think the attendance at meetings when you are a witness shows the respect in which you are held. We are glad to see you.

I would like to return to the question of Algeria. This seems to me to be one of the major problems facing us at the present time. I am thinking of possible action in the U. N. If we go along with the French, are we not going to antagonize the Arab countries? Which is preferable between these two alternatives?

(Discussion off the record.)

Mr. PROUTY. Thank you, General, very much.

Chairman GORDON. Mr. Bentley.

Mr. BENTLEY. (No response.)

Chairman GORDON. Mr. Fountain.

Mr. FOUNTAIN. I happen to be one of the new members of this committee and I find myself with a tremendous appetite for information. You used the term "psychological impact," which Mr. Dulles and many others have used, and you have referred to the "climate of opinion."

I assume you have in mind the psychological impact not only upon the Russian leaders but upon the governments of the countries in the Middle East.

I wish you would elaborate more, by saying what the psychological impact, in your opinion, will be and what the climate of opinion will be in those areas.

General GRUENTHER. To start out with, on psychological impact, I think we need to serve notice on the Soviets as to what our intentions are. That is one point. They understand determination very well.

Then, for our friends, the people we would like to have remain free and independent, I would hope that we would be able to go in there and make our approach in such a way that they realize we are indeed entirely sincere in wanting them to be independent. The combination of the serving of notice on a potential aggressor, plus our hope of being able to help these underdeveloped people would create a feeling of trust in us.

That is what I mean by climate of opinion and psychological impact.

Mr. FOUNTAIN. I think obviously we would be declaring our intention with respect to overt aggressive action on the part of international communism. I wonder if you would define international communism?

General GRUENTHER. I define international communism as the Communist movement that centers from Russia. I do that as against such terms as "national communism." Thus, "Tito communism" is a doctrinaire communism which I do not classify as international communism.

It has many of the same sinister concepts, with respect to religion, for example, and the materialistic dedication of international communism, but it does not have the same aggressive quality as the Stalin-Moscow brand of communism.

Mr. FOUNTAIN. I wondered if you included Tito communism.

General GRUENTHER. Not in international communism.

Mr. FOUNTAIN. Definitely by this resolution we will declare our intention with respect to any overt, aggressive action on the part of Russia or international communism, but we do not in any way declare our intent with respect to internal subversion or infiltration on the part of international communism.

General GRUENTHER. That is right.

Mr. FOUNTAIN. If Egypt and Syria continue to maintain their present dispositions, even if we pass this resolution, we may still have a very precarious situation on our hands; is that right?

General GRUENTHER. That is right.

Mr. FOUNTAIN. That is all, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. BYRD. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Chairman GORDON. Your time is up. Mr. Fascell.

Mr. BYRD. Now will the gentleman yield?

Mr. FASCELL. Yes, sir.

Mr. BYRD. In line with the question that my colleague, Mr. Fountain, has asked concerning the creation of a climate of opinion, may I ask, General Gruenther, if there isn't a great possibility, with the passage of this resolution, that it might stimulate and create a climate of opinion that is just the opposite to that which we are hoping to see created?

General GRUENTHER. There is that possibility. I would hope that by our skill in handling this we would be able to avoid that danger. Certainly our motives are honorable ones.

Mr. BYRD. The initial reports we are getting make the possibilities seem to be bad.

General GRUENTHER. I would not say that. Of course, I am not devoting full time to this, but I have been following it reasonably carefully, and I would say that many of the Arab nations have been favorably impressed with our proposal. But we may have to ride through an adverse reaction in certain countries.

Mr. BYRD. Mr. Chairman, I wish to thank the gentleman from Florida.

Mr. FASCELL. It has been a pleasure.

Chairman GORDON. Mr. Fascell.

(Discussion off the record.)

Mr. FASCELL. It would seem to me if we are going to give the administration a free hand to go around and spend money any way they want to (and I can see the necessity for it if you want to keep a country from being subverted), maybe you better say to a Mideast country, "Take this money and keep Egypt off your back." Otherwise we might not be able to save this republic. Isn't that true?

(Discussion off the record.)

Mr. FASCELL. Wouldn't it be logical for Russia to get Egyptians to do everything possible to fulfill their dream of an Arab world headed by the Egyptians and then the Russians would take it over?

(Discussion off the record.)

Mr. FASCELL. So it is an intraregional problem that must be taken into consideration when we are thinking about this resolution, whether we incorporate it specifically here or just keep it in mind for action in the future?

(Discussion off the record.)

Mr. FASCELL. It is just one of the things you cannot specifically spell out in a resolution.

General GRUENTHER. I would think it would be difficult.

Mr. FASCELL. Now, the other intraregional problem is the Arab-Israel dispute, and you feel that is a matter strictly for the United Nations?

General GRUENTHER. Yes.

Mr. FASCELL. Isn't it true, in other words, to arrive at any kind of settlement the United States is going to have to exercise a leadership in arriving at that settlement?

General GRUENTHER. It is.

Mr. FASCELL. Then the question arises as to whether or not you should go ahead and tell the world you are going to do that in this resolution.

General GRUENTHER. My advice would be against it, sir. I think the fewer controversies you introduce into this the better it will be.

Mr. FASCELL. I can understand the reason for that.

Now then, would you say that it might be good to indicate that within short order you are going to follow this thing up with a positive program dealing with the settlement of the basic issues in that area?

General GRUENTHER. Yes, I hope we have a positive program for settling them. I don't know.

Mr. FASCELL. If we are going to swing the club, we might as well swing it at our friends, too.

General GRUENTHER. Well, you start with a very difficult issue, and I would hope that we would do our best to get it solved. I don't know how soon we will be able to.

Mr. FASCELL. Is there any reason to believe that time by itself will solve it?

General GRUENTHER. I don't think so, but time may ameliorate it a bit.

Mr. FASCELL. Or make it worse?

General GRUENTHER. It might.

Mr. FASCELL. Thank you. That is all I have.

Chairman GORDON. Mr. Coffin.

Mr. COFFIN. General, this is my first time to hear you in the Capitol. I did have the pleasure of hearing you in Atlantic City in the early summer when you spoke before the governors, and you gave a very fine talk.

I just hope we civilians will be as well versed in military matters as you—

Chairman GORDON. You are quite far away. Will you speak louder please.

Mr. COFFIN. I hope we will be able to understand the military view as well as you as a military man are able to understand and keep your eye on the civilian point of view.

General GRUENTHER. Thank you.

Mr. COFFIN. I would just like to ask two questions and then let you answer them as you wish.

With regard to the objective of flexibility, would it not leave us in a more flexible position if in the resolution we did not set up as a prerequisite to invoking force, "control by international communism." Egypt, for example, or some other country might set up a Tito communism and create just as much of a threat to the free world and our own security.

The Soviet Union and its friends would no doubt know what we feel and would understand we are really against communism. That is question No. 1.

Question 2 is in regard to "climate of opinion," which I think is an excellent phrase. Would it not be well, since the world has spotlighted attention on whatever resolution the Congress finally enacts—and this is not a new suggestion, I am repeating what some of the others have said—would it not be well to recognize not only that \$200 million will be used but that we also believe in the principle of long-range, sound development without spelling it out in this resolution too precisely?

Would it not also be well by way of bolstering the climate of opinion to strengthen, insofar as words can do it, our adherence to whatever procedures and facilities may exist in the United Nations without giving up our sovereignty and without giving up the ability and the right to make a decision as we in the last analysis see fit?

The questions involve two areas: Flexibility and climate of opinion.

General GRUENTHER. I don't think my views on either of your points are profound enough to warrant taking up the time of the committee. Certainly flexibility is important and that is why I would favor broad language in the resolution. To insert additional problems would just complicate the solution.

Mr. COFFIN. Would it not simplify the wording because you wouldn't have to say that you have to have a nation controlled by international communism before the President was able to act?

General GRUENTHER. I don't feel that this is a field where I can make much of a contribution. The responsibility is not mine.

Mr. COFFIN. Thank you.

Chairman GORDON. Mr. Farbstein.

Mr. FARBSTEIN. I am a freshman here and I know you will pardon my ignorance. I appreciate listening to you more than I can say.

You made a statement that the Russian interest was a denial of this oil to the free world. These Middle Eastern countries depend upon the moneys they receive from that oil, do they not?

General GRUENTHER. Yes, sir.

Mr. FARBSTEIN. What would be their position in the event they can't sell that oil to free countries? Certainly Russia doesn't want to buy it.

General GRUENTHER. That is right.

Mr. FARBSTEIN. The advantage would be ours, wouldn't it, as far as these countries are concerned?

General GRUENTHER. I would say from the standpoint of logic that is correct. That is one reason why I feel we go into this situation with an inherent advantage. I don't feel that the problem is impossible at all to solve. I think we have a good chance of solving it.

One of the worries of course though is this, sir. Let us take a country that gets 80 percent of its income from oil. The man in the street just doesn't appreciate all the factors involved. He may be guided by strong emotions concerning the Arab-Israeli dispute. I feel that most governments in the Middle East will recognize the honesty of our motives and will want to cooperate with us. But some of them may have difficulty with their public opinion in view of the Communist propaganda campaign.

Mr. FARBSTEIN. Then you suggest that we take the "servile" attitude—a word that was used yesterday at the hearing—that we take a servile attitude because of their street armies?

General GRUENTHER. I didn't mean to take that kind of attitude. I didn't understand we were taking that kind of attitude. It is not my idea that we should.

Mr. FARBSTEIN. Would you say we should take upon ourselves the making of certain definite statements that we expect these countries to live up to in connection with any economic aid we may give them?

General GRUENTHER. I think when we do our explaining and negotiating that those things should be made clear. That is where I would hope to accomplish that purpose. I think it would hardly have a place in the resolution, but again I am not an expert on resolutions. That should be up to the officials who have the responsibility.

Mr. FARBSTEIN. There is just one other phase of this question upon which I would like to get your comment. In today's Times there is a dispatch coming out of Moscow by William J. Gordon, and he states:

President Eisenhower made a major tactical error in stressing military aid in his announcement of a new policy toward the Middle East, according to diplomatic opinions in Moscow. These diplomats say they consider it unfortunate that what seemed to be clear advantages of such a program had been overshadowed by the military aspect of President Eisenhower's program. The diplomats asserted that threats to use American Armed Forces in the Middle East even if only against Communist aggression raised a thought in the Arab's mind that Washington sought to replace London and Paris in Middle Eastern affairs, that the diplomats concerned played into the Communists' hands and gave them a terrific Communist barrage against the United States.

General GRUENTHER. I read that dispatch this morning. I would not suggest that this man who wrote it had not seen all of the diplomats involved. I would question whether this is necessarily a reflection of a large number of views. It could very well reflect the views of some, however.

Mr. FARSTEIN. Would you be against giving aid to Syria or Egypt?

General GRUENTHER. I should think this would be a question of determining whether or not they would avoid coming under the domination of international communism.

Mr. FARSTEIN. Then you have full confidence in the administration and that the administrators of this proposed plan will carry out the will of Congress.

General GRUENTHER. Yes, sir. If the American people don't, then they had better get another administration because in the kind of world we are living in, we must have confidence in our leadership.

I have been close to many in the present administration and I hope I may be excused for being a little bit partial. However, I served in the Armed Forces when Mr. Truman was the President and Mr. Acheson, Secretary of State, and I felt just as strongly about it then, so this has nothing to do with whether it is party A or party B.

Mr. FARSTEIN. That is all.

Chairman GORDON. Mr. Saund.

Mr. SAUND. General Gruenther, I have the belief that the day is over in this world where you can have control over the minds of people in the world by force.

General GRUENTHER. I agree.

Mr. SAUND. I think the days of the colonial power are gone. It was well demonstrated by the actions of the Hungarians that today the only way to have any influence is by winning the hearts and the minds of the people of the world.

In the Middle East today would you say that Israel and Syria are already lost? Couldn't we show through friendly action, and by still offering to give them help, still keep them on our side? I state those two extreme cases. Some of us are so aroused by the actions of Nasser, and Syria has been infiltrated by communism. Do you think if we give the President this power and not be disturbed by this \$200 million, it would be permissible, when we spent billions of dollars to protect Europe and allow those people to stand on their feet. We won the cold war there.

We might have to spend billions in years to come in the Middle East, if the Middle East is so necessary.

(Discussion off the record.)

Mr. SAUND. Has the time come for us to give up winning Egypt and Syria over by giving them economic aid?

General GRUENTHER. I don't think the time has come to give up hope in that respect. I want to say with respect to your basic hypothesis that I, too, have great concern about winning the minds of men by the use of force.

One of the feelings that I tried to communicate here in stressing this economic aspect is that, if I were forced to make a choice on the right leg-left arm amputation theory, I would say I would prefer to see the economic assistance left in. I think we start from the same basis on that.

I haven't given up hope on Syria or on Egypt, and I would hope in the administration of this program we wouldn't adopt a closed mind.

Mr. SAUND. I do sincerely hope, Mr. Chairman, that in some way we can alleviate the fears of the people who are friends of Israel, because I have seen where many sincere Americans are quite disturbed about the situation in Israel, and about the conflict between Israel and the Arabs. Something should be done to alleviate their fears and the administration should make it clear that they do want to protect the interests of Israel and, if any deal is made, one of the fundamental points to be considered by the Arabs will be that Israel is there to stay. Something should be done. I have been very much disturbed by the testimony of many persons before this committee. There is that fear that we are just helping Nasser and we might go on to help Syria and we might go out and help some Arab countries and make them strong and make Israel weak in their dealings with them.

I agree with you, General Gruenther, 100 percent. I know what the feelings of the people under the rule of colonial powers is. There is no better way than to go in there and give those people help, which we can afford to do.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman GORDON. I have not yet called on Mr. Zablocki.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. It is very good to see you, General Gruenther. I deeply regret that circumstances made it impossible for me to hear your entire testimony. I want to assure you that I will carefully read it at the earliest opportunity.

I have no questions, Mr. Chairman, except to make a statement. General, you said it is vital that the Congress and the people of the United States express confidence in the administration. I want to make it clear that those of us who favor a concurrent resolution do not desire to weaken the President's hand. We do have confidence in the administration, and we want to see that the intent of the administration is carried out.

The Soviets used force in Eastern Europe. Do you think it was just as vital and that the Congress of the United States should have considered a resolution for psychological effect in Eastern Europe? Would a resolution by Congress in that area have the effect that we are hoping to bring about in the Middle East?

General GRUENTHER. The United States position on that, I think, was made unmistakably clear. I am now connected with the Red Cross, and I know that people showed their feeling by the contributions they made for Hungarian relief.

Our choice of freedom of action, of doing something about it was very considerably limited. Whether a resolution of the same purpose would have been useful—be it a concurrent or joint resolution—is perhaps doubtful. I feel that where the essential difference is, this area of the world is not yet under Soviet control, and we are trying to prevent that by serving notice in time.

What I am trying to do is be sure we don't get into the position where there are the same very serious problems that were evident in dealing with the Hungarian situation.

Mr. JUDD. Mr. Chairman.

Chairman GORDON. Mr. Judd.

Mr. JUDD. General, if you don't want to answer this question or keep it off the record, that is all right, but we don't have an opportunity to pick your brains very often.

So many people in our country are saying, "Why didn't the United States, when Hungary rose up, go in, give her aid, send her arms, give her military support, and all that sort of thing?"

The only answer I have heard which makes any sense to me—and I just wanted your opinion because your outfit would have been called upon to do it had anything been done—is this, that it was not militarily feasible, that to make the effort and fail would have weakened rather than strengthened the free world's position. It was like when Jesus said that before you go to war you ought to sit down and determine whether you have enough strength to win. If you have only 10,000 men and the other fellow has 20,000, you had better not go to war.

In other words, is it true that we were not in a position, outside of all-out war against Russia itself, to send in aid that would have been successful.

Then the Soviet Union would not only have crushed little Hungary, but she would seem to have shown that we, too, are a paper tiger. The Reds would have gotten psychological credit for a great defeat of the powerful United States, and it would have weakened our position. Furthermore, we cannot be called upon to go to the military assistance of any country where some students, however patriotic and commendable their enthusiasm and heroism, set off a demonstration in a place where we cannot win; is that right?

(Discussion off the record.)

Mr. JUDD. And we would have had to go through 2 neutrals, 1 Austria and the other Yugoslavia to get to Hungary.

General GRUENTHER. Off the record.

(Discussion off the record.)

Mr. VORYS. I would like to have a chance to ask a question.

Chairman GORDON. Mr. Vorys.

Mr. VORYS. On this matter of handling internal subversion, we have been told in these hearings that the removal of the possibility of outside Soviet military aggression, the assurance of a reasonable amount of economic support and a beefing up possibly of the internal security forces would in itself be a combination which would tend to make internal subversion not pay off.

In the case of Syria, if Syria had some naughty ideas in mind and if the President found they were Communist controlled and they moved against either Iraq or Israel our forces would have authority to move in, and that would tend to prevent successful internal subversion.

I would like your comment on that sort of testimony which has been presented to us, on this question of internal subversion.

(Discussion off the record.)

Mrs. KELLY. What was the status of the Morocco bases?

Chairman GORDON. That is off the record.

(Discussion off the record.)

Chairman GORDON. As always, General, you have made an excellent presentation. I certainly want to thank you for your appearance and for your patience.

Mr. FULTON. If you will accept it, I move we continue General Gruenther's honorary membership on this committee.

Chairman GORDON. The committee stands in recess until 2:30 this afternoon.

(Whereupon, at 1:30 p. m., the committee recessed until 2:30 p. m.)

AFTERNOON SESSION

The committee reconvened at 2:40 p. m., in room G-3, United States Capitol, the Honorable Thomas S. Gordon (chairman) presiding.

Chairman GORDON. The committee will come to order.

This meeting is a continuation of the hearing on House Joint Resolution 117.

Our first witness this afternoon to testify is Mr. Salem Bader, who was to testify yesterday afternoon. He is with the United States Arab Asian Institute.

STATEMENT OF SALEM BADER, UNITED STATES ARAB ASIAN INSTITUTE

Mr. BADER. Mr. Chairman and ladies and gentlemen, yesterday I witnessed the proceedings, and it rather frightened me because as a man and as an American, I was amazed to see 2 or 3 gentlemen—2 of them Congressmen of Jewish extraction—who were taking such freedom in advising this committee on such an important subject. This subject is so terrifying that it could bring about world war III in short order.

I was also surprised to see that many of those present were so poorly informed on a subject of the Middle East and the Arab world. I saw 3 gentlemen practically having complete freedom to speak for the benefit of 1.75 million Israelis or Zionists, with total disregard for 45 million or 50 million Arabs who are the chief and original inhabitants of that part of the world.

I heard Mr. Multer use such strong high-handed language, slanderous language, vilification of the Arab leaders, of the people, that I, a man who was brought up under British imperialism, had never heard anything like it.

I want to state that Mr. Multer's attitude in stating or advising this Government to go into the district of the Middle East or the Mid-east or the Near East, as some of us wonder what it should be called, advising this Government to go in and tell the Arab world, or the Arab leaders, "This is what we want. Take it or leave it"—to me that is the worst tone of imperialistic talk I have heard.

I want to accuse the gentleman of being one of the leading anti-Semites of this country. That may sound strange to you, but 50 million Arabs are Semitic people. They are the original Semites. Long before Abraham came down from Assyria. They have lived there all their lives. They are the originators of the Semitic culture and language. These people today, whether we like it or not, control the resources of a portion of the world that recently you have seen these resources denied to Western Europe and other parts of the world, and it has brought those sections of the world into economic bankruptcy. You can realize if these resources are further denied

what would happen to Western Europe, Asia, and Africa, and consequently to the economy of this country.

Therefore, we must not lose sight of, even if these Arabs do not have Congressmen to speak for them or gentlemen who are cloaked with congressional dignity to sit and advise committees what to do and how to do it—and I saw such courtesy and such gratitude accorded these men, thanking them for their advice to the committee, and so on. That is very nice. I wish I could get some of that courtesy and gratitude when I get through.

I want to tell you ladies and gentlemen that I speak for 50 million Arabs who want to be heard. I have spoken for them for over 15 years in this country, and I want you to know that what I say is said to protect American interests as well as Arab interests. You must all realize there are a few others living in this country and over there who are not Zionists.

Another question I want to answer because it seems to crop up every time I speak some place: Who is the United States-Arab Institute and who supports it?

We are an American corporation. We are pro-Arab and make no bones about it. We are supported by fees paid to us through American businessmen and corporations who come to us for consultation, for public relations work, for advice, for counsel on investments in the Middle East. We have never accepted Arab official or unofficial moneys because we have refused it. We wish to be free agents, and, as free Americans, to speak for American interests and Arab interests.

We do have close and confident connections with Arab leaders because of my background, my birth over there, and my father's, and my activities in getting those people their freedom from the Turks, and so forth, and so on.

I do help them on policy. They do come to me for advice and I am proud of it.

However, that does not mean we are anti-Jewish or we are anti-Semitic. How could we be when we all have either 100 percent or partial Semitic blood in our veins? As I said, the Arabs are the original Semites. We are not anti-Zionist. If the Zionists wish a country or a nation, there is lots of room in the world. We would even help them acquire it, but we believe that Palestine is Arab territory. It has been for many, many, many centuries. We believe that you cannot go into any territory and say, "This is where I want to live, this is going to be my country, now get out." And that is exactly what happened. Of course, the subject is large and I am not going into details on it. If you wish later to question me, I will be glad to answer.

We believe Palestine to be given to the Zionists was a great mistake and a crime against its native inhabitants. We believe, like I have always preached, that the repercussions coming from it may bring about a disastrous world war which none of us, I am sure, want to encounter or countenance. Because if this war comes, and if it has to be blamed on the small State of Israel or the Zionists, I do not think they would fare very well in the world.

The Arabs want nothing from this country. Nothing. They have never asked for economic aid. They have never asked for armed protection. If the Zionists who have gone into their midst, infiltrated, and finally waged war against them, and who threw out the natives,

1 million of which today are, and have been for almost 10 years, hungry, destitute, and demoralized.

I beg of you, do not regard this or handle this subject or the President's resolution so very lightly. It may be in your hands, whether you sign the papers that bring about a cataclysmic world war; whether American boys will die again or not.

The subject of the Middle East is not new. The only tragedy is that a lot of people have been fast asleep and refuse to listen to the emergency as it has been going on for several years now. This committee today and our Government is faced with another crisis. As I said, this crisis concerns the Middle East, a section of the world that is most strategic—geographically, politically, and economically—the resources of which mean the life or death of Western Europe, Asia, and Africa, and carry ominous consequences to the welfare and economy of our country.

What concerns our institute and yours truly more than this committee's decision to grant President Eisenhower's request to use armed forces and expend \$400 million in that part of the world is whether this committee, Congress as a whole, our Government, and the public are getting a balanced and objective picture of this very serious situation.

Let us emphasize two pertinent and serious points: Are the President, the Security Council, head men in the State Department, heads of intelligence agencies, getting high-level advance information on important events, or are our Government leaders prevented from receiving such strategic news by assistants around them who assume the responsibility of evaluating any information and decide whether it should be submitted to their chief?

Now, what I am going to say may sound critical of Mr. Eisenhower or Mr. Dulles. I assure you that I have nothing against either gentleman, and I assure you Mr. Eisenhower's stand has been magnificent. But this is to bring out a very important point as to whether our heads of Government are getting the facts, and I will show you what I mean.

The other pertinent point is, is the policy of our Government being decided by the influence of a clamorous, Zionist and pro-Zionist propaganda and other devious activities, using every means of public agency to color and mold official and public opinion and decision?

If these points are true—and our experience shows them to be true—then we are all in a very tragic state of affairs.

1. Our institute and the speaker have for the past 2½ years issued confidential and important memoranda, reports, warnings, to the various heads of our Government, including many Senators, Congressmen, to make up a bulging file which we call the "11th hour file concerning the Middle East."

In personal meetings with, and at their request, and without pay, we have issued one report after another. We have been in contact with men in the White House, in person or in writing, like Sherman Adams, Dick Anderson, William Jackson, Vice President Nixon's Office, through his assistant, Mr. Christian Herter, Jr.; top men in the State Department, top men in our intelligence agencies, and at least a score of Senators, with Mr. Knowland leading the list, and many Congressmen.

When one reads the statements made by Mr. Dulles before the committee accenting the actions needed in the Middle East, it is distressing to hear the Secretary of State repeating statements that might have been taken from our institute's reports addressed to him a year or even 2 years ago.

To mention a few pertinent critical warnings—and I said just a few—our institute attempted to reach our American Government within only a few months back:

Two weeks before the Egyptian Ambassador returned from Egypt, we had the information that Egypt was willing to accept American financial assistance with regard to the Aswan Dam and our institute attempted to appraise Mr. Dulles of this forthcoming acceptance to give him an advance period of preparation and to advise him that President Nasser was in a congenial and cooperative attitude and anxious to do business with the United States. We were unable to meet any top State Department men to convey this message. This incident, as you will remember, namely, Mr. Dulles' abrupt withdrawal of the American offer, is chiefly what brought about the Egyptian seizure of the Suez Canal Co. Three weeks before the nationalization of the Suez Canal, we attempted to contact Mr. Hoover, Mr. Allen—Mr. Dulles was away, you know; he likes to travel—to appraise them of the impending events, but these gentlemen were too busy to see us at the time.

We wrote to Mr. Dillon Anderson on July 18, special assistant to the President, informing him that we have very important top confidential information that could have world repercussions which must be conveyed to him in person and which should be brought to the attention of the President and the Security Council. Nothing happened until we received a reply from Mr. Anderson's secretary on July 25, stating that the gentleman was away on vacation. In desperation we met with the vice president of the Arabian American Oil Co., an ex-Ambassador to one of the Arab countries. And at the meeting, the gentleman was so haughty, so self-sufficient, and he assured us that Aramco had its agents well situated and therefore knew exactly what was going on all the time, and that he did not think there was anything of importance we could tell him or his company.

I left the gentleman saying, "Within a few days you will have a shock that will reverberate around the world."

Of course, as you know, on July 26, Mr. Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal Co.

On October 4, our institute issued a one-page bulletin specifically emphasizing the brewing collusion of the British and French and Israeli Governments to attack Egypt. This confidential bulletin was mailed to the White House to the two Mr. Dulleses at their respective offices, and not a sound was heard from any of these sources. On October 29, Britain, France, and Israeli attacked Egypt.

Since then, all three offices declare they never received this bulletin. A copy of this bulletin is attached to this statement for the record, together with a newspaper article concerning this discrepancy.

(The items referred to follow:)

THE UNITED STATES ARAB-ASIAN INSTITUTE, INC.

WASHINGTON, D. C.

OCTOBER 4, 1956.

BULLETIN

Amidst the noisy bluff and bluster, together with the threat of war on the part of the English-French Governments against Egypt, it is possible that the main enemy within the heart of the Arab world may have been overlooked.

This enemy is Israel, which has been playing a very cunning underground game in attempting to maneuver the western powers into producing for her an advantageous and profitable position out of the present Suez controversy.

1. Israel's timetable for a full-scale attack against Jordan and/or Egypt was August 1, 1956. This important information was given by this institute to key Arab leaders about July 15, 1956. Israel's timetable was interrupted by the advent of the nationalization of the Suez Canal Co.

2. This institute must emphasize now that top-level information is in hand that a clandestine conspiracy exists between the English-French governments and Israel; namely, that Israel under one pretext or another will launch a large-scale military and air attack on Jordan and/or Egypt simultaneously. This invasion by Israel will be used as a ruse by England and France to invade Egypt, Jordan, and perhaps Syria, with the claim that it was a forced necessity to keep the peace and protect British interests in the Middle East.

The Israel plan at the moment is to provoke its neighboring Arab countries by launching a series of minor attacks across their borders. If the reaction to these provocative excursions does not bring forth any violent retaliation which will give Israel a chance to claim self-defense, then stronger methods will be used.

At the moment, this secret agreement is being held in abeyance until other methods against Egypt are exhausted. When conferences and United Nations debates prove fruitless to break down Egypt's sovereign stand, then our Arab friends may look for Israel to take the initiative in launching a full-scale war against her Arab neighbors. Jordan is No. 1 on the list!

Warning: Keep your eyes focused on Israel.

[From the Washington Daily News of November 6, 1956]

LETTER PREDICTED ISRAELI-BRITISH-FRENCH ATTACKS

ARAB-ASIAN GROUP HERE SAYS IT WARNED UNITED STATES ON MIDDLE EAST

By Milton Berliner

Salem A. Bader, president of the United States Arab-Asian Institute, Inc., charged today that State Department, Central Intelligence Agency, and White House officials ignored his October tip that the Middle East was about to erupt.

The institute, at 1536 Connecticut Avenue, is a profitmaking group incorporated in Delaware. Mr. Bader said its chief purpose was to advise American investors; also, "trouble shoot for this Government when it gets into a pinch and diplomats can't talk to each other."

"We speak for Arab governments when they have trouble trying to give their views, and we sometimes go where angels fear to tread," said Mr. Bader, an American citizen. "This doesn't put money in the bank for you."

He said the institute receives no money from Arab governments.

"We don't want to be accused of being pro-Arab," he explained. "Of course, we are pro-Arab but not anti-Jewish, in the broad sense of the word. As for zionism, we feel Palestine is an Arab country."

CONFIDENTIAL

With this background, Mr. Bader produced a copy of a "confidential" report, dated October 4, 1956, which, he said, had been sent to the CIA, State Department, and the White House.

"The United States Government was not caught by surprise as claimed," he said. "This memo was shown to Government officials. Top-level men however, assure me they did not get our reports.

He pointed to a paragraph in the copy of the October 5 bulletin which read:

"This institute must emphasize now that top-level information is in hand that a clandestine conspiracy exists between the English-French Governments and Israel; namely, that Israel under one pretext or another will launch a large scale military and air attack on Jordan and/or Egypt simultaneously. This invasion by Israel will be used as a ruse by England and France to invade Egypt, Jordan, and perhaps Syria, with the claim that it was a forced necessity to keep the peace and protect British interests in the Middle East."

Mr. Bader said that on July 18 he sent a letter to Dillon Anderson, special assistant to the President on national security, telling him that "events have reached a most dangerous point" and offering to give him "far-reaching information."

HE WROTE TO DULLES

On July 30, Mr. Bader complained in a letter to Secretary of State John Foster Dulles that he had been unable to reach anyone to give the information to.

"May we suggest that you be prepared for several far-reaching surprises taking place in the Middle East in the near future," his letter said.

Mr. Bader explained why he had not made these complaints before today.

"I did not want to embarrass Ike," he said. "I still think he is the best man. But he just wasn't told about these things."

The foregoing items are only a few, and should be some evidence that neither this emergency nor the recent world-shaking events should have been a surprise, nor should this Government have been caught unawares.

The question, therefore, arises why was nothing done about these important events before they took place? If our top Government officials had received our information, if they are not getting important and critical information earnestly submitted by organizations in strategic positions, such as our institute, then it is possible to suspect that our high-placed executives are surrounded by the wrong people. Again, one might ask, Where are our national and international intelligence agents?

Therefore, in these dangerous periods, is it not advisable to look into the status and qualifications of not only our intelligence agencies, both civilian and military, as well as the qualifications of many high-placed Government officials here and abroad, and see whether the gentlemen are qualified or are they indifferent, or just what is wrong?

It should be obvious in these critical times that this country cannot further afford the luxury of political appointments based on a person's wealth or social prestige. We need men and women who are trained, conscientious, who know their business and territories of the world assigned to them.

Now, to deal with the item concerning Zionist propaganda in this country.

This Nation now, as it has been for several years back, has been faced with a thunder of American-Zionist voices as against an almost nonexistent Arab voice. The press, the radio, and other means of public information, are stuffed with Zionist propagandists representing a multitude of Jewish organizations. As if this is not enough, every rabbi has become a geopolitician and every layman and businessman has emerged as a foreign policy expert. That is, when the subject concerns Israel as against the Arab people.

We find even Congressmen, as I said before, lending the weight and prestige of their office to influence one-sided American official decisions,

and people like us wonder if the interests of this country, its welfare and future is being directed to coincide with fanatical Zionist ambitions.

The American public today we believe to be at the mercy of this biased one-sided din of voices giving the impressions that Israel is a rosy, democratic utopia while every shade of criticism, ridicule, and condemnation is heaped upon the Arab countries.

The last few months have produced something novel and it would be fantastic if the American Government and public were not beginning to believe it. Namely, that the Arab governments and leaders have adopted communism as their new political idealogy and are about to vanish behind the curtain of international communism.

One columnist in last Sunday's Washington Post stated that only Turkey and Israel are devoid of communism in the Middle East. It is difficult to find words to contradict such unfounded and false propaganda. The truth is that communism is impossible to fit into the Moslem religious precepts and that its inception was conceived in the minds of Karl Marx and Engels, both Jewish gentlemen, and was carried to Russia by Trotsky, Litvinoff, and many others, all of Jewish extraction, working under assumed names. In the Middle East the Communist Party and Communist activities are outlawed in every Arab country, but the Communist Party in Israel has been not only legal but the fountainhead of all Communist activities in the Arab world. Further, it can be easily said that communism was not even Russian in its inception.

If this statement is true, and we are willing to challenge publicly anyone to dispute it, indeed, how is the American public and the Arab people able to combat this overwhelming, incredibly well-financed Zionist organizations with millions of dollars to throw away. Cohesively organized, politically entrenched, bending the will of a great and massive nation, a nation the whole world looks to for justice, decency, and impartiality. And I still believe we possess those qualities, gentlemen, but we must have a balance of facts.

The President's program is based on the assumption that the Middle East is being threatened by a new Frankenstein. Now it is the Russians or international communism which is threatening to take over the Middle East. How easy and accustomed we have become to find a scapegoat to blame it on in any world emergency that arises. It is not the Russians, nor international communism that has brought about this crisis, nor the Russian-Egyptian arms deal, nor the incident of the Suez Canal, nor the potential loss of the oil and resources of the Arab world. It is none of these. All these are effects, and not causes. This situation which may well bring about a cataclysmic world war is the natural aftermath of Mr. Truman's administration's policies against 50 million Arabs by forcefully imposing upon them the state of Israel in the heart of their land, their culture, and their civilization.

Mr. Truman admitted this in his book: that he was forced to act under pressure and against the best minds in our State Department.

Anything else used as a basis for this emergency is merely shadow-boxing, evading the issue, and covering up an incredible wrong inflicted against not only the Arab people but the American people as well.

Gentlemen, no amount of money, no threat to use United States Armed Forces, no United Nations debates will solve this problem until the basic cause is corrected or eliminated.

What the Middle East and 50 million Arabs are saying to us now is, "Choose ye this day whom you will serve."

Do we want the friendship, the goodwill, the cooperation, and benefits from the enormous resources controlled by a people who for decades have idolized the United States but whom we have shamefully alienated, or do we want to carry on coddling and supporting 1.75 million collections of Zionists whose presence there in the Middle East is an imposition and who have been and will continue to be no more than a subsidy of American Zionist power. They have been and still are, and increasingly so, will continue to be a liability, a millstone and a stumbling block to the future policy of the United States, Western Europe, and may indeed be the cause of another disastrous world war.

In the last few months Israel proved, in spite of the fact that she claims she wants the friendship of her neighbors—or the friendship of this country—she has proved that she possesses no gratitude for all this country has done for her.

In collusion with British and French politicians, whose Governments I might say have betrayed, subjugated, and abused the Arab world for years, Israel did not hesitate to spill over her dubious borders to gang up against a small nation and kill, pillage, and bomb men, women, and children by the thousands. This, mind you, in complete defiance of the world's opinion, the United Nations and above all, in defiance of the United States, her greatest benefactor, to whom Israel owes its very existence.

Further, at the specific order of the United Nations to withdraw unconditionally, even her withdrawal was fraught with malicious destruction of roads, buildings, and installations and brazen and willful pillaging and looting of everything before them, and arrogantly boasting about it. Now, this is not anti-Semitism, gentlemen, these are facts and they have been published and republished.

Since President Eisenhower's program distinctly concerns the Arab world, their future safety and welfare, we believe the President's program should have been taken up with the Arab leaders before it was presented to the Congress. However, our institute has taken the trouble to meet with various Arab diplomats and government officials to secure their intimate reaction to President Eisenhower's doctrine. This is what we find:

The use of armed forces:

1. Almost unanimously Arab leaders object to the placing of American Armed Forces within their respective countries and this objection includes any and all other foreign armed forces. They feel that this sudden sabre rattling may provoke similar action on the part of Russia and this might end up in Arab lands being devastated and loss of Arab lives beyond imagination.

2. They feel that as sovereign states—it is indeed presumptuous on the part of any nation to intend to march their troops into their respective countries under some pretext or another and particularly under the vague excuse of international communism. They ask, what if the Russians make the same request and ask for the same privilege?

3. They emphasize that the usage of the word "Middle East" is being promiscuously used without a definite and specific boundary explanation.

4. Arab leaders, due to the United States very sympathetic and partial past and present support of the State of Israel, are inclined to wonder if American troops are not really intended to further protect Israel from the Arab States, particularly now since Israel has committed its last bit of treachery and conclusive attack.

5. The Arab leaders, in spite of the fact they appreciate deeply Mr. Eisenhower's valiant opposition to the British-French-Israel attack against Egypt, question if the United States deep and basic sympathies is not for those three nations as evidenced by the rush to overcome American economic support to Britain and France, while no support whatsoever has been offered Egypt; intended to add insult to injury, the United States still refuses to free some \$50 million of Egyptian funds while at this late date Mr. Dulles takes a slap at the Egyptian economy.

6. The Arabs are amazed at American reaction toward Israel after its collusive and defiant activities against Egypt. As we all know, Israel did not even get a sound scolding.

7. The Arabs believe that if this program is to be sanctioned, the military aspect of it should never have been combined with the economic part of it.

Now with regard to the economic aid:

1. The Arab leaders state that \$200 million a year to cover the whole Mideast or Middle East, including Ethiopia and Baghdad Pact nations does not begin to make a dent of any substantial benefit to any one specific country.

2. This program is also presented in very vague terms. Arab leaders think that any American expenditures along that line should be specifically defined as to each and every country and based according to the country's needs, since some countries enjoy a much more extensive income than others.

However, the Arab leaders feel that Israel will get the lion's share again of any and all moneys involved in this economic aid program.

They wish to point out that they are not as privileged as is Israel to have hundreds of organizations in the United States collecting millions of dollars continuously for her benefit.

3. The Arab leaders wish to emphasize that the United States in matters of economic aid are sending them too many native American personnel who squander money needlessly with no understanding of the local economy, the people's psychology, their language, human needs, customs, and idiosyncrasies. Arab government leaders are sure that any moneys coming forth from the United States will go four times as far if such moneys are given to their respective governments to spend since they understand the needs of their people, and if American officials and a few technicians are necessary to limit that number to a very minimum.

In closing, gentlemen, Arab leaders expressly suggest that since the King of Saudi Arabia is visiting with Mr. Eisenhower at the end of the month, in this country, that all definite decisions be withheld until after consultations and intimate views have been exchanged between this Government and the King of Saudi Arabia.

Thank you, ladies and gentlemen.

Chairman GORDON. Thank you, Mr. Bader. I do not know whether you have touched on the point of the Suez Canal. You may have while I was called out during your statement. I want to ask you if you will give me your opinion on this: What do you believe should be done to guarantee the free use of the Suez Canal by all nations?

Mr. BADER. Well, Mr. Chairman, that is a good question and I might state—I cannot tell you all that our institute has been doing but we were asked to negotiate—by certain agencies of our Government—with the Egyptian officials to see what can be done after the seizure of the Suez Canal Co. And may I state here the term used—Nasser seizing the canal—Nasser never seized the Suez Canal. He merely nationalized the Suez Canal Co. which was an Egyptian corporation operating under Egyptian law. The Suez Canal was always Egyptian territory.

I can assure you that through our confidential meetings and in my negotiations, I found that Nasser was willing to cooperate in every way, shape, and form. He did not want English or French influence any more. Over and over again Egyptian officials assured me that "We want to do business with the United States."

In the matter of the pilots, if you will remember, the State Department was withholding the passports of certain pilots, and I am happy to say I was able to convey the message to them that it would be advisable to let American pilots go and also told them after a telephone call with Cairo that they will take all the American pilots we can give them. I also informed them that Russia offered Mr. Nasser 200 pilots. He only permitted 15 and refused the rest.

Egypt emphasized, that they object to the word "international control." They feel this is Egyptian territory, there is no crime nationalizing a company that was Egyptian. They were willing to pay the stockholders their full share and they felt that since they have proven that they did not close the canal, that they bent over backward to keep it open, even with 70 pilots—and I am told it needs 210, or something like that—worked day and night; even when the British and the French objected to paying their tolls to the Egyptian authorities—they wanted to pay them in London or Paris—the Egyptians said, "Go ahead and do it."

Now does that prove that they ever closed the canal or intended to?

As a matter of fact, one Egyptian official told me that, "We are willing to accept a board and to place as many Americans as we place Egyptians on the board that manages and runs the canal."

Now does that show that the country is being anti-United States or anti anybody?

Now, these are facts, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman GORDON. Thank you very much, Mr. Bader.

Mr. Vorys.

Mr. VORYS. Mr. Bader, I get the impression from your statement that you do not think that Arab leaders, by which I would mean the chiefs of state and the official spokesmen for the Arab governments—are communicating with our Government through the Department of State on this legislation. I assure you, you are in error.

Mr. BADER. I did not mean there had been no contact whatsoever, Mr. Vorys, but I do know diplomats, and diplomats can only speak

so much and go so far. Sometimes they are not at liberty to say what they think. That is where people like me who grew up with them sometimes can get to their innermost thinking and can get to what they really feel, and think, and I can convey it to our Government.

To say that the Arab diplomats in America knew of the details of this resolution and what it holds is not so, because, as you know, they are objecting to it. Secondly, there is contact with the State Department.

Mr. VORYS. The Arab leaders who contacted you on this matter were in error on the second objection you list, where you say they objected to the possibility of our marching troops into their countries under any sort of pretext because this resolution specifically requires that military aid will only be furnished when the countries request it. The Arab leaders who conferred with you about that did not know, as I think the government officials in all the countries involved know, that this legislation is not to authorize what Britain, France, and Israel did, to go into a country without its consent, but this resolution would not authorize the use of our arms without the request of the country involved.

Mr. BADER. Mr. Vorys, you know I have a great deal of respect for what you think, but let me point out that 50 million Arabs have for many hundreds of years been subjugated by the Turks, by the British, and other foreign powers. When people are subjugated for such a long period they develop a psychosis of fear of any foreign government or foreign power that may use some pretext or another to march troops into that country. Now I may have used my own language there to emphasize the subject but they are afraid that at some time or other, if Syria, for instance, was to buy further arms from Russia, because we won't sell them to her, then the Zionists in a big clamor would come up and say that they have gone behind the Iron Curtain now and they are a Communist state, and on that pretext we would send American troops to that country. Or it could be Egypt, Jordan, or any country.

The main point is, when you talk foreign troops to those Arabs who have wanted their freedom and have fought for it and have just emerged from under subjugation in the last 10 years, you might say, they are very much afraid of any large power talking about the sending of troops into their part of the world. And now, more than ever, after the British-French-Israeli attack on Egypt.

Mr. VORYS. Have you communicated with these Arab leaders since the testimony before our committee that it was not the purpose of this resolution to use the authority granted by this resolution to station troops in any Arab country? Did you know that? That is what the testimony is before this committee.

Mr. BADER. That the committee has decided that?

Mr. VORYS. No; that was the testimony of the executive branch before this committee. We have been told that this would not require any new forces to be stationed in the Middle East, because it is not proposed to use this authority to station any troops in the countries of the Middle East. That is the testimony before this committee.

Mr. BADER. That is very excellent.

Mr. VORYS. In any case, as I get it, you are opposed to both the military and the economic provisions of this resolution?

Mr. BADER. No; I am not opposed to the economic side of it because I have been working and recommending to certain executive branches of our Government and working for economic aid for the Arab world, and have been trying to show them how badly it is needed and that the standard of living and all this poverty must be eliminated before we get anywhere. I have even tried to show them that that is much more important than ranting and raving about communism and Russia. They are agreeable. No; I am not against economic aid, but I do want it more specific, and I think certain countries that have large oil revenues do not need it as bad as other countries who have no revenue whatsoever, or whose revenue is very, very meager. Do you wish me to mention countries? I would be glad to.

Mr. VORYS. No; we have been given that information and we are familiar with the countries that have oil revenues, and, of course, Egypt has available revenues from oil, as soon as the canal is cleared and the oil starts to go through the canal again.

Mr. BADER. That is not oil revenue; that is just merely tolls on ships going in. That is a very nominal amount and up to date they have not decided how much Egypt is to get. Of course, at the moment nobody is getting anything.

Mr. VORYS. Well, the oil companies out there pay royalties, and properly so, when the oil is taken out of the ground, and Syria gets revenue from the transit of oil across Syria, and Egypt, having nationalized the Suez Canal Co., which Egypt had the right to do under international law, Egypt will have the income from tolls as soon as the oil starts to go through again. Is that correct?

Mr. BADER. Whether that is sufficient to keep its economy going, many of our experts do not feel that it is.

Mr. VORYS. That is another question.

One thing I want to ask you: Yesterday we were told at some length about the violation of the truce arrangements by Egypt. The border incidents. I wonder if you have at hand any record of the violations that the United Nations Truce Observation Commission observed with regard to both the Arabs and Israel?

Mr. BADER. Do you mean recently or something that has been going on in the last several years?

Mr. VORYS. Well, we were told at great length yesterday about the violations by Egypt. When I was there over 2 years ago, there were constant border raids going on both ways. I wondered if you had any information on that.

Mr. BADER. Let me try and illustrate a picture of a small country where suddenly a million of its inhabitants—and the whole population was 1.5 million—but 1 million in that small country being kicked out and having to squat—to use a common word—on its borders, on the side of Jordan or the Gaza strip, or Syria, or Lebanon. They look across a dubious border and they see a Jewish or a Zionist gentleman living in their home, farming their land, utilizing their property, and there this poor Arab sits. How would you feel? There he sits starving, mind you, trying to exist on \$2 a month because that is all the United Nations permits him—how would you feel if you were in his shoes? These exaggerated reports about fadayeens and commando raids are nothing but small incidents of Arab people whose property

and homes and lives have been expropriated, taken away from them by force of arms. They sometimes get desperate and cross this border trying to get either some food or a cow that belonged to them or some goats that belonged to them, or some citrus fruit, or what have you.

To hear about them here in this country, you would think they have regular commando units trained, equipped, and armed to commit acts of terrorism.

There might be a few of those units, but what is the serious damage that they have done so far? It is so minute against Israeli's fanning out across her borders and killing 50 or 60 Syrians at one time, 50 or 60 Jordanians, or the recent attack on Egypt, completely without notifying anybody. And then the British and the French bombarding Port Said with thousands and thousands of men, women, and children, their homes, their businesses being blasted, and thousands killed and maimed.

Let us just use a sense of comparison.

Mr. VORYS. Mr. Chairman, I want to suggest in view of the discussion that has gone on along this line that we request our staff to secure from the State Department or our representatives in the U. N., any summary that is available, or any description of the border incidents in the past few years and up to now. The administration has in mind we should not try to cover the Arab-Israeli issue in this legislation, but since it has been brought before us so often by witnesses, it seems to me that in order to decide whether to incorporate it or eliminate it, we ought to have the U. N. observation reports on this before us for our committee deliberations.

Chairman GORDON. I think it is important that we have that information and I will have the staff look into it.

Mr. VORYS. I have no further questions.

Mr. BADER. I have one United Nations report that I can give you.

Chairman GORDON. Our staff will secure it.

(The information requested is as follows. For additional information, including a digest of the following summary of border incidents prepared by the Legislative Reference Service, see p. 472.)

THE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS
LEGISLATIVE REFERENCE SERVICE
Washington, D. C.

JANUARY 23, 1957.

SUMMARY OF BORDER INCIDENTS BETWEEN ARABS AND ISRAELIS, BASED ON U. N.
REPORTS

(By Arthur H. Darken, Foreign Affairs Division)

The enclosed summary is based exclusively on the reports of the U. N. Truce Supervision Organization and those of the Secretary General relative to the subject. These reports were made irregularly, usually on the occurrence of a major incident. Thus, this summary does not mention every individual incident. The U. N. reports do, however, include summaries of most of the incidents that had taken place since the report immediately preceding. An absolutely complete enumeration of the border incidents could be obtained only by recording each of the individual complaints filed with the U. N. by Israel or the Arab States. Finally, it should be noted that no U. N. reports have been received by the Library of Congress or the State Department for the period following the end of October, during the major Israeli military action in Egyptian-controlled territory.

1955

January 21: An Egyptian military patrol attacked an Israeli post manned by 3 soldiers of whom 1 was killed and the other 2 wounded. Egypt was condemned for the action.

January 21: Armed infiltrators from Egyptian-controlled territory attacked 2 Israeli's almost 4 miles from the demarcation line while they were ploughing their fields with a tractor. One was killed, the other wounded. Two attackers were killed. The Mixed Armistice Commission condemned Egypt for this attack.

February 1: An exchange of fire took place across the demarcation line between an Israeli patrol and an Egyptian military position. One Egyptian soldier was killed, two were wounded. One Israeli was wounded. The Mixed Armistice Commission adopted both the Egyptian and Israeli resolutions on the incident, thus dividing the responsibility.

February 22: An exchange of fire took place. Again, both sides were condemned.

November 1954 to February 1955: Including the 4 preceding incidents, there were 99 Israeli complaints, out of which 80 alleged infiltrations from Egyptian-controlled territory, 10 crossings of the demarcation line by armed groups, 4 firings across the line, 3 crossing the line by an armed unit. Out of 36 Egyptian complaints, 9 alleged firings across the line, 9 over flights of Egyptian-controlled territory, 6 crossings of the line by armed groups, 3 crossings of the line by an armed unit. In all these incidents 4 Israelis were killed and 4 wounded. One Egyptian was killed and 7 wounded. Among Arab infiltrators into Israel territory 8 were killed, 2 wounded, and 13 captured.

February 28: A force of Israeli soldiers estimated at two platoons, crossed the demarcation line and advanced about 2 miles inside Egyptian-controlled territory. Using explosives they attacked an Egyptian military camp, the Gaza stationmaster's house, and a concrete water-pump house supplying part of the Gaza area. At the same time, another group of the Israeli Army crossed the demarcation line almost 4 miles southeast of Gaza and ambushed a military truck carrying troops who were moving from the south to reinforce the garrison of the Egyptian camp near the railway station. The attack was carried out on a highway about 2 miles within Egyptian-controlled territory. The Egyptian casualties were 36 military personnel and 2 civilians killed, 29 military personnel and 2 civilians wounded. The Israeli claim that their troops had been ambushed on Israeli-controlled territory and that the battle merely continued within Egyptian-controlled territory was not adopted by the Mixed Armistice Commission. This was the most serious incident since the signing of the armistice agreement.

March 9: Israel was condemned when an Arab farmer was wounded in the Gaza strip by an Israeli patrol which fired across the demarcation line. The wounded man was captured by two armed Israelis who crossed the demarcation line.

March 12: Egypt was condemned when an Israeli Army command car was blown up by a mine laid on the track used by Israel routine patrols along the demarcation line of the Gaza strip. There were no casualties.

March 19: Egypt was condemned when a mine laid on the track used by Israel routine patrols blew up an Israel Army vehicle, slightly wounding four Israeli soldiers.

March 24: Egypt was condemned for an incident over 10 miles from the demarcation line, when 2 men threw hand grenades and fired 4 bullets at an Israeli wedding party, killing 1 woman and wounding 23 men, women, and children.

March 28: Egypt was condemned for an incident when a mine laid on the track used by Israel routine patrols blew up an Israel Army vehicle, seriously wounding 2 Israelis, an officer and a private.

March 30: Egypt and Israel were both condemned when fire was exchanged between an Israel patrol driving along the demarcation line and an Egyptian position. Both sides used automatic weapons and 3-inch mortars. One Egyptian soldier was wounded. It was impossible to determine which side fired first.

March 31: Egypt was condemned when a mine laid on the track used by Israel routine patrols blew up an Israel Army vehicle, wounding 2 Israeli soldiers.

April 1: Egypt was condemned when a mine was laid on the track used by Israel routine patrols blew up an Israel Army command car. One Israeli soldier was seriously injured.

April 1: Israel was condemned when Israeli soldiers opened fire at an Egyptian outpost with rifles, etc. wounding an Arab boy. The MAC chairman noted, however, that the firing took place near the spot where the Israel command car was blown up at about the same time.

April 2: Another case of the mining of the track used by Israel patrols and another case of an exchange of fire. Both the Israel and Egyptian resolutions were adopted. In the Egyptian resolution the Mixed Armistice Commission found that Israeli soldiers opened fire at an Egyptian outpost with rifles, etc. and that an Israel jeep penetrated 100 meters into Egyptian-controlled territory. As a result 2 Egyptian soldiers were wounded, 1 of whom later died. In the Israeli resolution, the Mixed Armistice Commission found that a group of men crossed the demarcation line and laid a mine on the routine route of Israel security patrols, 2 meters from the demarcation line. The mine blew up an Israel command car. Egyptian military positions opened fire at the patrol and at an Israel observation post with automatic weapons. Five soldiers and one officer of the Israel patrol were wounded.

April 3: Both the Egyptian and Israeli resolutions were adopted in an incident. On the Egyptian side, 2 soldiers were killed and 5 wounded. On the Israel side, 2 were killed and 14 wounded. In the Egyptian resolution the Mixed Armistice Commission found that an Israel Army unit driving three armed command cars came near the demarcation line and fired at an Egyptian check post. The Egyptian check post was heavily shelled from several Israel positions. One Israel armored vehicle crossed the demarcation line and attacked the Egyptian check post. These were considered violations by Israel. In the Israel resolution, the Mixed Armistice Commission found that two Egyptian military positions attacked a routine Israel military patrol driving along the routine patrol route. Reinforcements had to be called up to help the Israelis and crossed the demarcation line with one armored vehicle going toward the Egyptian position. Egypt was condemned for this flagrant violation.

February 28 to April 14: Between these 2 dates, the Egyptian delegation lodged 49 complaints and Israel 35. 21 Egyptian complaints alleged overflights, 16 firing across the demarcation line, 6 crossings of the demarcation line by an armed group, and 2 crossings by an armed unit; 13 Israel complaints alleged infiltration into Israel, 8 firing across the demarcation line, and 7 the blowing up by a mine of an Israel command car on patrol along the demarcation line. In addition, 3 Israel complaints alleged overflights, 2 crossings of the demarcation line by an armed group and 1 crossing by an armed unit. Israel reported these casualties: 4 killed and 51 wounded. Egypt reported these casualties: 6 killed and 9 wounded. 4 Arab infiltrators have been reported killed and 1 wounded inside Israel.

April 15 to August 22: It is reported that there were frequent incidents until June 1 arising from the combination of Israeli motor patrols along one side of the demarcation line and Egyptian outposts on the other side and close to it. There were very few incidents of this type from June 1 until their resumption on August 22.

August 22 to September 1: There was a steady stream of incidents during these days. It began on August 22 when an Egyptian post near the demarcation line was occupied by Israeli forces. One Egyptian officer and 2 soldiers were killed and 3 others wounded. This episode was followed by an organized series of attacks on vehicles, installations and persons, carried out by gangs of marauders in Israeli territory which resulted in the deaths of 11 military and civilian personnel and the injury of 9. Investigations by the U. S. military observers support the view these acts of sabotage well within Israeli territory were the work of organized and well-trained groups. There were also numerous incidents of firing across the demarcation line with, in some cases, incursions by small parties of troops on either side. According to U. N. information, 4 Egyptians were killed and 11 wounded, while 3 Israelis were wounded.

The major incident of this period was the attack by Israeli forces at Khan Yunis on August 31 to September 1. An Israeli armored unit penetrated Egyptian controlled territory and advanced to the police station at Khan Yunis, finally destroying it with explosives. A hospital under construction was also partly destroyed and neighboring buildings were machine-gunned. An Egyptian defensive position east of Abasan was attacked and casualties inflicted. The Egyptians reported 36 killed and 18 wounded.

December 11, 12: During the first 10 months of 1955 Israel reported that on at least 25 occasions Syrian outposts had fired on Israeli fishermen and police launches causing loss of life and property on Lake Tiberias. There were no

investigations requested. Such an attack by Syrian forces on the night of December 10 was held by Israel to be linked with Israel's attack on Syria the following day. On that day an Israeli armed force of company strength crossed the demarcation line into Syria and launched simultaneous attacks against a Syrian Army post in the vicinity of a farm and against the farm itself; 10 Syrians were killed, 1 wounded, and 3 were reported missing. The Israeli force destroyed five concrete bunkers and assorted buildings and tents at the Army post in addition to a large house on the farm and other equipment there.

The operations carried out by the Israeli Army extended further south. At a Syrian post which marked the demilitarized zone a Syrian soldier was killed and all the buildings blown up. At another post, all the concrete works were blown up and the ammunition dumps emptied by the Israeli attackers; 1 Syrian officer and 10 soldiers were killed; 3 other posts in the Lake Tiberias area were dealt with similarly. In addition, a small Israeli party apparently struck east. It was reported that a Syrian reconnaissance patrol had been caught and lost 1 officer and 6 other soldiers. Finally, Israel complained that Syrian forces had shelled an Israeli settlement in the demilitarized zone. U. N. observers found such evidence.

December 11, 12: As a result of all these operations, there were 56 Syrians killed, 9 wounded, and 23 missing. On the Israeli side, the Israeli Army reported that 6 were killed and 10 wounded. Neither Syria nor Israel requested a meeting of the Mixed Armistice Commission to deal with these incidents. The Chief of Staff of the truce supervisory organization concluded that the Israeli action on the night of December 11 and 12 was a deliberate violation of the provisions of the armistice agreement, including those relating to the demilitarized zone which was crossed by the Israeli forces entering Syria. The incident has been explained by Israel as a retaliatory one, but the report concluded there was striking contrast between the large scale of the retaliation and the small provocation cited by the Israeli Government.

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March 12: Several incidents had occurred in the Moussadiya area of Lake Tiberias from February 19 to 24 and this was another instance involving Israeli police boats being fired upon by Syrians. Both sides, Syria and Israel, violated the armistice agreement by firing across the demarcation line.

May 19: There was an ambush on the Hadera-Afula main road in Israel in which an Israeli motorcyclist was wounded. Jordan was held responsible.

June 5: Two Israelis were wounded during an exchange of fire following the uprooting of trees by an Israeli tractor on the Jordan side of the demarcation line. Joint responsibility of Jordan and Israel established.

June 24: During an exchange of fire, 2 Israeli policemen were killed, 1 Israeli settler and 1 Jordanian National Guard were wounded. Israel was held responsible.

April 26 to June 28: Two other instances in which Israelis were killed or wounded were not considered by the Mixed Armistice Commission. During the period Israel lodged 84 complaints with the Hashemite Jordan Kingdom-Israel Mixed Armistice Commission; 21 alleged crossings of the demarcation line by military units or armed civilians, 9 crossings of the demarcation line and firing, 18 firing across the demarcation line, 1 crossing of the demarcation line by unarmed civilians, 9 overflights and 8 miscellaneous violations. During the same period Jordan lodged 139 complaints, 84 of which were alleged overflights, 8 alleged crossing of the demarcation line by military units or armed civilians, 31 firing across the demarcation line, 4 crossing of the demarcation line by unarmed civilians and 12 miscellaneous violations.

July 9: An Israeli border police car was blown up by an electrically controlled mine about 2 miles from the demarcation line. Jordan was held responsible for this incident in which a police sergeant was wounded.

July 9: An Israeli civilian car was ambushed on a Negev road. Two Israeli civilians were killed. Jordan was held responsible.

July 13: An Israeli car driver was killed near Lydda Airport. Israel submitted no resolution referring to the futility of securing another condemnation of Jordan.

July 14, 15: A group of 100 Israeli soldiers crossed the demarcation line south of the Dead Sea, and penetrated over 2 miles into Jordan. The Israeli Government was informed that this constituted a very serious breach of the Armistice Agreement.

June 29 to July 21: In this period Israel lodged 29 complaints, 3 alleged crossing of the demarcation line and firing, 2 crossing of the demarcation line followed by thefts, 6 firing across the demarcation line, 10 crossing of the demarcation line by unarmed civilians, 5 overflights, 3 miscellaneous violations. Jordan lodged 113 complaints, 87 of which alleged overflights, 3 alleged crossing of the demarcation line by military unit or armed civilians, 1 crossing of the demarcation line and firing, 15 firing across the demarcation line, 3 crossing of the demarcation line by unarmed civilians; 4 complaints alleged miscellaneous violations. The casualties were 3 Israelis killed and 2 wounded.

July 22, 28: During the week, Israel lodged 17 complaints, 4 alleged crossing of the demarcation line by military unit or armed civilians, 1 alleging crossing of the demarcation line and firing, 7 alleging firing across the demarcation line, 1 alleging an attempted theft after crossing of the demarcation line, 1 alleging crossing of the demarcation line by unarmed civilians, 1 alleging overflights and 2 miscellaneous violations.

Jordan lodged 28 complaints, 16 of which alleged overflights, 1 complaint alleged crossing of the demarcation line by a military unit, 9 firing across the demarcation line and 2 miscellaneous violations. During the period 1 Israeli and 6 Jordanians were reported wounded.

July 24, 25: In the Sheik Abd El Aziz area there were conflicting stories of the Israeli-Jordanian fighting and the U. N. group adopted 1 resolution from Jordan and 1 from Israel. Israel said rifle fire opened from the houses there on some laborers. An Israeli covering force returned the fire to extricate the workers. There were no Israeli casualties. Jordan held that a party of 7 Israelis arrived at a vineyard and remained until a shot was heard from the Israeli side, followed by mortar fire, 5 Jordanian national guards and 1 civilian were wounded. In another incident at the same time, an Israeli resolution was adopted on the throwing of a bomb into the children's house of a kibbutz. No one was injured. Tracks led to the demarcation line. On July 25 firing took place between Jordanian and Israeli police on Mount Scopus. The presence of Jordanian troops could be considered a violation of this area. Situation was complicated by a dispute as to the correct line of demarcation shown on the maps used.

August 4: Both Egypt and Israel complained of firing across the demarcation line. The Egyptian complaint was upheld by U. N. observers.

August 5: Israel twice complained that the same Israeli position was shooting across the demarcation line again. U. N. observers witnessed the shooting.

August 5: Egypt complained that an Israeli patrol from El Auja crossed the international frontier into Egypt covered by fire from an Israeli position in the demilitarized zone. Substantiated by competent observers.

August 10: Israel complained that as a result of Egyptian firing across the demarcation line there was fire returned by Israeli military personnel. Substantiated.

August 11: Israel twice complained of Egyptian firing across the demarcation line. No evidence found. Two more Egyptian complaints of the same thing later that day.

August 12: Israel twice complained of Egyptians firing across the demarcation line showing mark on a tractor as evidence of one of the incidents.

August 13: Egypt twice complained of Israelis firing across the demarcation line; one instance was witnessed by a U. N. observer.

August 14: An Israeli truck was reported damaged and its driver slightly wounded by a mine at Sde Boker which was confirmed on investigation.

August 14: Israel complained that a lorry had been blown up by a mine in the Sde Boker area. The driver was only slightly injured and the only passenger not at all. Not considered likely the Mixed Armistice Commission will adjudicate the case due to opposition to its meeting at headquarters by Israel.

August 15: Israel complained of snipers firing across the demarcation line and said fire was returned.

August 16: Israel reported 1 civilian truck damaged and 5 of its 20 passengers wounded by a mine which was confirmed by U. N. observers.

August 16: Egypt reported Israeli night attacks. Investigation showed a group of from 12 to 20 armed persons had crossed the demarcation line from Israel.

August 16: Israel complained that a civilian transport vehicle had hit a mine laid by saboteurs from Egyptian-controlled territory on the road from Elath to Sde Boker and that 5 persons aboard were wounded, 1 seriously. Not likely the Mixed Armistice Commission will take up the matter for Israel opposes any meeting of the Mixed Armistice Commission at its headquarters in the demilitarized zone which is now occupied by Israeli troops.

August 16: An Israeli bus traveling from Tel Aviv to Elath and 2 military escort jeeps were fired upon from an ambush: 4 persons were killed and 6 wounded. Jordan was held responsible for this incident.

August 16 to 17: A group of 12 to 20 armed persons crossed the demarcation line from Israel to Egyptian-controlled territory, where they exchanged fire with a 3-man Egyptian listening post. Later met by an Egyptian patrol while still in Egyptian territory. Three Egyptians were killed in the fighting. Again, the incident could not be considered.

August 16 to 17: An Egyptian jeep with 6 passengers was ambushed by a group of 5 to 7 men. They laid mines in the road and attacked the jeep with machine-gun fire. Tracks led to the demarcation line. Again, the incident probably will not be considered.

August 18: Egypt complained that Israelis fired across the demarcation line. Israel complained the Egyptians had fired across the demarcation line in another place. Further complaints of exchanges of fire the same day.

August 19: Egypt complained that a civilian had been wounded by gunfire. United Nations observers saw the wounded man.

August 19: Israeli armored fighting vehicles were seen operating in the Dawiyima area near the Jordan border. The presence of armored fighting vehicles within $6\frac{1}{4}$ miles of the demarcation line is prohibited under the general armistice agreement. Israel was held responsible.

August 20: At this meeting of the Mixed Armistice Commission, Jordan was held responsible for an incident in which 15 armed men from Jordan crossed the demarcation line in the Arava area, set up ambushes at the side of the main road and opened fire on a passenger bus to Elath and at 2 jeeps escorting it. The attack resulted in killing 1 woman passenger and 3 soldiers in the escort. Seven Israelis were wounded.

August 21: An Israeli patrol crossed the demarcation line and exchanged fire with a Jordanian patrol, as a result of which 3 Jordanian National Guardsmen were wounded and 1 Israeli soldier killed. Israel was held responsible.

August 23: Egypt complained that Israelis fired shots across the demarcation line intermittently. A clash between Israeli and Egyptian patrols also occurred that day. It was not possible to determine which side began the firing. During the investigation the U. N. observers were fired upon from Egyptian-controlled territory. Two wounded Egyptians and two wounded Israeli soldiers were seen by the U. N. observer.

Observers reported mounted Israeli patrols of 30 to 40 men within 200 to 300 meters of the demarcation line on August 15, 16, 22, 25, as well as those engaged on August 23 and 24.

August 30: Israel complained that a command car was blown up by mine in the main road. Two Israelis were killed and four wounded. It was confirmed by U. N. investigation.

August 30: Egypt complained an Israeli patrol crossed the demarcation line. A fire fight took place between the patrol and Egyptian troops. Egyptian soldiers were killed and wounded.

August 30: Egypt complained that an Israeli force estimated to be of company strength attacked an Egyptian observation post killing six Egyptian soldiers. U. N. observers saw some proof.

August: During the month Israel complained of 40 incidents in the area surrounding the Gaza strip, and in and near the El Auja demilitarized zone; 2 Israelis were killed and 12 wounded. Egypt lodged 65 complaints for the same period; 22 Egyptians were killed and 5 wounded.

September 10: An Israeli unit carrying out mapreading exercises on the demarcation line was fired at by Jordan National Guards. In the ensuing clash 6 Israeli soldiers were killed and 3 wounded. Jordan was held responsible.

September 11: Approximately 1 Israeli battalion crossed the demarcation line and blew up a police post and an empty school building, killing 5 Jordan policemen and 10 soldiers. Part of this force laid an ambush about 3 miles inside Jordan and killed 5 Jordanian soldiers, and wounded 3. Israel was held responsible.

September 12: A group of aggressors from Jordan killed 3 Israeli guards at an oil-drilling camp. Jordan was held responsible.

September 13: A large Israeli force totally destroyed a police post and school in Jordan; 9 Jordanian policemen and 2 civilians were killed; 6 Jordanians were wounded. Israel was held responsible.

September 23: Machinegun fire was opened from a Jordanian position at approximately 100 members of the Israel Archeological Congress inspecting ruins

in the Jerusalem area; 3 were killed and 17 wounded. The Israeli complaint was to be considered at an emergency meeting.

September 24: Israel complained that a woman was shot while picking olives in the Jerusalem area. An investigation team saw the body and followed tracks to the demarcation line.

September 24: Israel claims that when the driver of a tractor went in search of a missing tractor driver he was shot at and wounded by fire from Jordan. The body of the first missing driver was found and the second wounded one was also seen by the U. N. observers.

September 23: Jordan alleges that two Israelis swam across the river Jordan and landed on Jordan territory. A Jordanian patrol opened fire, killed one Israeli and wounded another who disappeared in the river. Later fire was opened from Israeli territory. Bloodstains were found on the riverbank.

September 25 to 26: Israeli forces attacked a Jordanian police post, completely demolishing it and a nearby school building; 37 Jordanian soldiers and 2 civilians were killed and 11 Jordanians wounded. Evidence was observed by the U. N. group.

July 29 to September 25: During this period Israel lodged 59 complaints against Jordan; 19 Israelis were killed and 28 wounded. The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan lodged 210 complaints for the same period; 72 Jordanians were killed and 24 wounded.

October 11: An Israeli force traveling in about 30 vehicles approached the Qalqiliya police post about 800 meters east of the demarcation line in Jordan. The Israelis entered and captured the post by use of small arms. The police post was totally demolished by explosives. The village was shelled badly. The U. N. observers saw physical marks of the destruction from Israeli arms, including the bodies of 48 dead Jordanians. The Israeli forces reported the death of 18 of their forces.

This is the last of the border incidents reported by the Truce Supervision Organization prior to the large-scale Israeli military action in Egypt in November 1956.

A compilation of the total casualties as a result of the Arab-Israeli border incidents was prepared in October 1956. The U. N. group found that for 1955 there were a total of 297 Arabs (Egypt, Jordan, Syria, Lebanon) killed, 222 wounded, and 120 taken prisoner. For the same year 63 Israelis were killed, 172 wounded, and 3 captured. In 1956, through September 30, there were 199 Arabs killed, 197 wounded, and 8 captured; 58 Israelis were killed, 160 wounded, and 3 taken prisoner.

Chairman GORDON. Mr. Carnahan.

Mr. CARNAHAN. Mr. Bader, it seems to me that in your statements, in insisting upon using the exact wording, "nationalizing the Suez Canal Co." that perhaps you intend to make a distinction between nationalizing the Suez Canal Co. and nationalizing the Suez Canal.

Mr. BADER. Yes, indeed.

Mr. CARNAHAN. What is your distinction?

Mr. BADER. The distinction is that the canal, the physical property, the physical land or water, is and always has been Egyptian territory. The Suez Canal Co. is an Egyptian corporation incorporated under Egyptian law and under the supervision of the Sovereign Government of Egypt, and it only had the right to use the physical property known as the Suez Canal. What the Egyptian Government did is something it merely thought best for the interests of Egypt, to nationalize that Egyptian Suez Canal Co.

It is true that the stockholders, the majority stockholders, were British, French, and even some American, but this is not an unusual incident. Many governments in the history of the world have nationalized a business when they thought it was in the public interest. When they are willing to pay the stockholders and take care of all monetary aspects of the situation.

Mr. CARNAHAN. Then you feel it is the intention of the nationalized Suez Canal Co. to operate the canal as an international waterway?

Mr. BADER. I did not get the import of your question.

Mr. CARNAHAN. You feel it is the full intention of the nationalized Suez Canal Co. to operate the canal as an international waterway?

Mr. BADER. It is not my opinion, but the Government of Egypt has created the Egyptian Suez Canal Authority, or something like that, which is the equivalent of the Suez Canal Co., which has been operating it and has definitely kept it open and has stopped no one from going through. And even though it was understaffed. We were helping them to get pilots. Certainly it did not hinder anybody until the treacherous attack, the lightning attack of the British and Israel.

Mr. CARNAHAN. Of course, the canal is not in operation at the moment, but if it were, would any ship of any nation be permitted to go through?

Mr. BADER. I do not think Egypt would object to that. There may be a question of Israeli ships. But we must remember that the Arab States have never recognized the Government of Israel. It is just like we refuse to recognize the Government of China.

Mr. CARNAHAN. That would be an easy way to manage the canal. If you did not want a nation's ships to go through, you would just fail to recognize that country.

Mr. BADER. Those are things that have to be negotiated and settled without war and destruction. You know the Israelis do not show too much cooperation, either, you know. I find them very arrogant and very aggressive. Their recent actions have certainly proved that.

Mr. CARNAHAN. Do you feel that the nationalization of the canal company—since you insist on putting it that way—is a sincere move to bring about improved economic conditions in the area, or is it a move for the benefit of one country?

Mr. BADER. No, I don't believe it was ever intended for the benefit of Egypt because I think Mr. Nasser, in spite of all the detrimental propaganda he gets against him—the canal is not worth a hang to Egypt if it cannot operate and bring in revenue, Mr. Congressman. Now the Egyptians know that. Perhaps they feel they would like more of a share of that revenue, and they feel they are capable of running it, and they have proved that they can run it, even with a third of the staff, or one-third of the pilots. They have not refused passage of any ship. As I said before, when people refused to pay their tolls to them they said, "pay them wherever you please. Go through."

Now that certainly doesn't show any arbitrary attempt. It shows cooperation.

Chairman GORDON. Mr. Merrow—

Mr. MERROW. No questions at this time, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman GORDON. Mr. Burleson—

Mr. BURLESON. No questions, Mr. Chairman, thank you.

Chairman GORDON. Dr. Judd—

Mr. JUDD. No questions.

Chairman GORDON. Mr. Hays of Ohio.

Mr. HAYS of Ohio. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Bader, you stated in your prepared statement that because the Secretary of State withdrew his offer of assistance on the Aswan Dam, that that was the reason Mr. Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal Co., did you not?

Mr. BADER. No; I said that was probably one of the chief reasons, the abrupt slap and the abrupt withdrawal, after many months of negotiation. I think it may have had a great deal of effect on it. Not only the Secretary of State's withdrawal but his remarks about the Egyptian economy and its so-called unsoundness.

Mr. HAYS of Ohio. Do you approve of Mr. Nasser's doing what he did?

Mr. BADER. Nationalizing the Suez Canal Co.?

Mr. HAYS of Ohio. Yes.

Mr. BADER. I can't say I approve or disapprove. I feel this way, that when he did do it, it didn't do anybody any harm. If he was willing to take care of the stockholders, if he was willing to keep the canal open, which he proved he was willing to do and did, I don't see where it did any harm.

Mr. HAYS of Ohio. He hasn't paid the stockholders yet; has he?

Mr. BADER. The thing exploded and became an international world issue and England froze over \$300 million worth of the Egyptian money. Nobody has talked it over and settled it. That is what we tried to do before the attack of Britain and Israel against Egypt.

Mr. HAYS of Ohio. I don't have your statement before me but I certainly got the impression that the two had a very close relation and in my mind it was pretty much like a man coming into a bank and asking for a loan and then he didn't get it so he went out and got a machinegun and came in and took the money.

Mr. BADER. He didn't take the property, the property was already his, Mr. Hays. He merely nationalized a company that is an Egyptian company.

Mr. HAYS of Ohio. You say the property was already his but there have been quite a few international lawyers to whom I have put the question as to whether or not Mr. Nasser violated the law, international law, and I haven't heard one say yet that he didn't violate it.

That brings me to what I think in the whole argument is the \$64 question.

You said here that you don't think \$200 million would even make a good beginning out there.

Mr. BADER. If we are going to do some good and raise the standard of living.

Mr. HAYS of Ohio. Can you give one valid reason why the American taxpayers, my constituents, me or anybody else, should contribute one nickel to keep Mr. Nasser in power and keep his government going?

Mr. BADER. I don't think this economic program is especially designed to help Mr. Nasser, or keep him in power. I think this economic program is designed to raise the standard of living of 50 million Arabs who this Government believes are in need of such help.

Mr. HAYS of Ohio. I would go along with that.

Do you think if we gave \$50 million to King Saud of Saudi Arabia that it would raise the standard of living out there, outside of his immediate family?

Mr. BADER. I don't think the King would ask for it.

Mr. HAYS of Ohio. He is coming here, I assume, to ask for money. I don't know of any other reason why he is coming.

Mr. BADER. I know why he is coming and I don't think he wants money. He is getting enough money and he can draw on his advance royalties from the American-Arabian Oil Co.

Mr. HAYS of Ohio. I have some sympathy with him there because he is in a position where I have been, that he has overgrown his advanced royalties.

Mr. BADER. He is helping a lot of other countries. He may have to pay the subsidies to keep Jordan in business.

Mr. HAYS of Ohio. If you may permit me to say so, any money he spent to keep Jordan in business is money down the drain because that thing is a geographical monstrosity and whenever the rest of your Arab friends get ready, they are going to carve that country up. They say that themselves. They will not wait for Israel.

Mr. BADER. Many leaders in Jordan are inviting it and working for it. I agree that Jordan is a synthetic country, carved out to please King Abdulla and Mr. Churchill's ego, and I know the Jordanians very well, very intimately and you would be amazed how many of them have been working for some time to federate with—Syria happens to be their choice.

Mr. HAYS of Ohio. Going back to one other thing I don't pretend to know a lot about the Near East but I was out there last year and I have been in the Arab countries, too, and was to Israel. While I was there a border raid occurred just 2 miles from the village where Mrs. Kelly and I and the rest of the committee visited and we saw the results of it. We saw where people were killed. I told the Foreign Minister of Israel then that I wasn't much of a military man but if I couldn't take one division of the Israeli Army and clean up on Egypt, then I would throw my whole reputation away. Now the only thing that was wrong about that statement, they did it but I didn't lead the fight.

Mr. BADER. They didn't do it, Mr. Hays.

Mr. HAYS of Ohio. They didn't?

Mr. BADER. No, sir.

Mr. HAYS of Ohio. They sure had them on the run.

Mr. BADER. Now wait a minute. May I point out that you are overlooking—and I want to tell you that I like you—you are going to make a Democrat out of me one day. But remember that Israel did not attack Egypt alone.

Mr. HAYS of Ohio. She did the first few days, didn't she?

Mr. BADER. And didn't get very far.

Mr. HAYS of Ohio. I thought she did pretty well.

Mr. BADER. Do you think it was fair? Here is a nation of 20 million poorly armed people, to have three powers—and Israel may be a small nation but she has been arming and arming and arming and getting arms and ammunition and tanks and everything for many years.

Mr. HAYS of Ohio. She got \$50 million worth more in this affair, too, didn't she?

Mr. BADER. Yes, sir.

Mr. HAYS of Ohio. Of Soviet tanks.

Mr. BADER. That, I am assured by not only the Egyptian authorities but other authorities, is an exaggerated amount.

Mr. HAYS of Ohio. Whatever she got, we didn't have to pay for them, that is one nice thing.

Mr. BADER. If you believe in loot. It is just loot.

She didn't attack Egypt alone. Can you imagine a small nation being attacked by one nation from the East and then the British-French air forces and fleets swooping down on it and bombing the hell out of it? Now what nation could stand the power of England, France, and Israel combined. Do you think that was a fair fight?

Mr. HAYS of Ohio. I don't want to be petty about it but let's don't use that word "swoop." They said for 4 days they were going to do something and I sat on the edge of my chair waiting for them to do something and that is hardly a swoop. That is moving like a snake.

I want to say I like you, too. The funny thing about it is that people have accused me of being pro-Israel for political reasons. Now you will be surprised to know that I probably am the only Member of Congress who has more Arabs in his district than he has Jews. I am friendly with both sides and I don't have any quarrel to pick.

I think the Arabs in my district are awfully happy; they are not out there. Most of them tell me they are.

Mr. BADER. Mr. Hays, if I could have you for 1 week, I could make you the greatest champion of the Arabs in this country.

Mr. HAYS of Ohio. All I can say is if we had each other for 1 week, one of us would be brainwashed. That is all, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman GORDON. Mr. Fulton—

Mr. FULTON. We are glad to see you here Mr. Bader because it does give us a different point of view on this committee and we want all points of view.

Mr. BADER. Thank you, sir.

Mr. FULTON. There is much disputing back and forth between the various countries in this area—that means between the Arabs and Israel, and between various Arab countries themselves, as well as the Bagdad Pact countries and the nonpact countries disputing among each other. But I believe in this country there is a very large reservoir of good will for the whole area. For example I have many good Jewish and Israeli friends but I likewise have Arab friends. Simply as one well-intended person on this committee, I have met them and have full confidence in them and their abilities. We want to be friends with everybody. Now how do we do it? That is what some of us are trying to work toward on this committee. For example, Abdul Rahim, the former Egyptian Ambassador, now the Yemen representative and representative of the organization of the Arab states in the United Nations, is one of the friends I have made in our work here.

Mr. BADER. He is my friend, too.

Mr. FULTON. We in the United States feel this area is vital to our United States security.

Mr. BADER. Yes, sir.

Mr. FULTON. Because Europe is so dependent on oil and on passage-way rights in this area.

Mr. BADER. Yes, sir.

Mr. FULTON. Likewise, we have said, not only through the Republican present administration but through the previous Democratic administration that the existence of the State of Israel is basic in our

United States foreign policy. It is basic. It is unalterably basic. Both American parties have said it. Now that does this: That puts the United States policy in direct conflict with any Arab nation who says that they must be eliminated.

Mr. BADER. I don't think the Arab——

Mr. FULTON. May I go a little further. There is a double impact, here. We are trying to have an impact on you people, as well as you on us.

We previously have come up in the United States with an offer on the Aswan Dam to develop the Nile River in cooperation with Egypt, and other countries as well as international agencies. This development would go clear up through the Sudan into Ethiopia, and try to work out regional development for everybody. Egypt would get the largest share of the benefit. It would raise Egypt's gross national income per person per year from \$85 and probably would double the yield and production of land, factories, et cetera.

The next thing is, the United States had Eric Johnston go into the Jordan River Valley and come up with a plan of regional development for everybody, to give adequate water to prevent erosion, water power and electricity to do the developing of the economics, and we said we would help, otherwise, with capital on economic development.

Then the United States went over into the Euphrates River Valley in Iraq and we said "We will work with you nations in that area and come up with a regional plan which will again make the Euphrates River one of the garden spots of the world."

What has happened? Well, there was a fuss and a fight between these countries along the Jordan. In Egypt there got to be a fight over something bigger. On the Euphrates there has gotten to be a fuss and a feud. I think one reason that the Arab countries want to keep the Palestine refugees right where they are, and aroused, is that it gives them quite a propaganda advantage.

Now, those of us on this committee will help these refugees, we will help them get resettled. But I will say this to you: We are not going to give the United States back to the Indians and I will just bet your last cent, or nine, that neither the Israelis nor ourselves are going to try to unmix that situation or talk about anything like elimination. We are going to move on with development. I will say this, for my part, on the resolution, that your statement that you would like to have had our people sit down with the Arab leaders is one of the best suggestions I have heard yet. At hearing after hearing I have been suggesting, "Let's bring together representatives of all these countries in this area, at the instance of our President and backed by the good American people, to a roundtable conference and let's plan community development."

Five or six years ago Mrs. Bolton and I and others at this table had filed bills for regional development in this area. I have never heard from one person in an Arab country about regional development for you all in this area, regardless of country.

One of my big complaints is, when Egypt has moved over onto Tiran Island and shuts off the Gulf of Aqaba to international traffic it doesn't sound like justice to me. I think probably the sovereign Egyptian Government had a right, as this Government did, to nationalize the Suez Canal Co. stock and agree to pay the market price

at the close of the Paris market the day before. That is because the British did it in their steel industry and transportation and coal industries and no foreign stockholder could successfully complain on that. But when there is restriction and the Suez Canal isn't opened to everybody the way we in the United States keep the Panama Canal open and the Suez Canal becomes involved in local disputes so that it strangles one of our chief industrial bases of the West, you and I know that can't happen. The United States will not permit it to happen for that purpose.

Mr. BADER. May I answer that?

Mr. FULTON. Just a minute and I am through.

The other point I would make is this, that when Egyptian forces are seizing Israeli ships on the high seas, and when Arab governments are acting as if the Israelis should not even exist, I think that is less than the true Arab tradition. And while the United States disagrees with Communist China and doesn't recognize that government, you don't find the great United States of America running a blockade. May I say this in conclusion, as well: On the border of Israel, unless the Arab States can work out with Israel some method for these U. N. forces to patrol and keep the peace, unless that is done, you are going to find a reticence on this committee and in this Congress for helping you.

But if the people of this area will turn around and start to work the area out as we have done in this country and start economic development, as was done under the European Marshall plan where we had screening committees, if they would do that and forget their narrow nationalisms, they would find some very good friends on this committee. I would be for \$1 billion for you. I would show you real development.

Mr. BADER. May I quote you?

Mr. FULTON. You certainly can. I would develop your Nile Valley, I would develop the Jordan Valley, the Euphrates, and I would resettle all those refugees along those valleys where they can live not just exist.

Mr. BADER. That is very good. That is very excellent.

Mr. FULTON. But the point is this. Why do you come here with a statement that is in part like refighting the Civil War at this table. We in this country have said, "Well, we had trouble, but we have forgotten it; now we will go ahead and develop the country together in the United States." Why don't you do that?

Mr. BADER. We do. We do say it. We do want help. Of course, the Arab is a proud person and, if you notice, they are the only people on earth who have not asked for help from this country. They don't want economic aid. You know the Arab governments.

Mr. FULTON. How can you sit there and say to me that Communist activity is banned by law in every Arab country?

Mr. BADER. It is.

Mr. FULTON. And then I find Egypt bringing in every kind of a so-called "technical" person, even some with military background, for technician purposes, they say, and importing large quantities of arms from Iron Curtain countries. And for what?

Mr. BADER. Egypt bought arms from Russia and paid for them, or expects to pay for them as a commercial deal, and only when we refused to sell them arms. And so with every other country.

Mr. FULTON. The 400 technicians from behind the Iron Curtain, or the acceptance of volunteers that are Communist volunteers from even Communist Red China is certainly not blocking the door to communistic activity in that area.

Mr. BADER. If you are going to put every technician in the category of a propagandist or a spy, or a Communist agent, you may construe it that way. But, when Israel buys arms or airplanes or what have you from France, they also asked for French technicians.

Mr. FULTON. Suppose we could get agreement from your various countries—for example in Israel, where you claim that the Communist Party is the center for the whole region, that we ban the Communist Party in Israel, that we ban Communist technicians and importations in all these countries, and that we keep out that type of a person who is trying to subvert it from the inside? Would you agree to that?

Mr. BADER. Now, Mr. Fulton, I think there is too much promiscuity among all of us, not only here but all over this Nation. I refer to the use of the word "communism" as against "Russian."

Because Egypt bought arms from Russia, that did not make the Egyptian Government Communist or pro-Communist.

If Syria bought some arms from Russia, that does not make them Communist or even adherents to communism.

Mr. FULTON. When the United States banned arms to Israel, it came with ill grace for Egypt to go ahead and import these Iron Curtain arms that could be used in a local fight.

Mr. BADER. Mr. Fulton, in Israel you see a million and three-quarters people. Have you any idea of their military strength, for a small people like that?

Mr. FULTON. And 22 million in Egypt right beside them.

Mr. BADER. You saw Israel in operation. Where do you think Israel in the last 10 years got this ironclad army, this mechanized army—you saw it in operation, a million and a half of them. Do you think they have been asleep? If I could tell you the amount of Israel's smuggling of arms and ammunition for the last 10 years, even out of this country—our institute last year, through our efforts, uncovered an amount of 20,000 Garand rifles going to Israel through other countries which we stopped, and 400 armored cars, which we stopped. Those were just two incidents.

Mr. FULTON. Suppose we guaranteed your borders, wouldn't that be all right? Suppose the United States guaranteed the borders under the United Nations as we did in 1950 with the tripartite declaration?

Mr. BADER. The borders set by the United Nations, Mr. Fulton, if you will remember the partition plan in 1947, have nothing in common with the present borders of Israel.

You talk about this port of Elath and the Negeb, which is southern Israel. That did not come under the partition plan. Most of the borders of Israel today were taken by aggression, and the United States and even the United Nations does not recognize them.

Mr. FULTON. That is all. Thank you.

Chairman GORDON. Mr. Selden.

Mr. SELDEN. I think you said in your statement—and, if I am misquoting you, please correct me—that the Arabs want nothing from this country. I believe you said again a few moments ago that the Arabs did not want any economic aid.

Mr. BADER. If you put it that way, they have never asked for any.

Mr. SELDEN. You have advocated we give it, however. As a matter of fact, you said \$200 million a year would not be nearly enough. Do you think that economic aid should be forced on those countries if they do not want it?

Mr. BADER. No. I will tell you what those governments or those people would like: They would like us better if we went to Syria or Egypt or Jordan or any of them and said, "Look, we know you need money to carry on your economy and expand it. We would like to lend you so much money." I assure you they would like us better and respect us more, and it would do us more good, too.

Mr. SELDEN. In other words, you feel that any money in the form of economic aid that goes to any of the Arab countries should be in loans rather than in grants?

Mr. BADER. I certainly do. I know the Arab character. Just in the last week or two, since the Eisenhower program came out, I sat in several ambassadors' homes, and they said to me, "Do you mean to tell me you people are offering us \$400 million or \$200 million for nothing? What do you want back?"

We assured them we want nothing back but peace and stability and help. No. They don't think like we do.

Mr. SELDEN. Do you think this resolution would be improved if we designated in it that these funds, not to exceed \$200 million, should be made in the form of loans instead of grants?

Mr. BADER. I favor it very strongly, and I think the Arabs would love us more and would love to do business with us on that basis.

Mr. SELDEN. Thank you.

Chairman GORDON. Mr. Pilcher.

Mr. PILCHER. Mr. Chairman, the more testimony I hear the more I get confused. The hatred is so great between Israel and the Arabs, as Mr. Fulton said. We forgot the Civil War, but it took us 100 years, and I believe the hatred is worse over there than it was between the North and the South.

If it is going to take 100 years to iron this out, we are in trouble.

Would the Arabs be willing to sit down with the Israelis and discuss things? I have heard it both ways. They say they will not talk.

Mr. BADER. The Arabs demand this: The United Nations in 1947 declared the partition of Palestine. They demanded that Israel abide by the United Nations resolution in that direction. They state that anything outside of what was allotted to Israel out of the United Nations partition plan was aggression and grabbing what they can.

Secondly, the United Nations decreed that Jerusalem should be internationalized. Israel refuses to have Jerusalem internationalized. They wish to make it its capital.

Thirdly, the United Nations decreed that any Arab refugees—there are 1 million of them dying and starving—have the right to choose to go back to their former homes in Palestine if they so desire. Israel refuses to take one back.

We talk about other Arab nations defying. They haven't defied anybody. They just want law and order. If the United Nations is in operation and has any authority, then Israel should abide by its resolutions.

Mr. PILCHER. Do the Arabs recognize any State of Israel? I believe you said awhile ago they didn't recognize them.

Mr. BADER. Just night before last an ambassador called me about that. He said, "Let Israel recognize the resolutions of the United Nations and then we might be willing to sit down and talk with them. But we cannot recognize them when half their territory has been taken on by aggression."

Mr. HAYS of Ohio. Isn't it true, Mr. Bader, that in 1947, when the United Nations made this decision, that the Arab nations said, "No; we will have nothing to do with this. We will have Israel wiped off the map"?

The Arab nations have come along about 5 years too late on every proposal, when they saw they were whipped, and said, "We will accept what the United Nations"—and now they are saying, "We will accept what the United Nations said in 1947."

However, back at that time they were just as intransigent about it as ever; isn't that so?

Mr. BADER. Let me go back before that.

Mr. HAYS of Ohio. You go back there and I will follow you.

Mr. BADER. The Arabs have lived there for many centuries.

Mr. HAYS of Ohio. The Jews were there ahead of them.

Mr. BADER. I was born in Jerusalem and grew up with those people.

Mr. HAYS of Ohio. When were you born in Jerusalem?

Mr. BADER. Do you want me to tell you my age?

Mr. HAYS of Ohio. You weren't born when the Jews were there about 1268 B. C.?

Mr. BADER. You are talking about the Israelites. The term "Jews" wasn't used anywhere in the world until the year 1500 A. D. You are talking about the Israelites. I can assure you, if you have studied Jewish history you will find the European Jews are not descendants of the Israelites and have no connection with the Israelites, that they are all proselyte Jews, or Jewish converts who were converted to the Jewish religion in the year 670 at their kingdom, called the Khazar kingdom, on the shores of the Caspian, and that there is a total difference between the European Jew who is a proselyte and has no connection with the old Israelites, and the Sephardic Jew, which is the Mediterranean Jew which came from the tribe of Judah.

Mr. HAYS of Ohio. What is the difference between a proselyte and an Israelite?

Mr. FULTON. You are all Semitic, though.

Mr. BADER. The European Jews are not Semitic and never were. They never were. That is history. If you wish to read, I will recommend books for you to read.

Chairman GORDON. Mr. O'Hara.

Mr. O'HARA. I am a little dazzled in this sea of erudition.

My friend, you and I will agree that you cannot stop the march of progress. You will agree to that?

Mr. BADER. Yes, sir.

Mr. O'HARA. I suppose in an early period, when the people of England were Druids and a new order was coming, there was some uneasiness because of the change from an old order. But that did not stop the march of progress.

Isn't what we are finding in this area somewhat a reflection of that?

Mr. BADER. No, sir, Mr. O'Hara. You see, 2 million Jews were born in Europe and other foreign lands who had nothing in common with the Middle East or Palestine or the Arab world, and they are all foreigners.

How would you like a couple of million Germans, through the means of propaganda, or power, or any means at their disposal, to come to us here and say, "Wisconsin is going to be our country whether you like or not, and we will use every means in our power to establish it as a German state right in the heart of America."

Mr. O'HARA. We all are human beings. We have a common interest in living today in a happy world, and each makes some contribution to the others. Is it not appreciated among the leaders of Arab thought that the Arab States have been the beneficiary of a new order of an industrial age that has come? The money, the skill that built the Suez Canal, came from nothing that was produced by the people of Egypt.

Mr. BADER. They don't object to that.

Mr. O'HARA. Isn't it true?

Mr. BADER. But you must remember the Arabs have been subjugated for 400 years.

Mr. O'HARA. We cannot live today in memories. That we found out in our country, in the old misunderstandings between the North and the South. We have grown away from that. Today is today. We build on our hopes for tomorrow, not our regrets for yesterday.

Mr. BADER. Mr. O'Hara, they have only had their freedom for 10 years. Give them a chance to open their eyes. We start hammering them down before they have a chance to open their eyes.

Mr. O'HARA. I want to be very brief: As I see it—and remember that I am only a student here; I am a new member of this committee and I am listening—

Mr. BADER. You have my utmost respect.

Mr. O'HARA. As I see it, and I think as many Americans see it, Israel is representing in that area not only democratic government but the modern industrial order that in the march of progress will carry the Near East to greater levels of life for everyone.

President Truman, looking into the future, could see what Israel would contribute to the Arab States, that in building a great industrial order it would make possible for the Arab States to build an agricultural society beyond their dreams, benefiting from the great buying power that would be brought into the area by the industrial growth of Israel. Isn't that obvious to many of the Arab leaders?

Mr. BADER. Mr. O'Hara, Mr. Truman was very much concerned apparently with having the Jews or the Israelis make the desert bloom.

I lived in California and Arizona for many years and I used to drive through lots of desert. I think when Mr. Truman decided to give away land that was not his, namely, to the Zionists, to give away Arab land to make the desert bloom, I think he should have given them Arizona or part of New Mexico. If they like to make the desert bloom, there is lots of desert in this country to put them to work. We cannot give away other people's property, Mr. O'Hara. Palestine was not ours to give.

Mr. O'HARA. In the early period of our history the Indians said we had no right to give away public lands for the building of schools

and of railroads. But, my friend, you cannot stop the march of progress, because progress is the first rule of nature.

Mr. BADER. But we keep forgetting these Jews came from Europe and this land was native Arab land for 13 centuries. We bring a bunch of Jewish foreigners and put them there and kick out the natives. Does that sound right? I think a resolution should be made.

Mr. O'HARA. I can answer that briefly, my friend. I do not think God is a monopolist. He created a great and rich earth, and I don't think it is given to any one of us to say, "Because our forebears have been here for 1,000 or more years, in all eternity we are going to hold this land, whether we need it or not, and we will keep out other people, however worthy and in need, because God, being a monopolist, rules that preserving the status quo is the first law of his kingdom. You don't think that?"

Mr. BADER. No.

Mr. O'HARA. You are such a lovable fellow. I would not wish to continue a colloquy in which I feel your heart leaned as does that of the one who argues with you.

Mr. BADER. Mr. O'Hara, may I answer that?

Mr. O'HARA. I would like to have you answer it but I am afraid my time is up.

Chairman GORDON. Mr. Fountain——

Mr. FOUNTAIN. Mr. Chairman, I want to thank Mr. Bader for his statement. It has been most informative. I have no questions.

Mr. FULTON. Mr. Fountain, would you yield?

Mr. FOUNTAIN. Yes.

Mr. FULTON. I would like to say I agree a lot with Mr. Abdul Sholem O'Hara.

Chairman GORDON. Mr. Saund——

Mr. SAUND. Mr. Bader, I would like to have a heart to heart talk with you. I am a naturalized citizen like you are. You are a much more handsome man than I am, but that doesn't make much difference.

Mr. BADER. Thank you for the compliment.

Mr. SAUND. Now we are discussing this resolution and we divide it into two parts. In one part the President wants to use \$200 million to help stabilize the governments of those countries; is that correct?

Mr. BADER. If it is specified and put into more specific terms where we know each country gets so much, we would approve.

Mr. SAUND. But you are opposed to giving the President authority to use Armed Forces of the United States, under the conditions specified in this resolution; is that correct?

Mr. BADER. The first reason is I think the President already has that authority, and I am sure he is not going to sit still if he thought the Russians are ready to move in, and I don't think they are ready to move in.

Secondly, I think it is a high-handed manner that is not characteristic of the United States. It frightens people. I think it is saber rattling. I think it does not win back 50 million Arabs whom we have alienated, and God knows we need their friendship and must do everything to regain it, and I don't think it frightens the Russians, because I think the Russians are very shrewd, bright boys who will find some way to overcome that.

I know there is no fear of any Arab government going Communist or pro-Communist. The Arab is shrewd.

As I say, he would rather you lend him the money or do it on a business basis. And so are the Russians very clever business people. We are the only ones who love to give away our wealth and everything else.

Mr. SAUND. Mr. Bader, we are giving that authority if we pass that resolution to a man by the name of Mr. Eisenhower.

Mr. BADER. Yes, sir.

Mr. SAUND. Isn't it a fact that in view of the happenings in the Middle East, in Egypt and elsewhere, Mr. Eisenhower as one man has given ample and sufficient proof of the fact that he does believe in being friendly with the Egyptians and with the Arab nations?

Mr. BADER. Indeed.

Mr. SAUND. Then the man who is the head of the Government took a side alienating the two best friends of the United States. Now this man today, if he wants to go and stabilize the Middle East, and he is not asking for any authority that he does not already possess, I am convinced from the testimony heard that it is just for psychological reasons, to give notice to the Communists that they cannot go any farther, and they should not dare disturb the Middle Eastern countries.

Under those circumstances, and as long as it is Mr. Eisenhower, and he has shown his thinking about it, wouldn't you as one man use your influence to change the interpretation which the Arab people want to place on it, instead of trying to encourage a wrong interpretation among the Arab countries?

Mr. BADER. Do you mean with regard to the use of armed forces?

Mr. SAUND. Yes, sir. Do you have fear in your mind if Mr. Eisenhower gets this authority he is going to use armed force to do the same things that the British and French and the Turks did in the other countries before?

Mr. BADER. No, I do not have that fear. I trust Mr. Eisenhower explicitly, and I don't think this country is made up of that type of character to use armed forces just promiscuously. I know we don't want anybody's territory and we certainly don't want anybody's wealth.

Mr. SAUND. My time is up, but I want to make this statement, Mr. Bader, that you and everybody should stop carrying a chip on our shoulders. The American people have a certain obligation they feel to the rest of the world. They want a free world and a peaceful world. I would urgently request you that you use your own personal influence to make the Arab people accept the sincerity of President Eisenhower and the people of the United States.

Mr. BADER. I don't think they question Mr. Eisenhower's sincerity, and I think today Mr. Eisenhower's stock is so high in the Arab world—like I told some of our Government officials the other day at my office, I said, "For heaven's sake, Mr. Eisenhower's stand since the attack on Egypt has regained for us in a short period an ability to overcome 10 years of alienation of the Arabs."

Mr. JUDD. Mr. Chairman, I passed a while ago. Could I ask a question now?

Chairman GORDON. Mr. Judd—

Mr. JUDD. Mr. Bader, do you have any doubt that any uses that might be made of either the economic or military authority in this

resolution would only be to help those countries maintain their own independence? Do you have any doubt on that?

Mr. BADER. No, I don't.

Mr. JUDD. Since it is a resolution dedicated solely to maintaining their own independence, why should they fear it?

Mr. BADER. Do you mean economic or military?

Mr. JUDD. Both. The Kremlin would rather move by subversion, but where the situation was favorable, it has never hesitated to first take people by force and subvert them later by propaganda.

Mr. BADER. Russia is not now ready to move in by armed force to take over the Middle East, if they are, then I am a very poor student of Russian activities, and I have been a student of the subject for 30 years and have even lectured on it, and so forth.

My thought is this, and I believe it sincerely, that our statement on armed forces as it is, even, as Mr. Fulton or Mr. Vorys brought it out, it is only at the Government's request. It is too vague. It is merely a lot of noise that will not accomplish anything. I think the whole thing should be more specific. And I think when you heard Mr. Dulles and continued to read his statement, you will find you are confused more and more.

Mr. JUDD. I have been in a good many countries farther east than these countries, which also want to maintain their own independence, but they say, "We are a little country and can't substantially influence the outcome of this gigantic world struggle. We will just have to accept and try to get along with whoever wins. Now, we hope you will win but it doesn't look to us as if you will win. The Kremlin seems to be more determined and skillful in both subversion and the use of force, and therefore we have just got to sit tight and see who wins."

Do you not think that these governments which, as you say, are only 10 years old, they are just opening their eyes, they are not too strong or stable and couldn't be otherwise as yet, don't you think they have a better chance of stabilizing their internal economy, devoting their resources to the building up of the livelihood of their people instead of bleeding themselves to death to build up arms, if they have assurance that they are not going to be taken over by aggression from the outside? That is the whole purpose, to assure them they don't have to spend all their money on arms. For example, Mr. Nasser is spending practically all of Egypt's resources on arms because he has felt threatened.

Now, if he didn't feel threatened and could spend those resources in improving the lot of his people, isn't that what he would want?

Mr. BADER. Well, he wants to improve the lot of his people, definitely.

Mr. JUDD. He can't if he spends all his money for arms; can he?

Mr. BADER. Mr. Judd—and I remind you I respect you very much—you see, Israel on her borders never sits still. If you have followed this Israeli activity as I have—I was born with it and grew up with it and it is a distasteful subject. I am sorry I am even mixed up with it. When they cannot get arms legally, they smuggle them. And if you want the record of Israeli smuggling in the last 10 years, I will give you a record that will amaze you.

Mr. JUDD. I recognize that.

Mr. BADER. The Arabs feel this way: The Jew is a brilliant man. He is a restless man. He is an ambitious man. He is a man who

likes to expand. They don't believe that the Israelis now possessing 6,000 or 7,000 or 8,000 square miles are satisfied with it or are happy with it, and I assure you they are not.

If you think that Zionism or Israel doesn't have ambitions of expansion, you might have some surprises in the near future.

Mr. Judd. I would rather not get into that just here. I sense it and I appreciate the great fear that exists. The Arabs make statements that they will drive the Israelis into the sea. So the Israelis are afraid. The Arabs see the expansionism and very great military activity on the part of the Israelis, and the Arabs are afraid.

I don't think this can be solved on a basis of right and wrong because here is a case of two rights. There is no people in the world's history more closely identified with a given piece of territory than the Israelis are with Palestine.

On the other hand, the Arabs have lived there 1,300 years and they didn't take it from the Jews, they picked it up out of the remnants of the Roman Empire. The Romans had taken it from the Jews before Christ was born. So, both are right. You can't settle it on a basis of right or justice. It has to be lifted above right and wrong to wisdom, to survival.

Certainly the Arabs must want to survive themselves, more than they want to destroy Israel. If they become mortgaged to the point where their economies are not sound and they are subservient to the Soviet Union, they are not going to survive. Each side can perhaps get what it considers justice and neither side will long be free.

The fact is, here we are. You both want to survive. To do that, you have to lift it above right and wrong or even justice to the level of wisdom. What must both do in order to survive. What the Jews need most is peace so they can continue their remarkable development. What the Arabs need most is peace and security so they can go ahead with the long-delayed development of their people.

Now that is all we are trying to help them do. I agree with Judge Saund that you ought to try to assure them we are only trying to give both sides an opportunity to go ahead with the kind of peaceful development that will be mutually beneficial. Maybe it can't be done; but unless it is done, I fear neither of you will be free.

Mr. BADER. You are so right. It is pathetic. You and I are Americans who have lived in Asia. I want to bring out an important point: It is about time our Government began to secure the service of patriotic Americans who have American interests at heart who have lived abroad or who were born abroad to take care of these territories; secure the service of men who have the confidence and the trust of the leaders of those nations as well as their people.

We send them native Americans, well-meaning, well-intentioned. We pick them up as young men from Nebraska or Ohio, and so forth, who know nothing about the Arabs or the Egyptians. They don't speak their language. They don't know their customs, their religion.

Even in our intelligence agencies, you might be amazed how many heads of intelligence agencies say to me, "Why, in 30 minutes you can give me more valuable information than 60 of my agents sitting over there."

I say, "Because you don't select your agents correctly. They mean well. They are capable young men but they are qualified to operate in America."

There are many patriotic foreign-born Americans or Americans who have lived abroad. These countries suspect us. Why? Because they don't understand us.

Give me the power and the finances—not the power but the influence and the finances to sell America to the Arabs. You would be amazed. With all humility, I could do a much better job than the whole Voice of America is doing, because I know what they think, I know that they trust me and they know that I am not out to sell them out or make a deal with the Jews behind their backs.

This is a very important point, and you will find this Government has to awaken to this very great need. We cannot deal with the world unless we send them the men who understand them and speak their language spiritually as well as literally. We have too many novices. Well-meaning, yes; honest, yes.

Even in the way of foreign aid. Like one Arab official told me. He said, "For every \$4 you give us in this ICA program, we can spend \$1 and do a better job."

Mr. JUDD. You are making a speech that the committee has heard me make many, many times. We have been working at it a long time, mostly in vain. The Soviets don't send people in to these places until they know the language and the people. They will have studied it 2 to 10 years. They lose themselves in the landscape and work almost as an inconspicuous citizen, whereas we go in, as you well known, and tend to throw our weight around. We haven't been too successful in changing that pattern, but that still doesn't answer the question that I talked about in the beginning.

Somehow the people there have to work it out themselves, and they can't work it out unless they are enabled to maintain their independence. There is a force in the world dedicated to the destruction of the independence of both sides. There is no question about that. Look what it has done in the rest of the world. A lot of other countries weren't afraid of the Soviet Union. They, too, said, "We can deal with the Communists." They are not free now. I don't want that to happen to either the Arabs or the Israelis.

Mr. BADER. Mr. Judd, the way the world stands today, in my opinion, there is no time at this moment to negotiate peace between the Arabs and the Jews. Today the matter has reached far larger and worldwide proportions. Today the stakes are high. The Arabs say to us, "Look, stop worrying about the Communists. Where are they? If there are any, we haven't seen any. Stop throwing a bugaboo around the world. Remember, you were their [Russian] sweet allies just a few years ago and gave them \$20 billion worth of merchandise. We didn't criticize you for become their allies."

The Arabs say, "We are 50 million people who ask for nothing but sovereignty and freedom. We do possess enormous resources that you, Western Europe and the world need, and without these resources the whole western economy will collapse. For heaven's sake, if we are that important to the economy of the world, why don't you be nice to us a bit?"

That is all they ask for.

Chairman GORDON. Thank you very much, Mr. Bader.

Mr. HAYS of Ohio. Could I ask just one further question to clarify something?

Chairman GORDON. Yes.

Mr. HAYS of Ohio. Do you advocate—I don't think you, but your statement might leave that impression—that we should employ Arabs to deal with the Arab countries and Mexicans to deal with Mexicans and Spaniards to deal with Spaniards and Britons to deal with England in our foreign affairs?

Mr. BADER. I think there are many foreign-born Americans who have proven themselves to be just as patriotic and in many cases—

Mr. HAYS of Ohio. I am not arguing that.

Mr. BADER. I think in many cases keymen, whether they are born in Arabia or China or have spent years there, that know the people, understand their inner soul, know how to approach them, have their confidence, I think those people can do a great job for the welfare of this country. I know I can sell America to the Arabs much better than many a native American who doesn't know anything about their psychology or doesn't know how to approach them or how to reach them.

Mr. HAYS of Ohio. How much is it going to cost us for you to do that?

Mr. BADER. It will cost you about 1 percent of what we are spending, Mr. Hays.

Mr. HAYS of Ohio. We should give him a job and cut off the money.

Chairman GORDON. Mr. Bader, I want to thank you again.

Mr. FULTON. May we thank Mr. Bader on the record for his statement and the good exchanges he has had.

Mr. BADER. Thank you, sir.

Chairman GORDON. Our next witness is Mrs. Gladys D. Walser, a friend of Mr. Hansen who was to be the second witness but he relinquished his time in behalf of Mrs. Walser.

STATEMENT OF MRS. GLADYS D. WALSER, WOMEN'S INTERNATIONAL LEAGUE FOR PEACE AND FREEDOM, UNITED STATES SECTION

Mrs. WALSER. It is a shame to bring you back from your previous conversation about things of the past. I wish I could have been in it because I did want to give a few United Nations answers to Mr. Vorys' questions and I felt sympathy with Mr. Fulton when he said he wanted to be friends with both, which is more apt to happen in the World Community of Nations than it is between two nations separately.

I do have I think a different approach and what I am doing now is not fighting old wars but to come here and try to make us look forward to the kind of policy which some of us feel this, our United States, needs in order that there shall be no future wars.

I come as Mrs. Gladys D. Walser of New York City, as one who has been observed and consultant for the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom, founded in 1915 by Jane Addams, at the United Nations Headquarters in New York for nearly 12 years representing my organization which is one that has a consultative status, there.

I come also as one from Asia. I lived there 26 years of my life. I come also particularly because I am a member of the national board and the policy committee of our United States section of the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom, that Jane Addams founded in 1915.

I turn now to specific points concerning the resolution.

The recent reversal—the league believes to be a retrogression in the United States policy in respect to the Middle East, from the position held at the outset of the Middle East crisis has caused deep anxiety to our members here and abroad as to the possible adverse effects of the President's proposal of January 5, 1957, on that very sensitive and highly explosive part of the world. There is also considerable perplexity as to what suddenly developed, the worsening of the situation, that has made the situation seem urgent to the administration.

Now for a brief period, a brief, bright period at the beginning of November 1956, with the British-French-Israeli attack on Egypt, the United States assumed leadership on a sound basis by taking the initiative in the United Nations for ending hostilities.

Gentlemen, this won confidence, respect, and support of the majority of that 80-member world body, and gained for the United States the highest prestige I have ever known it to have in the 11 years that I have been observing the ebb and flow of great-power influence in the United Nations.

Now what was the record? It was the United States who asked for an immediate convening of the Security Council to consider the Middle East crisis. When Britain and France vetoed a move for a cease-fire, the United States supported the invoking of the "uniting for peace" resolution of 1950 which strangely enough was designed to bypass the Soviet veto during the Korean war and is now being used against the United States allies.

It was the United States that on November 2 submitted a cease-fire resolution adopted by an overwhelming majority of the United Nations members and at the same time found itself in the very unusual position of voting with the Soviet Union and the anticolonial nations.

It was the United States that supported the Secretary General's efforts to secure British-French-Israeli compliance with the General Assembly resolutions, later ones having to do with the withdrawal of foreign troops from Egypt, the establishment of that remarkable thing known as the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF), and clearing of the Suez Canal, well underway.

In the interests of the promoting of United Nations efforts along the above lines, the United States did not even press for action on two other resolutions it brought in on November 2 which had to do with long-range settlement of Suez and Palestine problems, in order to give the Secretary General a chance to go ahead with the resolutions.

The United States position in support of the United Nations was reinforced by the attitude taken last spring when the Secretary General was asked to go on a mission to the Middle East to relieve tensions and try to set up machinery for reinforcing the armistice agreements. On May 8, 1956, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles stated that:

Past efforts toward a settlement of substantive issues in the Middle East have encountered serious obstacles. The task remains complex and no real solution will easily be come by. But progress there is as necessary as it is difficult. There are grounds for hope that it may be possible to maintain the momentum now established by Mr. Hammarskjöld's efforts.

These words may well have been spoken during the time the United States initiative was strengthening the United Nations after the

our set of the Middle East crisis and even now when progress is being made by the U. N. to solve outstanding Middle East problems.

The President also strengthened the United States position in the United Nations by stating the position of the Government in these words:

We believe the Anglo-French-Israeli attack to have been taken in error for we do not accept the use of force as a wise or proper instrument for the settlement of international disputes. The dedicated purpose of the United States Government is to do all in its power to * * * end the conflict.

Later he stated the principle that it is impossible to have one policy for one's friends and another for one's enemies.

As late as November 17, the Acting Secretary of State told the Assembly during the general debate that the United Nations with full support of the United States would be obliged to take action if the U. S. S. R. sent "volunteers" into Egypt. But he left the clear implication that if the United Nations did not act the United States would not do so either. The "volunteer" threat was withdrawn when the British and French left Egyptian territory, and yet Mr. Dulles told your committee that the Eisenhower Middle East policy contemplates the use of United States armed force against any aggression by organized "volunteers" from the U. S. S. R. or China. This would happen, presumably, even though such help was requested by a nation or nations in that area. On the other hand, the United States would certainly deny any charge of aggression if it acted under the provisions of the current resolution. This is one of the confusions about the use of the word "aggression" which has never been defined under international law and therefore is open to interpretation by any nation. Some United Nations members, for instance, considered the French-British-Israeli attack on Egypt "aggression," although the United States never used that term. Who then is to decide when aggression occurs? By whom and what constitutes an act of aggression?

The most encouraging aspect of United States action through the United Nations was that it was primarily directed toward meeting a threat to the peace as outlined in the United Nations Charter, instead of following a former cold-war policy directed against a specified enemy—the U. S. S. R. This move actually resulted in tremendous gains in United States prestige. The anticolonial countries which formerly were inclined to regard the Soviet Union as their "protector" against "Western imperialism" now eagerly supported the United States initiative and lost much of their former suspicion of western motives. Had the United States continued to adhere to this policy, it would have consolidated the gains made. Instead, the policy of "noninvolvement" proclaimed with great satisfaction in November no longer held. Under the Eisenhower doctrine the United States could and would use force without necessarily obtaining either congressional or United Nations authorization. International cooperation, including that of the Soviet Union, without which a peaceful solution of the Middle Eastern crisis cannot be found, is more remote and there is already a loss of United States newly won prestige among the Asian-African and Arab United Nations members.

Why was this shift made? Was it because of fear of further weakening the western alliance or was it because what the United States thought was her leadership of the Asian-African-Arab group proved

to be merely following their lead and the unwillingness of a great power to hand over its foreign policy to the General Assembly majority?

Despite official explanations and extensive preparations by radio and press for the unprecedented appearance of the President before a joint session of Congress to outline his "new" Middle East policy, there are elements in the plan not clear and those that are raise some fundamental questions.

The provisions of the Eisenhower doctrine resolution, House Joint Resolution 117, asks the Congress (1) to authorize the President to cooperate with and assist any nation or group of nations in the general area of the Middle East in the development of economic strength in the maintenance of national independence. That is magnificent. This is the most effective part of the President's proposal, which should be given the highest priority. Although the amount suggested is but a "drop in the bucket" as you have heard, today, and as I will try to show it later. This part of it has already been welcomed by foreign envoys in Moscow as a wise and useful move, but they consider it unfortunate that what seems to be the clear advantage of such a program has been overshadowed by mixing it up, or rather diminishing it in favor of the military aspect of the President's program. Stressing military aid, the diplomats feel, is a major tactical error. You will find this in today's Times of January 17.

The two other provisions have to do, of course, with things with which you are well familiar.

By the admission of the Secretary of State himself, this is not a new policy. It is merely the application to the Middle East of the past—and some would add, outworn—policy of containment and the Truman doctrine of 1947. The only thing that is new is that it revives a United States attitude toward the Middle East which was a feature of the Truman doctrine, rather than pursuing the inclination of the United States policy of a more recent date.

Proponents of the doctrine maintain that it is a peace move on the grounds that the danger, which no one denies exists, in the Middle East situation has become acute by reason of two new factors. One is the overt exploitation of the Middle East countries by the Soviet Union, and the other is the collapse of British and French influence in that area. Certainly these could not be called new factors, for as to the first the United States has been aware of the spread of Communist influence in that area for some time, and as to the second was instrumental in urging the withdrawal of British troops from Suez in 1955. Supporters of the doctrine argue that this step is necessary to curb Soviet Communist expansion and to fill the power vacuum created by the elimination of French-British influence in the Middle East.

Critics of the Eisenhower doctrine resolution say that at its best, it is unnecessary, uncertain, inadequate, and unwise. At its worst, it is reckless, contradictory, and dangerous.

The Women's International League for Peace and Freedom might well agree with these criticisms and add some more of its own. However, in so doing—and I want to emphasize this—the position of the league has always been that merely opposing something is negative and serves no useful purpose. Unless the criticisms can be constructive, based on what it considers sound reasons for its opposition, even

such constructive criticism is insufficient. A positive alternative must be offered.

The league rejects the thesis that the threat or use of force can be used as a means to bring about a desired end—peace. Instead it increases tensions, suspicions, and fears, creates more problems, and solves none. Ends and means must be consistent. Therefore alternatives to the threat or use of force must be concerned with the substitution in every case of peaceful means to bring about the desired end, which is peaceful settlement of conflicts. This is not only a priority in the league's constitution but also in the United Nations Charter.

The league believes that any positive, constructive, and effective United States policy must be directed toward the actual problems to be solved in the Middle East if peace and security are to be assured and the danger of the spread of conflict is to be averted. On the basis of these criteria, it is our considered opinion that the Eisenhower Doctrine resolution now before the Congress fails to meet the requirements of a policy adequate to deal with the Middle East situation for the following reasons:

(1) The Eisenhower doctrine is not directed to meet the real danger nor to the solution of the actual problems that create that danger. Rather, it is directed toward gaining ascendancy in the power struggle.

The threat to peace in the Middle East cannot be attributed merely to Communist domination and expansion nor to the vacuum left by the retreat of former imperialist powers. Actually there is no such vacuum. It is being filled by the new nationalisms of ex-colonial nations with their own conflicts, on the one hand, and on the other, by the efforts of the two contending blocs grouped around the two superpowers—the United States and the U. S. S. R.—to exploit these conflicts in their competition for the allegiance of the new nations.

It would not be true to say that the danger to peace in these contested regions arises exclusively from such attempts at great-power exploitation of local conflicts. The conflicts are there on both the political and economic level. They are most desperately explosive among young, poor nations which, having barely emerged from long periods of foreign domination and often suffering from overpopulation, feel they have nothing to lose. How to deal with these new nationalisms is the real problem.

(2) The Eisenhower doctrine calls for unilateral action rather than international cooperation through the United Nations.

If the dangerous explosions of national conflict are to be prevented, if their exploitation by the great powers at the risk of an eventual worldwide conflagration is to be stopped, a comprehensive attempt must be made to deal with the problem of regional security and regional economic development as a whole. Although such an attempt will require—and I can't emphasize this enough—the agreement and contributions of great powers, it cannot command the necessary confidence of Middle Eastern countries if it is advanced by any one nation, a particular group of nations, or even a "deal" between them. The only sponsorship that would be acceptable to the nations of the Middle East is that of a truly disinterested international body—the United Nations.

In view of the vital importance that the United States has recently been attaching to the United Nations, one may raise the question as to whether there is a legal basis for action without authorization of

the Security Council or General Assembly. Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, it is true, safeguards the right of individual national or collective defense without waiting for United Nations action. It is the basis for NATO and other mutual-defense agreements involving the United States and forty-odd nations. Only in the case of the Truman Doctrine of 1947 has the United States left itself open to the charge of bypassing the United Nations. One may assume that this would again be the case in respect to the Eisenhower Doctrine that so closely follows the same pattern and since under its provisions the United States could and might use force if it could not obtain United Nations authorization.

President Eisenhower made a point of saying his policy was not concerned with two of the main problems of the Middle East—Suez and Arab-Israeli relations—and that he was leaving them to the United Nations, as they should be. But the chances of making progress are greatly diminished as the President's Middle East policy has put great obstacles in the way of reaching a peaceful settlement. The task is infinitely more difficult. There are already signs pointing to the dissipation of the reservoir of good will toward the United States so recently created. A Lebanese official, friendly to the West and now on a trip to the capitals of the world, warned recently that "the Eisenhower Doctrine will be so presented in this part of the world that the United States will lose all the prestige it gained by its conduct of the Suez crisis." Thus a golden opportunity may be lost by not using this prestige to help, rather than to obstruct the settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict and the Suez Canal issue.

(3) Dangers inherent in the threat or use of force.

Stern warnings, such as the United States is now giving to the Soviet Union to keep "hands off" the Middle East, it is well known, haven't must effect unless they have "teeth in them." In the case of the Eisenhower Doctrine those "teeth" are a declaration of conditions under which the United States will employ its Armed Forces and arm its Arab friends against the Soviet Union or "any nation controlled by international communism." This is, indeed, a vague and dangerous term, since in western eyes those countries in need of help which turn to the U. S. S. R., are considered under Communist influence.

As came out at the end of the testimony that was just before mine.

In the case of the Middle East this kind of ad hoc policy which has been devised is for limited local use and directed at one enemy. Its limitations are very great when it is considered that there is no known threat of "overt armed aggression" since the U. S. S. R. has other methods by which it extends its power. Therefore the possibility of using United States Armed Forces in the Middle East seems less likely than another use of military means to back up the warning to international communism: namely, the provision that at the request of a nation or group of nations, the United States would provide military aid. Since only a limited number of Arab nations might be tempted to make such a request to strengthen their position vis-a-vis a rival Arab state, and since others might accept Soviet military assistance, the danger of a local conflict is far greater. Still more is the danger that such a policy might set off an arms race in the Middle East, nations playing off one of the great powers against another and thus bear the seeds of a more widespread conflict. This danger

has already been voiced in Britain when the question was asked: "Will not such a program (of military assistance) invite an arms race with the Soviet Union arming one or more of its friends and the United States arming others?"

It would be the better part of wisdom for the administration, the Congress, and the American people to consider the bitter lesson learned by Britain as a result of what the London Observer in an editorial on December 16, 1956, terms "the wreckage of a mistaken policy" before supporting a United States venture which might well lead to the same tragic conclusion. The editorial goes on to say:

Positive efforts of reassurance and reconstruction, and an abstention from further saber rattling are the best immediate counter to the dangers of Communist infiltration in the Middle East. * * * We must remember that this endeavor can no longer be made in terms of a special British military and diplomatic position in the area.

What guaranty is there that the United States special military and diplomatic position which the Eisenhower Doctrine envisages would not meet the same fate? Since the Bandung Conference one thing has been crystal clear concerning the new nationalisms, and that is that these countries will no longer accept the domination of any outside, foreign power. The United States that succeeded in disentangling itself from the charge of "colonialism," will again be charged with taking over the responsibilities of the former imperialist powers.

Turning now to alternatives, it must be said that the state of mind revealed in the last sentence of a New York Times editorial of January 8 is purely defeatist. I sincerely hope it is not the atmosphere of the thinking of the people of America. The sentence was—

It is difficult to oppose the Eisenhower Middle East policy since there is no possible alternative.

There is always an alternative. Many valuable new approaches to the Middle East problem have been made during the past few weeks. Space and time prevent a detailed analysis of these suggestions but certain fundamental changes in United States policy are indicated in all of them. And I commend to you this remarkable thing drawn up by experts in England, "a plan for the Middle East." This is reprinted from the London Observer of December 16.

Chairman GORDON. Would you put that in the record?

Mrs. WALSER. I would love to. I also have a speech made before the Chicago World Affairs Council by John Scott, an editor of Time magazine, and printed in the Christian Century, January 2, 1957. I also have the Foreign Policy Bulletin, November 1, 1956, What Suez Means to Egypt.

Mr. FULTON. I would ask that the staff prepare a summary of those items to go in the respective places in the record.

Chairman GORDON. Without objection, it will be done.

(The summaries referred to are as follows:)

SUMMARY OF A SPEECH BY JOHN SCOTT ENTITLED "A UNITED STATES POLICY FOR THE MIDDLE EAST," APPEARING IN THE CHRISTIAN CENTURY FOR JANUARY 2, 1957

Prior to the withdrawal of the United Nations police force, programs must be worked out for the future of the Middle East. A short-range program would include the establishment of an Egyptian Canal authority which should be

vested with ownership of the canal. At the same time, however, the operation and maintenance should be entrusted to subcontractors experienced in the operation and maintenance of large waterways. None of the major powers should be included among the subcontractors. Financial management should be placed in the hands of a consortium of Swiss and Luxembourg banks. There should be a canal users association with Egypt being a permanent member and the other members named in rotation. This solution would not meet the major long-term problem of the obsolescence of the canal. Therefore, it is necessary either that a new canal be dug, that the present canal be deepened and double-tracked, or that a large pipeline be constructed from the Red Sea to the Mediterranean. Any of these would be too expensive to be financed from canal income and therefore the United Nations might have to step in. Additional steps in a short-range program would be the demilitarization of the Gulf of Aqaba, and the islands of Tiran and Sanafir, the merger of Iraq and Jordan, the establishment of exact frontiers between Israel and the new state (probably expanding Israel borders somewhat), the increase of pipeline royalties to Israel, Syria, and Lebanon, the formal annexation of the Gaza strip by Israel, and finally the acceptance of financial responsibility by Israel for the 900,000 Arab refugees. Further, it is suggested that the United Nations police force now in Suez might be moved to Palestine, that peace treaties be signed between Israel and the Arabs, that progressive disarmament be enforced, and that United States policy on the Baghdad Pact be reviewed.

As a long-range program, the water resources of the area must be developed. Although the area was, in ancient times, the granary of the world, the Arabs and Mongolian incursions during the Middle Ages reduced the area to desert. The only presently available sources are: (1) The more effective use of rainfall by reforestation of the entire area, (2) the conversion of sea water, (3) the Nile River, (4) the Jordan River, (5) the Tigris-Euphrates system. Any of these projects are extremely expensive, and only Iraq has made a start toward development. It is suggested that the United States encourage the diversion of oil incomes to water development and that strong measures be taken to that end. It is suggested that the oil companies themselves initiate projects in this direction. This program should be carried out under a United Nations-Middle East development authority.

SUMMARY OF STORY APPEARING IN NEW YORK HERALD TRIBUNE FOR JANUARY 16, 1957 ENTITLED "NUTTING FOR A SCHUMAN PLAN TO SOLVE MIDEAST OIL ISSUE"

We cannot rely on Russian brutality in Europe to win friends for democracy in Asia. The Russians are building a new empire by trade just as the British originally built theirs.

British policy toward the uncommitted world is too paternalistic while American policy is too passive. The British and the United States must work together to avoid catastrophe.

The best way to counter the threat of nationalism to the West's vital interest in the Middle East is a form of Schuman plan for Middle East oil on the lines of the European coal and steel community. This would not necessarily result in any change of ownership any more than does the European model. A governing board could be set up with supervisory powers consisting of the Arab States, the Persian Gulf States, America, Britain, Syria, and possibly Turkey. This would become the effective landlord while the existing companies would be the tenants of the board. Pipelines would be included in their arrangements. A percentage of the oil revenues could be set aside for development.

Such a plan could avert a crisis. It would result in the lowering of the company's rates but would give them greater security of tenure.

SUMMARY OF A PLAN FOR THE MIDDLE EAST, AN ARTICLE APPEARING IN THE OBSERVER, DECEMBER 16, 1956

It would be willful blindness to assume that the demise of imperialism will automatically insure the emergence of a new international order. Sovereignty by itself cannot furnish a foundation for an international order insuring peace and stability. The solution would lie in a regional security and economic development plan that would be acceptable to the countries of the area. Such a plan would have to be under the sponsorship of a disinterested international institution—the United Nations.

The two great needs of the Middle East are (1) internal and external security, and (2) economic development. The major internal security need is the solution of the Arab-Israel conflict. Such internal and external security might be achieved by a United Nations guaranty of the present Arab-Israel armistice lines and eventually of agreed frontiers. Such a guaranty would also avoid intervention by the great powers. Such a guaranty should be accompanied by the stationing of a United Nations police force in the area of the Suez Canal to serve as a trip wire which could not be touched without sounding an alarm committing the United Nations to action and bringing greater forces into operation.

Such an international force would also remove the international security problems of the Suez Canal itself. Concurrent with this, United Nations control of the technical and economic aspects of the canal's operation should be instituted. This technique would both safeguard Egypt's interests and protect the interests of the user nations.

In order to make such a plan more acceptable to Egypt and at the same time to meet the other great need of the area—economic development—both the military force and operating authority of the canal should be directly linked with a regional development board to be composed primarily of the representatives of the regional states and of those participating in the development plan.

In furtherance of this project, suggestions have been made that the United Nations purchase either the entire Sinai Peninsula or a corridor from Gaza to the Gulf of Aqaba along both sides of the Egyptian-Israeli border. Also, it would be necessary to include the islands at the entrance of the Gulf of Aqaba. The interposition of such a strip of international territory between Egypt and Israel might go far in establishing peace between the Jews and Arabs. The strip could also carry both a highway and pipelines. It would afford a valuable demonstration area for United Nations technical and economic development programs. The area could also absorb numerous refugees from Palestine.

The above plan would not, however, resolve the friction between oil importers and oil exporters. It alone would not reassure the peoples of the area that they were receiving adequate compensation for their valuable exports. In order to meet this problem, it is suggested that all Middle East pipelines be taken over by the United Nations as international utilities, and that a portion of the revenues of the pipelines and of the canal be paid over to a Middle East Development Agency to be set up under a technical assistance board of the United Nations. A similar levy would be made on all oil shipped from Middle Eastern ports. These funds would then be used for regional development of the Middle East. Among the suggested uses would be the development of the Nile, the Jordan, and other Middle Eastern rivers.

It is obvious that additional funds would be needed, and that these funds would have to come from some of the major member states of the United Nations.

In like manner, funds for the support of the United Nations police force would have to come from the major members of the United Nations.

SUMMARY OF AN ARTICLE BY JOHN S. BADEAU ENTITLED "WHAT SUEZ MEANS TO EGYPT," APPEARING IN THE FOREIGN POLICY BULLETIN, NOVEMBER 1, 1956

In view of the fact that Egypt would probably have nationalized the Suez Canal before the expiration of the canal concession, the Aswan Dam incident was the occasion rather than the cause of Egyptian seizure of the canal. Any solution of the canal problem must recognize both western interest and Egyptian interest since the Suez Canal vitally affects Egypt in two respects: (1) it is a major economic resource from which Egypt has received only minor return, and (2) a political threat to Egypt's sovereignty arises from the claim that the canal is international.

Egypt furnished 50 percent of the capital used in the original construction; in return, Egypt was to receive 15 percent of the net profits. Agreements by Egypt, however, eliminated this requirement. In 1936 revenue payments were begun to Egypt and by 1939 this amounted to 7 percent of the canal's net profit. Recently the Egyptian Government suggested that the company replace some of its investments in Europe by investments in Egyptian enterprises. This proposal was finally met in part. The Egyptians also requested an expansion of the canal facilities, but the company denied this request in view of its short tenure, namely, 12 years.

The contention that the canal has been internationalized is not technically correct in that the 1888 Constantinople Convention did not internationalize the

canal but merely neutralized it. Britain formerly opposed international control but now claims it.

Whatever the West does to safeguard its own interest in the canal it must be equally concerned with the threat of foreign political intrusion that the canal has always posed for Egypt.

SUMMARY OF UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY DOCUMENT A/3491, JANUARY 10, 1957, CONTAINING A REPORT BY LT. COL. K. R. NELSON (UNITED STATES MEMBER OF THE HEADQUARTERS STAFF OF THE UNITED NATIONS EMERGENCY FORCE)

1. The Israeli authorities have established a program to stabilize life in the Gaza strip. The population has recognized this and has remained calm. Removal of effective authority from the area would cause eruption.

2. The Israeli authorities, after initial difficulties, offered complete freedom of travel to United Nations observers.

3. There have been no mass deportations from Gaza.

4. Rumors are prevalent.

5. There were few troops in the area.

6. Some measures taken by Israeli authorities would seem to indicate an intention to make the existing situation permanent.

SUMMARY OF AN ARTICLE APPEARING IN THE NEW YORK TIMES, THURSDAY, JANUARY 17, 1957, BY WILLIAM J. JORDEN, ENTITLED "MIDEAST'S ENVOYS SEE UNITED STATES AID ERROR"

Many diplomatic representatives in Moscow are convinced that the Eisenhower plan errs in stressing military aid. The foreign representatives feel that the economic portion of the plan was wise, but that the advantages were overshadowed by the military program, and particularly by the threat to use American Armed Forces.

These diplomats who represent countries that are non-Communist or anti-Communist are in many cases pro-American. As they see the situation, the stress on the military phase of aid to the Middle East has three basic weaknesses: (1) it stresses overt Soviet aggression which these diplomats do not believe to be the major threat; (2) it unnecessarily frightens many Arabs and reinforces the rabble-rousers; (3) it gives useful propaganda material to Moscow.

SUMMARY OF UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY DOCUMENT A/3492, JANUARY 10, 1957 (SECOND REPORT OF THE SECRETARY GENERAL ON THE CLEARING OF THE SUEZ CANAL)

1. On November 8, the Secretary General made approaches to Dutch and Danish salvage firms which indicated their agreement to assist as required.

2. On November 15 through November 17 he visited Cairo and raised the question of canal clearance. Egypt requested the assistance of the United Nations. The Secretary General stated that the United Nations would assist.

3. Following the adoption of the November 24 resolution, salvage firms were requested to dispatch salvage ships to the scene.

4. Lt. Gen. Raymond A. Wheeler, of the United States, was named to assist in the operation. It was determined that the assistance of the Anglo-French units in Port Said might be needed to assist in the operations.

5. On December 22, the United Nations took over the responsibility for the clearing of the canal. It was agreed that Anglo-French units would be phased out.

6. United Nations salvage operations started at the southern end of the canal on December 28, and at the northern end of the canal on December 31, 1956. The clearance plans met with approval of the Egyptian authorities.

7. An exchange of letters has taken place between the Secretary General and the Government of Egypt concerning the clearance plans.

8. Cost estimates are not yet available.

9. Member governments have been requested to advance funds to United Nations for clearance of the canal.

10. Some governments have promised assistance and substantial amounts have already been made available.

Mrs. WALSER. I would also like to add what Mr. Nutting, who resigned from the British Cabinet over the Suez policy, has written in the New York Herald Tribune of yesterday on a Schuman plan for the Middle East. It is from these and other remarkable documents which I can also give to you from the United Nations, from the reports of the Secretary General, the latest ones on first the clearing of the canal and the other one on the United Nations emergency force.

Mr. FULTON. I ask the same on those items.

Chairman GORDON. Those will be given to the staff for condensation and inclusion in the record. (See pp. 423-426.)

Mrs. WALSER. May I add these 3 or 4 things which I believe would indicate certain fundamental changes in the United Nations policy which I want very much to bring out.

(1) A new bold United States policy is called for. This one we now have is not new.

The reason for that is that the Middle East presents in the most extreme form—it is a little pilot project, as it were—most of the tensions and the frictions that characterize our time. It is in a ferment of rapid social, economic, political change. No part of the world so urgently needs intelligent, disinterested help from the more developed industrial nations to solve its problems than the Middle East. Therefore, the West, particularly the United States, must offer what the uncommitted world seeks, independence and interdependence. Independence can be fostered by an understanding of the aspirations of the people desiring freedom from foreign domination. Interdependence may be furthered by international cooperation through the U. N. programs of technical assistance and economic development.

Often in the past, the United States statesmen—I have heard them at the United Nations when they have had to take a colonial question up in the United Nations, and they were not in agreement really with Britain or France or one of the colonial powers—I have heard them deplore the complex problem of colonial associations with which United States connections with Britain and France have involved this country. These included political domination, military occupation, and economic exploitation. Today colonialism has broken away, as recent events prove, and the United States is free to make its own bold, new program based on political cooperation, instead of domination, on collective security under the United Nations Charter, instead of military occupation, and on economic partnership through the United Nations, instead of exploitation. What is desperately needed is leadership with creative diplomacy expressed in a comprehensive program for political stability and economic development.

(2) The instrument for carrying out a bold, new program is the United Nations.

The only sponsorship for a regional security and development plan that would be acceptable to Middle Eastern countries is that of a truly disinterested international body—the United Nations of 80 nations which make up most of the world community. The machinery exists and can be expanded to meet the requirements of a larger plan. For some time a small permanent staff of the United Nations has been sponsoring economic programs, relief, etc. May I add right here that when the question of how far \$200 million or \$400 million or \$1 million, or any other amount you want to mention will go, I will

say that it goes much further in handling economic aid through the United Nations. And my reason for this is that the United Nations plan is one which examines the situations in the country, asks the government to draw up a program, gives only that part of the aid that is matched twice over by the country itself. It is no giveaway program.

And therefore for many years I have advocated channeling all United States funds through the United Nations. Not only because the money goes further but because the charges of political strings being attached, or that we want to exploit something or that we are using it as a cold war weapon will not be used if it goes through the community of nations, of the 80 nations.

Therefore these programs which must be undertaken would include, it seems to me, an example of this—of security as I mentioned—regional security and regional economic development. Take security and what the United Nations has tried to do about that, without raising an army. You will recall it had a truce observation organization under General Burns whose duty was to watch and patrol the armistice demarcation lines. And Mr. Vorys, I could have answered your question and documented it when you asked what the United Nations documents say about the raids across those borders for there are two resolutions now in the General Assembly that have contemplated Israeli's retaliation across those borders. Therefore, this truce observation organization patrolled the armistice demarcation line to see that there was compliance with the 1948 armistice agreements. That is all there was to keep peace in that area.

At the time of the French-British-Israeli attack, this was expanded into one of the most imaginative remarkable things, the United Nations emergency force which we call UNEF. It is composed of contingents from small countries with no particular stake in the Middle East. They have been very carefully screened. And the duties and functions of UNEF were clearly specified in General Assembly resolutions. These were to see that cease-fire was carried out and supervise withdrawal of French-British troops from Suez. When this was accomplished, to move into the Sinai Peninsula to take over, after withdrawal of Israeli troops, which has been very, very slow, as you know, and is not completed yet, but the promise is that it will be by January 22. UNEF's functions were those absolutely of police, not an army in the sense of an army. They are to undertake no military operations, nor act as an occupation army, nor be used to influence the balance of power in the Middle East. But here is this army containing a Yugoslav contingent moving into the Sinai Peninsula as Israeli departs accompanied by 400 Egyptian police, and here they will stay because quite rightly Israeli is very concerned as to whether Egyptian troops will again move into that area. But that, too, is in the future.

I wanted to mention particularly these various things. And then I think next in importance is the fact that the clearing of the Suez Canal is a United Nations enterprise, and according to an agreement made between the United Nations and the Egyptian Government made public on January 11, the time schedule has been set. By March, a 25-foot channel will be cleared. The remainder will be finished by May. According to the report of Lt. Gen. Raymond Wheeler, as you know, United States engineer in the Panama Canal, who was ap-

pointed by the Secretary General to oversee salvage operations, is there. And my friends, the exciting thing is that a fleet of 32 salvage vessels with crews of 7 countries—here they are: Belgium, Denmark, Holland, Germany, Italy, Sweden, and Yugoslavia—are going ahead with the work, now that Egypt has made concessions on her demands that no clearing should take place until all Israeli forces will be withdrawn.

The Secretary General has accomplished getting that concession. And I might add, and I want to add for the record, that the work has been greatly facilitated by a recent United States \$5 million loan. The Secretary General said he could not have gone ahead with the first \$10 million unless he had gotten this loan which was presented to him about 2 weeks ago by Mr. Lodge.

Now the Suez matter, as you see, will be settled more easily than the Palestine one. The Secretary General has already worked out a method of implementing those six principles agreed on by both sides which form the basis for negotiations on the canal. While observing Egyptian sovereignty by allowing Egypt to operate the canal, according to the Secretary General's plan, the international machinery will be set up to prevent any arbitrary abuse of power on Egypt's part. The users' rights will be considered and any dispute that arises will be referred to the World Court for arbitration.

I come then to my third point. I am near the end.

(3) Efforts must be directed toward the needs of the people of the Middle East, as well as those of other countries dependent on the Middle East.

While oil may be of predominant interest—excuse me, sir. May I go back, before I take up No. 3, to say that this second problem of a peaceful settlement of the Palestine question, I think, depends, for instance, first upon the complete withdrawal of Israeli forces. She has said she will withdraw from everything but the Gaza strip and that very strategic ground at the Straits of Tiran, you know, which Egypt formerly used to block shipping bound for Israeli ports.

Now Israel says she wants a U. N. solution before she withdraws from the Gaza strip. This is wise because any just solution will have to make a compromise and bring about agreement on the part of Egypt to allow Israeli shipping to go through the Suez Canal, if Israeli gives up the territory that she now holds on the Sinai Peninsula. This, too, is the kind of thing the United Nations can negotiate through the remarkable diplomatic skill of the Secretary General and the people he appoints to assist him in this task.

Any long-term solution of the Israeli-Arab conflict, in my mind, will have to take up the question of the refugee problem and be first solved on the economic level for the two sides can enter into some mutually beneficial project like that of the Jordan waters, because if the Arabs and Jews are willing to first cooperate on something that will benefit their economic life, political settlements might be more possible of attainment.

I then come to the very interesting suggestion that while oil may be of predominant interest to the people of other areas and to those in Arab countries who have enriched themselves, like King Saud, often at the expense of their own people, in general the people of the Middle East put more emphasis on water as a means of increasing economic development. That is why I had a certain sympathy with the former

testimony when it mentioned the terrible blow to Egypt of the withdrawal of the offer to help finance the Aswan Dam, which would have increased by two thirds the arable land of Egypt. Water is terribly important.

No underdeveloped region has so valuable an export as Middle East oil. Yet human ingenuity that enables it to drive so many million engines has so far done relatively nothing to harness the proceeds to develop the region from which the oil comes. It has been suggested—and it was Anthony Nutting who did it—that a kind of Schuman plan for the Middle East oil on the lines of the European Coal and Steel Community might offer a solution. This would not necessarily require any change in ownership. There can be an international governing board with supervisory powers (as has been suggested for the Suez Canal) set up and consisting of the oil-producing and oil-receiving nations on a profit-sharing basis, with a small percent but a definite percent allocated entirely to the carrying on of a Middle East development authority, which will undertake great projects such as I have suggested: An international concern under the United Nations for extensive development of the waters of the Nile, the Jordan, the building of dams. The Aswan Dam, it is estimated, would have given Egypt two-thirds more arable lands. The costs would be high but they could be met if all nations channeled their economic aid funds through the United Nations; if a certain percent of oil revenues is put back into the building of new pipelines and transportation improvements. It would be of interest to all industrially developed countries to help in the financing on a generous scale, such projects as would bring peace and prosperity to the Middle East instead of spending their money on defending the area militarily from a possible enemy, internal or external.

(4) United States leadership is needed now.

The time to start formulating a new, bold, and effective United States policy for the Middle East is immediately. While the Eisenhower doctrine includes a small amount (\$200 million a year for 2 years), it is but "a drop in the bucket," while the United Nations efforts are progressing toward the creation of an atmosphere in which negotiations for a peaceful settlement of the two key issues—Suez and Palestine. For this task the United States must mobilize an able team of statesmen, engineers, economists, and lawyers with the same vigor that would be used to mobilize them in a national war emergency, for the proposed Eisenhower doctrine would seem to make this a national emergency. If we are to organize for an emergency, this is the right kind of a war, a war against disease, poverty, and ignorance in the great areas of the world. It seems to me only thus can the United States discharge its obligations under the United Nations and regain and hold the prestige it deserves to have.

Other questions must be considered such as progress on disarmament, generous support of a special United Nations' fund for economic development. There you have your loans, low-interest loans and outright grants. A reexamination of United States immigration laws to help solve the refugee problems that are vital to the United States leadership.

This, gentlemen, is a challenge to a country with great traditions of freedom, democracy, and prosperity, all of which must now be shared with others with whom we live in the community of nations.

That the United States can meet this challenge is assured. That it will meet it depends upon all of us who call ourselves loyal Americans.

I thank you.

Chairman GORDON. Thank you very much, Mrs. Walser, for your interesting presentation.

Mrs. WALSER. Mr. Chairman, you have been very fair in giving us this much time when you have had such a long session. But it was only that I would have loved to have had as much discussion, if you so desired it, of some of the things I have suggested, as the discussion after the previous speaker; but I understand the time is limited, and I do thank you most gratefully for giving me this opportunity.

This is based not only on a deep concern, sir. It is based also, I think one can say, on experience, for I have lived for years in the underdeveloped regions of the world of Asia, and I have recently made a trip to see United Nations projects under the specialized agencies, and to do work with our different members of the Women's International League in India and various other parts of the world. We are proud to have Mrs. Pandit, Mr. Nehru's sister, as honorary chairman of the India section of our league. We have a strong section in Japan, and the head of that is now the head of the greatest women's university in Japan.

I saw what was being done through the United Nations with practically no money, by United States standards.

I would say that I believe these suggestions that I have here might be read into the record, or a summary of them put into the record. These contain a forward look of one of the traditions of a country who has pioneered in the past and has the challenge today for pioneering. Perhaps that is simply because my organization has always been known as a pioneering organization. So a pioneer is talking to pioneers.

Chairman GORDON. Thank you, Mrs. Walser.

Mr. Vorys.

Mr. VORYS. Mrs. Walser, the hour is late, and I merely want to suggest that much of the challenging program you suggest is being taken up under existing law, some of it by other committees in the Congress, and some of it will be taken up later in the year by this committee. I am happy to note that you feel as I do and as the administration does, that the Suez problem and the Arab-Israeli problem should be settled in the United Nations, and that we should not proceed to try to settle it under this legislation.

Mrs. WALSER. But, sir, if I may interrupt, note that I say while leaving it to the United Nations is correct, at the same time this legislation is affecting the progress that the United Nations is trying to make on these issues, and I give the reasons why I thought it was.

Mr. VORYS. We will surely give due consideration to the critical attitude you have toward this legislation.

Mrs. WALSER. I hope it is constructive.

Mr. VORYS. I just want to ask one question. I do not want to detain the committee now, but I wish you would furnish for the record information as to the organization of the International League for Peace and Freedom, the number of countries that are members, the membership in this and other countries, the personnel of the international board, if there is such, and the membership and personnel of the

governing board which determines the policies of the United States section.

Mrs. WALSER. We will supply that for the record.

(Part of this information was submitted and is in the committee files.)

Chairman GORDON. Mr. Carnahan.

Mr. CARNAHAN. Mrs. Walser, due to the lateness of the hour, I will ask you no questions, but I do want to express my appreciation for the fine concept you have brought to the committee.

Mrs. WALSER. Thank you.

Chairman GORDON. Mr. Fulton.

Mr. FULTON. I want to compliment you on an excellent statement. Your points of view are refreshingly new, and I believe they are without bias.

Mrs. WALSER. That sounds very good to me. I think that perhaps will go back, if I may say so, to a certain training which came from living in another part of the world. Secondly, to belonging to an organization that tries to keep unbiased and unprejudiced. Third, to working in the United Nations, which perhaps has a larger canvas upon which it projects its thoughts than any other organization in the world.

Thank you very much.

Mr. FULTON. I do like your method of using the United Nations where you can.

Mrs. WALSER. If we do not, we are sunk.

Mr. FULTON. I would suggest that, instead of referring to nations so much, you should refer to peoples.

Mrs. WALSER. The only reason I did that is because the United Nations is a group of sovereign nations representing peoples. I agree with you that that is an excellent and constructive criticism, and I wish you would write it in and correct it in the record for me.

Mr. FULTON. I have been doing it occasionally, here on my copy.

Mrs. WALSER. I would like very much if you would rewrite certain parts of it, but not all of it.

Mr. FULTON. On page 5 of your statement I read the following:

Since the Bandung Conference one thing has been crystal clear concerning the new nationalisms.

The next sentence should be: "The peoples of these countries will no longer willingly accept domination of any outside foreign power."

Mrs. WALSER. I meant to say they are no longer willing to accept.

Mr. FULTON. You didn't say "willing."

Mrs. WALSER. They are no longer willing to accept.

Mr. FULTON. I would add also: "But these peoples are more alert to the old receding and weak types of colonialism, whose injustices they have felt, than to the new, strong, and ruthless colonialism and imperialistic domination of Communist imperialism with which they have had no experience but simply tempting offers and blandishments."

Mrs. WALSER. Now, Mr. Fulton, you will have to keep that for your copy. It can't go in the record on my copy for the simple reason that I think there is a definition in the use of imperialism to the countries of Asia. You will remember the debate during the Bandung Conference where they were perfectly conscious of the bad elements of communism that operated the wrong way, but they were unwilling to

equate it with the word "imperialism," because for years imperialism had meant one thing to them.

Mr. FULTON. You see again you were talking of the representatives of nations and I am speaking of innocent and uneducated peoples. There is quite a difference between what you say about the Bandung Conference and what I am saying in this particular connection.

Mrs. WALSER. That is right and one other thing, Mr. Fulton, I wonder if you would agree with it and that is that they have experienced imperialism and therefore they see the signs of that, or they think they do, in certain domination. But they have never experienced communism and from my point of view watching Asia, I think they are not going to. I think that the average country in Asia is dealing with the question of communism very skillfully. And for the simple reason that when there is any overt act of sabotage—the Government of India, for instance—the Communists are thrown into prison. But they are given free speech and they are able to talk. They have a very small minority and they really don't get very far.

I think you could probably say that with the exception—and I think they are very worried over Indonesia at the moment—with the exception of perhaps a few countries, there is very much less danger of infiltration than Western countries are inclined to think there is.

Mr. FULTON. On your point for regional development, on an economic basis for the eastern Mediterranean area, I would like to refer you good ladies to the bills which in previous Congresses have been put in by Mrs. Bolton and myself among others, for that regional development.

Mrs. WALSER. Through the United Nations?

Mr. FULTON. This was on Marshall plan principles where we called them together to form their own type of development plans which would then be screened by our State Department and agencies to see that they were efficient for the proper use of the United States taxpayers' money.

Mrs. WALSER. May I suggest you bring those in again and begin to promote them. This is just the time to do it.

Mr. FULTON. Thank you very much.

Chairman GORDON. Dr. Judd—

Mr. JUDD. I, too, want to thank Mrs. Walser for her very comprehensive and stimulating statement. I hesitate to make one or two minor criticisms because it may seem to be carping or detracting from the main soundness of it.

I think it is too bad that you seem to accept the general idea that the Communists are spreading throughout the world, namely, that this is merely a power struggle between two great blocs led by two giant superpowers, both on an even par.

Of course that is not the case. It sounds like the argument, "Now if these two big wolves would just quit snarling at each other, everything would quiet down." But that is not an accurate description of the situation. It is not two wolves. It is a wolf dedicated to the destruction of the flock and a shepherd dog trying to save the flock, at the request of the flock. To change the definitions, makes the picture entirely different. The Communists always say "It is just a struggle between two power blocs," and a lot of people in America believe that. But it isn't so, and I don't believe we ought to repeat it. We have never moved in until we were compelled to by the necessities

of a situation. I think the shepherd dog would be faithless if he didn't move to the defense of the flock, at the request of the flock threatened by the wolf.

I regret that you seem to equate them when you say both sides are there to exploit and each is merely trying to get ascendancy over the other.

Mrs. WALSER. I would like to answer that, Dr. Judd.

I think if you will read that sentence, you will say the cause is not merely Communist domination but it is these other things, combined.

I was speaking to the resolution that seems to pick out the one thing which is the danger of international communism. I have said there is a real danger. I want to refer just a moment to the wolf and the shepherd and his flock. From my standpoint, the shepherd's chief objective in defending his flock from the wolves is a matter of enclosing them within safety and if you notice I have spoken "in a safe place" and I have spoken of security as one of the necessary things in the Middle East.

Secondly I think that a shepherd's duty is to feed his flock.

Mr. JUDD. I said a shepherd dog. I said a wolf and a shepherd dog. The shepherd dog has to attack the wolf when the wolf attacks the flock.

Mrs. WALSER. I have seen a shepherd dog but I haven't seen him meet a wolf.

The chief thing the dog does is drive his sheep. He is behind them and he gets them to a place of safety.

Mr. JUDD. Where is the place of safety?

Mrs. WALSER. My position on security is much more of the shepherd dog's function. I feel about the shepherd dog as I do of the United Nations Emergency Force, that he is more interested in seeing the danger removed than he is in attacking the danger by military force. That is the point.

Mr. JUDD. The sentence I regretted is one where you are talking about the Eisenhower doctrine being directed toward gaining ascendancy in the power struggle.

Mrs. WALSER. Well, winning people.

Mr. JUDD. But it sounds as if it is just a struggle of two greedy imperialistic powers each trying to get control over the other. I don't think that is an accurate description.

Mrs. WALSER. May I tell you what I meant?

Mr. JUDD. I think I understood what you meant, but I believe it was unfortunate that you used those phrases.

Mrs. WALSER. It is a struggle, since the threat of nuclear warfare has now come to another level. It is an economic level. It is a struggle. I would like to think, where most people can help themselves. It isn't just helping people to be on your side but it is helping people to help themselves for the reason that you want to have them have a higher standard of living because it is also to your interests and to their interests.

I think another thing is right, that it is winning the minds of men. It is, let me say, serving their bodily needs with the things we all have to have but it is doing a little more than that. It is reaching out to people to try to show—which I happen to think and you may not agree with me—that India is trying to do in relation to China. It is trying to show that India by democratic methods can make as

prosperous and decent and even better country than the Communist regime in China can through those methods. I think we are seeing a very wonderful demonstration, here, of the two. By that I do not mean in China there are not improvements, because India and other countries and people who have traveled there say there are improvements. But India is also trying to win the minds and allow the minds of people to be free, as well as have their bodies fed and this seems to me part of the democracy and part of the responsibility I would like to see the United States take.

Mr. JUDD. Of course the Germans were much better off materially under Hitler than they had been previously. I doubt the value and the wisdom of that kind of improvement.

Mrs. WALSER. Please remember I said not only bodily needs but freedom of the mind.

Mr. JUDD. In another place, you say—

Only in the case of the Truman Doctrine of 1947 has the United States left itself open to the charge of bypassing the United Nations.

The United Nations under its own charter couldn't act. It was an internal struggle in Greece. It would have been a violation of its own charter to intervene.

I think it is unfortunate that you say the Truman Doctrine bypassed the United Nations for that is not the case. He had to act or nothing could be done. The United Nations could not act there because it was strictly an internal struggle and the United Nations is forbidden by its charter to interfere in the internal affairs of a country.

Mrs. WALSER. It would open itself to bypassing the charter.

My source for this was Thomas J. Hamilton, who is the reporter to the United Nations from the New York Times.

Mr. JUDD. That was gone into by this committee in 1947 in great detail. I wish you might have read these hearings.

Mrs. WALSER. The reason the United States has never been charged with bypassing the United Nations in its actions is because they put them within the framework of article 51 of the charter.

The Truman Doctrine and, it seems to me, the Eisenhower Doctrine follow more or less the same pattern. One was for the Middle East, the other was for Greece and Turkey. It could have been put under the umbrella of the United Nations if the United States had joined the Baghdad Pact.

Mr. FULTON. Why should the United States join with the colonial powers in the area?

Mrs. WALSER. I say I wouldn't like to have seen it done.

Mr. JUDD. But the fact is that the people who say the Eisenhower Doctrine is essentially the same as the Truman Doctrine are inaccurate, because the Truman Doctrine applied to an internal struggle in a country where the U. N. couldn't act; and here we are making official, what we have already done a few times, going to the assistance of countries that are threatened not only from within but by external aggression.

I think it is too bad that you seemed to give the impression that we bypassed the U. N. at that time, when I don't think we did.

Mrs. WALSER. Then it is a misunderstanding.

I understood the Truman Doctrine was to help Greece and Turkey resist the peril of communistic activity.

Mr. JUDD. Internal aggression. The place it moved was Greece where there was an internal war. The U. N. couldn't have done that. The U. N. could have gone to the assistance of countries who felt themselves threatened by external aggression but it couldn't involve itself in a civil war, so to speak.

Mrs. WALSER. But we still would be under the charge of bypassing the charter of the United Nations even if as you say the United Nations couldn't do it. Neither should we have done it as members of the United Nations because, if you will remember, article 2, chapter 1, says that no nation can interfere with the internal affairs of another nation.

If you call this an internal conflict within Greece and Turkey, then you have the United States break one of the articles of the charter by intervening in the political or internal affairs of another country.

So, in either case you are caught.

Mr. JUDD. One would be bypassing and the other would be breaking the charter. You might have made the charge of breaking the charter stick better than the charge of bypassing the U. N.

Now the third point that I might mention—I think you said that not many of these Arab countries would be likely to accept the offer of aid because of political strings attached to bilateral aid.

What are the political strings to which you refer?

Mrs. WALSER. The fact that they would have to line up—I think you heard—what was his name who preceded me?

Mr. JUDD. Mr. Bader.

Mrs. WALSER. I think you heard him say they would be rather resistant to economic aid. He may have given other reasons for it. What I am trying to say is that I believe that the Arab nations would be rather hesitant in accepting aid from the United States for the purposes which the resolution is giving the aid.

Mr. JUDD. That might be but I regret the use of this common Communist shibboleth "political strings attached." I would like to have you name the political strings we allegedly attach to countries to whom we give aid.

Mrs. WALSER. Twice you have referred to things I have said as Communist shibboleths.

Mr. JUDD. Your speech is too good to be injured by slogans.

Mrs. WALSER. Then you would have to say that the Foreign Policy Association bulletin, a good many of our commentators who write in the newspapers, a great many very—what do I want to say—dignified and respected articles in magazines—use this phrase very often.

Mr. JUDD. And I greatly deplore it because they are wrong.

Mrs. WALSER. "Bilateral aid with political strings attached."

Mr. JUDD. We should be accurate even if they are not precise.

Mrs. WALSER. They say things that Communists have said. That does not mean that we say them with the same motive for the same reasons.

Mr. JUDD. I did not suggest that.

Mrs. WALSER. But we may think it is the correct way to say them, if you see what I mean.

Mr. JUDD. When they set out to discredit this whole program of helping countries stay free, one of the things they said was, "If you take this aid you have to agree to a lot of political strings," and I wondered if you had examined the law to see what the so-called political strings are.

Mrs. WALSER. I did examine mutual security.

Mr. JUDD. What are those political strings?

Mrs. WALSER. It seems to me under that we were not giving economic aid—please correct me, gentlemen, if I am wrong—we were not giving economic aid without certain restrictions.

Mr. JUDD. What are they?

Mrs. WALSER. I understood at one time India did refuse it because she could not accept the restrictions, and that was taking sides in the cold war.

Mr. JUDD. I would like to have you show me that in the language of the act.

Mrs. WALSER. Does not the Mutual Security Act put certain conditions on acceptance of aid?

Mr. JUDD. Yes.

Mrs. WALSER. I have not asked for any of that aid so I have not seen written-out forms of agreement. I have only known that some countries who need economic aid very, very much still refused because they felt it committed them to take a certain position which in their particular area was not a position that we were willing to take in the matter of the cold war.

Chairman GORDON. Mr. Judd, I am certainly enjoying this discussion, but we have another witness waiting to testify.

Mr. JUDD. I hope she will look up the strings and see if she believes we should have taken American money and used it for these assistance purposes without the conditions specified in the act. They are not strings on any country's political views. They are only to make sure the money will not be used for gunrunning, that the recipients will not transfer the aid we give them to other countries and will not use it for aggressive purposes.

Would anyone want us to give guns to countries without requiring an assurance they will not use them to start wars?

Mrs. WALSER. I do not want us to give guns to any countries, period.

I will conform to what the kind chairman has said. I merely want to say it seems to me that there have been certain demands for military bases. It has been very difficult for me to find out and for a good many people, I think, to find out just what is clearly only economic aid and what is military support aid and what is outright military arms aid. If you do not mind, a woman loves to have the last word, Mr. Judd, and I have enjoyed it.

Chairman GORDON. Thank you very much. This has been a very interesting discussion.

Mr. JUDD. I merely want to help you strengthen your very excellent statement with so much of which I am in fundamental agreement.

Mrs. WALSER. Thank you very much.

Chairman GORDON. Mr. Hansen, you may proceed.

STATEMENT OF OSKAR J. W. HANSEN, SCULPTOR

Mr. HANSEN. Mr. Chairman, after listening to the various witnesses this afternoon and hearing the questions propounded by the Congressmen, I came to feel that perhaps the end of my statement was the crux of the whole matter.

Mr. FULTON. Could we have your background and experience first?

Mr. HANSEN. I am a sculptor by profession, art and in particular sculpture began in the Near East and the Orient. I am also an Egyptologist. I am versed in the ancient languages; I am versed in the history of the region and in the geography. Being widely read in various fields, I have formed some personal conclusions about the situation we find ourselves in in relation to the Near East, and have expressed those convictions to some Members of Congress who felt the members of the committee might wish to inquire further into those views.

Mr. FULTON. Are you speaking for any organization or are you connected with any organization dealing in foreign policy?

Mr. HANSEN. Sir, I am not. I was born in Norway. Once upon a time I came to the United States. I took an oath to become a citizen and to defend this country against all its enemies, both foreign and domestic. I believe some of our policies throughout the world are not developed only by foreign enemies but by domestic enemies, and I believe we should proceed with more caution hereafter and particularly on this matter in the Near East, as well as to preserve the welfare of other folks.

I am speaking particularly to you, Congressman, at this moment.

Mr. FULTON. I am listening, particularly.

Mr. HANSEN. I am about 70-percent deaf. I am using a transistor hearing aid. So that you will know I am not dumb as well as deaf, I make known that fact. I do not know your name, sir.

Mr. FULTON. You are, then, appearing as an individual citizen.

Mr. HANSEN. As an individual citizen, as a very small member of the firm of the United States.

Chairman GORDON. You may proceed now, Mr. Hansen.

Mr. HANSEN. Mr. Chairman, gentlemen of the Congress, I am a sculptor. Sculptors deal with facts. For more than 40 years, and because of my art, I have been compelled to devote continuous study to the facts and history, both modern and ancient, concerning the peoples in the Near East. The history of art began there. This is particularly true of sculpture. A sculptor gave meaning to the activities of this, our legislative body, when He engraved upon tablets of stone, his divine message of the Decalogue. All of us came, thereby, to understand that men could not, in their own right, either initiate or amend laws. The law is; it was in the beginning.

This Congress may guide us in the present world crisis by giving thoughtful consideration to the path whereon our feet may walk. In so doing, we may all come to discharge, in every particular and complete respect, both the meaning and letter of our Declaration of Independence and the maintenance of our Bill of Rights.

We sculptors deal only with facts. Out of facts, we fashion the monuments which punctuate the great events of history. Because of the fact of the law which has been since the beginning, I could carve with my two hands the very image of Liberty from solid granite, which now is at Yorktown; there to commemorate, for both time and eternity, what our fathers in the first Congress did for us.

I deeply appreciate the kindness of this committee in listening to word pictures which I draw now in order to throw light upon the difficult situation submitted for the decision of the American people, through the Congress, by the President of the United States. This concerns our immediate reaction to current events in the Near East, but

certainly may more properly be said to concern the entire role in foreign relations, both in peace and war, envisaged for the United States in world affairs, by your consent.

To shape a course for our attention, let us consider momentarily the antecedents. History does not happen. Divine will and human response thereto brings it about. The situation which exists in the Near East does not exist through any single person's volition, either for good or evil. It is a dilemma that will test our reaction and sincere belief in all those things which are mouth professed, but to which our actions give, unfortunately, too often a negative answer.

It is not a negative answer which you and I seek. When the President of the United States humbly confessed that our mistakes are of the head, rather than of the heart, he gave expression to the sentiment which could only have been uttered by a totally dedicated and complete American. Whatever may be our reaction to the course he proposes to follow, that which has drawn us of foreign birth to swear allegiance for the defense of the United States against all its enemies, both foreign and domestic, has been the unquestioned certainty that humanity's heart beats as one with the hearts of all Americans. In this good intention, indiscriminately applied to friend or foe, we carry proudly on our shoulders the consummate dignity of an American.

I will give you now a picture of a city, beleaguered by its enemies; deserted by its friends. A siege had lasted many months, as now in Budapest. So the imperial commander investing the city ordered reprisals against "anyone caught outside—deserters, raiders, or foragers." These he ordered crucified.

Mercenaries nailed 500 of them every day to crosses just outside the city. Gradually a whole forest of crosses sprang up on the hillsides till the lack of wood called a halt to the frightful practice. * * * An unbearable stench hung over the bare and desolate countryside. The corpses of those who had died in battle, thrown over the ramparts by the beleaguered garrison, were piled beneath the walls by the thousands. Who had the strength to bury them in the traditional way?

Consider now, if you please, gentlemen, that the Judean hills have remained thus denuded since A. D. 70 and are only now after almost 2,000 years, sprouting the tender leaves of hope into the world of the future, nurtured by the God-given love and genius of a people who have contributed, also, so much to the greatness of the America which you and I love. Consider then, if you please, gentlemen, our duty and privilege in helping to shape their future.

Then, again, let us go back some 37 years earlier. A level, compelling voice is speaking to a multitude on the lofty mountains above the Sea of Galilee. "Amen. Amen I say to you: He that entereth not by the door into the sheenfold, but climbeth up another way, the same is a thief and a robber" (John 10.1). This same calm voice also taught us how to pray, "Our Father who art in Heaven" and to end that prayer with the expressive invocation, "Amen." What did he mean by the word "Amen"? Simply this: "In the name of God." "Amen" was the word which designated the God who is One to the very ancient Egyptians whose civilization had endured in the name of "Amen" for at least three millenniums before His coming. It was through the Princes' Wall, located substantially where now runs the Suez Canal, that Abraham and his family sought refuge and sustenance in time of famine. Through this wall also was carried to sanctuary Our Saviour, Himself, when the Roman suzerain would take His innocent life.

This, gentlemen, is the ancient land of Egypt, the traditional land of refuge; the traditional land of mercy; the traditional seat of learning through the Alexandrian Library of the ancient world. Here the name of God first came upon men's lips. Today, unsavory stench rises unto the nostrils of God, who still is One, from his innocent poor who died in the tenements of Suez. Does not this land, also, request from our minds and souls, a true inquest into the reasons for its present disabilities and more than a fervent hope, born of our enlightened self-interest, for the day of its resurrection?

These are two instances drawn from among the protagonists within the ancient world of the Fertile Crescent. Because the others fall into a similar pattern, although they are equally important, it is not necessary to particularize them here. You, gentlemen, will also search for a response to their problems.

Five years ago, I wrote an article bearing upon one of the features of Egypt which was considered one of the seven wonders of the ancient world. For this article, I wrote a foreword which was much favored by Egyptians, because it stated both the reason for their past glory and prosperity and the avenue for their escape into the better world of the future. May I then quote myself, gentlemen, and to some purpose, because the President of the United States gave particular emphasis, with reference to the use of water, in his state of the Union message, to what I said 5 years ago, as follows:

The Nile is not only a river; it is a way of life to all peoples who inhabit the heartland of Africa's ancient continent. It is the vascular system that feeds both their bodies and their intellects.

Thus He who first lay the course of its waters from the highlands to the sea, created also an absolute necessity for spiritual and political unity among the peoples who dwell along its watershed. To deny this unity to any of them brings to one and all the sanctions imposed by the natural law.

Since this is true of us in our country, it is also doubly true in Egypt. It is the hard core of their aspirations and their future.

Egypt is African. Except for brief sorties of imperial conquest, her destiny has resided on the African side of Suez, or the Princes' Wall. Her commerce has been with the interior and coastal regions of Africa, but also with the peaceful pursuits of trade on the Mediterranean Sea. Let it be said as a credit line for Colonel Nasser, that he first sought Egypt's destiny, south, along the Nile River. He knows, as we should know, that the upper delta of the Nile in the Sudan is capable of vast engineering improvement for the benefit of agriculture on a grand scale; that if he could have effected a *modus vivendi*, a sort of Benelux agreement with the Sudanese, the future of his country would have been assured without the higher Aswan Dam, particularly since the first dam was, in that it drowned the island and temple of Philae, mostly a mistake.

Let me digress at this point to state that for once our country acted correctly in denying Colonel Nasser money for building a higher dam. We would have looked awkward, to say the least, if in our own country we would not build a dam and reservoir for people now living, because to do so would have covered with water some fossilized bones of the dinosaurs; but would instead have undertaken with our money to drown into oblivion no less than 13 of the most magnificent altars ever built by man and whereon the name of the Creator, "Amen," was first considered in the days of civilization's youth. We need only look at Washington's Monument to know that

the future needs Egypt's past; while at the same time, we need to assure her future.

I submit for your consideration and that the President of the United States the following suggestions that:

1. A Nile River compact be established, patterned somewhat as circumstances may warrant, on our own Colorado River compact. This would necessarily have to include Abyssinia, Sudan, and the British controlled sources of the White Nile; all to be embodied into an agricultural power and industrial complex. It is necessary that the sources of the Nile be within the control of this compact, because the water table of the sources is very tenderly divided and could, with little effort, be diverted solely to the Congo; thus writing finis to 10,000 years of history and civilization on the Nile.

While in no sense having either the knowledge or the capacity to speak for Colonel Nasser, I, nevertheless, suggest that his excess energy in the Suez area would preferably be applied by him to a natural development of the resources surrounding the Nile.

2. I suggest that financial organization and development funds be provided by a specially organized division of the World Bank and that for this purpose the United States, on a business, and not on a political, basis provide an appropriate share of additional capital. The above suggestion applies to all the problems of the Near East, wherever located. This special division of the World Bank should offer expert technical and financial advice so that the resources of the Near East, as a whole, may be organized on a sort of Benelux basis.

3. The problems on the Jordan, the Tigris, and Euphrates Rivers, as well as those of the states of Araby, fall into a similar category of need for rejuvenation, overhaul, and additions to their irrigation works and agricultural resources. Such compacts, coupled with the oil production which is theirs, would, commencing at once, secure a stable and happy condition for their people. Our four-point program has, already, made a noble and valiant start in this direction.

4. It is futile to consider improvement in the Near East without noting the relation of the Republic of France to her own citizens in Africa and to those of her neighbors. France has, with vision and with competence, carried forward what we are wont to consider the very standard of Western civilization. She has done this, first of all, with limited means, but with real concern for human values and with an abiding sense of justice. That France wishes to confer upon her own citizens in Africa the abiding dignity and benefits of Frenchmen should be a matter of profound satisfaction to every soul under the Tricolor and to the entire world. I feel that the French national motto of *liberté, égalité, fraternité* could well add the fourth word, most appropriate of all, *réalité*.

For these reasons, I suggest that in north Africa proper, gentlemen, where now we have heavy commitments, we apply our skill and resources to an engineering scheme long cherished by the French. Here we could apply nuclear energy on a grand scale to converting salt water into fresh water and thereby reclaim for the use of humanity the truly vast, lower lying, highly mineralized areas of the Sahara Desert. Much of this area constituted, in former years, the replete granary for both Carthage and Rome.

5. These are bold ideas, gentlemen, but in the light of history, not overly bold. They simply point to a way wherein, by use of modern

technology and present-day ordinary neighborliness, we may extend what the ancient civilizations in these lands pioneered and practiced. The peaceful intent is our basic premise and to accomplish peace, we need not present a dove perched on a sword; nor extend authority beyond the confines of this Congress for waging war.

It may be proper, in order to give weight to our opinions abroad and the security of our people at home, that we now deploy our forces to meet the problems posed by the rocket and atomic age.

Recent events have given conclusive evidence to the untenable position of our Air Force in England. A rocket attack on England would, more than likely, destroy this Air Force on the ground. If it did not perish thus, it presents an overwhelming temptation for the English to purchase their own safety by delivering it, in totality, to the enemy. In the meantime, the route for air invasion of the continental United States and particularly our West and Northwest remain inadequately protected.

I note that the two messages of the President on this subject leaves one with both a sense of confusion and frustration. Obviously, our percentage of the world's population and resources does not leave us a premise for the very heroic pose he now wishes us to assume. It seems futile that we should undertake new, heavy commitments in the Near East and Levant, when we admittedly lack military resources for defending our homeland.

I, therefore, respectfully suggest that the United Nations, including Russia, be urged to establish a cordon sanitaire around the whole Levant, Near East, and pertinent regions of Africa. Within this cordon sanitaire, sale of any military supplies, whatsoever, would be strictly proscribed. Present armament within these areas should be limited to such types and quantities, thought in the judgment of the United Nations, to be necessary for purely police powers. Thus protected, against external aggression and with a Benelux-type unilateral customs agreement, the nations would, within this area, indeed develop in a climate close to the ideal of the millennium.

It is true, gentlemen, that the whole area within the cordon sanitaire is presently in a state of war, near war, or armed truce. It is also true that through race, history, and economic circumstance, a fundamental area of mutual need also exists. What the area needs is the voice of peace of the Good Shepherd brought to them without subterfuge through the main gate of the fold. In this role, I plead we assume our appropriate burden on the positive side of good. If, then, as applied to these nations, a pattern of conciliation has been visibly demonstrated to the world, other similar areas would become evident. Those who would enter the peaceful fold by sneak or by guile would, at once, be marked with the contempt of mankind.

I suggest that Russia, perhaps, may consider it wisdom to withdraw her armed forces from the nations now fringing her empire, if we withdraw those forces from England which she knows, and we know, do not pose any considerable threat to her security. In this climate, disarmament of the Near East and the establishment of a cordon sanitaire by the United Nations could be accomplished.

I appreciate your patience, gentlemen, and now perhaps you will say that such a plan is out of the realm of the practical, because the potential combatants in the Near East could not be made to see and

accept the appropriate areas of their self-interest. I have come to feel that they would.

A few years ago, I rode from Washington to Falls Church by automobile in the company of three very distinguished Egyptians who were then concluding a tour of research within this country. One was the dean of education of a university more than a thousand years old when America was discovered. All of them were equally prominent and were doctors of philosophy from the University of London, et cetera. We were following the crowded traffic pattern out of Washington, right in the evening rush hour.

I asked the learned dean, "What is the most important fact and idea you have observed on your entire trip in our country"? He replied, "If I were not in this automobile, I would never have discovered the most important thing about America. I saw it a half mile back. Did you see it?" "See what?" I asked.

"All these hundreds of cars," he said, "passed a boundary sign back there. I will remember this sign as long as I live. In rather small letters, it said, 'You are now entering Virginia,' but in very large, prominent letters, it also said, 'Welcome.'"

The whole situation in the Near East is that there are no boundaries in the whole area but there are no signs that say welcome.

They look upon each other with hate when actually they are very much alike. You find a "you" trying to define a strange difference in another "you." Both were very fine people.

Chairman GORDON. Thank you very much for your interesting statement.

We appreciate your stepping aside for the previous witness with her long discourse.

Mr. HANSEN. There are many points brought out today that are contained in my statement here. The question that was raised here is this: Could it be brought about? I simply believe it can. I know there are folks in the Near East who would be helpful in bringing it about. I am opposed to giving the President authority to use troops in the Near East in the form he now asks it. I believe a cordon sanitaire, as we call it in military terms, should be established around the area so peace might be preserved within the area itself and be policed if needed by the United Nations. And for that purpose the President has every right to ask and he has the authority now, I believe, to use troops in proportionate numbers with others for such an operation.

Indeed, our fleet in the Mediterranean now bears a major share of such an operation at present. We are not lacking in what is necessary for this area.

As to the matter of aid, you have heard this afternoon that Arabs particularly do not want direct aid. No self-respecting persons does. But still things have to be done in order to make life bearable and liveable for these folks. For that purpose we have a World Bank. The powers and functions of the World Bank could be extended to cover the whole operation on a business basis and for that purpose this Congress could extend further capital on behalf of the United States.

I have been an ardent observer of the Pan American Union's activities. I believe it is languishing now for the simple reason that there is not a Bank of the Americas available to put into effect all the things

that need to be done in Pan America. I have sought by every means to urge that we establish a Bank of the Americas or a definite section of the World Bank to function in that way.

I am going into branch banking here in a way for the simple reason that certain folks deal with certain problems every day and they become more familiar than other folks in carrying them into effect and now and then defer their policies to the boards of directors of the larger institutions. I am thinking of something of that kind in the Near East and also another important point I raised here is also applicable to the United States, now that we have an increasing shortage of water, and that is massive conversion of atomic energy to the purpose of converting salt water into fresh water.

The French have for almost a generation now been working on that since a man in Africa had a dream of running salt water into a dry lake in the center of the Sahara Desert, thinking that the climate of the whole area might be changed somewhat by a sheet of water of that kind. Now, all of a sudden the good Lord has presented us with ample atomic energies of great usefulness. Atomic energy may be capitalized over a long period of time for converting salt water into fresh water and really doing something for that whole part of the world. I believe that the natural situation there is ripe for it. It would create a relief on the population pressure and could be done on a business basis. It would enable the French to finally convince their citizens in Africa that they have their welfare truly at heart. They have had it right along but their worst problem is to sell it to the French and in their lifetime they have never been able to carry it far enough.

Those are some of the ideas that I have suggested in my paper that I have offered which I ask you to take under consideration.

Chairman GORDON. We shall certainly take it under consideration.

Mr. HANSEN. Again, I would be very happy if I can be of any aid whatsoever in carrying into effect any contact with the folks that I know there, and who are able to help, on behalf of this committee.

Chairman GORDON. Mr. Carnahan, have you any questions?

Mr. CARNAHAN. I have no questions, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman GORDON. Thank you very kindly for your appearance today. There are no more questions and we certainly appreciate your coming, sir.

Mr. HANSEN. Thank you, sir.

(Whereupon, at 6 p. m., the committee adjourned to reconvene Tuesday, January 22, 1957, at 10:30 a. m.)

ECONOMIC AND MILITARY COOPERATION WITH NATIONS IN THE GENERAL AREA OF THE MIDDLE EAST

TUESDAY, JANUARY 22, 1957

**HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
Washington, D. C.**

The committee met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10:40 a. m., in room G-3, United States Capitol, Hon. Thomas S. Gordon (chairman) presiding.

Chairman GORDON. Ladies and gentlemen, the committee is meeting this morning to continue and at the same time conclude its public hearings on House Joint Resolution 117.

Our witness will be Hon. Thomas K. Finletter, who is well known to us as the former Secretary of the Air Force and also as a witness whose testimony has been very helpful to the committee on many past occasions.

Mr. Finletter, we are happy to have you with us this morning. I understand you have a prepared statement, copies of which are before the members. You may either refer to it or speak extemporaneously. Please proceed in any way you wish, Mr. Finletter.

STATEMENT OF HON. THOMAS K. FINLETTER, NEW YORK, N. Y.

Mr. FINLETTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is always a special pleasure for me to appear before this committee.

The committee has heard so many able comments on the pending House Joint Resolution 117 concerning the Near East subject by the President on January 5 that I shall make only very brief comments about it.

The most important part of the resolution is the request for authority to the President to employ the Armed Forces of the United States to protect countries in the general area of the Middle East who may desire protection against overt—I stress the word “overt”—armed aggression from any nation controlled by international communism.

I recommend, Mr. Chairman, that this authority be granted as requested. To grant it will, as Secretary of State Dulles has said, present a strong combined front of the Executive and Legislature of the United States to the Communists. To refuse it might encourage the Communists to aggression.

Mr. Chairman, I see little advantage in discussing the question as to whether this authority is already in the hands of the President or not.

The fact remains that the President has chosen to request it, and one must consider I think as more important than the constitutional question the effect of the proposed resolution on the Communists.

And so, too, with the request by the President for authority to use up to \$200 million from available appropriations for the purposes of the resolution.

I gather it is not clear in any detail what this money is to be used for, but the Congress and this committee in particular will have assurance in this regard since I understand that Mr. Richards, the distinguished former chairman of this committee, is to head a group to go to the Near East and to report back with specific recommendations for the spending.

And then, too—and I think this is of special importance—the Secretary of State has testified that this authority about the \$200 million is not only “indispensable,” but is perhaps “the most important of all” the provisions of the resolution.

Indeed, the Secretary has gone so far as to say, as I understand it, that the alternative to the administration’s proposal would be a very great likelihood that United States troops would have to fight in the Near East; whereas there would be very little likelihood of such an event if Congress approves the administration’s resolution, including the section about the \$200 million.

Now, sir, with that testimony of the Secretary of State before the Congress, I respectfully suggest that the authority relating to the \$200 million also be approved as submitted.

However, I suggest that the administration’s resolution is defective in that in several respects it is not strong enough.

There is one gap with respect to Communist covert or indirect aggression which I believe should be filled. By spelling out authority to resist overt aggression in the Near East the resolution may lead the Communists to think that there is no objection by the United States to covert aggression of the kind they have been practicing there so recently and apparently are now getting ready to practice again.

I think, Mr. Chairman, there are two broad methods of diplomacy in this regard. One is to cloak your intentions and not to tell in any specific way what you are going to do or how you are going to do it and thus not give any opportunity to your opponents to make any definite judgment as to what you are going to do.

If you are going to adopt the opposite policy and spell out what you are going to defend and how you are going to defend it, I suggest that considerable care is required to see to it that you cover all the major important areas.

Now, the resolution also, sir, in my opinion, fails to make clear that the United States does not intend to return to the policies and conditions of the days before the Israeli attack but on the contrary intends to create new policies and new conditions in the area which will be favorable to peace and freedom rather than to war and Soviet penetration.

I therefore propose the following addition to the administration’s resolution to be inserted on page 2, line 16, section 2, before the word “Provided”.

So what I am suggesting here is 2 more "furthermore" clauses to follow the first "furthermore" clause, which starts on line 11 of page 2 and ends on line 16.

My suggestion reads as follows:

Furthermore, it is the sense of the Congress that this country will view with grave concern any new or continued efforts of international communism to use covert methods of aggression to bring under its domination peoples in the general area of the Middle East who are now free and independent, and that the Congress recommends and authorizes appropriate measures by the President to defeat covert as well as overt aggression by international communism.

Furthermore, it is the sense of the Congress that measures should be taken by the United States to remove the causes of the disturbed conditions in the Middle East, the continuance of which facilitates the penetration of communism in the area, including particularly such matters as (a) the lack of assurance of uninterrupted use of the Suez Canal, without discrimination, by the shipping of all nations; (b) the lack of effective arrangements to protect the states of the area against aggression by their neighbors and (c) the economic and social warfare currently being carried on against Israel and against Americans and others of Jewish faith.

May I point out on this first point (about covert aggression) which is dealt with in the first suggested "furthermore" clause, that we have already had one damaging experience when the Communists bypassed United States warnings against overt aggression and attacked the free world by covert means.

The committee will remember that in Indochina our warnings to the Communists, which were then spoken of as the doctrine of massive retaliation, up to the last moment referred only to an overt attack by the Chinese Communists.

For some reason, and possibly as a result of the gap in our warning system, the Communists did in fact make an indirect or covert aggression in Vietnam, as a result of which they conquered the northern half of the country and captured for communism about 10 million formerly free men.

We should, I think, heed this lesson and make clear to the Communists that there is no invitation to them in the proposed joint resolution to repeat this tactic in the Near East.

Now as to the second point (of not returning to the policies and conditions of the days before the Israeli attack), which is covered in the second "furthermore", may I say this:

The point here is that we will have a much better chance of preventing or reducing the Russian penetration into the region, of stabilizing good relations between ourselves and the peoples of the area, and of restoring satisfactory relations with our allies and friends of the free world, if we make it clear that there are certain principles in our dealings with the peoples of the Near East on which we are not going to compromise.

Among these principles, I suggest, are: that we will oppose aggression or preparations for aggression by any state of the area against any other (as we have promised to do in the United Nations Charter, article 39, and in the Tripartite Declaration of 1950); that the Suez Canal is an international waterway which must be surely available to the shipping of all countries without discrimination; and that we will not take part in or accept without protest discriminations against Americans or others because of their religious faith.

I add that we must be encouraged by the beginnings of such policies, as shown by the United States Government's approval—I think

it is an approval—of the occupation of the Aqaba area and the Gaza strip by the United Nations Emergency Force and by the indications of United States Government support for a policy of keeping the United Nations Force on the boundaries between Israel and her neighbors, until conditions favorable to peace and freedom shall be restored.

The joint resolution should, I believe, be strengthened in one other respect. The last paragraph, part of section 2, the "Provided" clause, states that the employment of the armed forces of the United States which is authorized above in section 2, shall be consonant with the treaty obligations of the United States and with the Charter of the United Nations and the actions and recommendations of the United Nations and, furthermore, shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council of the United Nations.

I believe our national policy would be improved if this proviso were also to state affirmatively that the United States will, to the greatest extent deemed practicable by the President, carry out the authority granted under the resolution through the United Nations, or if that is not practicable, in a multinational manner as, for example, under article 51 of the United Nations Charter.

The purposes of this suggestion are, first, to give support to the United Nations and thus to the rule of principle and law, and second, to help avoid having the United States find itself in a contest, possibly involving war, with Russia, or with Russia and China together, without the support of any major allies.

The Formosa precedent is instructive on this point. Under the Formosa resolution asked by the President and enacted by the Congress the United States acts alone in its defense of Formosa and Nationalist China. A warlike act or blunder by the Chinese Communists, or by the Chinese Nationalists, might precipitate a war in which the United States would have to fight alone, with Nationalist China, against the combined power of Russia and of Red China, and without other allies.

I would hope that the major countries of the free world would come to our help if we thus found ourselves almost alone fighting the totality of the Communist power. But there is no avoiding the fact that our present treaty arrangements and the Formosa joint resolution do not so provide. The resolution now requested for the Near East has this same character; it has us alone making the declaration to resist a Communist overt aggression.

The dangers of this from the political and military points of view are so serious and obvious that I shall not elaborate on them here except to ask the committee to consider the question: What would be the effectiveness of the Strategic Air Command of the United States Air Force if the bases of our allies and friends of the free world were not available to us in an all-out war between us and Russia and China?

So I submit the following proposed addition to the resolution under consideration which would change the opening words of the provided clause in section 2, line 16, to read as follows:

Provided, That the authority herein granted shall be carried out to the greatest extent deemed practicable by the President through the United Nations or by other multinational means; shall be consonant

the rest of the provided clause to continue as presently written.

I thank the chairman and the members of the committee for this opportunity to be heard.

Chairman GORDON. Thank you very much, Mr. Finletter, for your fine statement.

We will proceed with the questioning under the 5-minute rule period, and I want to present a question to you, Mr. Finletter.

Does your proposed language at the top of page 3 of your statement mean that we would invade a country to prevent its government from being taken over by a Communist minority? What else can we do to prevent covert aggression?

Mr. FINLETTER. No, sir; I think there are methods other than the use of arms to resist covert aggression.

Secretary Dulles made what seems to me an excellent statement on this, in connection with the pending resolution. As I remember it—and the chairman may correct me if I am wrong—the Secretary's point was that if we assure a country which is under covert attack by the Communists that it will not be invaded by overt means, and if we furnish it the arms with which to keep domestic order, and then if we give it economic aid so as presumably to eliminate poverty which would create conditions favorable to communism, then these methods the Secretary says would be sufficient—if not sufficient, at least would be extremely helpful—in protecting that country against the Communist covert aggression.

This, sir, seems to me to be correct. However, the point of my suggestion at the top of page 3 is that these are not the only methods by which covert aggression may be resisted, and that indeed one of the most effective ways of resisting it is to indicate to the whole world, our friends, and the "unaligned countries," as Mr. Nehru calls them, and the Communists themselves, that we are interested in the maintenance of the independence and the sovereignty of the nations concerned.

Chairman GORDON. Thank you. Mr. Vorys—

Mr. VORYS. Mr. Finletter, you have served your Government ably many times. Your suggestions deserve careful consideration.

I want to call your attention to the fact, however, that the problems of covert aggression and the internal problems in the Middle East are specifically left out of the legislation, not because we don't intend to do anything about them but because we already have the authority to cope with them. If any additional authority is needed, it is provided by the Gordon resolution on covert aggression.

If you will turn to the President's message, I want to read to you his words on these suggestions of yours and get your comments.

He says:

This program will not solve all the problems of the Middle East. Neither does it represent the totality of our policies for the area. There are the problems of Palestine and relations between Israel and the Arab States and the future of the Arab refugees. There is the problem of the future status of the Suez Canal. These difficulties are aggravated by international communism, but they would exist quite apart from that threat. It is not the purpose of the legislation I propose to deal directly with these problems. The United Nations is actively concerning itself with all these matters and we are supporting the United Nations.

The President then mentions the specific proposals made by Secretary Dulles on August 26, 1955. He says, and all the witnesses from the executive branch have confirmed this, that we don't need in this

legislation any authority to continue with the solution of those problems.

The President then speaks about covert aggression, which he refers to and which has been referred to in our public hearings as indirect aggression.

Experience shows that indirect aggression rarely if ever succeeds where there is reasonable security against direct aggression.

That is on page 6, next to the last paragraph.

Experience shows that indirect aggression rarely if ever succeeds where there is reasonable security against direct aggression. Where the Government disposes of loyal security forces, and where economic conditions are such as not to make communism seem an attractive alternative.

Then he says:

The program I suggest deals with all three aspects of this matter and thus with the problem of indirect aggression.

Mr. FINLETTER. Yes, sir.

Mr. VORYS. So the President says, and Secretary Dulles says, that we will have the authority necessary to deal with the problems you suggest, either under other laws or as provided in the Gordon resolution.

Would you care to comment?

Mr. FINLETTER. My first comment is that that is a very powerful statement, Mr. Vorys, and if I say anything in answer to it, it is with considerable reticence.

I would point out on the authority question, however, that as I understand the proposed joint resolution and the explanations of it—the able explanation of it by Secretary of State Dulles—I would say that the question of whether or not the authority is there or is not there to handle indirect or covert aggression is in a sense beside the point, and for this reason: The statements of the Secretary of State have been more with emphasis on what is good from the point of view of presenting a united front of the Legislature and the Executive in the United States rather than the necessity of authority to the President.

I would suggest, sir, the President does not need the authority to use the Armed Forces of the United States against overt aggression as provided in section 2, but the purpose of asking for this resolution with respect to overt aggression is not to seek authority but to create a condition of solidarity which will be so evident to the Communists that they will have no ideas about a hesitation by the President in using the authority which already exists.

And so, sir, I would suggest whether he has or has not authority to handle covert aggression is beside the point.

Mr. VORYS. You mentioned earlier that there are two ways to handle cloaked or covert aggression; either by cloaked countermeasures or spelling out those measures. Do you think it is necessary to spell out what we intend to do with respect to covert aggression, which requires all kinds of countermeasures?

Mr. FINLETTER. I think it would be a great mistake for us to spell out what we were going to do in the case of either.

What I propose does not require any spelling out. It merely suggests that the sense of Congress and therefore the whole United States, that this country would view with grave concern any attempts at

aggression in any form. That certainly doesn't tie one's hand as to what the actions may be.

So, sir, my suggestion on your first point would be that the question of authority is not involved either as to the overt or the covert.

Now, on the second one, which is the phrase which I referred to earlier before your question, the three conditions which protect against covert aggression—the protection against overt attack, the necessary arms to the indigenous government, and the necessary condition of the economy:

I would like to suggest that the experience in Indochina would raise some question as to that, because in Indochina the United States Government has made unmistakably clear by its repeated warnings—the so-called massive retaliation doctrine—that they did not want the Chinese Communists intervening there.

Then, too, as I recall it, we sent something like \$1 billion worth of arms within 1 year to Vietnam. And as far as economic conditions were concerned, I do not remember they were particularly bad.

I am raising the question as to whether, in Vietnam, where covert or indirect aggression did take over half the country, these three conditions which are supposed to be such guaranties were not there present.

Mr. VORYS. Wouldn't you consider that in Vietnam there was a case of control by international communism of the Vietnamese forces? So that the resolution here would be broad enough to cover a case where the Vietminh came under control of international communism? Do you see what I mean?

Mr. FINLETTER. Yes; as to whether that wouldn't have been an overt aggression is your suggestion, sir.

Mr. VORYS. We want to try not to interfere with the internal affairs in another country. If they want to have a Communist government, that is one thing. On the other hand, if they have been taken over by the other side, then they become a communist-controlled country and would be subject to the authority granted, and the countermeasures would be subject to the authority granted here.

Mr. FINLETTER. Possibly, Mr. Vorys, I have misunderstood this, which is quite probable, but I thought that the language about the protection against armed attack referred to an armed attack by a country dominated by international communism against some other country.

Mr. VORYS. Wouldn't that conceivably be an attack against Vietnam by the Vietminh?

Mr. FINLETTER. That was not an attack by one country against another; it was a covert aggression by international communism from without. But it was covert—the Chinese Reds made all the motions of keeping out, at least they tried to—everybody knew they were there, but the pretense was that they were not there. Insofar as the Chinese Communists were concerned the attack on Vietnam was covert, I should think.

Mr. VORYS. As you know, we have been informed that Red volunteers would be considered overt aggression in this area, whereas in both Korea and Indochina, due to the boundary situation, we didn't make any such determination.

I would be glad to have your comment on this.

Mr. FINLETTER. Well, there is a distinction between the volunteers in the case of the Chinese Communists in North Korea and the Chinese

Communist support of Ho Chi Minh. The Chinese forces in Korea were from Red China and there was no doubt about it, whereas the Ho Chi Minh forces purported to be and I think were indigenous forces, whereas the covert aid from Red China was in the form of arms and technicians and was concealed.

Mr. VORYS. Yes. Thank you very much.

Chairman GORDON. Dr. Morgan—

Mr. MORGAN. Mr. Chairman, thank you.

Mr. Finletter, I am sorry I was late and didn't hear the first part of your statement, but from going over it briefly I see you favor the resolution but you don't feel it is strong enough.

Mr. FINLETTER. Yes, sir. I made two specific suggestions for additions, which are in the single spacing at the top of page 3 and at the top of page 6.

The part at the top of page 3 I suggested be inserted in line 16, section 2, just before the word "Provided," and the part at the top of page 6 I inserted as a substitute for the beginning of the "Provided."

My first 2 recommendations are that the authority to use the armed forces against overt aggression be approved as submitted and that the request for the right to use the \$200 million without reference to existing law also be approved as submitted.

Mr. MORGAN. That is all, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman GORDON. Mr. Smith—

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Finletter, the one aspect of this question, as I understand your statement, deals with the matter of the psychological approach. Am I correct in my assumption?

Mr. FINLETTER. I think that is correct; yes, sir.

Mr. SMITH. Our action at this time would be primarily a psychological one?

Mr. FINLETTER. Yes, sir.

Mr. SMITH. As a matter of fact, President Truman and President Eisenhower both have stated quite specifically that any aggression on the part of the Communist world would be resisted. So this merely reaffirms what they have actually said heretofore; don't you think?

Mr. FINLETTER. Yes, sir.

Mr. SMITH. Now, this matter of dealing with covert aggression. As I have read the President's statement and listened to the testimony of other witnesses, it seems to me that we are attempting to deal with a problem abroad, with a question that we ourselves in this country haven't been able to deal with effectively, the infiltration and the subversion.

Now, you don't advocate that we can meet covert aggression by military force, do you?

Mr. FINLETTER. I would hope not. I would hope that military force would be the last of the means used to do anything. But whether I would say under no circumstances that the United Nations should use collective force or regional groupings should use collective force, I wouldn't wish to say "No" to that as a total proposition.

Mr. SMITH. I would like to know what your views are on how we can deal with covert aggression.

Mr. FINLETTER. Let's take one example of what I think was covert aggression in the past. I think that the "arms-for-cotton" deal, the Czechoslovak-Egyptian deal, where arms were sent in huge quantities

to Egypt and in lesser quantities to Syria far beyond any possible needs of these countries for domestic order, and the only possible purpose being to prepare them to have a military power to be used probably first against Israel, this coupled with the disposition of those arms in the Sinai peninsula, and coupled with the threats of certain of the neighbors of Israel to destroy Israel in fact constituted preparations for aggression within the 1950 declaration and a threat to the peace within article 39 of the United Nations Charter. And at the stage when they were shipped in the first instance it was the beginning of covert aggression.

One can only guess, looking back, as to what would have happened if we had taken a strong position against the shipment of those arms, but I think it is at least tenable to say that the Soviets would not have shipped those arms, that the Egyptians and the Russians would not have prepared the attack on Israel, had the United States, preferably through the U. N. or in some other multinational way, made it perfectly clear that we didn't like it.

Mr. SMITH. In other words, it would have been merely a protest; or would you have imposed sanctions? I am concerned with the modus operandi here, you see.

Mr. FINLETTER. I think it is impossible to say exactly what you would do under any circumstance.

For instance, it is impossible to say how you would carry out this authority which I hope will be granted to the President to resist an overt aggression. I don't think you can say how you would do that. I think it is next to impossible to define the military measures.

Mr. SMITH. Can't we establish certain criteria?

Mr. FINLETTER. Well, this has not been discussed, but I do not think it is possible to state with clarity how you would resist an armed aggression in the Near East, and I say it is equally difficult to say how you would resist an indirect aggression. There is an extremely difficult question.

The only thing I would suggest is that everything must be done to use diplomacy and the power of the country and the power of those other countries who are with us, and above all the power of the United Nations, to accomplish our purposes without war.

Mr. SMITH. Now, if we have left it to the United Nations, just following your argument, what would the United Nations do under that situation?

Mr. FINLETTER. I am very glad you asked that question, Mr. Smith, because I do want to say to this committee that I think it was a mistake to say "just leave things to the United Nations." I don't think that is the way it works. I think if we intend to act within the United Nations, we must always go to the U. N. with a policy, and probably in most cases with a program.

In other words, I don't think the United Nations as an entity can be counted on to do very much. The United Nations is nothing but the important powers and the other powers, too, within it.

When I say, "act within the United Nations," I mean the United States must have its ideas as to how to act.

Mr. SMITH. Well, I am glad to have your view, because that is one of the things that has been disturbing me.

I would just like to raise this question, Mr. Finletter—and I do appreciate your testimony here this morning—in all of the activity in

which we are now engaged, so far as this resolution that is before us is concerned, does it not leave something to be desired so far as resolving the basic conflict in the area is concerned?

Mr. FINLETTER. Yes, sir. I would like to make a very brief comment on that, if I may: That is why I think it is of so great importance that the United States make it very clear, above all to our friends and to the unaligned countries, that we are not going to willingly see the bad conditions come back, which created all the trouble, and that we are going to try to hit at the basic troubles.

You will notice, sir, that I said nothing in here about long-term economic aid because I didn't want to complicate the matter, because I think you have to have peace in the area or stabilization in the area before you can go after the long-term economic aid.

I didn't mean by my omission to imply that I don't think the restoration of good conditions in all the area, including an improvement in the basic economic facts of the area, is not indispensable. I was dealing in my paper, sir, only with the immediate questions.

Mr. SMITH. Well, what disturbs me about the President's statement is that he sort of leaves that situation to the United Nations, and I think that is a basic error.

Mr. FINLETTER. You have touched on a vital question. If we are simply going to say to the Secretary General, "We hope you will be able to solve the problems that we, the United States, and the other important nations of the world have been trying to solve," I think we are in difficulty and are only building up trouble anew.

I point to the support of the United States of the United Nations emergency force. I think it would be regrettable if that force is not used at least on the borders of Israel and her Arab neighbors, and also in the Gulf of Aqaba and the Gaza Strip, to prevent an occurrence of a threat to the life of Israel, which is one of the basic disturbing conditions of the area.

Mr. SMITH. Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman GORDON. Mr. Carnahan.

Mr. CARNAHAN. Mr. Chairman and Mr. Finletter, I want to express my appreciation for the prepared statement and for the answers to questions which have been put to you, and especially for your definite suggestion for strengthening the resolution.

Do you feel that there is no definite useful purpose in an extended constitutional debate in connection with this resolution as to whether or not the President has the powers he is seeking?

Mr. FINLETTER. I think, sir, it would be well to make clear that the purpose of the authority with respect to the overt aggression—and I would hope with respect to the covert aggression as well—is not for the purpose of granting an authority to the President which does not exist, but that the purposes as explained by the Secretary of State to create an atmosphere of solidarity of this country for the purpose of impressing the Communists.

So to that extent, sir, yes. But I would hope that the debate would not be extended too long on that particular ground, because I think there are other grounds which I think are even more important.

Mr. CARNAHAN. You approached an answer to this question in response to Mr. Smith's questioning, but I want to put it probably just a little more bluntly.

Do you agree with Secretary Dulles' statement that economic aid is indispensable and is perhaps the most important of all the provisions of House Joint Resolution 117?

Mr. FINLETTER. I must say, first, I do not know. I think that the idea of sending the group under the former chairman of this committee to the area is desirable.

Secondly, I do not see, if I may respectfully say so, how it is possible to refuse the authority when the Secretary of State has put it in such categorical terms as being perhaps the most important part of the resolution, a resolution which is going to decide whether or not American boys have to fight in the Near East. I just think that the responsibility of rejecting that would be so grave that I, sir, would recommend against it. I recommend that that part be approved.

Mr. CARNAHAN. That is all, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman GORDON. Dr. Judd.

Mr. JUDD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

It is nice to have you with us, Mr. Finletter, because you have always done a lot of work before you come to appear before us, or any place else on the Hill.

Of course, as you have said, our purpose here is (1) to reassure these countries that they need not fear external aggression, and (2) to strengthen them against internal unrest and subversion.

Now, do we help or hinder that purpose by making the announcement, as you would in your first "Furthermore" sentence, that we are asking the President to do what the Communists will promptly label all over the world as "interfering in the internal affairs of other countries"?

I agree thoroughly with what you say we must do to prevent subversion, but I have a grave question as to whether the Congress should make an announcement capable of being interpreted as above. They are already declaring either that we are going in to rescue the old colonialisms of Britain and France and shore them up, or we are going to take over Britain and France's position with our own colonialism. I believe we must not underestimate the distrust that exists in that whole area, not only of the whole West but of ourselves.

Would we not be appearing to give credibility to the Communist line that the United States is proposing this program, not really to help those Middle East countries remain independent, but rather to take them over as part of our "Wall Street imperialism"?

I fear putting it in here would defeat the very end you have in mind.

Mr. FINLETTER. Well, Congressman, if you say so, I must say that disturbs me because I had thought not. I had thought, in fact, that the present resolution that has been proposed by the President has already stirred up Communist propaganda, has already stirred up reactions from India and Syria. I noticed in the papers this morning a statement that the resolution is just more of the old military emphasis—this preoccupation with military means of the United States Government. The short heyday of popularity that we had with the Arab world seems to have disappeared with the request for the resolution.

I would suggest the important thing to do would be to do what we think right, and I think that is probably, if I may say so, the best guide anyhow in these matters.

Mr. JUDD. Let me read the last three lines of your first "Furthermore"—

that the Congress recommends and authorizes appropriate measures by the President to defeat covert as well as overt aggression by international communism.

Covert aggression is internal aggression. We would be authorizing and recommending that the President—that is what the Communists will say—move right in to deal with their internal affairs in such a way as to defeat the will of the people to free themselves of all imperialism.

Mr. FINLETTER. I think you are making a very strong case, and it might be wise to stop my "Furthermore" at the word "independence."

Mr. JUDD. I agree. I don't think the rest of it adds anything to it and raises a flag to be shot at.

Secondly, referring to your colloquy with the gentleman from Ohio, regarding Indochina. I respectfully suggest that the conditions in the Middle East are not quite the same as they were in Indochina because this resolution says:

To protect the territorial integrity and political independence—
and so on.

In Indochina they didn't have political independence, and I think that was the basic reason for the Communist victory. Our subcommittee, after its visit in 1953, wrote:

The apathy of the local population to the menace of Vietminh communism disguised as nationalism is the most discouraging aspect of the situation. That can only be overcome through the grant of complete independence to each of the Associated States. Only for such a cause as their own freedom will people make the heroic effort necessary to win this kind of struggle.

Until political independence has been achieved, an effective fighting force from the Associated States cannot be expected.

My point is, if we had had a half dozen of these resolutions I don't think we could have defeated the Vietminh there when the people were not really on the side we seemed to be on. They were more afraid of the French, who hadn't given them independence and whom they had been under so long, than they were of the possible imperialism of the Communists whom they hadn't yet been under. Therefore, I don't believe we can reason too much from that analogy on covert aggression.

We further said in 1953, "The struggle in Indochina is in every sense an international issue." The great myth was that it was a civil war. It wasn't. It was an international issue, but we couldn't get our allies there to come along with us because they feared that would raise the issue of colonialism in north Africa and elsewhere. We didn't have either our allies or the local people with us as we had in Korea, where we were helping an independent country defend itself.

I think we ought to keep this focus, that we are helping countries already independent retain their independence. Do you agree with that?

Mr. FINLETTER. Yes; I agree with everything you say, Congressman, and I didn't mean to say that there was an exact analogy between Indochina and the Near East. However, if I may say so, I think you have left out one condition in the Near East which brings it back fairly close to Indochina.

The trouble with Indochina was—and it was a basic trouble of our policy—we were abandoning our ideas of anticolonialism and were supporting a colonial power when there was no independence of the people involved. But I submit, too, Congressman Judd, that the Arab States are by no means free, independent democracies where the will of the people is a flaming force for freedom. In other words, I don't think we have got the conditions there which make for freedom fighters and for resistance against covert or indirect aggression, merely along the three lines suggested by Mr. Dulles. So I think you have a weak situation in the Near East, as you had a weak situation in Indochina.

Mr. JUDD. That is right, but I think in all those countries the thing that is first for them is their political independence, even though they don't yet have too much personal freedom internally.

Now, one other question if I may, sir.

Will you look at the resolution, page 2, line 15: Along the line we were just discussing, would it help if we changed one word? It now reads "Such aid against overt armed aggression from any nation controlled by international communism." Change the word "nation" to "force."

That would take care of Communist volunteers and would have taken care of the Vietminh.

Mr. FINLETTER. I would raise the question of whether it isn't too limited because it has to go back to the beginning of the "Furthermore" clause, which refers to the use of the Armed Forces, and I think there are other methods of resisting covert aggression. This would be exclusive.

Chairman GORDON. Mr. Burleson—

Mr. BURLESON. I shall pass, Mr. Chairman. Thank you.

Chairman GORDON. Mr. Prouty—

Mr. PROUTY. I have no questions, Mr. Chairman. Thank you.

Chairman GORDON. Congressman Zablocki—

Mr. ZABLOCKI. Mr. Finletter, I believe my colleague presented a very fine argument which you have accepted. Dr. Judd presented some of my thinking more adequately and more forcefully than I could possibly anticipate doing when he said "he is bothered," as I was, about your first "Furthermore" amendment, and you agreed that the last three lines would be better stricken.

In doing that, striking the words, "that the Congress recommends and authorizes appropriate measures" leaves your amendment an expression of the sense of Congress.

In dealing with covert aggression, which is the more dangerous threat in that area, you feel that an expression of the sense of Congress is sufficient to deal with that problem—therefore, Mr. Finletter, in your opinion do you believe a sense expression as to the use of Armed Forces for overt aggression is equally as adequate to meet the problem and thereby staying within the constitutional process?

Mr. FINLETTER. You are asking me the basic constitutional question, Mr. Zablocki.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. We will agree that there is no question as to the constitutional process. All I am asking, Mr. Finletter, is whether we have as effective an expression of solidarity with a sense resolution as we do with an authorizing resolution.

Mr. FINLETTER. If there is no constitutional question about the need for authority, yes.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. I believe a greater expression of solidarity will be obtained for a sense resolution than we could possibly expect for an authorizing resolution.

If we are primarily concerned about the psychological effect of the proposal as desired by the administration, would we not have a greater psychological effect if we passed by an overwhelming vote a sense resolution?

Mr. FINLETTER. I would have one reservation. I am not prepared to answer your question. It is one that goes to the heart of the matter. But I would suggest before you answer, Mr. Zablocki, you consider whether it is desirable in any way to amend the request of the President with respect to the Armed Forces and the \$200 million.

I think there is a great deal to be said for the solidarity that would come out of an acceptance of the language proposed.

I am not pretending to answer your question, but I think what I have just said is something to consider.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. If we amend the administration's proposal in any way are we weakening it?

Mr. FINLETTER. I can't go that far, but I am very much affected by the record, as I understand it, before this committee, and certainly before the Senate, of Mr. Dulles, that as this resolution goes, so goes the likelihood of American boys fighting in the Near East or not fighting in the Near East.

And with that testimony before the Legislature, I think we must approach with considerable diffidence the idea of making changes in it. I would be willing to strengthen it, but as to any modification of the language as submitted, I think I would want to look at it very carefully and be sure that it was plainly desirable.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. Do you believe that if the Soviets wanted to use overt aggression, their decision would depend upon any expression of Congress, either by a sense resolution or other type of resolution?

Mr. FINLETTER. No, sir, I don't. And if I may, I would say I am sure I agree with your opening statement that the real danger is overt aggression in the Near East. I think the real danger is indirect or covert aggression.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. I did mean the greater danger was covert aggression.

Mr. Chairman, I have no further questions.

Chairman GORDON. Mr. Hays of Arkansas—

Mr. HAYES of Arkansas. Mr. Finletter, I appreciate very much the help you are giving us on the problem of phraseology, and I am sure the committee observes that your thinking is flexible and that is helpful too.

The concession you made to Mr. Judd's point brings out pretty well the problem of making our words fit what we have in mind in this comprehensive statement.

The hearings have gone on long enough to bring out clearly the fact that some of these questions involve emphasis only and I take it from what you say that you would give emphasis to our use of the facilities of the United Nations?

Mr. FINLETTER. Yes.

Mr. HAYES of Arkansas. To what extent would you carry that same emphasis into the economic aid that we give?

Mr. FINLETTER. Any plan for long-term economic development should, I believe, if possible, be within the United Nations, or at the very minimum, on a multinational basis.

I wouldn't want to be quite as rigid about this \$200 million because I don't really know what it is for. The statement of Mr. Lippmann the other day was that it was for immediate purposes that were not susceptible, as he put it, of any elegant presentation.

In general, I think we ought to act through the United Nations.

Mr. HAYS of Arkansas. Mr. Dulles said he agreed with the spirit of some language I suggested—and I am not wedded to any particular language—to embrace the idea of making full use of the fact that these emerging nations in that area want a place in the world's society and they want to feel that they are identified with the world's decision-making procedures, and the United Nations provides that facility, of course. It is the only world forum they have and I fear sometimes in our desire to act with the usual American efficiency, we may fail to invite others as cordially as we should into the decision-making processes and if we fail to do that, the Soviets will surely make use of it in their propaganda.

Do you agree there is basis for some concern on that score?

Mr. FINLETTER. Yes, sir, I do.

Mr. HAYS of Arkansas. Mr. Dulles also wisely pointed out that one difficulty is establishing within the region the facilities for the multi-lateral considerations. They have nothing comparable to the OEEC, and that is largely because of the tensions between some of the nations.

I would like to know if you don't feel that some gesture in that direction should be made, if it is nothing more than saying that we should encourage the establishment of procedures for the advice of the nations in the area.

Now that could be without reference to the U. N. I mean to the extent that we acted unilaterally, we could still act upon the advice of the nations of the area, acting to the extent that it is possible, cooperatively.

Mr. FINLETTER. Yes. The only reservation I would have is to being too particular as to the method. In the proposal I made I suggested that to the greatest extent deemed practicable by the President, all the operations hereunder—under the joint resolution, which will include the money part as well as resistance to overt and indirect aggression—be carried on through the United Nations or on a multinational means.

If you want to go further than that and particularize, I think you might possibly get into trouble. I would want to see the language.

Mr. HAYS of Arkansas. I agree thoroughly. In other words, would you carry this over into the economic side, finding some multinational approach where that is deemed by the President, as practical?

Mr. FINLETTER. Yes.

Mr. HAYS of Arkansas. That is all, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman GORDON. Mr. Byrd—

Mr. BYRD. Mr. Secretary, there is, of course, a great deal of feeling to the effect that this resolution only deals with overt aggression. A tremendous amount of concern has been expressed that maybe we should attempt to so word it as to deal also with covert aggression.

Your first "Furthermore" clause attempts to treat covert aggression. There have been fears expressed that were this clause to be incorporated into the resolution, it might serve to arouse or exacerbate the antipathies that exist among the peoples of the Middle East toward any move which might be interpreted as meaning that American influence was going to be substituted for the British and French influence which has recently removed itself from the area.

I am just wondering if we might achieve the objective that you seek there and at the same time obviate the dangers of arousing those antipathies by just deleting the two words in line 15 on page 2 "overt armed," so as to make the resolution read "requesting such aid against aggression from any nation," and I would like to do as Dr. Judd suggested, namely that we also introduce the words "or force," following the word "nation."

What is your reaction to deleting the two words "overt armed" preceding the word "aggression" on line 15, page 2?

Mr. FINLETTER. My immediate reaction, Mr. Byrd, is that it then is limited by the words "authorized to employ the armed forces" and that there are other means of resisting nonovert aggression which should be used and that you would be more criticised and the countries of Asia would say "The only thing the United States can think about is using its Armed Forces to accomplish everything." That would be my worry about it.

Mr. BYRD. I can't understand your feeling that way. Would you mind explaining it just a little further to me?

Mr. FINLETTER. It would read this way:

Furthermore, he is authorized to employ the Armed Forces of the United States as he deems necessary to secure and protect the territorial integrity and political independence "of any such force"—

Mr. BYRD. You misunderstood me. My suggestion would make it read:

of any such nation or group of nations requesting such aid against aggression from any nation or force controlled by international communism.

Mr. FINLETTER. I think there are other means of resisting indirect aggression other than the use of the Armed Forces of the United States. I should think that would be too limiting.

Mr. BYRD. I am wondering if you understood just where I wanted to delete the two words. On line 15, delete the two words "overt armed."

Mr. FINLETTER. I have that out, but then you have to read back to the beginning of the sentence, don't you, Mr. Byrd? [Reading:]

Provided he is authorized to provide the Armed Forces of the United States.

That is all the authority granted to him and it excludes the use of other methods. The only authority granted to the President to resist all forms of aggression, overt or covert, would be the use of the Armed Forces. I would have some reservations about that.

Mr. BYRD. Perhaps that is true. I was just attempting to get around the confining of our efforts to overt armed aggression and I thought by striking the two words that it would then encompass covert aggression.

Mr. FINLETTER. I think, sir, if you are going to do it that way, would you not want to go back to line 12 and insert after the words "United States," "or such other means."

Mr. BYRD. Possibly so, yes.

I have just been struggling as you have and as others have, to try to meet the threat of covert aggression and meet it in such a way that it would not jeopardize our efforts in the Middle East.

Mr. FINLETTER. That seems to me a very ingenious way of doing it. I have no brief for any particular language. All I am after is the principle.

Mr. BYRD. Would your second "Furthermore" clause, Mr. Secretary, would it—let me put it this way: I have been very strongly in favor of working through the United Nations. I realize the dangers involved in our having to go it alone upon some occasion. But after witnessing the seeming inability of the United Nations to deal with the Hungarian situation, I am very much averse to subordinating our efforts totally to the will and the determination of the United Nations in any future situation which might, in our own self-interest, dictate the necessity of our having to take unilateral action.

As I understand the resolution as it is presently worded, it does not make it impossible for us to take unilateral action, if it is necessary that we do so.

Would your second "Furthermore" clause make it more difficult for the United States to proceed unilaterally if it became absolute necessary?

Mr. FINLETTER. I don't think so, sir, nor would the page 6 clause, because it reads—I would have the "Provided" clause beginning on line 16 read as follows:

Provided that the authority herein granted shall be carried out to the greatest extent deemed practical by the President, through the United Nations or by other multinational means.

So there is complete discretion in the Chief Executive. Does that answer your question?

Mr. BYRD. Yes, it does.

Chairman GORDON. Mr. O'Hara.

Mr. O'HARA. Mr. Secretary, do I understand, correctly, you favor the resolution but you think it should be strengthened? Now, if the strengthening amendment should not be offered or if offered it were defeated and the original resolution were before you for a vote, would you support it? If there had been no success in the attempt to amend and the vote were on the Gordon resolution as it now stands, would you recommend support?

Mr. FINLETTER. Yes. But if I may, Mr. O'Hara, I would say opposing the amendments would defeat certain national policies which would be highly desirable.

Chairman GORDON. Mr. Fulton.

Mr. FULTON. I will pass for the present.

Chairman GORDON. Mr. Fountain.

Mr. FOUNTAIN. Mr. Finletter, would you say there is more reason for the passage of this resolution now in view of the recent developments in the Middle East and expressions from Egypt, and Syria, and also the recent conference between the Communist Chinese dictator and Russia, than there was before?

Mr. FINLETTER. Yes, sir. I think there is more need now than ever before to cover the indirect or covert part because I see by the newspaper accounts that already more MIG's have been flown into

Syria and the evidence appears to me from the newspaper reading that the indirect or covert aggression is already underway.

Mr. FOUNTAIN. Mr. Chairman, I might make this comment, in support of the position Mr. Finletter takes, with respect to his suggested "Furthermore" clause.

I notice the preamble to the joint resolution recognizes covert aggression, but the body of the resolution does nothing about it. It seems to me we either ought to strike out the covert aspect from the preamble or amend the body of it to correspond therewith. It makes it pretty obvious we don't intend to do anything about it.

No further questions.

Chairman GORDON. Mr. Fascell.

Mr. FASCELL. Mr. Finletter, don't you feel it is a fair and logical assumption that while the resolution deals specifically with direct overt armed aggression, that it also has a method of dealing with indirect aggression without any specific "Furthermore" or "Whereases"?

Mr. FINLETTER. I find it difficult to say yes to that and what is even more troublesome, I wonder whether we can be sure that the Communists will understand that point of interpretation.

Mr. FASCELL. As soon as we react to whatever the Russians do, we will know.

Mr. FINLETTER. That is an argument for having no resolution at all.

Mr. FASCELL. But you feel that the expression of the President in his message and the expression in the "Whereas" clause is not sufficient and therefore you feel it ought to be spelled out?

Mr. FINLETTER. Yes, sir. I think as the gentleman has just said, the fact that the covert is in the preamble and not in the body, makes it work the other way.

Mr. FASCELL. In other words, we can say we will deal with indirect aggression by any means practicable.

Mr. FINLETTER. Yes.

Mr. FASCELL. Just so we say something.

Then I also understand you take the position that in dealing with aggression of all types and the economic assistance, they are inseparable parts?

Mr. FINLETTER. No, sir. I said that is what the Secretary of State has said and I just do not have the necessary detailed information.

Mr. FASCELL. You would go along with the idea that they are inseparable.

Mr. FINLETTER. Because of the very strong statement of the Secretary of State and the fact that he puts it on the basis of American boys fighting in the Near East or not fighting in the Near East. This is such a strong statement.

Mr. FASCELL. I can find no way to disagree with you. I was just wondering if I understood you correctly.

Now, sir, everybody who testified before the committee except the proponents of the resolution have all felt that the resolution didn't go far enough and that it would have very little meaning as far as foreign policy of the United States is concerned, unless it had some expression dealing with the basic issues in the area, and that is the reason for your second "furthermore" clause. Do you feel that is actually an inseparable part of this resolution at this time?

Mr. FINLETTER. Yes, sir. I think that this resolution is not—except insofar as the \$200 million is concerned—a resolution for legislative authority. It is as several of you gentlemen have said, a psychological, or a statement of policy, resolution.

Well, there are various people besides—it isn't just to the Communists to whom we wish to express our policy. We wish to express our policy, I should think, to the unaligned nations and to our friends and allies. And I think an assurance to them that we intend to act on principle, on the things that we believe in, it would be a great strengthener of the hand of the Secretary of State and the President, and a great improvement in the world position of the United States.

Mr. FASCELL. Well, sir, I agree with you but dealing strictly with the question of inseparability, do you seek and do we achieve political independence and economic stability as a means of bringing freedom to an area, and that would be the objectives of long-range foreign policy for the United States; is that not right?

Mr. FINLETTER. Yes, sir.

Mr. FASCELL. But I think you have already stated you cannot achieve these things unless you can get people to stop fighting each other because no economic program is going to have any value.

Mr. FINLETTER. That is right.

Mr. FASCELL. So we cannot lay down a long-range economic program unilaterally or multination in this resolution. We can say that we are going to in the future, but we can't do it in this resolution, can we?

Mr. FINLETTER. I don't think so.

Mr. FASCELL. Neither can we deal with short-range economic assistance because it is obvious from the testimony we have had that we are dealing with some kind of unspelled-out emergency.

Mr. FINLETTER. You can't deal with it in detail but you are dealing with it by this authority.

Mr. FASCELL. So I am just wondering if perhaps it wouldn't be better to say, in effect, "This is not the end. We are going to follow this thing up and solve these problems," and then come out later with a carefully thought-out proposition.

Mr. FINLETTER. I wouldn't be prepared to argue against that, sir. I think we have made a mistake in the Near East and I think it has been the cause of most of our difficulties, in that we have tried to be overrealistic and to compromise with the things that we believe in in order to preserve our position specifically with respect to oil. Now we should do that, the oil is extremely important to us and to our friends, but not at the expense of certain principles. Some of these principles are the canal, the compromising—to understate it—of our obligations of the 1950 declaration and under article 39 of the U. N. Charter, and above all acceptance of discrimination against Americans in violation of every principle upon which this country stands.

Now this has been for the purpose of being realistic and the result has been total failure.

I would suggest that this is not one of those things that you can allow to go on. I should think you would want to vote for a going back to action on principle as the best basis for long-term policy in the area, and for an immediate policy in the area.

Mr. FASCELL. And you feel the emergency which has risen has given us a great opportunity to do those very things?

Mr. FINLETTER. Yes, sir.

Mr. FASCELL. Thank you. That is all the questioning I have.

Chairman GORDON. Mr. Coffin.

Mr. COFFIN. Mr. Chairman and Mr. Finletter, you have seen the function of this resolution as that of conveying to, not only Communist nations, but also our friends and also the unaligned nations as far as can be done, a well-rounded view of our policy in that area, and that is why you do not wish to strike out what the President wishes but you are willing and think it extremely desirable to add to and strengthen the resolution; is that correct?

Mr. FINLETTER. Yes, sir.

Mr. COFFIN. You have not in your proposed drafted amendment gone so far as to indicate that anything should be done in the future with regard to long-range development of the economy of the area.

I understand that the working out of any details has no place in this resolution but do you not think it desirable to add to the resolution that it is the sense of Congress that one of the causes of disturbance is the lack of development of the economy of the area? Specifically, do you think it wise or not to add subparagraph (d) to your second "Furthermore" clause which might be like this: "The lack of development of the economy of the area."

Mr. FINLETTER. That is an objective with which I am in complete agreement but personally if I were a Member of the House and on this committee I would not add that, for this reason, that while I think that must be our policy in the Near East and we must get at it pretty soon, we can't get at it yet until we get certain basic breaches of the peace out of the way.

The whole Near East is now disturbed by violence and threats of violence and so nothing has to be done to restore the peace of the area and to establish the fact that the United States intends to act on principle. Not until you get these fundamental issues clear can you even move into the long-term development, in my opinion.

Take another example: I would like to see as we all would, I take it, peace treaties between Israel and her Arab neighbors. I think it is probably too early for that and I think it would be a mistake to refer to peace treaties in this resolution because I think you've got to give time to the feelings of these people, which feelings have been exacerbated very seriously. You have to give time to that to settle down.

In other words, there are some immediate things and long-term things and I believe we should stick to the immediate things.

Mr. COFFIN. Isn't it entirely possible that along with this healing process there should be an approach in a preliminary way to long-range development? It might be in the form of simply a survey, but it would indicate to the people that the United States through the United Nations or a multinational group was interested in doing something to alleviate what one of the witnesses has called the economy of scarcity in that area.

In other words is it so clear that the first thing that happens is a police force to keep the shooting from occurring and then after a period of time, you proceed with economic measures? Is it so clear that would be a chronological sequence?

Mr. FINLETTER. I think it is a borderline case. I am inclined toward leaving it out but I don't feel very strongly about it.

Mr. COFFIN. Thank you.

Chairman GORDON. Mr. Farbstein.

Mr. FARBSTEIN. Mr. Finletter, would you go as far as to use your second "furthermore" clause as a condition precedent to the granting of aid?

Mr. FINLETTER. That is a very interesting question. Let me put it this way: I think if this were a decision in the executive branch, yes. I would have some reservation as to whether it would be appropriate to tie it up in the legislative branch, but you gentlemen are more familiar with these procedures than I.

Mr. FARBSTEIN. Let me put it another way: Would you write into any resolution something along the lines contained here suggesting something more than a mere hope that the ideas contained in your second "furthermore" clause be carried out?

Mr. FINLETTER. I feel very strongly about that second furthermore clause.

Mr. FARBSTEIN. I do, too.

Mr. FINLETTER. I would like to communicate my sense of great concern that something of this kind be in this joint resolution. But as to whether as a proper constitutional procedure it should be stronger than what I have here, I must plead ignorance. This is a matter of the proper congressional procedures and I have put down what seemed to me to be as far as one should go, but I would certainly hope that, first of all, such a clause would be adopted and that it would be insisted on and that speeches in favor of it would be made with great vigor.

Mr. FARBSTEIN. Would you say that a distinction could be made between emergency aid and long-term aid insofar as making a condition precedent in condition with long-term aid, rather than with short-term aid?

In other words, if the emergency calls for the present granting of certain sums of money or military aid, that it be done unconditionally and unequivocally; but insofar as long-term aid is concerned, that then there be written in practically the contents of your second "Furthermore" clause?

Mr. FINLETTER. Well, this resolution has nothing in it about long-term aid. Mr. Coffin was suggesting that it should.

Mr. FARBSTEIN. Would you not say it is implicit in the resolution that long-term aid would be coming because there is a \$200 million figure here and an additional \$400 million for 2 additional years and that might go on and on?

Mr. FINLETTER. I quite agree with that. The additional amount might be for certain ad hoc purposes, but as I remember, the President, in presenting this resolution, did refer to his intention to ask for further requests for mutual security aid in years to come, for new obligational authority.

As to whether I would impose any conditions on that, my own judgment would not be good, as strongly as I feel about the second "Furthermore" clause.

Chairman GORDON. Mr. Saund—

Mr. SAUND. You believe the sole purpose of this resolution is just psychological and the President is not asking for any powers he does not already possess? I speak of the armed aggression, only. About the use of armed forces.

Mr. FINLETTER. I think, sir, to answer that question—and I do it realizing what an enormously large question it is—I think I would say that taken in conjunction with the President's statement that he intended to come back to the Congress in the event of anything approaching a declaration of war, that what you say is correct. That this is only psychological and involves no new authority.

Mr. SAUND. And you already made a statement to the effect that the Communists are already busy with their propaganda in the Middle East, saying "The United States is going to take over where the colonial powers left off"?

Mr. FINLETTER. Yes.

Mr. SAUND. Then our only answer is for the President to say in his resolution that we will go in only when an overt aggression is committed. Do you not think if we add the covert aggression we are just changing the foreign policy of the United States as it has been practiced in the past many years?

We have kept our hands out of their internal affairs.

If we wanted really to do what you say, just follow the principle and so forth, we would have been interfering in the internal affairs of almost all the South American countries and everywhere.

Mr. FINLETTER. I don't see the analogy with South American republics. Nobody is threatening the South American republics with aggression.

I was thinking of—the word is "aggression," by the way. It isn't propaganda and it isn't attempts to conquer the minds of a country. It is to cover a situation such as existed in Indochina. I think either we want to say nothing or we want to cover all kinds of aggression.

Mr. SAUND. I differ with you in this respect, Mr. Secretary: Would you agree with me again that the best way for us to promote the interests of peace and freedom in the Middle East will be to win the hearts of the people, there—the hearts and minds—before the Communists do that?

Mr. FINLETTER. I think, sir, in general, that is true, but I think that is a dangerous approach to the Near East. I would reverse it and say that the best way for us to have a good Near Eastern policy is to act on principle and in accordance with our fundamental beliefs, and whether or not that happens to satisfy any particular government of the area.

Mr. SAUND. Mr. Secretary, do you really believe we can run international affairs on principle alone? Isn't politics just a matter of compromise every day?

Mr. FINLETTER. No, I don't, Mr. Saund, but I do think this, that any attempt to play power politics is not within the genius of the American people and when we try to do it we get into trouble. I think that is what we did in the Near East and I think that is the basic reason we are in trouble, there.

Mr. SAUND. I happen to know the thinking of the people who were under colonial powers. I know when I was fighting on behalf of India's independence I always used to relate a story. A story about George when he first came to England. He did not speak English very well. His speech was prepared to say "We have come for your good," but he wanted to make it more emphatic and he said "We have come for your goods."

Some Englishman said, "And our chattels, too."

The people in the Middle Eastern countries who have just shaken off the authority of the colonial powers, they are afraid of that. I think if we are going to win the psychological war, we should be very careful. If the President is using "overt aggression," and leaves it that way, it will do us a great deal of good.

Chairman GORDON. Mr. Fulton.

Mr. FULTON. I wanted to welcome the Secretary. We are always glad to have him before this committee. We have enjoyed his books and his thinking.

Might I add something along the lines that has been asked here previously, with regard to the conditions in the second "furthermore" clause. If we attach conditions such as those three items onto this resolution, first we would block negotiation and secondly we would put in the hands of other people the power to make the resolution ineffective, wouldn't we?

Mr. FINLETTER. Well, Mr. Fulton, those three, (a), (b), and (c), are merely examples of certain of the disturbed conditions in the Near East and I would think we would want to try to achieve the elimination of all of them.

Mr. FULTON. We should try to but we should not try to make House Joint Resolution 117 operable only upon the doing of those things.

Mr. FINLETTER. No; I don't think we should.

Possibly I have misread my own language, but I felt this was merely a sense resolution.

Mr. FULTON. I feel that way also.

Mr. FINLETTER. It starts off that way: "It is the sense of the Congress."

Mr. FULTON. I agree.

I believe I would disagree with you when you say it does not really give the President any more power because he has said he will immediately come back to the Congress in case action like a declaration of war is needed.

We must understand that is merely a statement of present intention by the President and is not completely binding so that there is nothing that would have the weight of legislation on the Executive side. Therefore, I believe that when we are acting under a joint resolution, we actually are giving possibly a longer continuation of power to the Executive that has been temporary and rather limited in our country.

Mr. FINLETTER. Yes.

Mr. FULTON. Under those circumstances, don't you think that when the legislation has come here simply as a joint resolution, that we should put some sort of a concurrent resolution provision in so that Congress can get back its authority without the Executive having the power to defeat us by a veto which would require a two-thirds majority? Wouldn't you say that?

Mr. FINLETTER. Yes, sir.

Mr. FULTON. This resolution is actually the executive and the legislative branch acting in concert, so that I believe we are adding something when both branches favor an action which is a little more than the executive doing it alone, wouldn't you say?

Mr. FINLETTER. Yes. I withdraw my answer to Mr. Saund. I think that may be.

Mr. FULTON. One other thing: If we are going to have such an indefinite provision as \$200 million for economic aid, why couldn't we

on this committee adopt certain general purposes such as saying "Relief for refugees," in this particular area. Couldn't we put in here a provision covering matters the average person would like to see cleared up from the previous overt actions without causing trouble with our allies, Britain and France?

Mr. FINLETTER. I think only the officials of the executive branch can answer that because they must know what their intentions are, what they want this money for. I don't feel competent to answer your question.

Mr. FULTON. One final question and that is on the term "Middle East." As you know, that term "Middle East" has been a British term and it has no official standing in our State Department terms.

Under those circumstances, why would it not be better for us to adopt a new American term as we have for Midwest and call this area we are going to talk about the Mideast? This would designate a general area that can be filled in, as the United States proceeds through executive action, and fills in our own terms.

Our trouble is on this resolution when there is used a term like the Middle East, it looks like the United States is just picking up the colonial policies for the British in an area that they have described in their own colonial terminology—and they have used the term from Singapore clear west to Libya.

Mr. FINLETTER. I also understand they give offense to some of the people east of Suez and say it shows the concentration on ourselves as the center of the world.

I don't think it matters what it is called as long as it has no political overtones.

I have never understood why we adopted the term "Middle East," which is a British term.

Nor do I understand the situation about Formosa, Dr. Judd. If that is offensive to the people of the East, I don't think we ought to use it. What are the facts about that, Dr. Judd?

Mr. JUDD. They would prefer to have it called Taiwan. Formosa was the Portuguese name that the Portuguese gave it when they came in. The western nations always put on their own names.

Mr. FULTON. Going back to this other point, on the change of names, this committee changed the name of the military aid program called MAP, to mutual defense assistance program, putting in the word "Mutual." It has had quite a bearing on the concept of the program, since. That is why I think it is important in the beginning on this type resolution that we show it as an American policy and have it an American package with an American name.

Mr. FINLETTER. I think that is true, sir.

Still, Mr. Fulton, I don't understand the word "Mid." Middle of what?

Mr. FULTON. What do you think of the term "Midwest"? We have adopted that.

Mr. FINLETTER. We are speaking as Americans, there.

Mr. JUDD. Historically the British divided it in terms of distance from themselves. Asia Minor was the Near East going from England. Beyond the Suez Canal through the Persian Gulf to India was the Middle East. From there on, it was the Far East. To the British the Persian Gulf area was the Middle East and the Near East was the Asia Minor area, the eastern Mediterranean.

Mr. FINLETTER. I understand people of the area would like it called West Asia.

Mr. FULTON. That would be better possibly than Middle East.

We are trying to get a new term and not have this British military colonial connotation which "Middle East" does.

Mr. JUDD. The trouble is Egypt is not in West Asia.

Mr. FULTON. Would you finally put a statement in this resolution as to the kind of defense against covert aggression we should in the United States adopt? For example, the former Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, had urged the use of economic sanctions, or for example preventing certain nations from taking action within the area that we didn't like.

I had opposed that position at the time. Could you comment on that?

Mr. FINLETTER. I think it would be a mistake to be that specific, Mr. Fulton.

Mr. FULTON. Thank you very much, sir.

Mr. VORYS. Mr. Chairman—

Chairman GORDON. Mr. Vorys.

Mr. VORYS. I have one more question on this "psychological effect" business. Isn't it true that something that has real force has more psychological effect than something that is obviously designed merely for psychological effect?

For instance, a policeman carries a pistol. That has a psychological effect to deter a would-be criminal. But if he said "This isn't a real pistol; I just carry this for psychological effect," then he loses the very effect he is after.

So if we have a concurrent resolution, a so-called sense resolution, with no legislative effect, not signed by the President, it would not make very good sense in psychological warfare. What do you think about that?

Mr. FINLETTER. Well, sir, I wonder whether Mr. Khrushchev fully understands the difference between a joint resolution and a concurrent resolution. Maybe he does. I don't know. He seems to understand a lot.

Mr. VORYS. Their Embassy is here. They know the difference between passing a law and voicing an opinion.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. Will the gentleman yield? I believe Mr. Khrushchev knows if the President desires to use the power he already has.

Mr. JUDD. He also knows that President Wilson believed he had the United States behind him and the world took his word for it; and then the United States didn't support him—tragically as I saw it. I think the real value of this is not just psychological. It is a warning that the United States all the way down the line from the President to people agrees that we must take action in certain circumstances. "Warning" is the correct word, rather than just "psychological propaganda."

Don't you agree with that?

Mr. FINLETTER. Yes.

Mr. VORYS. Now as to what Mr. Krushchev knows, when I was a delegate to the United Nations in 1951, Mr. Vishinsky got up and quoted from statements I made in hearings in this committee room at a night session. So don't sell those fellows short as to keeping in close contact with our legislative procedure.

Chairman GORDON. This has just been brought to my attention. I quote from Cannon's Procedure in the House of Representatives:

The concurrent resolution is without force and effect beyond the confines of the Capitol and does not go to the President for signature.

Mr. FULTON. The question, however, is whether there can be a compromise by putting in a termination provision which will give the power by appropriate action, on concurrent resolution of the two Houses, to terminate at any time in whole or in part, the authority of this resolution.

Now that still leaves the resolution as Mr. Vorys wants, a joint resolution, but gives the House and Senate, by concurrent action, power to terminate. Just as we have had it ever since Greek-Turkish aid. We have had to put it in because the Executive never put it in.

Would the Secretary agree with that?

Mr. FINLETTER. Yes, sir.

Chairman GORDON. Mr. Finletter, I certainly want to thank you for your appearance, today. You have made a very fine witness.

I thank you for your appearance.

The committee will stand in recess until 2:30 this afternoon when we will hear the Hon. Raymond Hare, the Ambassador to Egypt, in executive session.

(Whereupon, at 12:25 p. m., the committee adjourned.)

APPENDIX

STATEMENT OF FORMER PRESIDENT HARRY S. TRUMAN SUBMITTED TO THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

I regret very much that I was unable to accept your invitation to appear before your committee to testify concerning the resolution the President has requested the Congress to enact with respect to the Middle East, and I am glad to have this opportunity to submit some views on the subject.

I am keenly aware of the dilemma which your committee and the Congress face. The present administration and its conduct of our foreign policy are not without responsibility for the dangerous and difficult situation which has arisen in the Middle East. Now they ask for more authority and you have no guaranty of how wisely or how well it will be exercised. Nevertheless, I believe the Congress has no choice except to take some action in response to the President's request. Since he has elected to come to the Congress, the failure of your body to act to support him might be widely misunderstood throughout the world. We cannot allow the impression to prevail that any of us is unwilling to do all that lies within our power to protect the interests of the free world in the vital Middle East area.

I do not think it follows that the resolution must be passed in just the form in which it has been requested by the administration. It is now being subjected to critical examination by the appropriate congressional committees. That examination may well reveal important opportunities for improving the resolution. Since I do not now have available the benefits of the full hearings before the congressional committees or the resources of the executive branch, I am perhaps not in as good a position as others to reach a final conclusion as to what the resolution should contain. Still, I am glad to submit some thoughts in the hope that they will be helpful.

First, I would give the President the authority contained in the resolution he has requested. Although the President may already have most if not all of this authority, I think the Congress should comply with his request as a means of recording its own determination that the independence and integrity of the nations of the Middle East shall be preserved. At the same time, I hope the Congress, in order to avoid the establishment of a dangerous constitutional doctrine, will make it clear that the Congress does not consider it legally necessary for the President to come to it for permission to exercise authority which is vested in him by the Constitution.

Next, I would examine the additional responsibilities of the Congress in the light of the facts which now confront it.

As the administration has presented its case in the hearings since January 5, it has revealed that it actually has no definite plan of action in the Middle East. The administration has failed to define the geographical area in which it proposes to use the powers requested, and it has refused to specify the means—military or economic—which it proposes to use. Furthermore, it has become evident that the administration's request is not based upon specific appeals to our Government from the nations threatened, or from our Atlantic allies, for the kind of operations proposed in the resolution.

In these respects, the administration's proposal differs from other foreign policy programs which the Congress has approved or authorized over the last decade. In the cases of aid to Greece and Turkey, the Marshall plan, the North Atlantic Treaty, and even in the case of military support for Formosa, which President Eisenhower asked the Congress to authorize, the proposed action was spelled out in some detail, measures were specified, dollar amounts were based on concrete programs, and the other nations involved played a cooperative part, at least, in the formulation of the proposed plan of action. The present case, however, now appears to be shrouded in vagueness—a vagueness that extends to the geographical, military, economic, and diplomatic aspects of the

requested authorization, and the Congress has no way of telling what realities may emerge from the general language it is asked to adopt.

Furthermore, the proposed resolution is, as the President has stated, primarily designed to deal with the possibility of overt Communist aggression and does not face up to the other problems of the Middle East, such as Cyprus, the tension between Israel and the Arab States, and the Suez Canal. Yet it is these problems which, in the absence of any clear-cut policy on the part of our Government, burst into flame in October, all but destroyed the western alliance, and dealt Europe its greatest diplomatic and economic setback since 1948. It is these problems, still unresolved, which demand our immediate and persistent attention. The United Nations has no magic of its own to solve them.

In this situation, with our national policy so indefinite and incomplete, the Congress ought not to act as a rubber stamp on a blank check. Even as it allows the President the authority for which he has asked, the Congress ought to spell out in some degree guides for the exercise of that authority, and recommend to the administration the outlines of the course of action that it deems most necessary. Far from being a hindrance to the administration, in the present state of confusion, such recommendations should help to fill the void of policy.

Furthermore, the Congress should keep any operations pursuant to the resolution, and the whole area of Middle Eastern problems, under continuous scrutiny. Something far more than annual reports from the President, as proposed in the resolution, is required in this terribly dangerous situation.

I think the Congress, in acting on the resolution, and thereafter, should take into account the following factors:

1. The adequacy of our military forces to act in the Middle East in such a way as to repel aggression without bringing about atomic war.

2. The importance of acting in the Middle East not only through the United Nations, but also in concert with our principal allies whose strength is part of our own defenses, and on whose territory our military power is partly based.

3. The necessity of bringing about an increase in the productive economic power of free nations over a long period of time not only in the Middle East but elsewhere, in order to balance the mounting economic power of the Communist bloc.

4. The desirability of bringing to an end the shipment of arms into the Middle East particularly by Russia, and eventually by all nations.

5. The desirability of expanding and strengthening the United Nations forces in the Middle East for the purpose of stopping the chronic state of guerrilla war on the borders of Israel and making the Suez Canal a guaranteed international waterway, open to all.

6. The necessity of finding a constructive solution for the conflict between the Arab States and Israel that will do justice to both sides. Israel is here to stay, and we might as well say so, and insist on its right to have access to its own ports free of blockade, and equal rights to use the canal with other nations.

7. The great importance of the long-range development of the natural resources of the Middle East, free of nationalistic interference. If the water resources of the area were taken in hand, and developed as vigorously as the oil resources, and without regard for political boundaries, the land would once again become the Fertile Crescent, capable of supporting in prosperity and peace a large population.

These are some of the considerations which the Congress may wish to reflect on and to incorporate in its response, both now and later, to the President's request.

(The following additional information has been supplied in response to a request by Mr. Vorys. See also pp. 395-401.)

EXTRACT FROM ELMO H. HUTCHISON, USNR, VIOLENT TRUCE

(The author served as a military observer assigned to the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization, Palestine, from November 1951 through October 1954. In the summer of 1953 he was appointed chairman of the Israel-Jordan Mixed Armistice Commission.)

From June 1949, to October 15, 1954, Israel alleged that Jordan had violated the General Armistice Agreement 1,612 times. During the same period, Jordan alleged that Israel was guilty of 1,348 violations.

Type of complaint	Israel violation	Jordan violation
1. Crossing of border by military units.....	357	146
2. Crossing of border by armed individuals or groups, nonmilitary.....	22	244
3. Firing across border.....	496	318
4. Crossing of border by unarmed groups or individuals.....	18	717
5. Illegal expulsion of citizens of one country into territory of the other.....	161	-----
6. Overflights, all types aircraft.....	340	48
7. All others, including stone throwing, burning of fields, etc.....	55	112

¹ 5,941 Arabs driven from Israel into Jordan.

NOTE.—Investigation of serious violations showed following: Israel condemned for 95 violations, Jordan condemned for 60 violations.

(The Legislative Reference Service of the Library of Congress prepared a chronology of border incidents between the Arab States and Israel for the years 1955 and 1956, based upon United Nations' reports. The chronology appears on pages 395-401. The following statistical abstract is drawn from that summary. Violations by individual nations are listed only when a United Nations agency made a determination of such violations. This list does not include complaints of incidents made by the various states:)

Type of complaint	Israel violation	Egypt violation	Jordan violation	Syria violation	Lebanon violation	Both condemned or responsibility divided	No determination	Total
1. Crossing of border by military units.....	7	2	-----	-----	-----	1	10	20
2. Crossing of border by armed groups or individuals, nonmilitary.....	-----	5	5	-----	-----	-----	7	17
3. Firing across the border.....	3	-----	2	-----	-----	4	9	18
4. Crossing of border by unarmed groups or individuals.....	1	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	1
5. Overflights.....	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----
6. All others or combinations of above.....	-----	2	-----	-----	-----	-----	2	4
Total.....	11	9	7	-----	-----	5	28	60

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
January 9, 1957.

HON. PORTER HARDY,
Chairman, International Operations Subcommittee of the
Committee on Government Operations,
House of Representatives, Washington, D. C.

DEAR PORTER: I wish to take this opportunity to acknowledge and thank you for your letter of January 8 with further reference to the report of your subcommittee on United States aid operations in Iran.

I plan on bringing your communication to the attention of the Foreign Affairs Committee at the very first opportunity during its consideration of House Joint Resolution 117.

With very best wishes, I am.

Sincerely yours,

THOMAS S. GORDON, *Chairman*

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE
COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS,
Washington, D. C., January 8, 1957.

HON. THOMAS S. GORDON, M. C.,
Chairman, Committee on Foreign Affairs,
House of Representatives, Washington, D. C.

DEAR TOM: I hope the report of this Subcommittee on United States Aid Operations in Iran that I sent to you on January 4, 1957, will be useful to you and your committee during deliberations on the pending joint resolution to increase the economic aid in the Middle East during the next 2 fiscal years.

In the last 4 fiscal years total United States aid to the Middle East, meaning Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Egypt, and Turkey, has been just over \$700 million. Obviously, Middle East aid programs of \$200 million each for the next 2 fiscal years, as proposed in the President's message, is a substantial increase over the average of the last 4 years. This increase becomes more pronounced when it is considered that more than half of the \$700 million spent over the past 4 years went to 1 Middle East country—Turkey.

We did not study the aid program in Turkey. We did, as you know, examine the program in Iran and we had access to the General Accounting Office audit reports of the programs in Egypt, Lebanon, and Jordan, as well as Iran. On the basis of all the information available to us, it is evident that the United States agencies were not equipped to administer and the recipient countries in the Middle East were without resources to absorb the aid levels of the past 4 years economically and effectively.

This can only mean that aid programs were fashioned after aid levels had been determined. If it is determined that the policy interests of the United States are best served by tailoring programs to meet allocations then it becomes us to provide in legislation authorizing these amounts such safeguards as are necessary to assure that a dollar's worth of aid is received for each dollar appropriated.

The safeguards I have in mind are embodied in the recommendations of the Iran report. They are designed principally to tighten controls and administration of aid dollars and to require the Department of State and the International Cooperation Administration to provide the Congress with more comprehensive information than they have previously made available. I sincerely wish that you and your committee would consider these recommendations in your consideration of House Joint Resolution 117.

Sincerely,

PORTER HARDY, Jr.,
Chairman.

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
Washington, D. C., Tuesday, January 8, 1957.

Subject: Necessity of building up airlift if we are to be able to fly enough troops to Middle East in real emergency.

HON. THOMAS S. GORDON,
Chairman, House Committee on Foreign Affairs,
Washington, D. C.

DEAR TOM: While I am in favor of the President's so-called Middle East resolution now pending before your committee, I would like to point out that the military section of the resolution would be far more effective as a deterrent to Communist aggression in the Middle East if the administration were to develop, from commercial and military sources, sufficient airlift to fly a minimum of three divisions, including their tanks, artillery, and other equipment, directly from the United States to the Middle East or any other trouble spot in the world—within 24 hours.

At present, however, we are in the dangerous situation of not having enough airlift for even one division including its hardware.

This means, as the December 1956 issue of Fortune magazine pointed out, that it would probably take the Air Force some 30 days to move the combat elements of a full division across the Atlantic.

There would be similar delays in using surface shipping.

If the Middle East resolution before your committee is going to be effective as a deterrent to Communist aggression we must be able to transport our troops from this country to the trouble spot in 24 hours instead of in 30 days. Other-

wise we are going to find that it is ancient history and that the aggression is all over and done with by the time our Armed Forces get there.

As a former member of your Committee on Foreign Affairs and as a member for 3 years on the Appropriations Subcommittee on the Department of Defense, I have made an intensive study of the airlift deficit and can summarize our findings for you.

I do so for the reason that I feel that your committee should ask the administration directly how they expect to transport our Armed Forces to the Middle East in the event of a real emergency such as the administration's proposed resolution contemplates.

The following testimony was given by the Department of the Army at the House appropriations hearings for fiscal 1956, page 648a :

"In reply to your question as to the percentagewise improvement in airlift potential in the last 12 months, the answer is there has been none."

On April 18, 1956, at our hearings on the defense appropriation for 1957, I brought up exactly the situation that the administration is now, 9 months later, recognizing as a potential trouble spot—the Israel-Arab area and the entire Middle East. At these hearings I asked again and again what would happen if we had trouble in the Middle East area and how we would transport our troops with their armament and armor. It was apparent to me that the testimony indicated that there is not enough airlift to move even 1 division, including its hardware, over the ocean in 1 flight to foreign soil.

Corresponding testimony was subsequently developed in the Senate :

"Senator SYMINGTON. General Gavin has just said we are well behind * * *. Based on the figures you have just read, we are planning to stay behind. Is that a fair statement?

"General WHEELER (Maj. Gen. Earl G. Wheeler, Director of Plans, Department of the Army). Sir, it would seem to me that we are going to remain about in the status quo, and it is behind.

"Senator SYMINGTON. You know the definition of status quo that General Knudson had. He said it meant a hell of a fix we are in. Testimony has shown that we are totally inadequate with respect to airlift for the Army. If the figures you have shown are correct we still plan to remain inadequate. Is that a fair statement?

"General WHEELER. There is no program that corrects the situation that I know of" (hearings by Senate Armed Services Subcommittee, 84th Cong., 2d sess., p. 851, May 25, 1956).

Your committee might well want to ask if there has been any improvement in our country's airlift capability since the congressional hearings referred to above.

This is a disgraceful situation which those of us who believe in genuine preparedness must overcome.

If Communist aggression occurs in the Middle East would we want to launch the H-bomb? I think that in all probability, instead of launching an end-all H-bomb, we would want to fly 1, or 2, or 3 divisions of the Army, in 24 hours, right to the trouble spot.

This country has got to have a system of national defense which is in between appeasement on the one hand and the dreadful finality of the H-bomb on the other hand. That is why we need an aerial Army.

I think if you interrogate the Chiefs of Staff you will find that they will be forced to admit that if we had had a genuine airborne army whereby a minimum of 3 divisions, including their tanks and guns, could be transported by air to any part of the world within 24 hours, that Korea would not have occurred and further that the Communists would not have dared to take over the top half of Vietnam.

Similarly, today, I believe providing airlift for at least 3 divisions immediately and 8 divisions ultimately will be the greatest deterrent possible to Communist aggression in the Middle East or any other part of the world.

We, of course, want to cooperate with the U. N. fully in maintaining the peace and we want to be able to provide our full share of an aerial fire brigade capable of putting out brush fires in any part of the world.

The difficulty as I see it at present is that we have equipped ourselves with a force of fire fighters and a police force but we have failed to provide them with the fire engines, motorcycles, and squad cars which they need to get there in a hurry.

Until an adequate airlift is developed through commercial and military means the Middle East resolution proposed by the President will not be fully effective as a deterrent to Communist aggression.

Sincerely yours,

DANIEL J. FLOOD, *Member of Congress.*

Cc: Congressman Thomas E. Morgan of Pennsylvania.

STATEMENT OPPOSING THE EISENHOWER MID-EAST PLAN

To: Senate Foreign Relations and House Foreign Affairs Committees.

From: Hamilton A. Long, 4 West 43d Street, New York City, January 14, 1957.

1. Stop America's "servitude of contradiction."—Unsound programs should not be pursued as a reflex to Kremlin opposition—faked to trap gullible Uncle Sam into doing what benefits Russia; for example, see 2 below.

2. "Aid" to Eurasia benefits Russia militarily.—Such "aid" depletes our limited resources, increases Russia's—able to seize Eurasia at will. Any United States forces there, if war comes, will be caught in a Bataan trap.

3. No Eurasia power-vacuum today.—Russia's power filled the "vacuum" in Eurasia in 1945. The war gave her impregnable power dominance over all Eurasia and vicinity (Britain, Japan, North Africa)—all indefensible against her H-rockets, H-bombs, forces. America is powerless to alter this hideous reality. Talk of "retaliation" from North American bases is irrelevant, even if it could be feasible.

4. Limit policy to fit power's limits.—United States policy, commitments, cannot soundly involve any challenge (foredoomed) of Russia's power in Eurasia, in war. Trapping us into overextension there is a main Kremlin aim.

5. Heed the Hungarians' haunting cry.—"Where are the promised American troops to help us?" cried Budapest rebels in November 1956, misled by our talk of "liberation" aid. America is powerless so to aid, or defend, Eurasian peoples against Russia. Ike's plan would thus victimize Mideast peoples.

6. Interference in other nations' internal affairs violates U. N. Charter and America's traditional principles.—Two wrongs do not make a right. The end does not justify the means. The fact that the brutish, godless, Communist, despots of the Kremlin—also Britain and France, for example—so interfere, is no excuse for America's using this typical tool of imperialism-colonialism, even though by "request" of manipulated regimes of local politicians "bought" with billions, arms. It is as futile in the long-run as it is violative of America's traditional principles.

7. "Aid" to Eurasia and vicinity violates the United States Constitution.—"Aid" to countries there could be justified, if at all, only under the power to tax, for "national defense," but aid to such indefensible countries cannot meet this test. It's not within the limited Federal powers, cannot help our national defense.

8. No blank check for war, or for "aid", to any man.—Ike demands in effect a blank check for war (use of United States forces versus Russia), and for economic "aid," in the Mideast. Yet the Constitution grants to Congress, solely, the power of "the purse" and to put us in war. His demand violates fundamental American traditions, principles; typifies rule-by-man thinking of the military mind; and his "emergency" is completely phony, like Truman's in March 1947 re Truman Doctrine.

9. The unofficial Anglo-United States military alliance is disastrous for America morally, politically, economically, militarily, and should be ended, now.—The secret deal in August 1941 of Churchill-FDR, for Anglo-United States forces to police the postwar world (using any "U. N." as a tool, to this end), was confirmed secretly by Churchill-Truman at Potsdam, July 1945. (Against Russian imperialism, so automatically in support of Britain's.) "The United States is about to take the weight of Russian expansion off British shoulders * * *," said the May 1947 pamphlet: "Cards on the Table" of Britain's Labor Party. re Truman Doctrine moves in Mideast (Turkey, etc.) designed to do exactly that, including protection of oil interests there, despite Acheson-State Department fake denials to a suspicious Senate, March 1947. Now Ike seeks to further this scheme, fulfill those wartime deals, though Mideast oil is Russia's for the taking the first day of war, hence useless to United States defense. (See Senator Malone committee report re Western Hemisphere self-sufficient as to oil, in war). Our relying on that oil, and on "ally" Britain—indefensible against Russia's rockets—delights Russia, traps America. Ike's plan means, in part:

America joins the Baghdad Pact, backs the Churchill-Attlee-Eden-Macmillan program for United States imperialism-by-proxy and carries out the FDR-Truman program regarding Mideast oil.

10. Identification.—I speak as an individual citizen; veteran of both World Wars (major, AF, World War II); lawyer; widely known as a foe of the Kremlin's aims and its Communist conspiracy (see, for example, my privately written study: "Permit Communist-Conspirators To Be Teachers?"—adopted in 1953 by the United States House of Representatives as its own Document 213, and widely used). For more factual background information regarding the foregoing points, see my statements: Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearings May 1949 pp. 1235-1262 re North Atlantic Treaty; House Foreign Affairs Committee hearings March 1948, pp. 2240-2248 re Marshall plan, and June 1953, pp. 994-1013 re Mutual Security Act extension.

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